Conflict was an important element in the population mobility, which occurred in Indonesia in the two decades following the declaration of independence in 1945. Suhrke (1981) developed a model of refugee movements in which seven types of conflicts are identified as producing refugees. In discussing this model, Keely (1981:17) points out that it is especially appropriate to Third World situations where the conflicts are often associated with evolving processes of state, nation and regime-building. In Table 2, the seven categories of refugee-producing conflicts put forward by Suhrke are listed supplemented with two additional categories. In the table selected, examples from Indonesia in its first three decades of independence are given. It has been argued elsewhere (Hugo, 1987:20) that whereas conflict induced migration across international boundaries has a considerable literature internal migrations resulting from insecurity have attracted much less attention, although the scale of it has been substantial and the problems and consequences flowing from it have often been as significant as those of international refugee flows (Cohen and Francis (eds.), 1998a and b; Sorensen and Marc, 2001).
While the mandate of the UNHCR only includes refugees fleeing for their lives across international boundaries, it has increasingly became involved in providing assistance to those displaced within nations. However, as they (UNHCR, 1997:99) point out:
'... Doubts have been raised with regard to the very, concept of "internally displaced people" and the wisdom of institutionalising this notion in international law. Although a number of international organisations have contributed to the welfare of internally displaced persons during the past few years, no single humanitarian agency has been given statutory responsibility for their protection'.
Table 2: Types of Conflict Initiating Refugee Movements with Examples from Indonesia in the 1940s, 1950s, 160s and 1970s
Source: Categories modified and extended from Suhrke, 1981:17-23; Hugo and Chan, 1990
Type of Conflict
1. Independence Struggles
Evacuation of virtually the entire Indonesian population (approximately half a million people) from the City of Bandung 1946-48 (Hugo, 1975:254). In West Sumatra the large scale evacuation of people from Dutch occupied coastal areas to the republican territories of the interior (Naim, 1973:135).
2. Ethnic Conflicts with Autonomy/
Separatist movements in Irian Jaya have at times initiated refugee flows, some of them into neighbouring New Guinea (Garnaut and Manning, 1974:23; Roosman, 1980).
3. Internal Ethnic Conflict Not
Related to Separatists/Autonomy/
In 1967 some 60,000 ethnic Chinese were forced out of the interior areas of West Kalimantan due to long-standing hostility against the Chinese (Ward and Ward, 1974:28). Similarly displacement of Chinese occurred in West Java in the 1950s (Hugo, 1975:245)
4. Class Conflict
Persons displaced by the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) events of 1965.
5. Inter-Elite Power Struggles
The PRRI and Permesta Rebellions in Central Sumatra and North Sulawesi during the 1950s were against the authority of Jakarta and were supported mainly by the educated elite. It caused substantial movements both during the rebellions and after authority was restored (McNicoll, 1968:44; Naim, 1973:139).
6. State Intervention Conflicts
The Indonesian annexation of East-Timor in 1975 resulted in its people suffering great violence and dislocation such that its population in 1980 of 552,954 was less than in 1970 (610,541). Perhaps up to a half of the population were displaced during the late 1970's (Jenkins, 1978; 1979a and b, Rodgers, 1979; 1981).
7. International Wars
The Second World War initiated many refugee flows throughout the entire region. Since then the compounding of internal struggle by external intervention has produced huge involuntary displacements of people, as for example in Vietnam and Cambodia (Keely, 1981:17). Some boat people came to Indonesia.
8. Religious Based Conflict
In Indonesia rebellions aimed at making Indonesia an Islamic state erupted in West Java (1948-62), South/Southeast Sulawesi (1951-65), Aceh (1953-57; 1959-61) and South Kalimantan (1950-60). These initiated substantial migration flows (McNicoll 1968:43-8; Hugo, 1975; Harvey, 1974).
9. Colonial Based Conflicts
Colonial rule tended to favour some groups over others. with decolonisation conflicts based upon these differences can initiate refugee movements. In Indonesia several groups from Maluku were fiercely loyal to the Dutch and after Independence there was an attempt to set up a Republic of the South Moluccas causing refugee movements (McNicoll, 1968:43). In fact many South Moluccans followed their colonial masters back to the Netherlands where they settled (Kraak, 1957:350).
They point out that there is no formal or legal definition of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and they use the term to refer to:
‘... those persons who, as a result of persecution, armed conflict or violence, have been forced to abandon their homes and leave their usual place of residence, and who remain within the borders of their own country.’
This definition is relevant when considering forced migrations within Indonesia in the early post independence period.
Before looking at these migrations, however, it needs to be reiterated that the single cause explanations evident in the Table 2 classification are overly-simplistic. While ethnic, religious and political factors may be the triggers of forced movement there are more fundamental elements such as inequalities, power imbalances, discriminations and inequity in access to resources which cause forced migration. Nevertheless, it provides a convenient framework to consider involuntary migrations in early independent Indonesia. The major conflicts, which produced significant forced migrations during the first three decades of independence, are depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Conflicts Creating Outmigration in Indonesia, 1950-65
Source: Compiled from information in McNicoll, 1968
It is indicative that the main review of internal migration in Indonesia over the period under consideration here gives particular prominence to forced migration (McNicoll, 1968). This makes a distinction between long term persistent migratory flows and sudden large scale movements. The latter, predominantly forced migrations are termed non migrations. One of the distinctive patterns of forced migration not only in Indonesia but elsewhere in the region is pointed out elsewhere (Hugo, 1982:89) “… there have been important instances of forced rural-to-urban migration of refugees in Southeast Asian urbanisation … In times of political and military insecurity in rural areas, cities are often fortified havens of safety which attract flows of refugees." In his review of the growth of Indonesia's cities over the 1930-61 period, Goantiang (1965) stresses the importance of refugee movements in swelling the population of many of Indonesia's cities over that period. For example, he reports a field survey undertaken in Jakarta in 1954/55 thus ... "The findings prove that the main reason why people move to Djakarta is the prevalence of lawless disturbances in the interior." The case par excellence of forced migration being a major element in rapid urban and metropolitan growth in Indonesia, however, is that of Bandung in West Java and we shall briefly examine its postwar population change and the role of forced migrations in that growth.
Bandung was Indonesia's fastest growing city between the census of 1930 when its population was 166,815 and that of 1961 when it had reached 972,566. The pattern during the intervening period, however, was one of massive fluctuations. As was the case in Jakarta, Bandung experienced marked growth during the Japanese occupation due to the "push" exerted by the social and economic disruption wrought by the Japanese (Hugo, 1975:252).
In 1945-6 the Japanese surrender, the declaration of Indonesian independence and arrival of allied troops in Bandung, initiated much population movement. First there was a massive in-movement from all over West Java of Dutch persons freed from Japanese internment camps so that there were 60,000 Europeans in the city in November 1945 (Smail, 1964:99) - more than twice the pre-war peak. For the following two years Bandung was effectively divided into two cities, separated by the railway tracks passing through the city centre. To the north was the European enclave guarded by British troops and to the south the Indonesian section. Between November 1945 and March 1946 when fighting was at its height, 100,000 Indonesians moved out of the north sector while Europeans and some Chinese settled in the north. In addition, there were substantial evacuations from the southern sector into villages in the southern part of Bandung Kabupaten. Women, children and older people made up the bulk of these movers and they were replaced by young men coming from all over Priangan to take part in the struggle against the Europeans. The latter numbered some thousands (Smail, 1964:121). An additional group moving to Bandung from surrounding rural areas at this time were village officials who were unpopular for enacting oppressive Japanese policies and sought refuge in the city (Smail, 1964:122).
In March 1946 following an ultimatum by the British, Bandung was evacuated of Indonesians and large sections of it destroyed. "South Bandung, except for the parts of it with a large Chinese population, became and remained for a year and a half a dead city with grass growing in its streets" (Smail, 1964:151). Within four months approximately half a million people had moved from Bandung and its environs into rural areas of Priangan. After the evacuation the Indonesian struggle for independence continued, Bandung remained an essentially European- Chinese city until the beginning of 1948 when much of West Java was put under Dutch control. Many Sundanese men followed the Republican army to Yogyakarta or joined guerilla units operating in mountainous parts of the Province, particularly in the Sukabumi region. Despite these moves Bandung's population grew rapidly during the period of Dutch occupation.
With the transfer of sovereignty there began a decade of rapid growth for Bandung which saw its population almost double. Official figures of natural increase and net migration (Abdurachim, 1970:5) show that, on average, 62.5% of each year's growth was due to net migration gain. Initially there was a return of soldiers and evacuees who had left when the Dutch had reoccupied Bandung as well as those who, after the excitement of life as a guerilla, were unwilling to return to their village. Throughout the decade, particularly in the mid-50s, population movement to Bandung, as well as to other West Java urban centres, was initiated as a result of the insecurity of many rural areas due to the Darul Islam (D.I.) rebellion which lasted from 1948 until 1962.
The D.I. revolt began when a group of soldiers who had previously fought against the Dutch rebelled against the newly independent government to make Indonesia become an Islamic state. There were similar revolts in South/Southeast Sulawesi, Aceh and South Kalimantan loosely associated with the D.I. rebellion (McNicoll, 1968:44). The D.I. established control over much of the Eastern highland section of West Java and adjacent areas of Central Java, although at its height, its impact was felt all over West Java. Figure 4 shows the Indonesian Army’s official view as to which areas were in D.I. hands in May 1954 and this is indicative of the area which experienced the brunt of the impact of the rebellion. The D.I. adopted a campaign of terror and sabotage initially against the government but as the years went by they degenerated increasingly into "terrorizing and plundering gangs which could not return to normal life in society" (Boland, 1971:61). They caused much devastation of life (averaging 1,500 deaths per year) and property (9,000 houses destroyed per year) and "economic opportunities inevitably shrank in rebel-threatened or rebel-controlled areas, as roads and railways became unsafe and as peasants limited their output of food crops in response to rebel requisitions" (McNicoll, 1968:44). This produced substantial refugee movement toward areas protected by the army - particularly to local towns such as Garut and Tasikmalaya and to the City of Bandung. As with most such movements, accurate figures of the numbers are not available but provincial authorities put the total number of refugees at 215,700 over the 1951-6 period and at 52,672 in the last quarter of 1951 alone (McNicoll, 1968:44).
Figure 4: West Java: Location of Areas Under Darul Islam Control in 1954
Source: Hugo, 1975
The influx of refugees to West Java's cities in the 1950s resulted in them recording exceptionally rapid growth rates over the 1930-61 intercensal period. The population registration figures for Bandung show the city's population increasing from 592,825 in 1949 to 1,028,245 in 1960 (Abdurachim, 1970:5). However, these undoubtedly understate the influx of refugees since many refugees did not register and others subsequently returned to their homes. The rapid increase in population and build-up of urban refugees placed great strain on Bandung's resources. In 1957 a labour force sample survey in Bandung found that only 62.7 percent of males aged 12 years and over were employed (Indonesia, Direktorat Tenaga Kerja, 1958:589). Housing was another area under stress - in 1959 for example, there were 12 persons in Bandung for every house (Rasjid, 1972:4) and it was estimated by Lontoh (1964:51) that in 1964 at least 11,000 houses in the city were rumah liar (illegal housing built without permission on government or private land). The seriousness of the urban refugee problem and the growing pressure on city resources moved the authorities to attempt to membendung (dam up) the flow of people by declaring Bandung a "closed city" on 1st March 1954. Although the regulation stayed in force until September 1964, its major effect like the more recent attempt in Jakarta, was to dissuade migrants from registering as permanent residents.
Figure 5 shows the impact of forced migration on Bandung's growth. The top graph depicts net migration gains calculated by Abdurachim (1970) from registration statistics maintained by authorities of the City of Bandung. The lower graph presents results from a
Figure 5: A. Kotamadya Bandung: Annual Net Migration 1950-1968
Source: City Registration Statistics, quoted in Abdurachim, 1970.
B. Kotamadya Bandung, Kecamatan Astanaanjar and Lengkong: Year of Arrival of Resident Lifetime Migrants, 1969
Source: Population Registers
study undertaken in 1969 of Population Registers in the sub-districts of Bandung in which the year of arrival in Bandung of migrants still living in those two sub-districts is 1969. Both sources are incomplete but they indicate the major patterns of forced migration to the city. Peaks of inmovement are evident at the time of the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch, the onset of the D.I. rebellion in the early 1950s and the mid 1950s decline in registration due to the "closing" of the city. It will be noted also that there was an upswing in inmigration in 1965. This was again largely due to refugee movements, on this occasion people displaced by the violence and disruption caused during the attempted coup, although this dislocation was not as great in West Java as elsewhere in Java and Bali.
The implications of the IDP movement to Bandung during the 1950s are considerable. Above all they gave the city perhaps the most rapid rate of growth of any major city in Southeast Asia during the 1950s. In fact population projections of the world's million cities made in the early 1970s by the United Nations Population Division (Frejika, 1974:10-11; Bose, 1974:40-41) designated Bandung as the fastest growing city in the world.
It is clear that the refugee movements were a major catalyst in the growth of Bandung. It was suggested that the impact of such influxes of refugees is essentially temporary (McNicoll, 1968:45) but field investigation in Bandung would indicate that this is not the case. Although it was clear that most rural-urban refugees moved to Bandung with the intention of returning to their home village when security is restored, there is evidence that the longer the period of insecurity in the home place, the more likely they are to settle permanently in their urban refuge. Certainly many refugees to Bandung returned to their villages as soon as security was restored, but Figure 5 shows no massive net migration loss from Bandung when normalcy returned in its hinterland. Thus, at least among those refugees who were sufficiently committed to Bandung to register as citizens of the city, it was very common to remain in the city after security was restored in their home villages. Indeed fieldwork in Bandung during 1973 showed that many of the linkages between that city and particular parts of rural West Java which are major areas of origin for contemporary permanent and temporary migrants to the City, were originally established by refugee moves made during the 1950s. These consisted firstly of links with Bandung-based family members who had moved in as refugees, settled and remained but still maintain strong contacts with their natal village. Secondly, even among refugees who returned to their home village it was common for them to do so with a greatly enhanced knowledge of the City, the opportunities located there and some contacts with urban-based people. This frequently meant that regular visits to Bandung to work on a seasonal or other temporary basis were within their calculus of conscious choice and indeed many became regular "circular" migrants between village and city (Hugo, 1975; 1978).
Although less substantial, there were forced movements of D.I. displaced persons in other parts of Indonesia during the 1950s. The smallest was in the province of South Kalimantan where insecurity in the mountainous interior area of Hulusungai precipitated refugee migrations to the cities of Banjarmasin (McNicoll, 1968:48) and Samarinda (Goantiang, 1965:56). Both cities recorded very rapid rates of growth between the 1930 and 1961 censuses, with Banjarmasin's population more than trebling to 214,096 persons and Samarinda growing by more than 600 percent to a population of 69,715. The rebellion in Aceh in 1953 created a flow of refugees, estimated at around 60,000 persons (McNicoll, 1968:47), into neighbouring North Sumatra. Although most returned to Aceh in the late 1950s it is apparent that a significant minority remained and settled in North Sumatra. There was also, as in the other cases studied above, significant displacement of refugees to the towns and cities of Aceh, and this is reflected in their very high rates of intercensal population growth.
The other area to experience an Islamic rebellion was South/Southeast Sulawesi (Figure 6), where the insecurity extended from 1951 until 1965. The rebellion was accompanied by
Figure 6: Sulawesi: Showing Areas Influenced by Rebels 1956-57
Source: Harvey, 1974, 265
much terrorization of the local population, not only by the rebels but also wild gangs which roamed the countryside (Harvey, 1974:268). The main areas influenced by the conflict are shown in Figure 6, but at the peak of their power they controlled the bulk of the countryside and had the major cities encircled and it was only Makassar which was effectively under government control. No data are available concerning the scale of refugee movements associated with the rebellion, in fact at the time of the 1961 census, enumerators could not enter many areas due to insecurity – only two of the 25 regencies could be completely enumerated (McNicoll, 1968:47). What is apparent, however, is that the scale of movement was substantial. In a single 1957 offensive in Southeast Sulawesi, for example, 40,000 refugees were forced to flee to the city of Kendari (Harvey, 1974:376). As with other internal refugee movements in Indonesia, much of the migration was directed toward the towns and cities which were in government hands. Accordingly these urban areas recorded some of the most rapid rates of population growth between 1930 and 1961 of all cities in Indonesia. Makassar more than quadrupled its population from 84,855 to 384,159 and recorded an average annual growth rate of 4.9 percent. Throughout the 1950s its annual rate of population growth approached 10 percent, due primarily to the influx of refugees. The growth of Pare-pare (7.7 percent per annum) was even more rapid as Goantiang (1965:106) expresses...
"The reason that lawlessness in the interior swells the population of a small town may be aptly applied to Pare-pare ... Disorder, terrorism and torture, perpetuated (sic) by gangs of outlaws, drive people out of the interior of Central and South Sulawesi and force them to find asylum in coastal towns. Within 30 years Pare-pare was transformed from a sleepy community of 4,000 inhabitants into a bustling town of 68,000 people .... Such seventeen fold growth is astonishing indeed!"
Similar rapid rates of growth were recorded in other local urban areas such as Watampone (8.3 percent per annum) and Barbau (6.9 percent). Fieldwork in Ujung Pandang in the late 1970s indicated that, as in Bandung, many of the "migration chains" along which permanent and temporary migrants are moving to the city were established by IDPs during the years of the rebellion.
The latter not only applies to intra-provincial movements but also to much of the movement of Bugis and Makassarese people out of South Sulawesi, especially to Jakarta and the east coasts of Sumatra and Kalimantan. McNicoll (1968:46) quotes reports of 10,000 Sulawesi born refugees in the provinces of Jambi and Riau in 1956 and another 5,000 along the coast of East Kalimantan. He also shows that this was a period of increased Bugis migration to Jakarta. Lineton (1975a:180-1) quotes a Bugis businessman who arranged accommodation and transport for most Bugis migrants passing through Jakarta from the early 1950s and who claimed that "the rebellion led to a flood of emigration which reached its peak in 1955: in this year, more than 10,000 migrants passed through Tanjung Priok (the port of Jakarta) on their way to Sumatra, generally traveling in large parties of 45 or more". Lineton’s own fieldwork in both South Sumatra and Wajo and Bone in South Sulawesi confirmed this. She quotes another of her informants thus (Lineton, 1975b:24)
"During the rebellion, three quarters of Wajo was in the hands of the rebels ... If people did not want to join them, they had to move to Senkang or Makassar or merantau (move outside of the province). In Peneki (on the coast) practically all the houses were destroyed the rebels burnt the houses of those who did not join them, then the army burnt the houses of those who did."
Lineton explains that both fishermen and peasant families were involved in the migration and she points out that even with the return of security ... "emigration continued of people attached to migrant areas by the tales of kin and friends who had gone before them" (Lineton, 1975b:24). Also after the return of security some former guerillas could not return to their home villages and joined the migration. Some refugees returned to South Sulawesi once the rebellion had been crushed, but the majority appears to have settled at their destinations and attracted family and friends from South Sulawesi to join them.
Several other conflict-induced refugee migrations in Indonesia have been referred to in Table 2 and Figure 3. These include several moves which were associated with the struggle for Independence against the Dutch. In Java much movement focused on the capital of the guerillas, Yogyakarta. Elsewhere the typical pattern was for people to flee to the interior away from the Dutch controlled coastal areas as Naim (1973:135) has described for West Sumatra. There were several short lived rebellions involving former members of the colonial army immediately following the granting of independence which initiated refugee flows. These were located in the provinces of West Java, South Sulawesi and Maluku (McNicoll, 1968:43). This initiated the refugee flow of some 4,000 Ambonese (South Moluccans) soldiers and their families (totaling 12,500 persons) to the Netherlands, along with a larger number of Indonesians of mixed Dutch-Indonesian parentage. By the early 1980s the South Moluccans in the Netherlands had grown to number 35,000 (Woldring, 1980:55). Another group of refugee flows are those associated with the PRRI and Permesta rebellions in Central Sumatra and North/Central Sulawesi respectively (Figure 1). These were separatist rebellions inspired by the belief that the Java-focused central government neglected the interests of smaller numerical groups located in the periphery zone of the Other Islands. McNicoll (1968:48) and Naim (1973:139) have shown that although these conflicts were fairly short-lived they initiated some significant refugee flows. McNicoll (1968:49) points out that these flows tended to be dominated by the educated sections of the population, while those forced to move by the Darul Islam rebellions tended to be generally representative of the total resident population in the areas of conflict. Activities of separatist movements such as the "Free Papua Movement" (OPM) have also initiated refugee flows from Irian Jaya. These have not only occurred within that province but a substantial flow occurred into neighbouring New Guinea (Garnaut and Manning, 1974; Roosman, 1980).
For many conflict-induced movements there is little or no information available. In 1965, for example, there was an attempted coup by elements of the Communist Party of Indonesia and it was quickly suppressed by the army. However, "For several months afterwards, violent and widespread reprisals against members of the Party and affiliated organisations occurred" (McNicoll and Mamas, 1973:15). This led to significant refugee flows as well as large numbers of suspects being imprisoned without trial, many of them on the isolated island of Buru in Maluku. More recently Indonesia's annexation of East Timor in 1975 resulted in its inhabitants suffering great violence and dislocation. In fact its population at the 1980 census was considerably less than it was in 1970 (552,954 compared to 610,541). It seems that up to half of the population of East Timor were displaced during the second half of the 1970s. It appears that some 20,000 fled overseas after the outbreak of violence in 1975, most going to Portugal and Australia (Rodgers, 1981:18). Many fled to West Timor in 1975 and it was reported that there were still 25,000 there in 1979 (Rodgers, 1979:5). In late 1978 it was estimated that 125,000 East Timorese had passed through or were still living "in squalid refugee camps and officials estimate there could be as many as 100,000 more people hiding in the mountains" (Jenkins, 1978:29). The scale of displacement was and is huge as is the despair and suffering of those involved. By 1979 malnutrition and hunger were rife and death commonplace - the condition of more than half the population living in East Timor was described by experienced relief agency workers as "bad to critical" (Jenkins, 1979b:24). The desperate situation is well summed up by a contemporary observer ...
"The current suffering in East Timor is a direct outcome of the civil war which erupted in the Portuguese province in August 1975 and of the subsequent Indonesian invasion. At that time hundreds of thousands of Timorese took refuge in the mountains fearing for their lives as the fighting, often involving great brutality, ebbed and flowed through the major towns and villages. As in Kampuchea, the result was that normal agriculture virtually ceased in many parts of the province. East Timor, an area of acute deprivation at the best of times, fell victim not only to War but to starvation and disease as well' (Jenkins, 1979b:24).
A final group that needs to be considered in any comprehensive discussion of forced migration in Indonesia is the Chinese. While some Chinese settlement and sojourning in Indonesia predated European contact, it wasn’t until the full development of colonialism that the Chinese were encouraged to move in large numbers to the East Indies. In colonial times there were various restrictions on where they could settle. They were concentrated particularly in urban areas but also were spread through rural areas as well. They tended to be employed in commercial activity medium and small-scale trade, foremen and white collar occupations. In the post-Independence period there were pressures on the Chinese population, which in some cases produced migration. It is apparent that the growth of Jakarta and Bandung in the 1950s was assisted by the displacement of Chinese from West Java. Chinese were subject to great pressure in several rural parts of West Java and indeed at the end of the decade legislation was passed which forbade Chinese and other foreigners to operate a business or own land in rural parts of the Province. Hence, all remaining Chinese were forced to migrate into the cities (Hugo, 1978:53). In 1960 also Chinese residents in Indonesia were forced to choose between Chinese and Indonesian citizenship and as a result many Chinese returned to China. There was a net emigration of 142,653 Chinese nationals between 1952 and 1961, 102,297 in 1960 (Hugo et al., 1982).
It is clear that the movement of Chinese was one of the elements of forced migration which contributed substantially to urbanisation in Indonesia in the first post Independence quarter century. For example, there was also substantial migration of Chinese to Jakarta due to "financial uncertainty and maltreatment in the villages' (Kroef, 1954:158). Chinese internal migrants interviewed by Heeren (1955:710-712) were predominantly from West Java, particularly Tanggerang and Bogor. Purcell (1951:556) reports that anti-Chinese incidents in that region in June 1946 caused some 25,000 Chinese to flee to Jakarta. Further urbanization of Chinese occurred in 1959 after the promulgation of new regulations prohibiting aliens from engaging in retail trade in rural areas and a special army ordinance forced aliens outside the towns to relocate (Skinner, 1963:115). Thus, in contemporary West Java it is an extremely rare occurrence to encounter Chinese in villages. This movement to the cities counterbalanced to some extent an outflow of repatriated Chinese city dwellers to China.
Another major movement of Chinese refugees is referred to in Table 2, namely that in West Kalimantan where Dyak insurrections against Chinese traders in the interior of the province forced most of the Chinese living there to flee to Pontianak, Jakarta or to emigrate. At the end of 1967, it was estimated that there were 25,669 refugees in Pontianak City and 22,622 in the neighbouring regency of Sambas (Ward and Ward, 1973:41). It is estimated that a third of the total refugee population were forced to move (around 75,000) with about half settling in the major towns, and most of the rest were established on land close to the towns. Very few Chinese now remain in the Dyak areas. Ward and Ward (1973:49-50) suggest that the abandonment of the interior by the Chinese has resulted in much wet rice land going out of production and production of cash crops like pepper and rubber has also declined due to the absence of their capital and skill. It is clear too that the rapid growth of Pontianak between the 1961 and 1971 censuses (3.8 percent per annum, or nearly twice the provincial growth rate) is largely due to this forced refugee migration from the city's hinterland.
The focus here has been on conflict induced migration but other forms of forced migration have also occurred in post independence Indonesia. There have been many examples of people being forced to migrate because of the fear or onset of a natural or physical disaster. Indonesia has more than 70 active volcanoes which have caused calamities at an average of around once every three years causing 140,000 recorded deaths (Awanohara, 1982:42). The number of people displaced by volcanic eruptions, however, has been many times greater. The 1963 eruption of Mt. Agung in Bali displaced 85,000 people, while that of Mt. Galunggung in West Java during 1982 has forced some 30,000 people to migrate to Indonesia's Outer Islands and placed some 300,000 more residents at risk of evacuation (Awanohara, 1982:42-3). Lucardie's (1979) study of the people of Makian in Maluku province of Indonesia has documented the repeated abandonment of settlements after volcanic eruptions and for fear of new eruptions over the last 300 years. His study focuses especially upon a government scheme to gradually evacuate the entire 16,000 resident population of the island because vulcanologists have predicted the eventual eruption of Makian's volcano which would lead to a disaster comparable to that of the evisceration of Krakatoa in 1883. Lucardie (1979) documents the opposition of residents of Makian to the government program to resettle them on another island to escape from the risk of the eruption of the island volcano. Other more or less forced migrations initiated by government policy decisions are also of relevance here. The construction of large scale developments like dams usually involves substantial forced displacements of the residents. The building of large dams like Jatiluhur near Jakarta have resulted in substantial forced migration.