Islamophobia is engrained within American culture. Changing government policies is ineffective, can’t lead to broader change, and only serves to distance Americans from their own Islamophobia.
Sheehi 11 (Stephen, March 9, 2011. “Don’t Blame the Kingdom for Islamophobia, Blame the Kingdom.” Shehi is a professor of Middle East studies at the College of William and Mary. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/840/dont-blame-the-king-for-islamophobia-blame-the-kin // EMS).
To approach the current hearings on “radicalization” of American Muslims along partisan boundaries is to deflect from the depths to which Islamophobia is engrained within American political culture. That Geller had to “beg” to be included in the CPAC convention and attack paleo-conservatives such as Grover Norquist suggest that the Republican Party realizes the liability of the visibility of Tea Bag xenophobia.¶ Blaming opportunistic and predatory Islamophobes is a convenient means to distance the American mainstream from their own Islamophobia. King’s hearings are dangerous not for their demonizing of Muslims but because they further mainstream these predators and offer them a prominent political platform and the credibility that comes with it.¶ However, the difference between good ole’ fashioned Muslim and Arab hating and Islamphobia as a mass cultural phenomenon is that the latter is a fully fledged ideological component of American culture that has flowered since the end of the Cold War to accommodate US power in a unipolar world. Consequently, Islamophobia permeates all spectra of American culture. Juan Williams’ honesty that Muslims make him nervous, Howard Dean accusing Islam of being “stuck in the 12th century,” and Obama’s clear distaste for the “wisdom” of Park 51mosque show how Democrats share their counterparts’ suspicion of Muslims.¶ In the media, discussion of Muslims and Islam is, at best, infused with the Good Muslim-Bad Muslim dichotomy that poses patriotic loyalty against religious identity. While highlighting the psychological instability of white terrorists and ignoring the white supremacy beliefs of anti-government militias, cable news obsesses over “home grown terrorism,” perpetuating the stereotype of the “Muslim threat” and, therefore, legitimizing it as a valid analytical topic.¶ Islamophobia is not only a set of misrepresentations, misunderstandings and intolerance by overt racists and the religiously bigoted. It is a culture formation that has been activated for ideological reasons. As such, the shared Islamophobia of both parties translates into very real effects for Muslims. For example, municipal police hire Islamophobe charlatans to train them to identify home grown threats using outlandishly racist anti-Muslim literature. As a consequence, not only do police profile and target anyone who might look like their version of a Muslim but they under report hate crimes against Muslim and Arab Americans.
The 1AC is an act of world ordering – images of disempowering structures produce a vision of the world that negates activism at the level of the self. The I-In-Relationship is a necessary starting point for changing larger structures
Jayan Nayar, Law—University of Warwick, 1999 “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity ,” 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599
Despite the fixation of the beneficiaries of ordered worlds, even the ordered "critic," with the prescribed languages, visions and possibilities of human socialities, other realities of humanity nevertheless persist. Notwithstanding the globalization of social concern and the transnationalization of professionalized critique and reformatory action, struggles against violence remain energized, persistent and located. They are waged through the bodies of lives lived in experiential locations against real instruments of terror, functioning within embodied sites of violence. Non-information and non-representation of the existence of such struggles, and non-learning of the wisdoms thus generated do not negate their truths or the vibrancy of their socialities. 51 "We" are participants in ordered worlds, not merely observers. The choice is whether we wish to recognize our own locations of ordered violence and participate in the struggle to resist their orderings, or whether we wish merely to observe violence in far-off worlds in order that our interventionary participation "out there" never destabilizes the ground upon which we stand. I suggest that we betray the spirit of transformatory struggle, despite all our expressions of support and even actions of professionalized expertise, if our own locations, within which are ordered and from which we ourselves order, remain unscrutinized. And so, what might I contribute to the present collective exercise toward a futuristic imaging of human possibilities? I am unsure. It is only from my view of the "world," after all, that I can project my visions. These visions do not go so far as to visualize any "world" in its totality; they are uncertain even with regard to worlds closer to home, worlds requiring transformatory actions all the same. Instead of fulfilling this task of imagining future therefore I simply submit the following two "poems." [*629] Changing the "I" of the World: The Essential Message of Mahatmas?" We are today bombarded by images of our "one world." We speak of the world as "shrinking" into a "global village." We are not all fooled by the implicit benign-ness of this image of "time-space" contracted--so we also speak of "global pillage." This astuteness of our perceptions, however, does not prevent us from our delusion of the "global;" the image of the "global" world persists even for many activists amongst us who struggle to "change" the world. This is recent delusion. It is a delusion which anesthetizes us from the only world which we can ever locate ourselves in and know--the worlds of "I"-in relationships. The "I" is seldom present in "emancipatory" projects to change the world. This is because the "relational I"-world and the "global"-world are negations of one another; the former negates the concept of the latter whilst the latter negates the life of the former. And concepts are more amenable to scrutiny than life. The advance in technologies of image-ing enables a distanciation of scrutiny, from the "I"-world of relationships to the "global"-world of abstractions. As we become fixated with the distant, as we consume the images of "world" as other than here and now, as we project ourselves through technological time-space into worlds apart from our here and now, as we become "global," we are relieved of the gravity of our present. We, thus, cease the activism of self (being) and take on the mantle of the "activist" (doing). This is a significant displacement. ¶ 1NC¶ That there is suffering all over the world has indeed been made more visible by the technologies of image-ing. Yet for all its consequent fostering of "networks," images of "global" suffering have also served to disempower. By this, we mean not merely that we are filled with the sense that the forces against which the struggle for emancipations from injustice and exploitation are waged are pervasive and, therefore, often impenetrable, but, more importantly, that it diverts our gaze away from the only true power that is in our disposal--the power of self-change in relationships of solidarities.¶ The "world," as we perceive it today, did not exist in times past. It does not exist today. There is no such thing as the global "one world." The world can only exist in the locations and experiences revealed through and in human relationships. It is often that we think that to change the world it is necessary to change the way power is exercised in the world; so we go about the business of exposing and denouncing the many power configurations that dominate. Power indeed does lie at the core of human misery, yet we blind ourselves if we regard this power as the power out there. Power, when all the complex networks of its reach are untangled, is personal; power does not exist out there, [*630] it only exists in relationship. To say the word, power, is to describe relationship, to acknowledge power, is to acknowledge our subservience in that relationship. There can exist no power if the subservient relationship is refused--then power can only achieve its ambitions through its naked form, as violence. Changing the world therefore is a misnomer for in truth it isrelationships that are to be changed. And the only relationships that we can change for sure are our own. And the constant in our relationships is ourselves--the "I" of all of us. And so, to change our relationships, we must change the "I" that is each of us. Transformations of "structures" will soon follow. This is, perhaps, the beginning of all emancipations. This is, perhaps, the essential message of Mahatmas.
Nayar, Law—University of Warwick, 1999 “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity ,” 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599
So, back to the question: to what extent, for this, "our world," do we contemplate change when "we" imagine transformed "world-orders?" In addition to the familiar culprits of violent orderings, such as government, financial institutions, transnational corporations, the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO (as significant culprits they indeed are), do we, in our contemplations of violent orders, vision our locations within corporate "educational" institutions as "professional academics" and "researchers," our locations within corporate NGOs as "professional activists," our locations within "think-tanks" and "research organizations" as "professional policy-formulators," and whatever other locations of elite "expertise" we have been "trained" to possess, as ordered sites, complicit and parasitic, within a violent "world-order"? Do we see in our critiques of world-orderings, out there, the orderings we find, right here, in our bodies, minds, relationships, expectations, fears and hopes? Would we be willing to see "our (ordered) world" dismantled in order that other worlds, wherein our "privileges" become extinguished, may flourish? These concerns are, then, I believe, the real complexities of judgment and action. Consideration should be given, not only to those of the political-structural, so often honed in on, but also to the [*628] issue of the political-personal, which ultimately is the "unit" of "worlds" and of "orders." If "globalization," as a recent obsession of intellectual minds, has contributed anything to an understanding of the ways of the "world," I suggest, it is that we cannot escape "our" implication within the violence of "world (mis)orders." IV. A WORLD FOR TRANSFORMATION: TWO POEMS Despite the fixation of the beneficiaries of ordered worlds, even the ordered "critic," with the prescribed languages, visions and possibilities of human socialities, other realities of humanity nevertheless persist. Notwithstanding the globalization of social concern and the transnationalization of professionalized critique and reformatory action, struggles against violence remain energized, persistent and located. They are waged through the bodies of lives lived in experiential locations against real instruments of terror, functioning within embodied sites of violence. Non-information and non-representation of the existence of such struggles, and non-learning of the wisdoms thus generated do not negate their truths or the vibrancy of their socialities. n51 "We" are participants in ordered worlds, not merely observers. The choice is whether we wish to recognize our own locations of ordered violence and participate in the struggle to resist their orderings, or whether we wish merely to observe violence in far-off worlds in order that our interventionary participation "out there" never destabilizes the ground upon which we stand. I suggest that we betray the spirit of transformatory struggle, despite all our expressions of support and even actions of professionalized expertise, if our own locations, within which are ordered and from which we ourselves order, remain unscrutinized.
Government reform doesn’t solve- Islamaphobia is psychological, not just a system of concrete policies.
Kundnani 14 (Arun, March 28 2014, “No NSA Reform Can Fix the American Islamophobic Security Complex.” Kundnani is the author of “The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror” and teaches at New York University. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/28/nsa-reform-american-islamophobic-surveillance-complex // EMS).
Better oversight of the sprawling American national security apparatus may finally be coming: President Obama and the House Intelligence Committee unveiled plans this week to reduce bulk collection of telephone records. The debate opened up by Edward Snowden's whistle-blowing is about to get even more legalistic than all the parsing of hops and stores and metadata.¶These reforms may be reassuring, if sketchy. But for those living in so-called "suspect communities" – Muslim Americans, left-wing campaigners, "radical" journalists – the days of living on the receiving end of excessive spying won’t end there.¶ How come when we talk about spying we don't talk about the lives of ordinary people being spied upon? While we have been rightly outraged at the government's warehousing of troves of data, we have been less interested in the consequences of mass surveillance for those most affected by it – such as Muslim Americans.¶ In writing my book on Islamophobia and the War on Terror, I spoke to dozens of Muslims, from Michigan to Texas and Minnesota to Virginia. Some told me about becoming aware their mosque was under surveillance only after discovering an FBI informant had joined the congregation. Others spoke about federal agents turning up at colleges to question every student who happened to be Muslim. All of them said they felt unsure whether their telephone calls to relatives abroad were wiretapped or whether their emails were being read by government officials.¶ There were the young Somali Americans in Minnesota who described how they and their friends were questioned by FBI agents for no reason other than their ethnic background. Some had been placed under surveillance by a local police department, which disguised its spying as a youth mentoring program and then passed the FBI intelligence on Somali-American political opinions.¶ There were the Muslim students at the City University of New York who discovered that fellow students they had befriended had been informants all along, working for the New York Police Department's Intelligence Division and tasked with surveilling them. There was no reasonable suspicion of any crime; it was enough that the targeted students were active in the Muslim Students Association.¶ And then there was Luqman Abdullah, a Detroit-based African-American imam, whose mosque was infiltrated by the FBI, leading to a 2009 raid in which he was shot and killed by federal agents. The government had no evidence of any terrorist plot; the sole pretext was that Abdullah had strongly critical views of the US government.¶ These are the types of people whom the National Security Agency can suspect of being two "hops" away from targets. These are the types of "bad guys" referred toby outgoing NSA director Keith Alexander. Ten years ago, around 100,000 Arabs and Muslims in America had some sort of national security file compiled on them. Today, that number is likely to be even higher.¶ A study published last year by the Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition documented the effects of this kind of mass surveillance. In targeted communities, a culture of enforced self-censorship takes hold and relationships of trust start to break down. As one interviewee said: "You look at your closest friends and ask: are they informants?"¶ This is what real fear of surveillance looks like: not knowing whom to trust, choosing your words with care when talking politics in public, the unpredictability of state power. Snowden has rightly drawn our attention to the power of what intelligence agencies call "signals intelligence" – the surveillance of our digital communications – but equally important is "human intelligence", the result of informants and undercover agents operating within communities.¶ Underpinning all the surveillance of Muslim Americans is an assumption that Islamic ideology is linked to terrorism. Yet, over the last 20 years, far more people have been killed in acts of violence by right-wing extremists than by Muslim American citizens or permanent residents. The huge numbers being spied upon are not would-be terrorists but law-abiding people, some of whom have "radical" political opinions that still ought to be protected by the First Amendment to the constitution. Just the same, there are plenty of other minority Americans who are not would-be "home-grown" terrorists – but they still live in fear that they might be mistaken as one.¶ So let's reform the NSA and its countless collections. But let's not forget the FBI's reported10,000 intelligence analystsworking on counter-terrorism and the15,000 paid informantshelping them do it. Let's not forget the New York Police Department's intelligence and counter-terrorism divisionwith its 1,000 officers, $100m budget and vast program of surveillance. Let's not forget the especially subtle psychological terror of being Muslim in America, where, sure, maybe your phone calls won't be stored for much longer, but there's a multitude of other ways you're always being watched.¶
World-ordering is the ordering of worlds – a civilizing mission that subdues assimilates and eradicates the other
Jayan Nayar, Law—University of Warwick, 1999 “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity ,” 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599
[*606] Distinguishing these two meanings of "order" provides us with radically opposed directions of analysis and orientations for future imagings of social relations. Although the rhetoric of world-order would focus on visions of some projected "world" that provides the aspiration for collective endeavors, "order" does not come to be without necessary "ordering;" the "world" of "world-order" has not come to be without the necessary ordering of many worlds. The ordering and the ordered, the world of order and the ordered world, all are inextricable parts of the past and the present of "civilization." Despite the vision of world-order founded on a notion of a universal society of humankind aspiring toward a universal common good, (first given meaning within a conceptual political-legal framework through the birth of the so-called "Westphalian" state system n14 ), the materialities of "ordering" were of a different complexion altogether. Contrary to the disembodied rhetoric of world-order as bloodless evolution, the new images of the world and languages of "globality" did not evolve out of a sense of "hospitality" n15 to the "other," the "stranger." Rather, the history of the creation of the post-Westphalian "world" as one world, can be seen to be most intimately connected with the rise of an expansionist and colonizing world-view and practice. Voyages of "discovery" provided the necessary reconnaissance to image this "new world." Bit by bit, piece by piece, the jigsaw of the globe was completed. With the advance of the "discoverer," the "colonizer," the "invader," the "new" territories were given meaning within the hermeneutic construct that was the new "world." [*607] The significance of this evolution of the world does not, however, lie merely in its acquiring meaning. It is not simply the "idea" of the world that was brought to prominence through acts of colonization. The construction of the "stage" of the world has also occurred, albeit amid the performance of a violent drama upon it. The idea of a single world in need of order was followed by a succession of chained and brutalized bodies of the "other." The embodied world that has been in creation from the "colonial" times to the present could not, and does not, accommodate plurality. The very idea of "one world" contains the necessary impetus for the absorption, assimilation, if not destruction, of existing worlds and the genocide of existing socialities. This violence of "order-ing" within the historical epoch of colonialism is now plainly visible. Through "colonialism" was reshaped the material basis of exchange that determined human relationships. Put differently, the very idea of what is "human" was recast by the imposed value-systems of the "civilizing" process that was colonialism. To be human, to live, and to relate to others, thus, both lost and gained meaning. Lost were many pre-colonial and indigenous conceptions of human dignity, of subsistence, production, consumption, wealth and poverty. Gained was the advent of the human "self" as an objective "economic" agent and, with it, the universals of commodification as the basis for human relations. Following this transformation of the material political-economy of the colonized, or "ordered," colonialism entrenched the "state" as the symbolic "political" institution of "public" social relations. The effect of this "colonization of the mind" was that the "political-economic" form of social organization--the state--was universalized as common, if not "natural," resulting in a homogenization of "political" imagination and language. Thus, diversity was unified, while at the same time, unity was diversified. The particularities and inconveniences of human diversity--culture and tradition--were subordinated to the "civilized" discourse of secular myths (to which the "rule of law" is central), n16 while concurrently, humanity was formally segregated into artificial "states," enclosures of mythic solidarities and common destinies.This brief remembering of colonialism as an historic process, provides us with the most explicit lessons on the violence of the "ordering" of "worlds." From its history we see that an important feature of ordering prevails. The world of those who "order" is the destruction of the "worlds" of those ordered. So many ideologies of negation and (re)creation served to justify this "beginning"--terra nullius, the "savage" native, the "civilizing mission." n17 The [*608] "world," after all, had to be created out of all this "unworldly" miasma, all for the common good of the universal society of humankind. Although historical colonialism as a formal structure of politico-legal ordering of humanity has come and gone, the violence of colonization is very much a persistent reality. A striking feature of historical world-orderings was the confidence with which the "new world" was projected upon human imagination. Colonialism was not a tentative process. The "right" of colonization, both as a right of the colonizer and as a right thing to do by the colonizer, was passionately believed and confidently asserted. Thus, for the most part, this "right" was uncontested, this confidence unchallenged. "World-order" today is similarly asserted with confidence and rectitude. Contemporary world-orderings, consistent with those of the past, are implemented using a range of civilizational legitimization. With the advent of an ideology of "humanity," a "post-colonial" concession to human dignity demanded by the previously colonized, new languages of the civilizational project had to be conceived of and projected. "Freed" from the brutalities of the order of historical colonialism, the "ordered" now are subjected to the colonizing force of the "post-colonial," and increasingly, globalization-inspired ideologies of development and security. Visible, still, is the legitimization of "order" as coercive command through the rhetoric of "order" as evolutionary structure.
A speech is not capable of divorcing you from a liberal society that has over-determined your identity.
Alcoff 5, Linda, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College and the CUNY Graduate Center, Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self (Studies in Feminist Philosophy) [Paperback])//AG
This moment crystallizes for me the effect of social identity, precisely because it is so obvious that global capital and neocolonial political formations had over- determined that encounter between the U.S. soldiers and my father. My argument in this book begins from the premise that structural power relations such as those created by global capital are determinate over the meanings of our identities, the possibilities of social interaction, and the formations of difference. Nonetheless, the focal point of power most often today operates precisely through the very personal sphere of our visible social identities. This should be no surprise, given that capitalism was a racial and gender system from its inception, distributing roles and resources according to identity markers of status and social position and thus reenforcing their stability. Social identitiessuch as race, ethnicity, and gender remain the most telling predictors of social power and success, predicting whether one works in the service sector, the trades, or the managerial class, whether and how much profit can be had by selling one’s home, how likely one is to be incarcerated, how likely one is to suffer sexual or domestic violence, and even how high one is likely to score on the SAT. Such facts do not displace the importance of class; rather, they reveal that class works through, rather than alongside, the ca- tegories of visible identity.