Foreign Direct Investment and Host Country Productivity: The American Automotive Component Industry in the 1980s Wilbur Chung

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Foreign Direct Investment and Host Country Productivity:

The American Automotive Component Industry in the 1980s

Wilbur Chung

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

2027 Steinberg-Dietrich Hall

Philadelphia, PA 19104

Phone: 215-898-2tbd

Will Mitchell

The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University

Box 91020, Durham, NC 27708-0120

Phone: 919-660-7994, Fax: 919-681-6244

Bernard Yeung

Stern School of Business, New York University

44 West 4th Street, KMC 7-65

New York, NY 10012

Phone: 212-998-0425, Fax: 212-995-4221

July 12, 2002 (Version: fdi_07_2002d.doc)

Yy submitted to JIBS.

We gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions of James Bodurtha, Richard Caves, Gunter Dufey, Mark Huson, Doug Joines, Randall Morck, Rolf Mirus, Subi Rangan, J. Myles Shaver, Joel Slemrod and Bernie Wolf, as well as the editorial assistance of Nancy Kotzian. We are responsible for all errors.

Foreign Direct Investment and Host Country Productivity:

The American Automotive Component Industry in the 1980s


Although several studies show that inward foreign direct investment often leads to greater host country productivity, researchers have yet to determine the relative importance of direct technology transfer and competitive pressure. To assess the relative importance of the two channels, we examine the U.S. auto-component industry between 1979 and 1991. During this period, Japanese automobile assemblers began to produce vehicles in North American and began to purchase inputs from U.S. auto-component manufacturers. Those U.S. manufacturers that sold components to Japanese transplants would be the direct recipients of any technologies transferred from the Japanese. Although we find that the direct investment by Japanese assemblers was associated with overall productivity improvement in the U.S. auto-component industry, we find little evidence of direct technology transfer. The productivity growth of U.S. suppliers affiliated with Japanese assemblers was no greater than other non-affiliated U.S. suppliers. Further, we find that the Japanese assemblers tended to purchase components from less productive U.S. suppliers and, moreover, that low productivity suppliers that sold goods to Japanese assemblers had a higher survival rate than low productivity suppliers that did not sell to Japanese firms. The results suggest that increased competitive pressure in the auto sector was the main cause of overall productivity improvement, at least during the initial stages of foreign direct investment of the 1980s.

JEL classification: F14, F23, L62

Foreign Direct Investment and Host Country Productivity:

The American Automotive Component Industry in the 1980s
A classic line of inquiry in international strategy research is the origins and outcomes from foreign direct investment (FDI). In “The Future of the Multinational Enterprise”, Buckley and Casson (1976) explore why multinationals exist. By addressing why firms conduct foreign direct investment, they raise critical issues for policy makers. Notably, what stance should host country governments take towards foreign direct investment since FDI causes social and environmental externalities? Buckley and Casson suggest that entering foreign firms might train labor, cause greater worker migration, and exhaust critical inputs. They ask whether the net welfare outcome for the host country is positive. Even after several decades of research this remains a challenging question.

In exploring this question, we focus on a particular dimension of outcome: host industry productivity. Productivity is a particularly useful barometer, because FDI’s numerous effects will be directly or indirectly reflected: training of labor will increase productivity, for instance, while transfer of unique knowledge will increase productivity. Several studies examine the productivity issue. Prominently, Caves (1974) suggests that foreign direct investment (FDI) improves host country productivity in two ways: (1) by stimulating better resource allocation among firms and industries, and (2) by transferring technology from foreign firms to local firms in the host country.

Following Caves, other studies consistently find that inward foreign investment increases host industry productivity. Globerman (1979) use industry aggregate data, while Blomström and Persson (1983) and Blomström (1986) use establishment level data to study the relationship between productivity and FDI in Canada, Mexico, and the Unites States. Using cross-sectional regressions, these studies find that foreign-owned subsidiaries’ production share in an industry relates positively to value-added per employee and weakly negatively to average profitability.

Using firm level data for Morocco from the late 1980s, Haddad and Harrison (1993) find that greater foreign presence reduces dispersion in productivity among local firms, because the firms converge towards best practices, even though the study also finds that foreign presence is unrelated to productivity growth in domestic firms. Using Mexican establishment level data in the 1970s, Kokko (1994) finds that local establishments’ productivity level significantly lags in industries that use complex technologies and have a high foreign share of production, with large technology gaps in conjunction with high foreign ownership that inhibits knowledge spillovers. For a panel of Venezuelan plants, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that foreign equity participation is positively correlated with plant productivity for small enterprises. They also find that foreign investment negatively affects the productivity of domestically owned plants. Taking into account these two offsetting effects, the net impact of foreign investment is quite small. Hence, studies using firm and plant level data reveal a more complicated picture that suggests a multitude of foreign direct investment effects on productivity. In addition, the existing research does not clearly delineate the relative importance of Caves’ two explanations.

The relative importance of the competing explanations has significant policy and strategy implications. From a policy perspective, if increased host productivity is primarily the result of direct technology transfer, then attracting FDI is crucial for productivity growth. If, instead, increased host productivity is the result of greater competition, then attracting FDI is secondary to the question of why competition was not originally intense enough to ensure high productivity. From a strategy perspective, the key issue is whether establishing direct commercial linkages with specific productive foreign firms tends to help a firm become more productive itself or, instead, whether the firm must respond to more diffuse competitive pressures in order to gain improved productivity. Therefore, we investigate the relative importance of the channels through which foreign direct investment might influence host industry productivity using an industry study in which we can observe linkages between firms.

Our experimental setting is the U.S. auto component industry from 1979 to 1991. We focus our attention on Japanese FDI’s influence on U.S. suppliers’ productivity during this period. The North American auto sector in the 1980s had several features that made it an attractive setting. Unlike the end-product automobile sector, where there were only the Big Three U.S. assemblers (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler), the large number of firms that operated in the auto component supply sector provides the opportunity to examine how differences in supply relationships and other firm-level variables affected firm productivity. There was substantial inward foreign direct investment that originated predominantly from a single country, Japan. This Japanese investment likely increased competition that then led to productivity changes. In addition, the Japanese entrants possessed superior production techniques and management practices, which created the potential for technology transfer. Japanese transplant assemblers and some U.S. component manufacturers had direct contact via supply contracts. These relationships might have facilitated the direct transfer of production processes, operating systems, and management skills.

We compare the productivity and the survival of U.S. component firms that did and did not supply Japanese transplants. The comparison allows us to differentiate among the channels through which Japanese FDI in the automobile sector might affect productivity in the auto component industry. Because of the vertical assembler-supplier nature of our investigation, we add a third channel to the two that Caves discussed. The three channels are: (1) direct technology transfer from foreign firms to host-country firms, which would increase firm-level productivity; (2) competitive pressure, which would improve industry-level resource allocation and utilization; and (3) adverse selection, which would retard improvement of industry-level resource allocation. Adverse selection might arise if transplants were less knowledgeable than U.S. assemblers of U.S. suppliers’ capabilities and if relatively less productive suppliers were more inclined to seek supply contracts from the Japanese transplants.

Of note is that we examine FDI’s influence across vertically-related industries: FDI at the assembler level changing productivity at the supplier level. This contrasts with existing research that examines FDI and productivity change within the same industry. To evaluate whether FDI’s net welfare outcome for the host nation is positive, examining vertically-related industries is a natural extension. Additionally, the presence of buyer-supplier relationships provides a unique instrument to capture direct technology transfer. As far as we know this is one of the few studies to extend the investigation of FDI’s effects across related industries.

Several results stand out. First, the productivity of U.S. component firms in our sample rose with the share of vehicles that Japanese transplants assembled in the U.S. Second, the Japanese transplants tended to source from U.S. component suppliers that had lower initial productivity levels. Third, the less productive suppliers that sold components to Japanese transplant assemblers had a higher survival rate than other less productive suppliers. Fourth, U.S. component firms that supplied transplants did not experience faster productivity growth, although they were the most likely to receive any technology that was transferred. Together, our results suggest that increased competitive pressure was more responsible than technology transfer for the observed industry productivity growth, while adverse selection at least temporarily inhibited industry productivity growth.

The paper proceeds as follows. We present a brief history of Japanese foreign direct investment in the North American automobile sector during the 1980s. We then discuss the three ways that foreign direct investment may influence host industry productivity and outline their empirical implications for the auto component industry. The subsequent sections describe the data, the empirical analyses, the results and their robustness. We conclude by identifying the major implications of the results.

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