Richard Elmore 1980
The emergence of implementation as a subject for policy analysis coincides closely with the discovery by policy analysts that decisions are not self-executing. Analysis of policy choices matters very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood. In answering the question, "What percentage of the work of achieving a desired governmental action is done when the preferred analytic alternative has been identified?"Allison estimated that, in the normal case, it was about 10 percent, leaving the remaining 90 percent in the realm of implementation. Hence, in Nelson's terms, "the core of analysis of alternatives becomes the prediction of how alternative organizational structures will behave over . .. time."6 But the task of prediction is vastly complicated by the absence of a coherent body of organizational theory, making it necessary to posit several alternative models of organization.7
2. Counterplan Ground—specifying your agent is critical to negative counterplan ground. This is especially true when dealing with police presence—or military contractors.
3. Crushes solvency debates—never debate what the best actor to do the plan is. These debates are critical to education about the federal government and how it works.
4. Moving target—lack of severance proves the plan is conditional—they can sever out of all offense—leaves us with statism which destroys education.
D. Voting issue for all the reasons above—also, 2ac is too late
XO CP Shell
Observation 1. Text: The President of the United States should
Observation 2. Solvency
Presidents have traditionally used their executive authority to control military redeployment.
Cooper 2 (Phillip, Prof of Public Administration @ Portland State, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action)
The deployment of troops has presented presidents with a range of political and military issues that involve measures from sending troops into harm's way in existing conflicts to low-intensity wars that had the potential to grow.95 More often, the administrations worked with various constellations of positioning troops and their equipment in strategically important or tactically advantageous locations. Such deployments have also been used to project force as well as to prepare for possible action, as in the case of President Kennedy's buildup of troops in Europe as conflict with the USSR over Berlin grew.96 As a number of recent presidents have, learned, one of the more complex aspects of deployment can be extricating the troops from difficult situations. Thus, President Reagan's NSDD 123 laid out the plan for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon in the midst of continued fighting.97 National security directives have also been used both to launch military action and to direct combat operations. One of the more significant examples of such action was President Bush's NSD 54 that launched the Desert Storm attack on Iraq in 1.991:98 Pursuant to my responsibilities and authority under the Constitution as President and Commander in Chief, and under the laws and treaties of the United States, and pursuant to H.J. Res. 77 (1991), and in accordance with the rights and obligations of the United States under international law, including UN Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 666, 667, 670, 674, 677, and 678, and consistent with the inherent right of the collective self-defense affirmed in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, I hereby authorize military actions designed to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. These actions are to be conducted against Iraq and Iraqi forces in Kuwait by U.S. air, sea and land conventional military forces, in coordination with the forces of our coalition partners, at a date and time I shall determine and communicate through the National Command Authority channels.99 The next day, Desert Storm was launched. The order defines the purposes of the attack and the cautions to be observed during the battle. Interestingly, President Bush reserved the right to escalate hostilities and to target Saddam. Hussein directly if Iraq should seek to destroy Kuwait's oil fields. In such a case, the NSD announces, "it shall become an explicit objective of the United States to replace the current leadership of Iraq. I also want to preserve the option of authorizing additional punitive actions against Iraq?, mo Iraq did set the fields on fire, and the United States did not "replace the current leadership of Iraq." Bush knew that his authority was limited both domestically, in terms of his dealings with the Congress, and internationally, in terms of holding the coalition together. To be sure, this was not the first time that NSDs had been used for such a purpose. President Reagan had issued NSDD 110 in fall 1983, setting in motion the invasion of Grenada.ml
Observation 3 Net Benefits
Mayer 01 (Kenneth, Proff. Of Polt. Science Univ. of Wisconsin, Princeton Univ., “With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power”, p. 90, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/103282967?title=With%20the%20Stroke%20of%20a%20Pen%3a%20Executive%20Orders%20and%20Presidential%20Power) CBC
Since executive orders are a unilateral presidential tool, presidents may use them to compensate for congressional opposition.This theme arises from histories of the civil rights orders, which have maintained that Democratic presidents used executive orders because they knew that Congress would refuse to pass legislation.Presidents may also use executive orders to preempt legislation or undercut Congress in other ways.When faced with the certain prospect of legislation imposing sanctions on South Africa in 1985, President Reagan successfully fractured a veto-proof coalition of Democrats and moderate Republicans by imposing weaker sanctions by executive order. In doing so, he “managed to avoid a major legislative defeat and the further embarrassment of an almost inevitable veto override,” although Congress overrode Reagan's veto of sanction legislation the following year. Presidents have restructured the intelligence community through executive orders, in part to undermine congressional efforts to reorganize the community via statute. For the same reasons, presidents who have low levels of public approval may be more likely to resort to executive orders. Doing so offers a way of getting around other institutional actors who might be emboldened in their opposition to what they perceive as a weak White House, and also provides presidents with a method of position-taking, framing policy questions, or delivering on promises made to key constituencies.
B. Presidential Powers
First, Presidential power is decreasing under Obama The Gazette (Montreal), March 14, 2009 Saturday , Obama's rule of law; Breaks with Bush's 'enemy combatant'
The Obama administration dropped the term "enemy combatant" and incorporated international law yesterday as its basis for holding terrorism suspects at Guantanamo prison while it works to close the facility.
The U.S. Justice Department said it had filed court papers outlining its break from Bush administration detention standards, and said only those who provided "substantial" support to Al-Qa'ida or the Taliban would be considered detainable.
"As we work toward developing a new policy to govern detainees, it is essential that we operate in a manner that strengthens our national security, is consistent with our values, and is governed by law," U.S. Attorney-General Eric Holder said. "The change we've made today meets each of those standards and will make our nation stronger."
Unlike under former president George W. Bush, who greatly sought to expand presidential powers during his term, the new detention policy does not rely on the president's powers as military commander in chief to hold terrorism suspects at Guantanamo.
Instead, the Justice Department said: "It draws on the international laws of war to inform the statutory authority conferred by Congress." Second, must increase Presidential Power to secure hegemony Paul 98 (Joel, Professor at University of Connecticut School of Law, California Law Review, “The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3481139) CBC
The United States could not exercise world leadership without a shift in power from Congress to the executive. "Other governments must know, if they are to be willing to undertake indispensable joint commitments, that the United States can so act to implement integrated and responsible policy." In McDougal and Lans' view, a foreign policy led by a powerful executive unhampered by Congress best served democracy. In the new world environment, the values of efficiency, flexibility, and secrecy took precedence over the deliberative process: Executive officers, who are charged with the task of conducting negotiations with other governments, must be able to treat the national body politic as a whole and must be able to canvass it promptly and efficiently as a whole for the majority will, without being subjected to delays, obstructions, and disintegrating efforts by minorities... A leisurely diplomacy of inaction and of deference to dissident minority interests supposedly characteristic of past eras when economic and political change proceeded at a slower pace and the twin ocean barriers gave us an effortless security is no longer capable, if it ever was, of securing the interests of the United States.