Scheinin, Martin (1998), p. 23. It has even been stated that the ECB represents a great deal of the EU’s democratic deficit.
129 Brentford, Philip (1998), p. 110.
130 Scheinin, Martin, (1998) p. 21.
131 Idem. According to Scheinin, the situation of the ECB is corollary of the more general constitutional problem or defect in the constitutional structure of the EU. Hence, law making in the EU is not based on direct or first-degree-indirect participation of the people. Idem.
132 Laffan, Brigid (1997), p. 51.
133 Arndt, Hubertus (1996), p. 226-227.
134 Art. 112(2)b and Art. 11(2) of the Statute. The members shall be appointed from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters by common accord of the governments of the Member States on a recommendation from the Council, after it has consulted the European Parliament, and the Governing Council of the ECB. The Statute includes specific provisions for the initial appointment of the Executive Board, namely that the President is appointed for 8 years, the Vice-President for 4 years and the other members for terms of office of between 5 and 8 years. None of these are renewable (Art. 50).
135 Art. 11.4 of the Statute. This is initiated by an application by the Governing Council or the Executive Board.