Rosen 98 [Colonel Richard, Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army, “Funding "Non-Traditional" Military Operations: The Alluring Myth Of A Presidential Power Of The Purse” Military Law Review 155 Mil. L. Rev. 1, Lexis]
Finally, if a situation is sufficiently grave and an operation is essential to national security, the President has the raw, physical power--but not the legal authority--to spend public funds without congressional approval, after which he or she can either seek congressional approbation or attempt to weather the resulting political storm. To the President's immediate advantage is the fact that the only sure means of directly stopping such unconstitutional conduct is impeachment. 703 Congress could, however, [*149] certainly make a President's life miserable through other means, such as denying requested legislation or appropriations, delaying confirmation of presidential appointments, and conducting public investigations into the President's actions.
IBC destroys leadership
Winik ‘91 [Jay, Senior Research Fellow, Nat’l Defense U, Washington Quarterly, Autumn, Lexis]
Thus, it is demonstrably clear that, in the absence of bipartisanship, dealing with the new international system will be difficult at best and at times next to impossible. Friends and foes alike, watching U.S. indecision at home, will not see the United States as a credible negotiating partner, ally, or deterrent against wanton aggression. This is a recipe for increased chaos, anarchy, and strife on the world scene. The appeal, then, to recreate anew as the hallmark of U.S. efforts abroad the predictability and resolve that can only come from bipartisanship at home is as critical as during the perilous days following World War II. Bipartisanship in Context The ease of constructing bipartisanship, however, should not be overstated. Its halcyon years are often idealized. People forget that the golden years from Pearl Harbor to the Tet offensive were the exception rather than the rule. Consensus was not a prevailing characteristic in the first 170 years of the Republic. Critics have noted with justification that it was the clear lack of purpose regarding vigorous U.S. involvement in world affairs that led to the U.S. rejection of membership in the League of Nations. In no small measure, this rejection led to the 20-year crisis that resulted in the rise of Hitler. Proponents of bipartisanship point out its crowning achievements. Unprecedented unity between the two political parties made it possible for President Harry S. Truman and a Republican senator, Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-Mich.), to join forces and create such monumental achievements as the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the North Atlantic Alliance, and the United Nations Charter. Despite strains between the two parties over the Korean War and China, to name but two issues, that unity held firm and enabled United States to act with continuity and consistency. Allies saw that the United States was strong and reliable, and the unmistakable message to adversaries was that the United States would abide by its commitments. Some argue that it was the foreign policy consensus prevalent during the Cold War that made possible the tragic U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. But this argument in no way invalidates the benefits of bipartisanship and, in the case of Vietnam, represents an oversimplification of the facts. The failure of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia had as much to do with the unique circumstances of the war itself, which were exacerbated by the then current theories of limited war fighting. These factors, in conjunction with the profound domestic turmoil on both domestic and foreign policy that was tearing at the U.S. political fabric, made a complicated and protracted war abroad virtually impossible to prosecute. More generally, the fact remains that the perception of strength resting on bipartisan unity has been crucial to the United States in times of crisis. This principle was most vividly displayed by the bipartisan support for President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis. Had the Soviets felt the United States was divided, the situation might have ended in tragic defeat or quite possibly in a devastating war. Although history will be the final judge, it could be argued that in the recent Gulf crisis it was precisely the vast chasm that separated the Republicans from the Democrats over whether to use force or to employ sanctions in order to reverse Saddam Hussein's aggression that led him to calculate that the United States would never actually employ significant military power. This encouraged him to ignore the resolutions passed by the United Nations (UN) and wait for the United States to seek a watered-down diplomatic compromise. Certainly Hussein's statements that the American people would have to "face rows of coffins' if there were a war, echoing statements emanating from lengthy Senate hearings and floor debate, were designed to play into the antiwar sentiment that wanted to "give sanctions a chance." Tragically, the perception of division and weakness at home made the necessity for a military solution almost inevitable. Executive-Legislative Relations: The Search for Balance The foundation of sustainable bipartisanship is effective executive-legislative relations. After the Vietnam War, however, the cold war foreign policy consensus, supported by harmonious executive-legislative relations and by both parties in Congress in a manner that minimized conflict over foreign affairs, was rudely shattered. Although it was not completely undone, as is often claimed by the pundits, and central elements of the postwar consensus enjoyed a fair deree of support, it was severely frayed. As a result, a slide began down a slippery slope leading to the balkanization of the U.S. approach to national security, and today this threatens to inject chaos into the foreign policy process. Congress lies at the heart of the issue.
Global nuclear war Khalilzad ‘95 (Zalmay, RAND Corporation, Losing The Moment? Washington Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2, p. 84)
Global Leadership Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
Affirmative Answers: Politics links to the CP
Politics links to the CP—Congress backlashes against XO’s
Mayer 01 (Kenneth, Proff. Of Polt. Science Univ. of Wisconsin, Princeton Univ., “With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power”, p. 121, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/103282967?title=With%20the%20Stroke%20of%20a%20Pen%3a%20Executive%20Orders%20and%20Presidential%20Power) CBC
In 1954 Richard Neustadt described the expansion of central clearance this way: “For more than thirty years now, central clearance has persisted, its history marked by a long series of ‘accidental,’ unforeseen accretions. Nothing once absorbed has been wholly displaced; each new element somehow encompasses the old … overall, here is a record of great growth, successful adaptation—this under six successive Presidents, through every variation in national and governmental circumstance since Harding's term of office.” 57The presidential budget and growth of BoB power illustrates the pattern: societal and political pressures serve as the impetus for a new government capability; Congress and the president compete over the question of control; the president prevails and uses the new capability in unanticipated ways to develop even more power, and Congress can do little to stop him. Over time, the new powers—once so controversial—become institutionalized as a routine and accepted part of the presidency. Thepattern has played out in a number of situations, across presidents and eras, and has less to do with specific presidential initiative than the motivations and incentives, relative positions, and inherent institutional qualities of Congress and the presidency.
Affirmative Answers: Take years
Executive Orders can take years to happen
Mayer 01 (Kenneth, Proff. Of Polt. Science Univ. of Wisconsin, Princeton Univ., “With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power”, p. 61, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/103282967?title=With%20the%20Stroke%20of%20a%20Pen%3a%20Executive%20Orders%20and%20Presidential%20Power) CBC
In contemporary practice, executive orders typically either originate from the advisory structures within the Executive Office of the President or percolate up from executive agencies desirous of presidential action. For particularly complex or far-reaching orders, the White House will solicit comment and suggestions from affected agencies on wording and substantive content. Simple executive orders navigate this process in a few weeks; complex orders can take years, and can even be derailed over an inability to obtain the necessary consensus or clearances.
Affirmative Answers: Congress Checks
Limits to XO are inevitable Congress checks the President from becoming to powerful
Mayer 01 (Kenneth, Proff. Of Polt. Science Univ. of Wisconsin, Princeton Univ., “With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power”, p. 222-223, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/103282967?title=With%20the%20Stroke%20of%20a%20Pen%3a%20Executive%20Orders%20and%20Presidential%20Power) CBC
The ultimate check on executive energy is—and should be—political. Congress can step in to reclaim the ground it has lost to the executive, and its failure to do so is much more a function of political will than of any flaws in constitutional arrangements. If, say, the 105th Congress had successfully overturned the affirmative action requirements in Executive Order 11246, the ban on assassinations included in the intelligence orders, or the secrecy regulations in Executive Order 12356, its success would not be viewed as a destruction of constitutional foundations (although, to be sure, there would be vigorous debate about the merits). More important, a president would be hard pressed to defy such a legislative statement, although we might expect chief executives to exploit any residual discretion that Congress left them. When presidents have ignored statutory limits on their power, as exemplified by the ineffective 1973 War Powers Resolution, they are often able to do so because Congress has either left them with more than enough residual decision space (or, to use a less technical term, “wriggle room”) to permit broad discretion or has passed legislation with poorly worded or ineffective restrictions. The history of executive-legislative relations strongly suggests that overreaching by one branch often leads to a clear response from the other. Fisher notes: “At some point, after passing beyond a threshold of common sense and prudence, aggressive actions become counterproductive. They trigger revolts, leading to the recapture of ground taken not only in the most recent assault but in earlier offenses as well.” 11The boundaries of executive power might be ambiguous, but they are not invisible. The importance of the legal construction of the executive has not been matched by a commensurate level of attention, at least among political scientists, to the empirical, historical, or normative aspects of the question of just how much executive power is enough.
Executive Orders bad-hurt democracy and undermine the constitution
Mayer 01 (Kenneth, Proff. Of Polt. Science Univ. of Wisconsin, Princeton Univ., “With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power”, p. 9, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/103282967?title=With%20the%20Stroke%20of%20a%20Pen%3a%20Executive%20Orders%20and%20Presidential%20Power) CBC
Although the rate at which Clinton issued executive orders dropped after the Republicans won congressional majorities in 1994, critics still accused him of using the prerogative power to turn the presidency into a dictatorship. One review of Clinton's use of executive orders concluded that the president had relied on his decree authority to “act dictatorially without benefit of constitutional color.”39In his 1997 State of the Union Address Clinton announced his “American Heritage Rivers” initiative, in which federal agency officials would help communities find and apply for environmental grants (the program's details were fleshed out in a series of proposed rules, culminating in Executive Order 13061, issued in September 1997). 40The program did not commit any funds, create new environmental regulations, change any laws, or impose any requirements at all on local governments or the private sector. 41Still, conservative property-rights groups claimed it was “a massive conspiracy to extend federal, and perhaps foreign, control over the nation's 3.5 million miles of rivers and streams, over watersheds, even over private riverfront property.” 42Representative Helen Chenoweth (R-Idaho) denounced the initiative as a “flight from democracy,” and attempted (unsuccessfully, so far) to stop the program both legislatively and through the courts. 43During 1995 Senate hearings held in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, John Trochman, head of the Militia of Montana, complained that “the high office of the Presidency has been turned into a position of dictatorial oppression through the abusive use of Executive orders and directives, thus leaving Congress stripped of its authority.When the President overrules Congress by Executive order, representative democracy fails.” Despite the apparent importance of executive orders, the political science literature has paid scant attention to them. This position is especially clear within the subfield of presidency studies, which has been dominated by a research paradigm that emphasizes the president's leadership skills and strategic acumen, not the legal basis of presidential power, as the keys to political success.
Presidential powers bad-they hurt democracy and undermine the political system
Branum 2 (Tara, Editor in Chief Texas Review of Law and Politics, Texas Review of Law and Politics, “President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America”, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.journals/jleg28&id=8&size=2&collection=journals&terms=increased&termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=#7) CBC
The current use of executive orders and other presidential directives is a fundamental problem in modern-day America. The Constitution does not give one individual an "executive pen" enabling that individual to single handedly mite his preferred policy. Despite this lack of constitutional authority, presidential directive have been increasingly used—both by Republicans and Democrats—to promulgate laws and to support public policy initiatives in a manner that circumvents the proper lawmaking, body, the United States Congress. It would be foolhardy to ignore the danger inherent in situation, simply because one might like the individual currently holding the presidential pen." It could be hypocritical, as well as dangerous, to seek change when a president from the opposing political party is in power, but to ignore the problem once a president from one’s own party has been elected. While the current president may back acceptable policies or refrain from using his executive power in a tyrannical fashion, there is no guarantee that all future presidents will continue to do so as well. Controversy over the nature of executive power and the limitations that should be placed upon it is not new. Since the founding of out country, Presidents, congressman, scholars, and individual citizens have sought to properly define the boundaries of the executive's power. Two Presidents, who served in the early 1900s are often said to exemplify the two opposing views on the proper use of executive power.' President Theodore Roosevelt, a proponent of a powerful executive. once stated:
Affirmative Answers: Congress will Rollback
Congress hates executive orders-they are viewed as totalitarianism
Mayer 01 (Kenneth, Proff. Of Polt. Science Univ. of Wisconsin, Princeton Univ., “With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power”, p. 8, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/103282967?title=With%20the%20Stroke%20of%20a%20Pen%3a%20Executive%20Orders%20and%20Presidential%20Power) CBC
Executive discretion cuts both ways, of course, and opponents of a particular case of presidential initiative will view these pen strokes quite differently. After President Clinton issued an executive order that barred government contractors from hiring permanent replacement workers, 34congressional Republicans were in no mood to congratulate him on either his energy or his dispatch. On the House floor the next day, Representative Bill Barrett (R-Neb.) condemned the president for overturning fifty years of labor law “with the stroke of a pen.” Observers who are even less sympathetic cast executive orders in an altogether sinister light, seeing in them evidence of a broad conspiracy to create a presidential dictatorship. The common theme of these complaints is that the executive order is an example of unaccountable power and a way of evading both public opinion and constitutional constraints. In the more extreme manifestations, executive orders are portrayed as an instrument of secret government and totalitarianism. The president says “Do this! Do that!” and not only is it done, but the government, the economy, and individual freedom are crushed under the yoke of executive decree.
Prez powers bad-if unchecked leads to war
Eland 7 (Ivan, Sen. Fellow and Dir. of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute, Consortium News, “Bush Out of Line In Scolding Pelosi”, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2007/040307a.htmlQ1) CBC
This expansive view of wartime presidential power couldn’t be further from the framers’ intent. In fact, the founders undoubtedly would have noted that the warlike European monarchs of the day were the sole purveyors of their nations’ foreign policy—the very problem the framers attempted to address with the constitutional separation of powers. Curiously, although the expansion of executive power in foreign policy has not served the nation well, it often has the counterintuitive effect of serving the interests of Congress. If the President is always in charge of U.S. foreign policy, members of Congress can duck responsibility for tough issues that might pose risks to their paramount goal—getting re–elected. For example, by allowing presidents to fight even major conflicts without constitutionally required declarations of war—a phenomenon that began when Harry Truman neglected, with a congressional wink and nod, to get approval for the Korean War—the Congress conveniently throws responsibility for the war into the President’s lap. The founders would be horrified at the erosion of a major pillar of their system of checks and balances. To fulfill their constitutional responsibility as a check on the President, members of Congress do have a responsibility to be heavily involved in U.S. foreign policy. Instead of publicly condemning Speaker Pelosi for carrying out the bipartisan Iraq Study Group’s heretofore–languishing recommendation of actually talking to Syria to resolve bilateral issues, the President should be happy that someone in the U.S. government is willing to take risks with one of America’s major adversaries in the region.