Heg sustainable indict

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Decreases Heg

Multilateralism destroys hegemony – by decreasing the signal of US committal, it incentivizes competition and disincentives burden sharing

Selden, 13 – director of the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly AND an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida (ZACHARY, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony,” Security Studies Journal, 08 May 2013, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2013.786918#.U8b7VI1dVe8)//eek

The purpose of this article is to develop an understanding of why many second-tier states expanded their security cooperation with the United States from 2001–2009 when American foreign policy was internationally unpopular and viewed as highly unilateral, as well as the implications of this trend for the endurance of American hegemony. T. V. Paul and Robert Pape argue that American unilateralism drove second-tier states to frustrate American actions through soft balancing, thus weakening the endurance of US hegemony.1 Yet, William Wohlforth and others counter that second-tier states would continue to align with the United States out of fear of rising regional powers and the desire to avoid running afoul of what is still the most powerful state in the international system.2 Understanding which of these choices—soft balancing against the hege- mon or alignment with the hegemon—is more prevalent among second-tier states has significant ramifications for the endurance of American hegemony. The record of the 2001–2009 period indicates that a wide range of second- tier states not only aligned with the United States, they strengthened their security cooperation in a manner that extended the reach of the US military at a time when American foreign policy was widely seen as unilateral.3 In addi- tion, they did so by incurring certain costs that helped to spread the burden of maintaining the American hegemonic system. This pattern of alignment with the United States has implications for the endurance of American hege- mony because states aligned with the United States may have more at stake in the maintenance of American hegemony than the United States itself. A smaller American naval presence in the Asia Pacific region, for example, may be seen as a relatively minor shift in the United States with some beneficial budgetary savings. In Vietnam, Australia, or the Philippines, however, such a shift could prompt a wholesale reevaluation of national defense policy and have costly implications. Therefore, second-tier states have an incentive to participate in activities that extend the endurance of American hegemony, even if they do not receive a formal security guarantee for their efforts. This may have implications for American foreign policy. There are dis- tinct policy recommendations flowing from the logic of those scholars and policy professionals who argue that a more proactive and unilateral foreign policy speeds the decline of American hegemony. The most important of these is that the United States should practice a policy of self-restraint that defers to international organizations, which would alleviate concerns about the current preponderance of the United States in the international system.4 A policy of self-restraint would signal that the United States is not a threat to other major powers and preclude attempts at balancing. This policy would also help to set a norm for the behavior of future great powers and recog- nize the emerging reality of a multipolar world. Another policy implication from this line of reasoning is that the United States should reduce its global military presence that both encourages balancing behavior by other states and speeds hegemonic decline by draining financial resources.6 Yet, this policy of restraint may be precisely what would cause second- tier states to question the utility of their security relationship with the United States and move away from policies that help to maintain American hege- mony. This could at least partially explain the trend of states moving to es- tablish closer security relationships with the United States in the 2001–2009 period, when it was at its most proactive and least deferential to interna- tional organizations. States may logically conclude that a hegemon willing to project power regardless of international opinion will be likely to use its power in the defense of the hegemony that is in the interest of second-tier states. Second-tier states might be far less willing to contribute to the main- tenance of American hegemony if the United States behaves in a manner that raises doubts as to the durability of its commitments or its willingness to use its power in the international arena. Thus, what would trigger a se- rious decline in the cooperation that helps to sustain American hegemony would be a self-imposed reduction in the ability of the United States to project power and an increased reluctance to use its power in support of its national interests. As Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander note, the United States is threaten- ing to a relatively small number of states.7 Regional powers such as Russia and China, however, present a security challenge to many of the states on their borders. Russia has used its energy resources to pressure Ukraine dur- ing its elections, has repeatedly violated the airspace of the Baltic states, and has taken a range of actions against Georgia.8 In 2007 alone, a cyber attack emanating from Russia temporarily crippled internet connectivity in Estonia, Russia cut off the flow of energy to Lithuania when that country decided to sell its main oil refinery to a Polish rather than Russian company, and Rus- sian aircraft fired missiles into Georgian territory.9 In the summer of 2008, Russia launched an invasion of Georgia that demonstrated its willingness to use military force to resolve issues in its “near abroad.” China as well has sought to expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific region and South Asia. Its military buildup, establishment of military facilities in Burma and islands off the coast of India, and major assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear program are all viewed with varying levels of concern by China’s neighbors. Defense spending is difficult to gauge given the opacity of the Chinese budgeting system, but most estimates show double-digit increases since the early 1990s with an average increase of 16.5 percent annually since 2001.10 A 2006 review of the country’s foreign and defense policy signaled a decision to “make a break with Deng’s cautious axioms and instead, embark on a path of high-profile force projection.”11 Although many scholars of Asian security note the success of China’s “charm offensive” using trade, diplomacy, and other tools of persuasion to bolster its position in the region, there is a debate within the field as to China’s intentions and how other states in the region are reacting.12 These actions push second-tier states to align with the United States and, despite much discussion of the emergence of a multipolar world and the end of American hegemony, the emerging pattern of alignment with the United States means that its hegemony may be far longer-lasting than some assume. This article first proposes an explanation of the expansion of security cooperation with the United States between 2001 and 2009. It then examines the increasingly broad range of alignment with the United States demonstrated by second-tier states in the same period and offers a means to measure alignment. It then examines the changes in the relationship between the United States and three states in the 2001–2009 period that span the range from soft alignment to hard alliance. Lastly, it concludes with a consideration of the implications of this pattern for the future of American hegemony.

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