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Unilateralism is key to maintain alliance coherence – other strategies guarantee unstable alliances

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Unilateralism is key to maintain alliance coherence – other strategies guarantee unstable alliances Selden, 13 – director of the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly AND an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida (ZACHARY, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony,” Security Studies Journal, 08 May 2013, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2013.786918#.U8b7VI1dVe8)//eek Regardless of the degree of formality, states form alliances to improve their security through deterrence. By gathering allies, they increase the re- sources that can be brought to their defense. Alliances, therefore, should be a stabilizing factor in the international system, but they can also lead to destabilizing behavior in which the alliance partners may be tempted to push off the costs of deterring aggressor states to others (buck-passing) or may be drawn into conflicts they could otherwise avoid (chain-ganging). This tendency toward stability or destabilization may be a product of the polarity of the system. In a bipolar system, alliances are relatively firm as there is little chance that an alliance partner would defect to the opposite threatening pole. In a multipolar system, however, alliances may be more fluid as states have a broader range of potential partners and the delineation between friend and enemy may not be as clear.43 Any consideration of alliances or balancing is rooted in balance of power theory, which is the touchstone of realist international relations theory. Under conditions of anarchy where there is no higher authority than the state that can guarantee the sovereignty of the individual states, each state must do what it can to survive. Some states will do better than others in the anarchic environment and the more powerful will seek hegemony as their expanding concept of national interest drives them to acquire still more power to protect their expanded territorial, political, and economic interests. Yet, as one state approaches hegemonic status, other states will tend to form balancing coalitions to protect themselves against the potential threat posed by the aspiring hegemon. In Waltz’s formulation, “balance of power theory leads one to expect that states, if they are free to do so, will flock to the weaker side.”44 The existence of a single predominant power should prompt other states to either expand their military capability to balance against it or band together in a coalition whose collective power will provide sufficient resources to balance against that single power.45 Historically, states balance against the stronger power to protect their fundamental interest of remaining independent, sovereign actors.46 The most important challenge to the idea that states balance against power in and of itself is Stephen Walt’s concept that states in fact balance against threats and not simply against power.47 What is and is not a threat, however, is highly subjective. The intentions of the hegemon, however be- nign, are not terribly relevant because, as Robert Jervis notes, “minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift, new opportuni- ties and dangers can arise.” Therefore, smaller states can be expected to balance against the hegemon’s power rather than a specific threat because, as Christopher Layne stresses, “in a unipolar world, others must worry about the hegemon’s capabilities, not its intentions.”49 Yet, the concept of balance of power needs to be considered in a re- gional as well as a global context; geography is a significant variable that should not be discounted.50 Regional powers, particularly those with demon- strated aggressive attentions, pose a more significant immediate threat to their smaller neighbors than the globally predominant power. In this sit- uation, states concerned about those proximate threats tend to align with the global power as insurance against regional powers. States that are not geographically proximate to the rising regional powers are less concerned about the implications of their increased capabilities and are freer to engage in behavior that runs contrary to the interests of the hegemon. This may ex- plain the pattern in which some western European states engage in behavior that at times aims to counter American goals, while most eastern European states, members of the former Soviet Union, and states in the vicinity of China engage in behavior that forges closer security ties between them and the United States with the express intent of facilitating American military activities in their region. When Russia and China take actions that raise the threat perceptions of their neighbors, the incentives for pulling closer to the United States increase. It is not a coincidence, for example, that Poland final- ized its agreement to host the US third site missile defense system in the wake of the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 when public support in Poland for establishing a closer security relationship with the US soared.51 Directory: rest -> wikis -> openev -> spaces -> 2014 -> pages -> Michigan7 -> attachments attachments -> Middle passage neg Case attachments -> Thorium doesn’t solve – multiple reasons attachments -> Jaden Lessnick " McCarthyism is Americanism with its sleeves rolled. " attachments -> Nepa counterplans 2014 attachments -> Makah Whaling Aff Aff 1ac colonialism attachments -> 1nc The Ex-Im bank charter will be renewed White House and Dems capitalizing on gop fracture Cohen 6/25 attachments -> Incrementalism good /T version attachments -> Military Counterplan Notes attachments -> Psychoanalysis Answers – hjpv tips attachments -> 1ac metaphors Download 169.79 Kb. Share with your friends: