Obradovic, Daniela (1996), p. 198-199. According to Brentford, effectiveness may justify the creation of the Bank on the output side of democracy. Still, the deficiencies on the input side and the absence of a subjective constitution should not be overlooked. Brentford, Philip (1998), p. 110.
42 A wide interpretation of the most central Human Rights conventions, especially the European, considering it to be the most relevant in this context, can contribute to the discussion on the ECB and fundamental rights. According to the ECHR Art. 13 “everyone whose rights and freedoms are set forth in the Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that he violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity”. According to Art. 8(1) everyone has “the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” and according to Art. 6 is also “entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”.
According to Art. 1 of the first Additional Protocol to the same Convention “every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. (…) The proceeding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
43 Concerning macroeconomic statistics is it reasonable to assume that ECB will mainly make use of the statistical information the national central banks collect. According to Art. 285 (2) EC the production of Community statistics shall not entail excessive burdens on economic operators. It is, however, the ECB who decides what makes an excessive burden.