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work at Clark University (MA, 1919), then to

Frankfurt School Frazier, E. Franklin (1894–1962)

215

further study at the New York School of Social



Work (1920–1) and the University of Copenhagen

(1921–2). Frazier then taught at Morehouse College,

Atlanta University, and the Atlanta School

of Social Work. He was forced to flee Atlanta

when white racists were provoked by his 1927

essay “The Pathology of Race Prejudice.” He

then pursued doctoral studies in sociology at the

University of Chicago (PhD, 1931).

After teaching at Fisk University (1929–34),

Frazier began his long tenure in sociology at

Howard University, from which he retired in

1959. An academic at heart, Franklin always put

his learning to use in public service and race

politics. CHARLES LEMERT

Freud, Sigmund (1856–1939)

The founder of psychoanalysis, Freud was born in

Freiberg, a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

A studious child, he undertook medical training

in 1881, and subsequently pursued his clinical

interest in hysteria with a colleague, Josef Breuer

(1842–1925). Studies in Hysteria (1895 [trans. 1957]),

the book that emerged from the researches of

Freud and Breuer, developed a path-breaking

theory, one that underscored the central role of

sexual memories in the formation of mental disturbance.

The work laid a skeletal structure for

the theoretical development of psychoanalysis,

which emerged in 1900 with the publication of

Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams (1900 [trans.

1958]).


Therapeutically, Freudian psychoanalysis is

perhaps best known as the “talking cure” – a

slogan used to describe the magical power of language

to relieve mental suffering. Theoretically,

psychoanalysis is rooted in a set of dynamic

models relating to the human subject’s articulations

of desire. Freud’s originality is to be found

in his analysis of the unconscious as repressed. In

his celebrated essay “The Unconscious” (1914) in

The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund

Freud, vol. XIV, he argued that the individual’s selfunderstanding

is not immediately available to

itself, that the human subject is itself split, torn

between consciousness of self and repressed

desire. In discussing human subjectivity, Freud

divides the psyche into the unconscious, preconscious,

and conscious. The preconscious can be

thought of as a vast storehouse of memories,

most of which may be recalled at will. In contrast,

unconscious memories and desires are cut off, or

buried, from consciousness.

We become the identities we are, in Freud’s view,

because we have inside us buried identifications

with people we have previously loved (and also

hated), most usually our parents – and particularly

the mother. The breakup of our primary

emotional tie to the maternal body is, for Freud,

the founding moment not only of individuation

and differentiation, but also of sexual and gender

difference. Loss and gender affinity are directly

linked in Freud’s theory to the Oedipus complex,

the psyche’s entry into received social meanings.

For Freud, the Oedipus complex is the nodal point

of sexual development, the symbolic internalization

of a lost, tabooed object of desire. In the

act of internalizing the loss of the pre-Oedipal

mother, the infant’s relationship with the father

(or, more accurately, symbolic representations of

paternal power) becomes crucial for the consolidation

of both selfhood and gender identity.

Freud’s writings show the ego not to be master

in its own home. The unconscious, repression,

libido, narcissism: these are the core dimensions

of Freud’s psychoanalytic dislocation of the subject.

Freud’s dislocation of the subject reemerges

in various guises in contemporary sociological

theory. In the critical theory of the Frankfurt

School, it is part of an attempt to rethink the

powerlessness of identity in the face of the objectifying

aspects of contemporary science, technology,

and bureaucracy. For Ju¨rgen Habermas, it is a

series of claims about the nature of distorted

intersubjective and public communication as a

means of theorizing repressive ideologies. For

Jacques Lacan, it is a means for tracing imaginary

constructions of self-concealment, as linked to

the idea that language is what founds the

repressed unconscious. ANTHONY EL L IOTT

friendship

This concept played an important role in ancient

philosophy, where the virtues of loyalty and trust

were seen to be pre-eminently displayed in relations

between friends. Friendship designated a

social relation that is neither instrumental nor

selfish. In contemporary philosophy, there has

been a renewed interest in the ethical nature

of friendship, for example in L. Blum, Friendship,

Altruism and Morality (1980).

In The Care of the Self (1984 [trans. 1986]), Michel

Foucault examined the Roman conception of

friendship between a man and a woman, and between

men and boys. In this classical conception,

a manly affection for a young boy could

exist through life, and was not subject to the

vagaries of aging. In Homeric Greek, according to

E. Beneviste in Indo-European Language and Society

(1969 [trans. 1973]), philos (friend) was closely

Freud, Sigmund (1856–1939) friendship

216

connected with aidos (reverence or respect), indicating



that a bond of friendship was defined

by a strong sense of obligation. There was also

an obligation of friendship towards a “gueststranger”

(xenos). Although in contemporary society,

friendship implies an intimate, close, and

private, but not sexual, relationship, in Greek

society the word philia covered a range of relationships,

including passionate and erotic ones. Aristotle

distinguished between friends of utility,

pleasure, and virtue, and, in the latter, friendship

involved the whole person. In the Nichomachean

Ethics, Aristotle claimed that friendship as a universal

emotion forms the basis of the polis. Plato

also saw friendship as the basis of harmony and

consensus, and hence necessary to politics. Although

friendship can therefore be treated as

quintessentially ethical, political philosophy has

been primarily interested in the relationship between

friendship and government. In Redeeming

American Political Thought, J. N. Shklar, in the chapter

on “A Friendship” (1998), discussed the complex

relations between politics and friendship,

noting that there are obvious tensions between

loyalty to a friend and to government.

With some important exceptions, such as Ray

Pahl’s On Friendship (2000), the topic has been

somewhat neglected in sociology. When friendship

is analyzed by sociologists, it is typically in

the context of the study of privacy and intimacy.

For example, Barrington Moore, in his study of

Privacy (1984), examined the ambiguities of friendship

in classical society. Aspects of friendship

have also been analyzed in exchange theory, in,

for example, George Homans’s Social Behavior: Its

Elementary Forms (1961) and Peter M. Blau’s Exchange

and Power in Social Life (1964). In the perspective

of exchange theory, people make and

keep friends because they are useful or rewarding.

These theories implicitly accepted Aristotle’s definition

of friendships of utility, thereby admitting

that by the 1960s friendship had become a commodity.

The corrosion of friendship in modern

society is an implicit topic of recent research on

emotions. In a consumer society, where emotional

work (for example of air-hostesses) involves

the production of fleeting intimacy for cash,

friendliness is commercialized. For example, in

Postemotional Society (1997), S. Mestrovic argues

that synthetic, quasi-emotions become the basis

for manipulation in public life. The commercialization

of friendship represents a form of

alienation.

In summary, friendship has been important in

philosophy but not in sociology. This neglect is

curious given the fact that sociology is literally

the study (logos) of companionship or friendship

(socius), pointing once more to the notion that

friendship is the ultimate root of both the polity

and the community. In Latin, the idea of civis is

best translated as “fellow-citizen” or companion.

BRYAN S. TURNER

Fromm, Erich (1900–1980)

A psychoanalyst and philosopher, Fromm was

for a time associated with the Frankfurt School,

though they split acrimoniously in the early

1940s. Fromm developed a theory of the cultural

roots of personality, organized around the ideas

of freedom and autonomy. The scope of freedom

in human societies emerges historically and

appears most strongly with modern individualism,

but living with freedom is difficult and people

seek means of escape in ways that are set during

socialization. These include, first, authoritarianism,

of which the most extreme forms are masochism

and sadism, although milder versions are

widespread. Second, destructiveness, which can

be outwardly directed through brutality or inwardly

directed in, for example, drug addiction,

alcoholism, and passive entertainment. Third,

automaton conformity escapes from freedom

through submission to social hierarchies or by

following the dictates of mass cultural forms

of fashion and style. This is the dominant form

of personality in modern society. In these strategies

for escaping freedom, people become alienated

from themselves. Finally, there is potentially

the productive and loving personality type in

which freedom is accepted – this would be developed

in a humanistic socialist society. In later

work Fromm brought together psychoanalytical

insight and evidence from physical anthropology

to develop the concept of a “necrophilous personality”

(such as Adolf Hitler [1889–1945] and

Joseph Stalin [1879–1953]), passionate to transform

life into death. Major works include Escape

from Freedom (1941), Man for Himself (1947), The Art of

Loving (1956), The Sane Society (1955), and Anatomy

of Human Destructiveness (1973). LARRY RAY

functional theory of stratification

At the heart of the functional theory of stratification

is the argument that structured social inequality,

that is the differential allocation of

social rewards and facilities, enhances social efficacy

and social integration. This is both its (seldom

realized) “social purpose” and “social cause”;

stratification, in turn, has become universal

because it engenders “evolutionary advantage.”

friendship functional theory of stratification

217

We owe the classical formulation of allocative



functionalism to Kingsley Davis and Wilbert

Moore. In “Some Principles of Stratification,” in

the American Sociological Review (1945), they argued

that in all complex societies the functional importance

of social positions and social roles vary.

Some positions are more strategically important

than others, and they require special and rare

talents and skills. Because such talents and skills

are scarce, and because they typically require long

and costly training, there have to be incentives

for their display and cultivation. Differential rewards

inherent in stratification systems provide

such incentives for cultivating knowledge, skills,

and talents. Similarly, the optimal allocation of

the best candidates to the most important jobs

and continuous motivation of incumbents to

perform well require differential rewards. Societies

that fail to develop such a system of functional

stratification lose efficacy, and they are in

a position of disadvantage in developmental

competition.

Thus there are a number of preconditions of

socially functional stratification – and a number

of criticisms directed at functional arguments:

(1) The reward structure has to reflect accurately

the social consensus as to which roles and

positions are more, and which less, strategically

important. Critics point out that this

assumption is unrealistic.

(2) Rewards should effectively attract the best

incumbents and motivate them in their performance.

According to critics, incompetent

elites prove that this condition is seldom met.

(3) The recruitment process has to be open and

merit-based. In functionally stratified systems

there is no place for inheritance, ascription,

and closure. This claim produced the most

serious bone of contention between functionalists

and their critics. While Davis and Moore

recognized that inheritance and ascription

persist, and it weakens the functionality of

stratification, they nevertheless disagreed

with those critics who argued that functional

theory was unrealistic. The critics also question

the functionalist explanation of the universality

of stratification. Since functional

principles are similar in most societies, one

would expect to find similarities in stratification

systems, at least among contemporary

societies at a similar level of development.

Yet one of the striking features of modern

societies has been a broad diversity of social

hierarchies – a fact that contradicts allocative

functionalism.

These criticisms resulted in a gradual eclipse of

allocative functionalism. In the 1960s–1970s a

more sophisticated Parsonian version of integrative

functionalism gained a currency among

sociologists. Talcott Parsons suggested that functionality

of stratification systems consisted in

strengthening social integration around core

values. Differential rewards, according to Parsons,

contribute to such integration by rewarding

commitments to central societal values. Stratification

also contributes to effective value socialization,

because it increases the transparency of the

core value standards according to which social

rewards are allocated. Thus the system of structured

inequalities strengthens value integration

and aids value socialization. J AN PAKUL SKI

functionalism

Functionalists argue that society should be understood

as a system of interdependent parts. The

different parts of social life depend on each other

and fulfill functions contributing to social order

and its reproduction.

Functionalism can be traced to E´mile Durkheim

and Herbert Spencer. The anthropologists Bronislaw

Malinowski and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1881–

1955) drew on Durkheim to develop a distinctive

form of functionalist anthropology in the early

twentieth century. Functionalism came to prominence

as a school of sociology in the United

States in the 1950s. It was associated with Talcott

Parsons and Robert Merton, although they differed

in approach. From the 1960s, functionalism

was subjected to major criticism and few sociologists

defended it until the 1980s when Jeffrey

Alexander identified a convergence with functionalism

by erstwhile critics such as Ju¨rgen Habermas,

Anthony Giddens, and Margaret Archer.

Functionalism departs from the traditional

logic of causal argument where a cause should

precede its consequences. Functionalists identify

a causal loop or feedback linking cause and effect.

When an anthropologist asks “why do the Hopi

dance for rain?” a functionalist considers the consequence

of the dance and notes that it maintains

group solidarity. The functionalist concludes

that if the rain dance did not have this positive

function it would not be reproduced.

Functionalists are aware of illegitimate teleology,

arguing that the explanation of the origins

of a practice should be distinguished from that of

its reproduction. Radcliffe-Brown distinguished

sharply between diachronic and synchronic analysis,

between the analysis of change in a system

and the analysis of the interaction among parts

functional theory of stratification functionalism

218


of a system at a moment in time. The latter was

the proper domain of functional analysis.

Malinowski argued that all societies have to

meet some universal and interconnected requirements

– as well as group solidarity, economic

subsistence, social control, sexual reproduction,

socialization and education of new generations,

and the management of sickness and death –

and that these can form the basis for comparison.

Parsons was influenced by Malinowski, but

believed his identification of functions to be ad

hoc, arguing that functions must be theoretically

specified in a general framework.

For Parsons, there are four different interconnected

systems bearing upon human action: the

human organism, the individual personality, the

social system, and the cultural system. The behavioral

organism is concerned with the human body

as the primary vehicle for engaging the physical

environment; that of personality corresponds to

the individual actor viewed as a system. It includes

conscious and unconscious motivations (or need

dispositions). Actors respond not only to positive

rewards, but also to internalized feelings of guilt,

anxiety, and the need for approval. The social

system is a system of positions and roles organized

by expectations and maintained by sanctions;

the culture system refers to the symobls and

meanings that are drawn upon by actors in the

pursuit of their personal projects.

Parsons’s primary focus is the social system.

He proposed four functional imperatives necessary

to its constitution and operation (the A-G-I-L

scheme). Adaptation is concerned with relationships

to external environments and the utilization

of resources in the pursuit of goals. Goal attainment

is concerned with the direction of systems towards

collective goals. Integration refers to the

maintenance of coordinated relationships among

the parts of the system, while latency, or patternmaintenance,

describes the symbolic order in

terms of mutually reinforcing meanings and

typifications.

The A-G-I-L scheme also allows the classification

of societies in terms of the level of structural

differentiation or institutional specialization

around functions – for example, the extent to

which political institutions are separated from

economic institutions, or economic institutions

separated from the household. The idea of the

“superiority” of higher over lower stages of developmental

complexity carries the implication

of evolutionary change, where better-adapted

forms are realized out of the deficiencies of

“lesser” forms. Modernity – more substantively,

the United States, which Parsons called the new

“lead” society – is the culminating stage of development.

This seemed to critics to be an extreme

form of teleology, one that revealed an ideological

bias inherent in a scheme that Parsons had presented

as the “indispensable logical framework

in which we describe and think about the phenomena

of action” (The Structure of Social Action,

1937: 733).

While Parsons regarded functionalism as part

of a unified general theory, Merton saw it as

an adjunct to the development of empirically

grounded theories of the middle range. His argument,

originally in 1949 in “Manifest and Latent

Functions” and reprinted in Social Theory and Social

Structure (1968), was taken to be a veiled criticism

of Parsons, especially the latter’s emphasis on integration.

Merton identified three unsatisfactory

postulates of functionalism: the functional unity (or

integration) of a society, universal functionalism,

and indispensability.

According to Merton, it may be that some nonliterate

societies show a high degree of integration,

but it is illegitimate to assume this would

pertain to all societies. It is also possible that what

is functional for society, considered as a whole,

does not prove functional for individuals or for

some groups within the society, and vice versa.

This suggests that, alongside the concept of

function, it is necessary to have a concept of

dysfunction – that is, where the consequences

of an item are negative for some individuals or

groups. For Merton, persisting forms have a net

balance of functional consequences, either for

society considered as a whole or for sub-groups.

Finally, it is necessary to distinguish between

functional prerequisites – preconditions functionally

necessary for a society – and the social forms

that fulfill those prerequisites. While the former

are indispensable, it is not required that particular

forms meet those functions. There are always

alternative ways of meeting any particular function.

Each of Merton’s qualifications was designed

to transform the postulates into variables.

As a form of methodological holism, functionalism

was criticized by methodological individualists,

such as George Caspar Homans or Peter M.

Blau, working within the exchange-theory perspective.

Functionalism was also criticized by conflict

theorists such as John Rex and Ralph

Dahrendorf, for its neglect of power, though the

criticism was more aptly applied to Parsons and

his definition of functions in terms of the generalized

collectivity. Merton’s more empirical approach

had asked “functional for whom?” David

functionalism functionalism

219


Lockwood sought to reformulate functionalism

in order to allow a concept of system contradiction.

Alvin Gouldner argued that functionalism

was an ideological expression of welfare

capitalism. JOHN HOLMWOOD

fundamentalism

Combining both political and religious radicalism,

fundamentalism constitutes a distinct, specific,

modern social movement and ideology,

promulgating adherence to a strict and intense




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