Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

XO Solvency: Control Deployments

Download 179.2 Kb.
Size179.2 Kb.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   12

XO Solvency: Control Deployments

Presidents can withdrawal troops with XO—they are used to manipulate military deployments empirically

Cooper 2 (Phillip, Prof of Public Administration @ Portland State, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action)

Among the standard executive orders issued by each administration is a variety of actions concerning military personnel, including adjustments of rates of pay and allowances for the uniformed services83 and amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martia1.84 Particularly during periods of heightened national security activity, orders are regularly used to transfer responsibility, people, or resources from one part of the government to the military or the reverse. Many orders have been used to manage public lands, but it is often not recognized that frequently the lands are parts of military reservations or sites. In fact many of the orders issued by presidents in times of war or national emergency are very focused actions of this sort. Even in peacetime there are manifold organizational issues too detailed for statutes but that require action beyond the Department of Defense. President Clinton's order of succession of officers to act as secretary of the army is a typical example

XO Solvency: Rules of Engagement

The president can control rules of engagement with executive orders

Cooper 2 (Phillip, Prof of Public Administration @ Portland State, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action)

Notwithstanding Panama, Grenada, and Iraq, full-scale military attacks are the exception rather than the rule. However, there are other contexts in which combat is waged, often on a limited scale or where troops are placed in positions in which the likelihood of hostilities is high. In such situations, the White House has often sought, in the contemporary period, to be directly involved with the management of those forces because of the political volatility of the situation. One of the more common ways in which this has been done using NSDs is by the issuance of rules of engagement. Though many people have heard debates in the media over whether the rules of engagement were sufficiently robust to protect American forces or were too loose, permitting politically unintended clashes, few have actually seen such orders. President Reagan issued these rules of engagement to U.S. forces in Lebanon in early 1984: The Rules of Engagement (ROE) governing the defense of the official American presence in Lebanon will remain in effect. Specifically, U.S. Naval and tactical air power will be employed to destroy sources of hostile fire directed at the American Embassy compound, the Ambassador's residence and other U.S. personnel or facilities in Lebanon. As in previous practice, fire will be returned at organizationally associated targets if response to the source of fire is precluded. In view of the sudden and proximate threat to the Ambassador's residence which would be posed by a breakthrough at Suk al Gharb, the ROE for support to the LAF at that point is reaffirmed. To permit effective and timely responses to hostile fire in the situations described above, the Secretary of Defense will ensure that adequate technical means are available so as to determine the source of hostile fire directed at American personnel in greater Beirut.102 The establishment of rules of engagement can also be important in instances where the U.S. assigns military advisers or trainers, as in the Bush administration's Andean Initiative in 1989 intended to help address threats from the Sender° Luminoso (Shining Path) rebels and to suppress the drug trade.103 The continuing debates over such issues has expanded as the United States has become increasingly involved in what are called peacekeeping forces but that are often actually peacemaking forces. There have been many debates over a range of issues, from mission to command and control to preparation for possible hostilities, that have been high visibility issues in the years since the attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon, exacerbated by the debacle in Somalia. In response to the Somalia experience, the Clinton administration issued PDD 25 in May 1994:

XO Solvency: Intelligence Gathering

The president can issue an executive order to control intelligence operations abroad

Cooper 2 (Phillip, Prof of Public Administration @ Portland State, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action)

Beyond the obvious realities of its operations, the well-established cultures of organizations from the Department of State through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) present special challenges for the chief executive. The flexibility and relative simplicity of the executive order make it a useful tool that can target the special problems of particular postings abroad. This category also includes management of intelligence agencies. While control of the operations of these organizations is also handled through national security directives, the executive order provides a more or less public way to provide information On the structure, operation, and governance of intelligence agencies. This was a particular theme during the Carter administration in the post-Vietnam period.86 Yet even the Carter approach did not always mean the imposition of new restrictions on the agencies. Thus, he issued E.O. 12139, setting forth the authority of a range of officials to approve foreign intelligence electronic surveillance.87

Executive Orders and Presidential Powers key to U.S. intelligence

Mayer 01 (Kenneth, Proff. Of Polt. Science Univ. of Wisconsin, Princeton Univ., “With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power”, p. 163, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/103282967?title=With%20the%20Stroke%20of%20a%20Pen%3a%20Executive%20Orders%20and%20Presidential%20Power) CBC

Executive orders proved useful as the primary means of controlling intelligence, for two reasons. The first was the close proximity of intelligence to core executive powers. The second was that most presidential decisions about the way the intelligence community should operate involved the coordination of intelligence functions across departments. As such, executive orders, a recognized tool of administrative organization and procedural change, were a natural source of authority. The intelligence function already existed within various agencies, and because of the wartime environment in which it initially expanded, Congress was in no position to object. Postwar presidents used executive orders to move the authority from one organization to another. After 1945, the World War II emergency that had played such an important role in congressional deference on security issues was replaced by the cold war, which rendered Congress similarly unwilling to challenge presidential ascendancy. Here, too, presidential authority was less open to question, and once the precedent of executive control was firmly established it was that much harder for Congress to assert its own powers to control the organizations that emerged. Finally, the secrecy of the organizations and powers subverted congressional control. Since Congress cannot oversee activities about which it knows nothing, presidents have successfully used their ability to control information dissemination to avoid before-the-fact congressional participation in sensitive intelligence operations. Intelligence coordination thus stood at the intersection of individual presidential powers, with the combination proving a potent instrument of executive autonomy.
President can control intelligence agencies

Mayer 01 (Kenneth, Proff. Of Polt. Science Univ. of Wisconsin, Princeton Univ., “With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power”, p. 170, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/103282967?title=With%20the%20Stroke%20of%20a%20Pen%3a%20Executive%20Orders%20and%20Presidential%20Power) CBC

Presidents have consistently opposed congressional restrictions on their ability to conduct intelligence functions, an opposition based more on broad separation of powers issues and a desire to maintain control rather than on the substance of any proposed legislation. Presidents have repeatedly and successfully preempted congressional efforts to impose a formal statutory framework on the intelligence agencies, and most of the legislation ultimately enacted has represented, at best, marginal reforms. Even when Congress has passed legislation, presidents have responded by using their organizational flexibility to outmaneuver congressional attempts to control—or even look into—intelligence activities.

Download 179.2 Kb.

Share with your friends:
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   12

The database is protected by copyright ©essaydocs.org 2023
send message

    Main page