NEI 12 [May 2012, Nuclear Energy Institute, White Paper, “Global Nuclear Power ¶ Development: Major ¶ Expansion Continues”]
Introduction¶ The development of energy policy is a balancing act for ¶ any nation. Resource availability, projections of electricity demand growth, the age of existing infrastructure and ¶ climate change goals are a few of the issues that must ¶ be addressed. A country’s decision to include nuclear ¶ energy in its portfolio can be more complex because ¶ nuclear requires a regulatory and industry infrastructure ¶ to ensure safety, ongoing access to global nuclear trade ¶ through treaties and cooperation agreements, significant ¶ capital for new plant construction and public support for ¶ peaceful use of the technology. In the aftermath of the ¶ Fukushima accident, a few countries—including Germany ¶ and Switzerland—have indicated that that they do not ¶ plan further nuclear expansion. But many more plan to ¶ proceed with nuclear power development.¶ The table on page two shows the 30 countries with existing nuclear programs, and includes their plans for new ¶ nuclear generation. Thirteen of the countries rely on ¶ nuclear power for over one-quarter of their electricity ¶ generation. Another 14 countries are moving ahead with ¶ new plant construction, and others have longer-term ¶ plans for new nuclear development. In rapidly ¶ developing countries like China and India, governments¶ are planning a major role for new nuclear generation as ¶ they increase basic electrification and keep up with ¶ demand growth from economic expansion. ¶ The case studies in this paper provide examples of how ¶ different countries have balanced their resources and ¶ needs and determined that nuclear generation should be ¶ a part of their energy portfolios. Even in the postFukushima environment, this robust growth is expected ¶ with an additional 329 proposed¶ planned and 68 units proposed in countries without operating nuclear plants. ¶ Nuclear Countries¶ Operating Under Construction Planned Proposed¶ Country¶ As shown in the map, countries with existing nuclear programs are not the only ¶ ones planning to build nuclear plants. Some governments, like those in the ¶ United Arab Emirates and Poland,have made firm commitments to develop the ¶ infrastructure needed for a nuclear program. Other countries like Thailand and ¶ Chileare keeping nuclear energy as an option for the future by announcing¶ proposals for new reactors. Countries will continue to evaluate policy and energy options as time passes and make appropriate decisions at the national level. ¶ For many nuclear energy will be a part of their clean energy future.¶ As the current status of new nuclear construction demonstrates, the majority of ¶ nuclearenergy growth is occurring in non-OECD countries. OECD countries will ¶ build nuclear plants as they seek to replace aging generating fleets and reduce ¶ carbon emissions. But non-OECD countries are building electricity generation ¶ on a large scale to fuel high economic growth and to expand residential electrification. This presents many opportunities for U.S. suppliers to take ¶ advantage of markets aboard. ¶ Brazil¶ From the beginning of its nuclear program in the 1970s, Brazil has remained ¶ supportive of nuclear energy and its role in the country’s generation portfolio. ¶ Brazil has two operating nuclear units, Angra 1 and 2, near Rio de Janeiro, as ¶ well as facilities for uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication in Resende that ¶ serve the two domestic reactors. The planning for the first unit at Angra, a 520 ¶ MW unit designed by Westinghouse, started in the 1970s. Brazil signed a deal ¶ with West Germany for eight 1,300 MW units in the late ¶ 1970s, but economic stagnation and lower demand growth ¶ halted those plans. In 1995, construction on Angra 2 was ¶ restarted with the help of additional German investment.
Fast reactors inevitable – US lead key to nuke leadership
Kirsch 9 [Steve Kirsch, founder and CEO of multiple tech companies collectively worth over %241 billion and MS in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from MIT, November 2009, "Why We Should Build an Integral Fast Reactor Now,", ]
The genie is out of the bottle: refusing to play will not make fast reactors go awayand will ultimately make us less safe. If we don’t re-start our fast reactor technology, then other countries will take the lead. France, Russia, India, Japan, and China all have fast reactor programsand all are either operating fast reactors now, or soon will be. The US shut down our last remaining fast reactor 15 years ago. Leadership is important for two reasons: 1) if we fail to lead, we will have missed taking advantage of our superior technology and missed a major economic opportunity as the premiere supplier of clean power technology and 2) the nuclear industry is in far safer hands if the US leads the way than if we abdicate. For example, if Chernobyl had been a US reactor design, that accident could never have happened.
Prolif – Plan solves it
A. Economic incentive to forego ENR and PUREX – means no weapons
Stanford 10 [IFR FaD context – the need for U.S. implementation of the IFR, 18 February 2010 by Barry Brook, This is a context statement for the IFR FaD series, written by Dr. George S. Stanford. George is a nuclear reactor physicist, part of the team that developed the Integral Fast Reactor. He is now retired from Argonne National Laboratory after a career of experimental work pertaining to power-reactor safety. He is the co-author of Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from Cold War Weaponry. He is a founding member of the Science Council for Global Initiatives, Brave New Climate]
Background info on proliferation (of nuclear weapons). Please follow the reasoning carefully.¶ – Atomic bombscan be made with highly enriched uranium (90% U-235) or withgood-quality plutonium (bomb designers want plutonium that is ~93% Pu-239).¶ – For fuel for an LWR, the uranium only has to be enriched to 3 or 4% U-235.¶ – To make a uranium bomb you don’t need a reactor — but you doneed access to an enrichment facilityor some other source of highly enriched uranium…¶ – Anykind of nuclear reactor can be used to make weapons-quality plutonium from uranium-238, but the uranium has to havebeen irradiated for only a very short period. In other words, nobody would try to make a plutonium weapon from ordinary spent fuel, because there are easier ways to get plutonium of much better quality.¶ – Plutonium for a weapon not only has to have good isotopic quality, it also has to be chemically uncontaminated. Thus the lightly irradiated fuelhas to be processed to extract theplutonium in a chemically pure form. But mere possession of a reactor is not sufficient for a weapons capability — a facility using a chemical process called PUREX is also needed.¶ – Regardless of how many reactors a country has, it cannot have a weapons capabilityunless it has either the ability to enrich uranium or to do PUREX-type fuel reprocessing.¶ – Therefore, the spread of weapons capability will be strongly inhibited if the only enrichment and reprocessing facilities are in countries that already have a nuclear arsenal.¶ – But that can only happen if countries with reactors (and soon that will be most of the nations of the world) have absolutely ironcladguarantees that they can get the fuel they need even if they can’t make their own, regardless of how obnoxious their political actions might be.¶ – Such guarantees will have to be backed up by some sort of international arrangement, andthat can only come to pass if there is effective leadershipfor the laborious international negotiations that will have to take place. (For a relevant discussion, see here)¶ – At present, the only nation thathas a realistic potential to be such a leader is the United States.¶ – But a country cannot be such a leader in the politicalarenaunless it is also in thetechnological forefront.¶ – The United States used to be the reactor-technology leader, but itabandoned that role in 1994 when it terminatedthe development of the IFR.¶ – Since then, other nations — China, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, France — have proceeded to work on their own fast-reactor versions, which necessarily will involve instituting a fuel-processing capability.¶ – Thus the United States is being left behind, and is rapidly losing its ability tohelp assure that the global evolution of the technology of nuclear energy proceeds in a safe and orderly manner.¶ – But maybe it’s not too late yet. After all, the IFR is the fast-reactor technology with the post promise (for a variety of reasons), and is ready for a commercial-scale demonstration to settle some uncertainties about how to scale up the pyroprocess as needed, to establish better limits on the expected cost of production units, and to develop an appropriate, expeditious licensing process.
B. Commercial leadership and solving uranium – also solves the nuclear arsenal
Jones 12 [The Hill, “US must remain leader in nuclear enrichment”, Retired General James L. Jones, senior fellow at the Bipartisan Policy Center and co-chairman of its Energy Project. He was national security adviser to President Obama from January 2009 to November 2010, 01/17/12]
Achieving energy security is among our nation’s most pressing requirements in this still-young century. I believe that America must employ a more strategic national energy policy if it is to overcome the many complex energy challenges that will so heavily influence its economic and national security. While our continued dependence on foreign sources of oil might remain the most visible threat to American eneurargy security, consequential energy-related threats such as climate change and the proliferation of nuclear material will continue to bear heavily on our security for many decades to come.¶ Nuclear nonproliferation, long one of America’s chief international security strategies, has been a major priority for this administration, as it has for every administration since World War II. Nuclear poweris unique among energy sources because the commercial use of civilian technology is inseparable from nuclear security and proliferation concerns. The commercial trade of nuclear technology can heighten proliferation risks. Such vulnerabilities in a complex and dangerous world must continue to be managed responsibly— a primary objective of the nonproliferation laws and safeguards that accompany the export of U.S. nuclear technology. ¶ ¶ Our commercial leadership in the nuclear industry has been an enduring source of America’s influence in the global marketplace and a potent lever for promoting international cooperation in developing and enforcing nonproliferation regimes. Unfortunately, the U.S. is ceding its leadership in key areas of nuclear technology development. Of greatest concern is potential loss of leadership in the enrichmentindustry. The U.S. once produced a majority of the world’s supply of enriched uranium necessary to generate nuclear power, but today it produces only 25 percent. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), which operates the United States’s largest commercial uranium enrichment facility, is the only U.S. majority-owned supplier. However, its plant located in Paducah, Ky., uses antiquated and inefficient technology. The enterprise is not well-positioned to compete cost-effectively and its ability to sustain operations remains in serious doubt. ¶ The loss ofour only domestically-owned source of enriched uraniumwill severely undermine America’s influence in the industry and our leadership in vital international nonproliferation efforts.Without the United States as a reliable source of nuclear fuel, particularly in a world with increasing demand for low- and no-carbon electric generation, other nations willhave greater incentive to pursue their own enrichment capabilities, increasing therisks of proliferation and the chances that civilian nuclear technology will be diverted for malign purposes. We know well the adverse effects on U.S. national security and international stability of North Korea’s and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons under the guise of commercial enrichment.¶ The disappearance of a domestically owned capability would not only undermine U.S. leadership in a highly consequential arena of global commerce and security, it would render us dependent onforeign-controlled sources of uranium enrichment.This could increase the vulnerabilitynot only of America’s commercial nuclear industry but of our national nuclear arsenal. Tritium, produced using enriched uranium, is necessary to maintain and modernize our nuclear weapons. Relying on foreign suppliers for material essential for maintaining the safety, security and reliability of our nuclear capability is unacceptable.
Proliferation likely now – risks Israel strikes
Chalmers 13 [Royal United Services Institute, independent think-tank founded in 1831 by the Duke of Wellington, “The Nuclear Agenda for 2013: New Solutions to Old Problems”, RUSI Analysis, 10 Jan 2013, Hugh Chalmers, Research Analyst, Nuclear Analysis, formerly had consulting position at the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, previously held positions at IHS Jane's and the King's College Centre for Science and Security Studies, MA in Science and Security from the King's College Department of War Studies]
After a year characterised by leadership transitions in the US, Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea, political paralysis has pushed many old nuclear problems into 2013. And through the momentum this has afforded them, they will almost certainly colour the coming year.¶ Continuing Crises¶ Chief among these old problems is the Iranian nuclear crisis. Despite increasingly bellicose rhetoric from Israel and the implementation of further sanctions, Iran's stockpile of 20%-enriched uranium almost tripled in 2012 - increasing the threat to what fragile stabilityexists in the Middle East. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can neitherconfirm nor deny whether Iran's nuclear programme has a military dimension, and the P5+1 group of nations has yet to negotiate a satisfactory conclusion to this crisis.¶ This was in part due to the US Presidential elections in November. The lingering presence of the crisis in US election debates meant that few risks were taken by the US, and consequently the P5+1, to compromise with Iran in the latter half of 2012. And while the IAEA ended the year with a small step towards resolving its dispute with Iran, the US and its partners in the P5+1 start 2013 no closer to their goal than they were a year ago. Unless Iran dramatically reduces itsproduction of 20%-enriched uranium (or significantly increases the conversion of enriched uranium to less-sensitive forms) its stockpile will probably cross Israel's hazy redline of 240kg beforemid-2013. If this occurs, the Israeli airstrikes that were narrowly avoided in 2012 may yet haunt 2013.¶Elections in South Korea and Japan were also coloured by North Korea's successful launch of the Unha-3 rocket in December, which also cast a shadow over the newly-formed Politburo Standing Committee in China. While the timing of the launch ostensibly commemorated the first anniversary of Kim Jong-Il's death, it served equally well as a reminder that North Korea is still prepared to use provocative displays of power to influence regional debates. The launch was rightly met by familiar condemnation from the international community, including an important call from China to abide by UN Security Council Resolutions. However, the Security Council itself has yet to add its voice to this chorus - something it did within four days of North Korea's failed rocket launch in April 2012.¶ While it is too early to judge the impact of the launch, ifNorth Korea feels that provocation has provenproductive(and that it may dodge an assertive response from the UN), it may be tempted to consider further provocation.Satellite imagery analysis suggests that North Korea has maintained a readiness to test a nuclear warhead within two week's notice. And if North Korea does indeed hope to eventually mount a nuclear warhead on a modified Unha-3 rocket, it will have to test a reliable, small-scale warhead.¶ Decaying Relations¶ Finally, since Vladimir Putin's controversial return to the Kremlin in March of 2012, a distinct chill has come over US-Russia relations. While the 'reset' in relations between the two powers successfully secured modest reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two states, it has since stumbled over the deployment of US ballistic missile defence systems in Europe, and fallen over Russia's tit-for-tat response to the blacklisting of select Russian individuals by the US Magnitsky act at the end of 2012.¶ Two important symptoms of this deteriorating relationship will manifest themselves this year. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which safeguarded and dismantled weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union, and the Megatons to Megawatts Program, which converted Russian weapons-origin fissile material into fuel for US reactors, will be dropped by Russia before 2013 is out.Without a thaw in relationsbetween the US and Russia, and the reinvigoration of bilateral nuclear arms control between the two powers, 2013 may leave the global nuclear disarmament movement in a worse state than it found it.
Israel strike causes great power war
José Miguel Alonso Trabanco 2009; researcher for Global Research, “The Middle Eastern Powder Keg Can Explode at Anytime,” globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11762 In case of an Israeli and/or American attack against Iran, Ahmadinejad's government will certainly respond. A possible countermeasure would be to fire Persian ballistic missiles against Israel and maybe even against American military bases in the regions. Teheran will unquestionably resort to its proxies like Hamas or Hezbollah (or even some of its Shiite allies it has in Lebanon or Saudi Arabia) to carry out attacks against Israel, America and their allies, effectively setting in flames a large portion of the Middle East.The ultimate weapon at Iranian disposal is to block the Strait of Hormuz. If such chokepoint is indeed asphyxiated, that would dramaticallyincrease the price of oil, this a very threatening retaliation because it will bring intense financial and economic havoc upon the West, which is already facing significant trouble in those respects. In short, the necessary conditions for a major war in the Middle East are given. Such conflict could rapidly spiral out of control and thus a relatively minor clash could quickly and dangerously escalate by engulfing the whole region and perhaps even beyond. There are many key players: the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Arabs, the Persians and their respective allies and some great powers could become involved in one way or another (America, Russia, Europe, China). Therefore, any miscalculation by any of the main protagonists can trigger something no one can stop. Taking into consideration that the stakes are too high, perhaps it is not wise to be playing with fire right in the middle of a powder keg.
Prolif causes extinction
[David, Pres. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Councilor – World Future Council, “Still Loving the Bomb After All These Years”, 9-4, https://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/09/04_krieger_newsweek_response.php?krieger]
Jonathan Tepperman’s article in the September 7, 2009 issue of Newsweek, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” provides a novel but frivolous argument that nuclear weapons “may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous….” Rather, in Tepperman’s world, “The bomb may actually make us safer.” Tepperman shares this world with Kenneth Waltz, a University of California professor emeritus of political science, who Tepperman describes as “the leading ‘nuclear optimist.’” Waltz expresses his optimism in this way: “We’ve now had 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” Actually, there were a number of proxy wars between nuclear weapons states, such as those in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, and some near disasters, the most notable being the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Waltz’s logic is akin to observing a man falling from a high rise building, and noting that he had already fallen for 64 floors without anything bad happening to him, and concluding that so far it looked so good that others should try it. Dangerous logic! Tepperman builds upon Waltz’s logic, and concludes “that all states are rational,” even though their leaders may have a lot of bad qualities, including being “stupid, petty, venal, even evil….” He asks us to trust that rationality will always prevail when there is a risk of nuclear retaliation, because these weapons make “the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.” Actually, he is asking us to do more than trust in the rationality of leaders; he is asking us to gamble the future on this proposition. “The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling,” Tepperman argues, “it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace….” But if this is a peace worthy of the name, which it isn’t, it certainly is not one on which to risk the future of civilization. One irrational leader with control over a nuclear arsenal could start a nuclear conflagration, resulting in a global Hiroshima. Tepperman celebrates “the iron logic of deterrence,” but deterrence is a theory that is far from rooted in “iron logic.” It is a theory based upon threats that must be effectively communicated and believed. Leaders of Country A with nuclear weapons must communicate to other countries (B, C, etc.) the conditions under which A will retaliate with nuclear weapons. The leaders of the other countries must understand and believe the threat from Country A will, in fact, be carried out. The longer that nuclear weapons are not used, the more other countries may come to believe that they can challenge Country A with impunity from nuclear retaliation. The more that Country A bullies other countries, the greater the incentive for these countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Deterrence is unstableand therefore precarious. Most of the countries in the world reject the argument, made most prominently by Kenneth Waltz, that the spread of nuclear weapons makes the world safer. These countries joined together in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but they never agreed to maintain indefinitely a system of nuclear apartheid in which some states possess nuclear weapons and others are prohibited from doing so. The principal bargain of the NPT requires the five NPT nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and the International Court of Justice interpreted this to mean complete nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Tepperman seems to be arguing that seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is bad policy, and that nuclear weapons, because of their threat, make efforts at non-proliferation unnecessary and even unwise. If some additional states, including Iran, developed nuclear arsenals, he concludes that wouldn’t be so bad “given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.” Those who oppose Tepperman’s favorable disposition toward the bomb, he refers to as “nuclear pessimists.” These would be the people, and I would certainly be one of them, who see nuclear weapons as presenting an urgent danger to our security, our species and our future. Tepperman finds that when viewed from his “nuclear optimist” perspective, “nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening.” “Nuclear peace,” he tells us, “rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad – conventional war – won’t happen.” But the “extremely bad” thing he asks us to accept is the end of the human species. Yes, that would be serious. He also doesn’t make the case that in a world without nuclear weapons, the prospects of conventional war would increase dramatically. After all, it is only an unproven supposition that nuclear weapons have prevented wars, or would do so in the future. We have certainly come far too close to the precipice of catastrophic nuclear war. As an ultimate celebration of the faulty logic of deterrence, Tepperman calls for providing any nuclear weapons state with a “survivable second strike option.” Thus, he not only favors nuclear weapons, but finds the security of these weapons to trump human security. Presumably he would have President Obama providing new and secure nuclear weapons to North Korea, Pakistan and any other nuclear weapons states that come along so that they will feel secure enough not to use their weapons in a first-strike attack. Do we really want to bet the human future that Kim Jong-Il and his successors are more rational than Mr. Tepperman?
Credible nuclear arsenal deters all war and solves Russia and China nuclear war
Payne ’12 – professor and head of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State
(Dr. Keith B., Testimony to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, United States Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, 7-25-2012)
The GNZC report, however, essentially dismisses this concern by asserting that Russia and China are not now opponents and are unlikely ever to be so again: “The risk of nuclear confrontation between the United States and either Russia or China belongs to the past, not the future.” Such a prediction fits the narrative for further deep reductions, but it does not appear to fit Russian or Chinese actions and statements concerning their ambitions and nuclear developments. Over the past several years, top Russian leaders have made numerous threats of pre-emptive and preventive nuclear attack against US allies and friends. Most recently, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Gen. Nikolai Makarov threatened a pre-emptive attack against NATO states, and the threat was implicitly nuclear. 11 (Please see the attached compilation of Russian nuclear threats since 2007 by Dr. Mark Schneider). Such threats challenge Western sensibilities and faith in a powerful, global nuclear “taboo,” but they are within the norm of Russian behavior and doctrine regarding nuclear forces. To claim that nuclear weapons will not be salient in contemporary or future US relations with Russia or China is an unwarranted and highly optimistic prediction, not a prudent basis for calculating US deterrence strategies and forces. If wrong, Minimum Deterrence and corresponding low force levels could invite serious risk and provocations. Second, the question of having an adequate deterrence capability cannot be answered simply by determining if we can threaten some given, contemporary set of targets. Deterrence must work in contemporary and future crises, and we will come to those crises with the forces we have in hand. No one knows with confidence “how much of what force” will be necessary for credible deterrence now, and future requirements are particularly arcane because opponents and threats can shift rapidly in this post-Cold War era and the requirements for deterrence correspondingly can change rapidly. This reality complicates the task of calculating “how much is enough” for deterrence. The priority deterrence question now is whether we have sufficient force options and diversity to threaten credibly the wide spectrum of targets that opponents may value over the course of decades. In some plausible scenarios, a small and undiversified US nuclear force may be adequate for deterrence, in other cases, effective deterrence may demand a large and diverse nuclear arsenal with capabilities well beyond those envisaged for Minimum Deterrence. Confident declarations that some fixed Minimum Deterrence force level will prove adequate cannot be based on substance; they reflect only hope and carry considerable risk. Instead, the flexibility and resilience of our forces to adapt to differing deterrence requirements should be considered a fundamental requirement of US force adequacy, and our standing capabilities must be sufficiently large and diverse to adapt to a variety of shifting deterrence demands. It may be convenient to pick some fixed, low number and claim that 300, 400, or 500 weapons will be adequate for deterrence now and in the future, but no one can possibly know if such statements are true. We do know that the more diverse and flexible our forces, the more likely we are to have the types of capabilities needed for deterrence in a time of shifting and uncertain threats, stakes and opponents. But force diversity and flexibility does not come automatically. It is important that our nuclear force posture and infrastructure incorporate these characteristics and that they are manifest to opponents and allies for deterrence and assurance purposes respectively.