Elgie, Robert (1998), p. 67. According to others the organ should possibly not have binding power on the acts of the Bank. Antola, Esko (1997), p. 20.
170 Elgie, Robert (1998), p. 67.
171 Mayes, David G. (1998), p. 27.
172 Obradovic, Daniela (1996), p. 194.
173 Gustafsson, Sverker (1999), p. 19.
Brentford, Philip (1998), p. 109. According to Brentford, “it is arguable that a lack of broad public support or the total absence of political involvement in monetary policy would lead to a central bank eventually being overridden.” Idem.
174 Brentford, Philip (1998), p. 109.
175 Gustavsson, Sverker (1999), p. 18.
176 Gustavsson, Sverker (1999), p. 18.
177 Chryssochou, Dimitris N. (1998), p. 47.
178 Majone, Giandomenico (1998), p. 155.
179 MacCormick, Neil (1994-95), p. 296. According to MacCormick, this can be avoided through control of sovereign government and with full and equal participation of all citizens, or at least those who wish to involve themselves.
Louis, Jean-Victor (1990), p. 57. According to Louis, in case of persistent disharmony between the government and the central bank its importance depends greatly on the degree of autonomy granted to the central bank.
180 Ward, Ian (1996), p. 95. Gustavsson argues that even if it has become politically correct to believe that influential politicians actually wish to abolish the democratic deficit it is not necessarily so. Gustavsson, Sverker (1996), p. 123. Governments wish to avoid making the Union democratic. For functionalists, the deficit is a central element of the Union, which becomes problematic only in the area of public opinion. Idem, p. 108. Thus, governments do not wish to empower the European organs with the same legitimacy they enjoy. Therefore the democratic deficit turns into a weapon against the powers of the EU in their hands.
181According to De Búrca, “the reality may be that, despite many years of high-sounding Treaty preambles and general declarations of peace and prosperity, the legitimacy and relevance of the EU is not felt by large sections of the public. Much of the Community law which affects people’s lives seems either trivial or irritating, or important but at such a level of remoteness that there seems little prospect of any influence over the policy and little understanding of why it ought to be decided at a European rather than at any other level.” De Búrca, Gráinne (1996), p. 374-375.