Frame the alternative within consequentialism – neoliberalism is most ethical because all practical alternatives are worse and cause violence
-coming up with an alternative economic system matters
-don’t take a leap of faith
-any alternative is utopian and unachievable
-capitalism can be reformed
Richards 9 – PhD in Philosophy @ Princeton
Jay Richards, PhD with honors in Philosophy and Theology from Princeton, “Money, Greed, and God: Why Capitalism Is the Solution and Not the Problem,” pg. 31-32
Myth no. 1: The Nirvana Myth (contrasting capitalism with an unrealizable ideal rather than with its live alternatives) But the myth can have subtle effects even if we reject utopian schemes. To avoid its dangers, we have to resist the temptation to compare our live options with an ideal that we can never realize.When we ask whether we can build a just society, we need to keep the question nailed to solid ground: just compared with what?It doesn’t do anyone any good to tear down a society that is “unjust” compared with the kingdom of God if that society is more just than any of the ones that will replace it. Compared with Nirvana, no real society looks good. Compared with utopia, Stalinist Russia and America at its best will both get bad reviews. The differences between them may seem trivial compared to utopia. That’s one of the grave dangers of utopian thinking: it blinds us totheimportant differences among the various ways of ordering society. The Nirvana Myth dazzles the eyes, to the point that the real alternatives all seem like dull and barely distinguishable shades of gray. The free exchange of wages for work in the marketplace starts to look like slavery. Tough competition for market share between companies is confused with theft and survival of the fittest. Banking is confused with usury and exploitation. This shouldn’t surprise us. Of course a modern capitalist society like the United States looks terrible compared with the kingdom of God. But that’s bad moral reasoning. The question isn’t whether capitalism measures up to the kingdom of God. The question is whether there’s a better alternative in this life. “Those who condemn the immorality of liberal capitalism do so in comparison with a society of saints that has never existed—and never will.” —Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works If we’re going to compare modern capitalism with an extreme, we should compare it with a real extreme—like communism in Cambodia, China, or the Soviet Union. Unlike Nirvana, these experiments are well within our power to bring about. They all reveal the terrible cost of trying to create a society in which ev- eryone is economically equal. If we insist on comparing live options with live options, modern capitalism could hardly be more different, more just, or more desirable than such an outcome. That doesn’t mean we should rest on our laurels. It means we need to stay focused on reality rather than romantic ideals. So how should we answer the question that began this chap- ter: can’t we build a just society? The answer: we should do everything we can to build a more just society and a more just world. And the worst way to do that is to try to create an egalitarian utopia.
Force the negative to explain how their alternative produces behavioral change - their alternative may sound good, but it produces no institutions for creating social change
(Clive, Professor of Geography and Social Theory at the University of Exeter in the UK, “The politics of behaviour change”, September 3, 2010, http://clivebarnett.wordpress.com/2010/09/03/the-politics-of-behaviour-change-2/)
Another plug, this time for a Theme Issue of the journal Environment and Planning A, on the topic of Ethical Foodscapes. I was asked to write a short commentary on the papers in this collection, and ended up using this an excuse to try to say something coherent about ‘the politics of behaviour change’ - the papers in the collection all engage, in different ways, with ongoing attempts to influence individual patterns of consumption by fiddling with the backgrounds of food practices. This is just one field in which the issue of how and whether to influence people’s conduct to achieve various ‘public goods’ has become central to contemporary politics and governance. There is a great research project investigating this phenomenon, based at Aberystwyth, on the time-spaces of soft paternalism. Behaviour change is all over the place these days – in climate change debates, in obesity agendas, amongst the Research Councils who fund science and social science in the UK - it’s all the rage in policy circles, not just in government but also amongst think-tankers and NGOs. The House of Lords Select Committee has just announced an inquiry into how ideas about behaviour change are working in government. What I find most interesting about all this is the challenge this seems to present to styles of ‘critical’ social science analysis – Elizabeth Shove has an interesting reflection on this issue, also in Environment and Planning A earlier this year, which focusses on how ‘attitude-behaviour-change’ models of governance tend to marginalise insights of social theory. It is interesting, certainly, to track the ways in which certain scientific and social scientific fields are being ‘sourced’ for authoritative models of how to intervene to bring about social change – the most obvious example being the selective use of neuroscience, along with the popularisation of behavioural economics by Thaler and Sunstein’s Nudge. There is a cross-over here between academic research fields and popular discourse too; think of Malcolm Gladwell’s books, the success of Freakonomics, or my favourite, Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski’s Soccernomics - a book which uses simple statistical analysis to develop some interesting explanations and make some entertaining predictions about how success in national and international football is determined (interestingly, this book was published in the UK under the title Why England Lose: And other curious phenomena explained – the difference in the title between the UK and US version is indicative of the current popularity of this style of popular social science beyond any particular specialised interest).¶ There is an easy default position that this style of thinking about influencing people is inherently sinister, since it explicitly seeks to get at people through less-than-fully-rational means – by either designing change into infrastructures, or by deploying affective styles of communication. This seems to circumvent a basic principle of persuading people of the reasons to change through rational argument. Behaviour change initiatives are all about ‘manipulating’ the contexts in which people exercise choice and discretion. They seem to be designed to confirm the model of ‘governmentality’ developed by Michel Foucault, of a mode of power which works by shaping the contexts of individuals’ conduct without directly intervening in that conduct. Of course, the question that Foucault doesn’t necessarily help us with is how to know when it is a problem that your conduct is being configured, ‘nudged’, in certain ways, and when it isn’t. There is a tendency of course to read Foucault as a theorist of social control, but I think the proliferation of behaviour change initiatives is one occasion to re-visit the ‘politics’ of using Foucault. The anthropologist James Ferguson has recently argued that there is a real political stake at play in seemingly arcane differences between conceptualisations of neoliberalism as a hegemonic project of class-power, informed by Marxist theorists such as David Harvey, and neoliberalization as a contingent assemblage of varied ‘arts of government’, informed by governmentality theory, in the work of Aihwa Ong for example. One reason not to reconcile these approaches – not to think that Foucault provides a nice micro-analysis of the ‘how’ of neoliberalism, while Marxism still holds the secrets to explaining the real interests driving the ‘why’ (an argument made by Bob Jessop) – is because the governmentality approach draws into view the ‘critical’ imperative to think through the possibilities of alternative ‘arts of government’. Quite a lot of sexy theory these days doesn’t like to do this, preferring stylized images of contestation and disruption. This is why the default reading of behaviour change, as a sinister way of controlling people’s actions in the interests of more neoliberalism, more consumerism, more responsibilization, doesn’t seem convincing to me – it seems to close down the more difficult form of analysis which would ask about the possibility of using devices and discourses of ‘behaviour change’ for different purposes, or in more democratically accountable fashion.
Perm do both
The permutation solves best - neoliberal institutions and market mechanisms can be used against themselves - the alt’s refusal of state and market engagement makes reductions in structural violence impossible
Ferguson, Professor of Anthropology at Stanford, 11
(James, The Uses of Neoliberalism, Antipode, Vol. 41, No. S1, pp 166–184)
If we are seeking, as this special issue of Antipode aspires to do, to link our critical analyses to the world of grounded political struggle—not only to interpret the world in various ways, but also to change it—then there is much to be said for focusing, as I have here, on mundane, real- world debates around policy and politics, even if doing so inevitably puts us on the compromised and reformist terrain of the possible, rather than the seductive high ground of revolutionary ideals and utopian desires. But I would also insist that there is more at stake in the examples I have discussed here than simply a slightly better way to ameliorate the miseries of the chronically poor, or a technically superior method for relieving the suffering of famine victims.¶ My point in discussing the South African BIG campaign, for instance, is not really to argue for its implementation. There is much in the campaign that is appealing, to be sure. But one can just as easily identify a series of worries that would bring the whole proposal into doubt. Does not, for instance, the decoupling of the question of assistance from the issue of labor, and the associated valorization of the “informal”, help provide a kind of alibi for the failures of the South African regime to pursue policies that would do more to create jobs? Would not the creation of a basic income benefit tied to national citizenship simply exacerbate the vicious xenophobia that already divides the South African poor,¶ in a context where many of the poorest are not citizens, and would thus not be eligible for the BIG? Perhaps even more fundamentally, is the idea of basic income really capable of commanding the mass support that alone could make it a central pillar of a new approach to distribution? The record to date gives powerful reasons to doubt it. So far, the technocrats’ dreams of relieving poverty through efficient cash transfers have attracted little support from actual poor people, who seem to find that vision a bit pale and washed out, compared with the vivid (if vague) populist promises of jobs and personalistic social inclusion long offered by the ANC patronage machine, and lately personified by Jacob Zuma (Ferguson forthcoming).¶ My real interest in the policy proposals discussed here, in fact, has little to do with the narrow policy questions to which they seek to provide answers. For what is most significant, for my purposes, is not whether or not these are good policies, but the way that they illustrate a process through which specific governmental devices and modes of reasoning that we have become used to associating with a very particular (and conservative) political agenda (“neoliberalism”) may be in the process ofbeing peeled away from that agenda, and put to very different uses. Any progressive who takes seriously the challenge I pointed to at the start of this essay, the challenge of developing new progressive arts of government, ought to find this turn of events of considerable interest.¶ As Steven Collier (2005) has recently pointed out, it is important to question the assumption that there is, or must be, a neat or automatic fit between a hegemonic “neoliberal” political-economic project (however that might be characterized), on the one hand, and specific “neoliberal” techniques, on the other. Close attention to particular techniques (such as the use of quantitative calculation, free choice, and price driven by supply and demand) in particular settings (in Collier’s case, fiscal and budgetary reform in post-Soviet Russia) shows that the relationship between the technical and the political-economic “is much more polymorphous and unstable than is assumed in much critical geographical work”, and that neoliberal technical mechanisms are in fact “deployed in relation to diverse political projects and social norms” (2005:2).¶ As I suggested in referencing the role of statistics and techniques for pooling risk in the creation of social democratic welfare states, social technologies need not have any essential or eternal loyalty to the political formations within which they were first developed. Insurance rationality at the end of the nineteenth century had no essential vocation to provide security and solidarity to the working class; it was turned to that purpose (in some substantial measure) because it was available, in the right place at the right time, to be appropriated for that use. Specific ways of solving or posing governmental problems, specific institutional and intellectual mechanisms, can be combined in an almost infinite variety of ways, to accomplish different social ends. With social, as with any other sort of technology, it is not the machines or the mechanisms that decide what they will be used to do.¶ Foucault (2008:94) concluded his discussion of socialist government- ality by insisting that the answers to the Left’s governmental problems require not yet another search through our sacred texts, but a process of conceptual and institutional innovation. “[I]f there is a really socialist governmentality, then it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. It must be invented”. But invention in the domain of governmental technique is rarely something worked up out of whole cloth. More often, it involves a kind of bricolage (Le ́vi- Strauss 1966), a piecing together of something new out of scavenged parts originally intended for some other purpose. As we pursue such a process of improvisatory invention, we might begin by making an inventory of the parts available for such tinkering, keeping all the while an open mind about how different mechanisms might be put to work, and what kinds of purposes they might serve. If we can go beyond seeing in “neoliberalism” an evil essence or an automatic unity, and instead learn to see a field of specific governmental techniques, we may be surprised to find that some of them can be repurposed, and put to work in the service of political projects very different from those usually associated with that word. If so, we may find that the cabinet of governmental arts available to us is a bit less bare than first appeared, and that some rather useful little mechanisms may be nearer to hand than we thought.
No root cause of war – monocausal explanations are reductive and fail
Holsti 91 Kalevi Jaakko, Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, On The Study Of War,” Peace And War: Armed Conflicts And International Order, 1648-1989, Published by Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521399297, p. 3
Investigators of conflict, crises, and war reached a consensus years ago that monocausal explanations are theoretically and empirically deficient. Kenneth Waltz’ (1957) classic typology of war explanations convincingly demonstrated various problems arising from diagnoses that locate war causation exclusively at the individual, state attribute, or systemic levels. He also illustrated how prescriptions based on faulty diagnoses offer no solution to the problem. Even Rousseau’s powerful exploration of the consequences of anarchy, updated by Waltz (1979), remains full of insights, but it only specifies why wars recur (there is nothing to prevent them) and offers few clues that help to predict when, where, and over what issues. Blainey (1973), in another telling attack on monocausal theories, continues where Waltz left off. He offers, on the basis of rich historical illustrations, both logical and anecdotal rebuttals of facile explanations of war that dot academic and philosophical thought on the subject. But rebuttals of the obvious are not sufficient. We presently have myriads of theories of war, emphasizing all sorts of factors that can help explain its etiology. As Carroll and Fink (1975) note, there are if anything too many theories, and even too many typologies of theories. Quoting Timascheff approvingly, they point out that anything might lead to war, but nothing will certainly lead to war.
Economic calculations are good – ethics requires choices between competing demands – economics creates a system for stabilizing the demands of the Other as preferences, allowing for ethical dialogue through market competition and negotiation
(Dag, Prof. of Economics @ U of Agder, Norway, Ethics and Economy: After Levinas, pgs. 65-66)
What is original in Levinas compared to other authors who also have defined being a human as being related to another human, such as, for instance, Buber and Løgstrup (mentioned in the previous chapter), and those representing the ethics of care (also presented in the previous chapter), is that Levinas acknowledges that I not only meet the Other, but also the third, as the Other. By meeting the third I am again confronted with an appeal for mercy. From this – as a result of an intention of being responsible – I am forced to evaluate, compare, reason and to seek what is just.Justice exerts violence but is still better than injustice. In my efforts towards more justice I must compare, and in this comparing I may have to count, also money; it may even be necessary to set a price for a human life, something that, from the point of view of mercy, is a scandal, but still necessary, because the third is also there. It is necessary to count; the question is why I count. Is it out of my conatus, which, if it is allowed to unfold freely without being questioned (or, alternatively, if I ignore the questioning), will lead to violence? Or is it out of mercy, which comes to me as an imperative in the encounter with the Other, and which, in the encounter with the third – as the Other – drives me to seek always more justice? This is not only about counting, it is about being in general – why and how I am. Levinas will insist that “To be or not to be, that is not the question” (Cohen in Levinas, 1985: 10). Instead, it is a question of how I am a being together with others in the world. Ethics comes before ontology. An objection to Noddings’ ethics of care is that the mother-infant- situation is not a common one. It is instead a special situation where special qualities are called forth, that are not found elsewhere in society. To believe that the good is natural can be naïve; it can even be dangerous. Looking around in the world today the opposite would be more natural to claim: we have a natural inclination towards controlling and reducing the Other, with violence, physical or psychological. But through the encounter with the Other we are told that this is wrong. It is this small ‘source of the good’ which dominates a mother when she is alone with her infant. At the moment we have to relate to more than one other we understand that we need to make some efforts to understand the situation of the other individuals, their special situations and needs, so that we can know what is just in our dealing with others. It is his discussion of the meeting with the third that makes Levinas’ philosophy so relevant to economy, although most presentations of his philosophy concentrate on the encounter with the Other, and may thus cause the misunderstanding that this is his ethics, and consequently a quite impossible one. However, as mentioned earlier, Levinas’ description of the encounter with the Other is his answer to the question of what is the meaning of ethics, or, why we at all (at least sometimes) want justice. In short, to Levinas, the task of the economy is to contribute to justice.The cause of the striving for justice is the imperative of mercy in the encounter with the Other.And as there is always more than one other my experience of the encounter with the Other cannot be directly transferred to social reality.I must perform a brutal transformation from mercy to justice (but which nevertheless is less brutal than me not caring about justice), and in doing so I need as much as I can possibly acquire of what is available of detailed knowledge of each particular situation, as well as my ability to reason logically. It is not only a fact that ethics is necessary for the economy. Economy is also necessary for ethics.Just as a house may be a concrete security for a loan, the economy is a concrete security for ethics. Without economic goods and needs and the accompanying knowledge for myself, there would have been no need for ethics. An ethics for the other can only be expressed as long as the other has specific needs competing with mine. Only then can I act for the other instead of acting for myself, and thus set the needs of the other before those of me. Or, put in another way: angels do not need ethics, because they have no needs and thus no need to help each other
Neolib leads to oceanic protection -- Chile proves
Juan C. Castilla- Professor for the School of Biological Sciences at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, Agust 16th 2010 http://www.pnas.org/content/107/39/16794.abstract
The Loco, historically the most economically important shellfish in Chile, and its collapse in the late 1980s served as a major trigger for governance transformation. Before its collapse, the Loco fishery operated under an open access regime, fishers had no incentives to cooperate, and short-term individualism prevailed. Until 1974 the Loco fishery was characterized by landings of ≈2,000–6,000 tons y−1, used mainly for domestic consumption. In 1973–1974, shortly after a military coup, Chile adopted a neoliberal policy framework. This together with the implementation of an aggressive exchange rate policy substantially improved fishing export earnings (27). As export markets grew, artisanal fishers intensified their mobility along the coast to take advantage of the new opportunities. More than 15,000 Loco divers moved around Chile, increasing landings but sparking conflicts between locals and outsiders. Landings of Loco declined between 1980 and 1988 (Fig. 2), almost certainly owing to overexploitation, precipitating a series of management steps that attempted, unsuccessfully, to prevent clandestine catches and smuggling (28, 29). The Loco fishery was a path-dependent system, trapped in an undesirable state that finally collapsed, resulting in a closure from 1989 to 1992 (Fig. 2). The fishery only reopened after a legislative window of opportunity, when democracy returned to Chile (Fig. 2). A key starting point, which prepared for the governance transformation associated with the MEABR policy, was an increased understanding of basic ecological concepts pertaining to the role of fishers in structuring marine ecosystems in Chile. This information came initially from two small experimental no-take coastal reserves, administered by universities, in central (Las Cruces; 5 ha) and southern (Mehuín; 10 ha) Chile. Research at these reserves (1981–1988) showed that humans controlled the abundance of intertidal and shallow subtidal Loco populations, which in turn determined the species composition of the intertidal communities (30). When Loco is absent, the ecosystem shifts to a mussel-dominated intertidal seascape, which has little or no economic value. Consequently, human harvesting is a key driver of intertidal and shallow subtidal ecosystem dynamics (Fig. 3) (30, 31). In addition, research showed that when harvesting was experimentally curtailed, benthic resources, such as Loco, sea urchins, keyhole limpets, and algae, could be restored via “natural seeding” over a period of 3–5 y (31, 32). The enhanced understanding of the role of fishers in these linked SES came at a time when artisanal fishers were acutely concerned about the depletion and recovery prospects of several key benthic resources. It created the opportunity for scientists and existing fisher associations to exchange information and develop participatory research at a larger scale, encompassing specific fishing coves, or “caletas” (33). Such collaboration involved the implementation of experimental MEABR undertaken jointly by marine ecologists and artisanal fisher associations christened as “natural shellfish restocking via rotational exploited areas” (30). To experimentally track the recovery of stocks, fishing was voluntarily suspended in these trials years before MEABRs became a legal management tool.¶ The new fishery governance arrangements also established space-based zoning affecting the “midscale artisanal fishery” along the richest upwelling waters and productive Chilean coastal areas (Fig. 1). In essence, a 5-nautical-mile exclusive access zone was granted to artisanal fisheries, and a pseudo-individual transferable catch quota system was implemented for fully exploited species (mainly for small-pelagic species). This quota is nontransferable between industrial and artisanal fleets (23). These regulations controlling fishing rights have led to a continuous and sustained increase in landings by the midscale artisanal fleet from ca. 200,000 tons in 1991 to 1.84 million tons in 2008. In turn, the industrial fishery landings decreased from ca. 6 million tons in 1991 to ca. 1.4 million tons in 2008. Additionally in Chile, between 1997 and 2006 the industrial purse seine vessel holding capacity has decreased by ≈50%. In summary, the 1991 Chilean fishery governance reforms and innovative management tools seem to have counteracted the overexploitation of fish that is characteristic of common pool resources in open-access systems (23).¶ Transdisciplinary studies of transformations for improved systems of governance in the management of natural resources are not common in the literature (but see refs. 13 and 43), probably because changes in governance are typically small and incremental. Investigations focusing on radical transformations in SES, such as fishing reserves in the Phillipines (44), the Great Barrier Reef (19), and the Helgeå River catchment in southern Sweden (21), share a number of key insights, together with the Chilean case, on how these shifts happen. Transformations involve a series of elements and decisions to convert a system trapped in a determined undesirable pathway to a different, potentially more beneficial system (22). This study illustrates how a window of opportunity for change can emerge when current policies fail. In Chile, the collapse of stocks and a change in government provided this opportunity for rapid policy innovation. Such reform did not occur in a vacuum; rather, it built on existing strengths, social structures, local and scientific knowledge, and skills that recombined for new innovative solutions. This required the identification of dysfunctional states and alternative pathways. Importantly, the transformation was not completed once the new fisheries policy was implemented. The needs to navigate a transition phase toward a sustainable pathway and to keep building resilience of the new system are shown to be critical issues. The Chilean case supports the utility of the three-phase model (preparation, transition, and building resilience of the new regime) linked by a window of opportunity. It represents a transformation from an undesirable path-dependent system to more favorable trajectories and provides empirical insights on critical factors of specific phases (Fig. 2).¶ Critical elements that allowed preparing for the transformation were (i) recognition of the depletion of resource stocks, (ii) new scientific knowledge on the ecology and resilience of targeted stocks and their role in ecosystem dynamics, and (iii) demonstration-scale experimental trials, building on smaller-scale scientific experiments. The Chilean experience illustrates the importance of identifying new pathways or alternative states for an effective transformation. The experiments carried out by scientists and local fishers generated the necessary knowledge to develop this new pathway for the management of coastal SES (26). The three initial experimental/pilot sites where fishers and scientist collaborated constituted important learning platforms from which the new management approaches could be tested at an appropriate spatial and temporal scale (26, 33). The development of a communication network between researchers and the emerging confederation of artisanal fishers was crucial to create the technical and political support for a transformation in governance that incorporated new information and understanding of ecosystem dynamics.¶ Importantly, the Chilean case helps identify enabling factors for going from one phase to the next. Political turbulence and resource stock collapse provided a window of opportunity that triggered the transformation, allowing the consolidation of enabling legislation. Critical elements to further navigate this transformation were the ability to communicate new knowledge from the experiments by harnessing a preexisting social network of fishers. In particular, the reemerged fisher confederation provided the capacity and political leverage to link the initiative of the three pilot trials to change institutions at the national level. Members of the confederation of artisanal fishers acted as institutional entrepreneurs (19) and facilitated the cross-scale and the cross-organizational interactions that were required to transform the social–ecological regime (22). In effect, the confederation of fishers represented a bridging organization (45) that could enhance vertical integration from local to national levels among different players.¶ The existence of social mechanisms for transformability, such as those identified in this article, are key for moving toward a social–ecological trajectory with the capacity to manage ecosystems sustainably for human well-being. However, the resource management task is not over once a policy is implemented. It is essential to build resilience and adaptability of the new system (46). In Chile, the achievement of the MEABR management regime has been seen as an end point, and consequently colearning processes have been weakened, with negative consequences for the system and individual fishers. The Chilean system still needs to develop incentives for fisher associations to continuously experiment and foster values of stewardship (36). At present the Chilean MEABR policy has left few legal options for fishers to undertake experiments as the basis for future adaptations or transformations (45, 47). This is unfortunate, because mechanisms for colearning need to continue evolving to deal with change (48, 49).¶ Building resilience of the new regime is an ongoing task. Indeed, current collaborations between researchers and fishers may be an unrecognized phase in which the system is preparing for a new transformation. For example, new collaborative research on the role of MEABRs as biodiversity offsets (38) and fisher-managed marine protected areas (40) might be providing basic elements of future plausible alternative states. Only with a historical perspective will we know whether these initiatives are building resilience of the existing system or preparing for a new transformation in governance.¶ In Chile, a transformation in governance reorganized the fishing rights of individuals, communities, and fleets. Different social processes were needed to achieve the current management arrangements, and it is encouraging to see that the Chilean FAL has helped to ameliorate overexploitation (23, 24, 36, 42). However, the increased dialogue between resource users, academics, and policy makers decreased after policy implementation. We urgently advocate for the need to reinforce dialogue to prepare for the future. As we have seen, governance transformations toward improved pathways are ongoing processes that involve a preparation phase. Elements of this phase, although very hard to anticipate, will involve identifying dysfunctional states, alternative pathways, change agents, and strategies for overcoming social and ecological coastal problems.¶ Our analysis of evolving systems of governance for coastal marine resources in Chile reveals several general conclusions that may act as lessons for the future. A common theme with other studies on transformations (19, 21, 22, 44) is how new knowledge is developed and built into novel governance systems for managing ecosystem services and how the ideas and practices developed in shadow networks were connected to political leadership to create a governance transformation. In addition, transformational change is most likely to occur when a window of opportunity for change arises and when stakeholders agree that the current system is dysfunctional. Further research to understand critical elements in guiding transformations toward improved stewardship of marine ecosystem services will help prepare and recognize windows of opportunity (22). This is an imperative issue, considering the current global marine resource crisis and the difficulties in implementing new governance models to tackle future global social–ecological changes.
Neolib creates conditions that allows for environmental sustainability.
Daniel. Director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies, Masters in economics from London School of Economics. 8/2/1. http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-015b.pdf
Expanding trade is not merely compatible with high standards of environmental quality but can lead directly to their improvement. As a country sees its standard of living rise through economic liberalization and trade expansion, its industry can more readily afford to control emissions. Its citizens have more to spend, above what they need for subsistence, on the “luxury good” of improved environmental quality. And as economic growth creates an expanding, better- educated middle class, the political demand rises for pollution abatement. That explains why the most stringent environmental laws in the world today are found in developed countries that are relatively open to trade. Development by itself can have a mixed impact on the environment. All else being equal, an economy that produces more of exactly the same goods and services in exactly the same way will produce more pollution. But development changes not only the size of an economy but also its composition and its level of technology. More sophisticated technology can mean cleaner production processes and more affordable and effective pollution abatement. And as nations progress to higher stages of development, they tend to move away from more resource-intensive activities such as mining, agriculture, and heavy industry and into light manufacturing, information technology, and services. A study by the OECD on globalization and the environment found: “There is some evidence that, once a country begins to industrialize, trade liberalization helps to make the structure of its economy less pollution-intensive than in those countries whose economies remain relatively closed. In particular, freer trade seems to promote the transition from heavy resource-processing sectors to light manufacturing ones (at least at middle income levels).”
The alternative leads to developmentalist protectionism – causes US isolationism – turns the K because it blocks sustainability and social justice
(David Hess, David J. Hess is a professor in the Sociology Department at Vanderbilt University, Associate Director of the Vanderbilt Institute for Energy and Environment, Director of Environmental and Sustainability Studies, and Director of Undergraduate Studies for the Sociology Department, “The Green Transition, Neoliberalism, and the Technosciences.” In Luigi Pellizzoni and Marja Ylönen, eds. Neoliberalism and Technoscience: Critical Assessments, Ashgate Press, www.davidjhess.org/GreenTranNeolibEnv.pdf)
The field sociology of neoliberalism also provides new ways to think about its possible future. The fact that there was an historical change during the 1970s and 1980s from the dominance of social liberalism to neoliberalism in many political fields across the world raises the question of what type of ideology might emerge to replace neoliberalism. Historical change tends to create new contradictions and countermovements (Polanyi 2010), but much of the scholarship on a post-neoliberal order is clouded by nostalgia, such as belief that increasing within-nation inequality will lead to a swing of the pendulum back toward the happy days of social liberalism, or by utopianism, such as belief that a crisis in capitalism and global ecology will lead to a great transition to socialism or localism. I suggest that the historical condition of the relative decline of an economic superpower may be leading to resurgence of a modified form of its past of developmentalism. Developmentalist liberalism can be distinguished from neoliberalism and social liberalism on several grounds, of which the increasingly defensive position on trade and the corresponding invigoration of industrial policy are the most central. Developmentalism remains mainstream because it does not challenge the premise of restricted government intervention into an economy based on large, publicly traded corporations. In contrast with the three mainstream positions, agents in subordinate positions in the political field advance more radical visions of the global economy, such as an economy based on locally owned, independent enterprises or one based on much higher levels of public ownership. Although it is possible that ideologies currently in a subordinate position in the political field may become dominant over the long run, the likely outcome, albeit not necessarily desirable from either a sustainability or social justice perspective, may be a growing tendency toward developmentalism. The shift within the American political field in the twenty-first century is consistent with its nineteenth-century past and its isolationist proclivities. During the nineteenth century the United States was a secondary economic power with respect to European countries, and it pursued its successful policy of industrialization based on strong tariffs and import substitution. Only after the United States had achieved clear hegemony in the global economy did it shift to a liberalized position on trade, which at that time benefited the country by opening up foreign markets to trade on terms favorable to the United States (Chang 2008). However, as foreign competition increased, sentiment in favor of a more defensive approach to trade increased, first with respect to Japan during the 1980s and then today with respect to China. Thus, the stage is set for the political field in the United States during the twenty-first century to look more like that of the nineteenth century than the twentieth century. Because the United States has been the world’s leading supporter of neoliberal policies, a shift toward developmentalism could have global implications for the history of neoliberalism as well as for the global economy.
Protectionism and isolationism cause extinction – terrorist WMD use, ethnic conflict, resource wars, and diversionary wars
Panzner 8 (faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase (Michael, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, Revised and Updated Edition, p. 136-138, googlebooks)
Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislationlike the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster, But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange, foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the (heap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United States and China is "inevitable" at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.