Arndt, Hubertus (1998), p. 218. See also Scheinin, Martin (1997b), p. 181.
156 Scheinin, Martin (1998), p. 30. According to Scheinin the independence of the central bank would undoubtedly be compromised in case the Governor of a NCB could at any time be given a vote of non-confidence.
157 Idem., p. 31. Gros points out that the reporting obligation can still be useful for parliamentarians in helping develop understanding of the policies of the central bank. Gros, Daniel (1998), p. 359. Greater powers to the European Parliament with regard to the ECB, through a regular report by the ECB president and a formal veto power over the ECB leaders and this way a transformation in the distribution of power in the EU system of multi-level governance signifies, however, according to Snyder, increased legitimation without increased democratisation. Snyder, Francis (1999), p. 466.