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Low levels of transparency

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Low levels of transparency

Another basic principle of modern corporate governance is that companies (including state-owned companies) should be highly transparent. Transparency allows an early detection of problems, and increases the confidence of shareholders, stakeholders, and the public in the company.

SOEs in Senegal are characterized by a lack of transparency. SOEs (like any company) are required to file their financial statements at the Commercial Registry. However, in practice financial statements do not include the information described in the OECD Guidelines, many SOEs have been late in preparing their financial statements, and the statements are frequently not publicly available (although compliance has recently been improving).4

Recommendation 8: The new ownership entity should develop a framework for aggregate reporting on state-owned enterprises and publish an annual report.

Recommendation 9: The ownership policy should require a high degree of transparency. Large SOEs should follow information disclosure requirements of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and Guidelines on SOE Governance, including a clear statement of the company objectives and their fulfillment, the ownership and voting structure of the company, a description of any financial assistance (including subsidies and guarantees) received from the state, and any material transactions with related entities.

The ownership entity should demand high-quality financial reporting and audits, should carefully review the quality of information submitted, and work to continuously improve the quality of financial information.

Recommendation 10: The ownership policy should require SOEs to establish an independent audit committee of the board, to establish an internal audit function that is monitored by and reports directly to the audit committee, and to develop efficient internal audit procedures,

A Country Action Plan

The main objective of this assessment is to assist the Government in its efforts to strengthen corporate governance and transparency in State-Owned Enterprises. The above policy recommendations will be presented to country stakeholders at a workshop in Dakar. Inputs from the stakeholders will be incorporated into a country action plan that will be developed under the supervision of the Government, with the assistance of the World Bank and other donors including the Global Corporate Governance Forum.
Implementing these recommendations is likely to require substantial technical assistance and capacity-building efforts. Areas that could require significant technical assistance include:

  • Capacity building and training of the ownership entity

  • The development of an ownership policy

  • The development of a reporting framework

  • Work at the company level with a specific enterprise, to create a “champion” of SOE governance reform.

Guideline - By - Guideline Review of Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises

Section I: Ensuring an Effective Legal and Regulatory Framework for SOEs

The legal and regulatory framework for state-owned enterprises should ensure a level playing field in markets where state-owned enterprises and private sector companies compete in order to avoid market distortions. The framework should build on, and be fully compatible with, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.

Guideline IA: There should be a clear separation between the state’s ownership function and other state functions that may influence the conditions for state-owned enterprises, particularly with regard to market regulation.

The State has largely separated the ownership and regulatory functions for many of the large SOEs. For example, independent regulatory agencies have been created in the electricity and telecommunications sector.

There has been no active industrial policy for many years – the stated policy for all SOEs is privatization. Some SOEs are artifacts of the privatization strategy, and represent state assets that are managed by a separate company (e.g. SONES).

There are no SOEs that are owned by other SOEs.

Guideline IB. Governments should strive to simplify and streamline the operational practices and the legal form under which SOEs operate. The SOE legal form or arrangement should allow creditors to press their claims and to initiate insolvency procedures.

SOEs are in general subject to the same laws and regulations as other companies. All commercial SOEs operate as standard public limited companies (société anonymes). The portfolio includes 19 commercial companies with majority state ownership. These companies are governed by Law 90-07 on public enterprises, which defines three types of public enterprises5:

1. Sociétés nationales are standard public limited companies (sociétés anonymes), where the State (or other state bodies) holds 100 percent of capital. Statutes are fixed by decree.

2. (Sociétés anonymes à participation publique majoritaire). Majority state-owned companies are also public limited companies in which one or several state bodies own directly or indirectly more than 50 percent of capital.

3. EPICs (Établissements Publics à Caractère Industriel et Commercial) are “specialized legal entities, with financial autonomy”, but with no private founding capital. They do not operate under standard company law, and their statutes are set by decree. In practice, EPICs appear to include a variety of non-commercial entities, and are not included in the analysis in this report.

SOEs do have some important differences in their corporate governance structure, particularly in the nomination of board members and general directors; these are addressed below.

Guideline IC. Any obligations and responsibilities that an SOE is required to undertake in terms of public services beyond the generally accepted norm should be clearly mandated by laws or regulations. Such obligations and responsibilities should also be disclosed to the general public and related costs should be covered in a transparent manner.

There appears to be a wide variation in practice. Some SOEs (e.g. SENELEC) appear to have relatively clear policy goals (even if these goals conflict with company profitability). However, company obligations and responsibilities are not explicitly disclosed.

Some subsidies appear to be covered in a relatively transparent manner (e.g. the government subsidy to SENELEC for rising fuel prices has been budgeted and widely reported).

Guideline ID. SOEs should not be exempt from the application of general laws and regulations. Stakeholders, including competitors, should have access to efficient redress and an even-handed ruling when they consider that their rights have been violated.

SOEs are formed as standard public limited companies and are not exempt from other laws and regulation. They are not exempt from labor or bankruptcy law, and do not have any special legal immunities, or sovereign immunity to lawsuits.

SOEs governed by Law 90-07 (sociétés nationales and sociétés a participation publique majoritaire) have different procedures for liquidation; the CGCPE supervises the activities of the liquidator.6 The CGCPE has liquidated 32 enterprises since the beginning of the privatization program, and five more are in the process of liquidation. The remaining enterprises must be liquidated by July 2006.

Guideline IE: The legal and regulatory framework should allow sufficient flexibility for adjustments in the capital structure of SOEs when this is necessary for achieving company objectives.

There is no ownership entity or holding company structure that provides capital flexibility (for example, the ability to reinvest dividends of one SOE into another). All dividends are the property of the state budget (Trésor Publique). Any new state funds raised by SOEs would come from the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

Guideline IF: SOEs should face competitive conditions regarding access to finance. Their relations with state-owned banks, state-owned financial institutions, and other state-owned companies should be based on purely commercial grounds.

The main source of credit to SOEs is the commercial banking sector. At least two SOEs and minority-owned companies (Port Autonome de Dakar and ICS) have issued bonds to the public.

Bad debt owed to State-owned banks by SOEs was a traditional problem in Senegal. Bad debts (including loans to SOEs) resulted in a banking crisis in the early 1990s. However, the past few years have seen the completion of Senegal’s bank privatization program. As a result, there are no more state-controlled commercial banks, and collusion with state-owned banks is no longer a possibility.

A number of observers noted that many private commercial banks have (until quite recently) treated the large SOEs (including large companies with minority state participation such as ICS) as “too big to fail”, with an implicit state guarantee, and thus provided credit on better terms than would have otherwise been the case.

Section II: The state Acting As Owner

The state should act as an informed and active owner and establish a clear and consistent ownership policy, ensuring that the governance of state-owned enterprises is carried out in a transparent and accountable manner, with the necessary degree of professionalism and effectiveness.

Guideline IIA: The Government should develop and issue an ownership policy that defines the overall objectives of state ownership, the state’s role in the corporate governance of SOEs, and how it will implement its ownership policy.

There are no formal objectives of State ownership. The formal policy of the State for two decades has been divestiture and privatization (including liquidation of non-viable enterprises). This policy has resulted in the reduction in the number of SOEs from 87 in the mid-1980s to 24 SOEs at the end of 2005 (excluding the EPICs) today. The organization that comes closest to playing the role of “ownership entity” (the CGCPE) has been more focused on its privatization mission. The State’s ownership policy for many SOEs remains privatization at some point in the future; SENELEC, LONASE, and CICES are currently slated to be privatized during 2007.

Senegal experimented with earlier forms of setting specific goals for SOEs, including performance and management contracts. Between 1981 and 1988, nine performance contracts (called letters de mission) were signed between the State and strategic SOEs. These contracts were considered to be unsuccessful. Today the performance contracts remain only in the agricultural sector, in two enterprises (SAED and SODAGRI).

See the “Overview of State-Owned Enterprise Governance in Senegal, above, for a description of the current framework.

Guideline IIB. The Government should not be involved in the day-to-day management of SOEs and allow them full operational autonomy to achieve their defined objectives.

Government intervention in day-to-day management appears to be relatively limited in Senegal. There were no reports of companies under the direct operational control of Ministries or other government agencies. The Ministry of Economy and Finance does consistently exercise ownership rights.

There is a potential conflict of interest in the role of the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Some observers indicated that in certain cases, the Ministry supports the goal of increasing tax payments, rather than creating valuable companies.

Guideline IIC: The state should let SOE boards exercise their responsibilities and respect their independence.

Government intervenes in SOE governance beyond the level deemed appropriate by the Guidelines:

  • There is no clear and consistent ownership policy or strategy, and the board nomination process is not optimal.

  • There is active consultation between Ministers and other senior government officials (on the one hand) and board members – and in fact many board members are senior government officials. As a result, the State’s ability to give direction to the SOE or its board is not limited to strategic issues and policies, and is not publicly disclosed.

  • The presence of a contrôleur financière as a (non-voting) member of the board, with a reporting responsibility to the Presidential administration, gives the chief of state the ability (or gives the perception of the ability) to directly intervene as needed in the affairs of the company.

  • Director Generals (CEOs) are nominated / approved by the Cabinet du Président, giving further influence to the State and weakening the power of the Board.

The OECD Guidelines call for the State to avoid nominating “an excessive number” of board members from the State administration. Civil servants and political nominees should only be elected to the board if they meet high qualifications and if they do not act as “conduits for undue political influence.” However, as a general rule, boards of public enterprises in Senegal do not meet these criteria;

  • Only civil servants are appointed to the board. In most SOEs companies 50% of board members are appointed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and 50% are appointed by the line ministry.

  • Many board members are not considered to have the required professional qualifications. There are no rules or guidelines on the professional qualifications required to become a board member of an SOE. Informal interviews suggest that, in practice, a wide variety of board members are appointed, including some without any private sector experience, and no financial experience.

  • There is no tradition of board members acting in the interests of the company and all the shareholders. As in many countries and companies, board members appear to act in the interest of the State or individual that appoints them, and not in the interests of the company. Some Ministries apparently have “pre-board” meetings for some companies in which important issues are discussed and instructions

  • There are no board guidelines that have been developed for the board members of state companies to assist them in carrying out their duties, and no training is provided. Many observers expressed the opinion that board members of SOEs do not understand many aspects of their role, and that guidelines and training would be a welcome step in assisting them to carry out their duties. Some companies (e.g. Senelec) have developed codes of ethics.

Guideline IID: The exercise of ownership rights should be clearly identified within the state administration. This may be facilitated by setting up a coordinating entity or, more appropriately, by the centralization of the ownership function.

Ownership rights (including voting at general assemblies and nominating board members) are divided between the Ministry of Economy and Finance - Cellule de Gestion et de Contrôle de Portefeuille de l’Etat, who vote the State’s shares, and nominate about half of the board members (in most companies), and the Line Ministry, who nominates the other half of the board. Either the Director of the CGCPE or a director nominated by the State casts the State’s votes at general assemblies.

Guideline IIE: The coordinating or ownership entity should be held accountable to representative bodies such as the Parliament and have clearly defined relationships with relevant public bodies, including the state supreme audit institutions.

As noted in the description of the institutional framework, there is no clearly defined coordinating or ownership entity in practice. The CGCPE, a directorate of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, is charged by law with supervising the State-owned portfolio. It receives reports from the SOEs, drafts an annual report to the government on the SOE portfolio, and votes the State’s shares at annual meetings of shareholders. It also plays the important role of acting as the government’s secretariat for the privatization process, and overseeing liquidations.

However, in practice, true responsibility and accountability are shared with the Line Ministries and with the Presidential administration. The CGCPE’s activities are hampered by its lack of resources and small staff size (four professionals).

Guideline IIF: The state as an active owner should exercise its ownership rights according to the legal structure of each company. Its prime responsibilities include:

(1) Being represented at the general shareholders meetings and voting the state shares.

The Ministry of Economy and Finance represents the State at general shareholders meeting and does vote the shares under State ownership.

(2) Establishing well-structured and transparent board nomination processes in fully or majority owned SOEs, and actively participating in the nomination of all SOE boards.

The process for nominating board members is not clear or well-structured. The number of board seats is generally proportional to the level of State ownership. The Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Line Ministry generally appoint equal numbers of board members. In some large and important companies, the Primature (Prime Minister’s office) also appoints board members.

The members appointed are nominated through each Ministry’s internal processes, which are not transparent. Many outside observers commented that many board members (especially those appointed by the line Ministries and to smaller SOEs) were not highly qualified, and some had limited or financial, business or related experience, and that some were appointed for reasons of political connections.

(3) Setting up reporting systems allowing regular monitoring and assessment of SOE performance.

The CGCPE receives annual reports from majority or wholly-owned companies, and prepares an internal report summarizing the situation of each SOE. However, the report is limited, focuses on company indebtedness, and does not provide a complete assessment of company performance.

(4) When permitted by the legal system and the state’s level of ownership, maintaining continuous dialogue with external auditors and specific state control organs.

The ownership entities (Line Ministry / MoEF - CGCPE) have limited contact with the external auditors or state audit bodies. They do not approve or communicate with the external auditors of SOEs.

Two control bodies (the Contrôle Financier (CF) and the Inspection Générale d’Etat (IGE)) carry out inspections. The Presidential Administration can then take action (although how much and how formally this is done in practice is unclear). This process does not appear to involve the CGCPE.

(5) Ensuring that remuneration schemes for SOE board members foster the long-term interest of the company and can attract and motivate qualified professionals.

The State currently does not ensure that board members are sufficiently compensated, and most boards are not. Traditional sitting fee for board members is CFA 25,000 (USD 50) per meeting, which is considered derisory by the private sector and insufficient to attract qualified professionals.

Section III: Equitable treatment of Shareholders

The state and state-owned enterprises should recognize the rights of all shareholders, and in accordance with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, ensure their equitable treatment and equal access to corporate information.

Guideline IIIA: The coordinating or ownership entity and SOEs should ensure that all shareholders are treated equitably.

Awareness of corporate governance is in its early stages in Senegal. Most market participants and board members (from the private and the public sectors) tend to have a traditional view of corporate governance, in which board members act in the interests of those that appoint them, and not necessarily in the interest of the company as a whole. In addition, majority-owned companies have only a handful of shareholders, who are most often represented on the board.

While CGCPE staff is well aware of modern corporate governance principles, the CGCPE does not have sufficient authority to set policy for SOEs as a whole. In addition, CGCPE has functioned as a privatization agency, and in many countries privatization goals have been in conflict with internationally recognized shareholder rights.

Guideline IIIB: SOEs should observe a high degree of transparency toward all shareholders.

In general, SOEs (both majority and minority-owned) practice very poor public disclosure of information. In the one listed company (SONATEL, with about 28 percent State ownership) the company discloses according to regulation; there are no complaints about its transparency. In non-listed companies, the only source of public information is the company registry (greffe du tribunal), where all companies are required to file financial statements. In practice, this information is frequently unavailable. Most SOEs have traditionally been very late in filing financial statements, although this has reportedly improved in recent years.

In practice, outside shareholders are represented on the board in proportion to their ownership, which provides shareholders with an important source of information.

Guideline IIIC: SOEs should develop an active policy of communication and consultation with all shareholders.

In general few companies commit to an active policy of communication and consultation with all shareholders. This practice is rare among majority- or wholly owned SOEs.

SENELEC does publish an annual report. SONATEL maintains an investor relations department and states a policy of full information and disclosure. SENELEC also produces an annual report which comments on its commitment to full transparency.

Guideline IIID: The participation of minority shareholders in shareholder meetings should be facilitated in order to allow them to take part in fundamental corporate decisions such as board election.

Shareholder meetings are held according to standard company law. There were no reports of problems in this area.

Section IV: Relations with Stakeholders

The state ownership policy should fully recognize the state-owned enterprises’ responsibilities toward stakeholders and request that they report on their relations with stakeholders.

Guideline IVA: Governments, the coordinating or ownership entity and SOEs themselves should recognize and respect stakeholders’ rights established by law or through mutual agreements, and refer to the OECD Principles on Corporate Governance in this regard.

Employee rights are strong in Senegal, particularly at SOEs. Unions are present at most major companies, and work to protect the interests of their members.

At SONATEL, employees are represented on the board by an elected union representative. However, this board representation is in their capacity as shareholders (approximately 10% at the time of privatization in 1997, now reduced to approximately 8 percent), not as employees.

Guideline IVB: Listed or large SOEs, as well as SOEs pursuing important public policy objectives, should report on stakeholder relations.

There is no public reporting at all by most large SOEs, or special reporting on stakeholder relations. Those companies that do produce annual reports (e.g. SENELEC, SONATEL) do contain sections that focus on corporate social responsibility issues, including information about contributions to employee health care, sporting clubs, etc.

Guideline IVC. The board of SOEs should be required to develop, implement, and communicate compliance programs for internal codes of ethics. These codes of ethics should be based on country norms, in conformity with international commitments and apply to the company and its subsidiaries.

There is only limited practice of developing company codes of ethics.

Section V: Transparency and Disclosure

State-owned enterprises should observe high standards of transparency in accordance with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.

Guideline VA: The coordinating or ownership entity should develop consistent and aggregate reporting on state-owned enterprises and publish annually an aggregate report on SOEs.

There is no standardized public reporting on SOEs. The CGCPE does prepare a summary report on SOE activities, but it is not published.

The Cours des Comptes does prepare an ad hoc report on the independent investigations of SOEs by the Commission des Vérifications des Comptes. This report consists of specific reviews of companies or company transactions. Companies are included in this report based on the CVCCEP’S own schedule. This report is published, and is a valuable and independent control over the activities of SOEs.

Guideline VB: SOEs should develop efficient internal audit procedures and establish an internal audit function that is monitored by and reports directly to the board and to the audit committee or the equivalent company organ.

According to Law 90-07, each SOE must have a “procedure manual” and an internal auditor (contrôleur interne) who is responsible for monitoring compliance with the manual.7 The law also requires the company to establish a management control unit (cellule de contrôle de gestion). This unit is responsible is responsible for establishing a set of company indicators, monitoring the budget and cash flow, drafting a quarterly report on management, and keeping track of the number of company employees.

In practice, large SOEs do have internal audit departments. However, internal auditors report to management, and not to the board, and are not considered by most observers to be particularly effective.

Guideline VC: SOEs, especially large ones, should be subject to an annual independent external audit based on international standards. The existence of specific state control procedures does not substitute for an independent external audit.

SOEs are subject to external audit. However, the audit process in Senegal is not always in line with international good practice (see the Accounting and Auditing ROSC). In addition, international good practice requires the creation of an audit committee of the board, which would oversee the audit process.

Guideline VD: SOEs should be subject to the same high quality accounting and auditing standards as listed companies. Large or listed SOEs should disclose financial and non-financial information according to high quality internationally recognized standards.

See the Accounting and Auditing ROSC for a complete description of the relevant accounting standards.8 SOEs (which are sociétés anonyme) are subject to the same accounting standards as listed companies.

Guideline VE: SOEs should disclose material information on all matters described in the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and in addition focus on areas of significant concern for the state as an owner and the general public. Examples of such information include;

  1. A clear statement to the public of the company objectives and their fulfillment;

  2. The ownership and voting structure of the company;

  3. Any material risk factors and measures taken to manage such risks;

  4. Any financial assistance, including guarantees, received from the state and commitments made on behalf of the SOE;

  5. Any material transactions with related entities.

SOEs are required to file financial statements at the Commercial Registry like any other private company. The financial statements do not include the information described in the Guideline. Many SOEs have been late in preparing their financial statements, although compliance has recently been improving.

Section VI: The responsibilities of the boards of state-Owned Enterprises

The boards of state-owned enterprises should have the necessary authority, competencies and objectivity to carry out their function of strategic guidance and monitoring of management. They should act with integrity and be held accountable for their actions.

Guideline VIA: The boards of SOEs should be assigned a clear mandate and ultimate responsibility for the company’s performance. The board should be fully accountable to the owners, act in the best interest of the company, and treat all shareholders equitably.

The mandate of directors is not particularly clear. Overall accountability appears to be shared with government Ministries and the Presidential administration (see separate discussion below).

Directors of public limited companies (including SOEs) owe a duty to the company and to third parties to obey the law and applicable regulations, as well as the Articles of Association.9 There is a general duty of care; officers must act as “a good father” towards the company (under the Civil Code). There is no general duty for board members to act in the interests of the company and all shareholders (i.e. a duty of loyalty). Some specific ad-hoc duties are set out by the law: management and directors are liable for false or insufficient disclosure when raising new capital10, and for irregularities related to share issuance, especially handing out share certificates before full payment, and for failure to assure pre-emptive rights to all shareholders or present false or misleading information at the annual meeting of shareholders where the pre-emptive rights are being waived.11 Management and the board are jointly and severally liable for: distributing dividends without the underlying assets of financial health to do so; false statements in the published financials; using company assets of credit against the interests of the company, for personal gain.12

There are no precedents for any enforcement of any of these duties in court, and even during recent corporate governance scandals, no legal action has been taken against management or directors.

SOE board members appear to be even less accountable than their private sector counterparts. Most State representatives are appointed to the board by their Ministry, and represent the interests of their Ministry. There is no tradition of acting in the interests of all shareholders.


Guideline VIB: SOE boards should carry out their functions of monitoring of management and strategic guidance, subject to the objectives set by the Government and the ownership entity. They should have the power to appoint and remove the CEO.

According to AUSGIE, all boards “…shall have the widest powers to act in all circumstances on behalf of the company…The board of directors shall … define the company's objectives and guidelines for its administration”. The board is responsible for defining company objectives and management guidelines and management oversight.

In practice, SOE board responsibilities are poorly defined, and many directors do not understand their duties. There are no regulations or best practice recommendations that give the board explicit responsibility over the monitoring of corporate governance practices or evaluating their performance. Board self-evaluation does not take place.

According to the law, “the board of directors shall … control, on a permanent basis, the management.” The board formally appoints, remunerates, and removes the general director (§462 AUSCGIE). In practice, in many SOEs, the general director is nominated by the Presidential administration, and the nomination is then approved by the board. This practice greatly weakens the board in these companies.

The board “adopts” the annual financial statements. However, there does not appear to be any practice of the board overseeing or managing the process of internal controls. Many companies have internal auditors, but they report to the general director, not the board. The directors or manager do not need to certify the financial statements.

Guideline VIC: The boards of SOEs should be composed so that they can exercise objective and independent judgment. Good practice calls for the Chair to be separate from the CEO.

Board composition. In general, board composition of most companies (particularly SOEs) is based on a “parliamentary” model. Board members are allocated to shareholders based on their ownership in the company, sometimes by formal shareholder agreement. As a general rule, the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Line Ministry split board seats 50/50, although in important SOEs other Ministries and government bodies may be represented.

Independent board members. In general, board independence is a new concept and is not practiced in Senegal. There is no definition of “independence” in the law, and in general the concept is new. SONATEL has had two independent directors since its privatization in 1997, and this is considered by most observers to be a success. Other companies are now discussing the concept as part of a general corporate governance reform.

Separation of Chairman and CEO. The position of Chairman and the CEO (Directeur Générale) are separate in SOEs. The two positions are separately regulated under basic company law.

Remuneration. In practice, board remuneration remains very low, especially compared to Chairman and general director pay. Remuneration is insufficient to attract new, qualified candidates with higher levels of responsibility and liability.

Guideline VID: If employee representation on the board is mandated, mechanisms should be developed to guarantee that this representation is exercised effectively and contributes to the enhancement of the board skills, information and independence.

Employee representation is not mandated on the board of any companies in Senegal. One company (SONATEL) does have employee board representation, but in their capacity as shareholders, not employees.

Guideline VIE: When necessary, SOE boards should set up specialized committees to support the full board in performing its functions, particularly in respect to audit, risk management and remuneration.

Law 90-07 allows the board of directors to delegate some functions to a Management Committee of the board (Comité de Direction), except for those specifically enumerated in the law.13 The Management Committee must inform the full board about its meetings. It must be overseen by the Chairman of the full board; representatives of the Line Ministry are automatic members; three other members must be elected by the board.

Board committees (other than the management committee) are not present in SOEs. As noted in the Corporate Governance ROSC, audit committees and similar structures are a new concept in Senegal.

Guideline VIF: SOE boards should carry out an annual evaluation to appraise their performance.

Board appraisal and other forms of evaluation are not practiced in Senegal.

1 Article 2, Loi 90-07 du 26 juin 1990 relative à l'organisation et au contrôle des entreprises du secteur parapublic et au contrôle des personnes morales de droit privé bénéficiant du concours financier de la puissance publique

2 Acte Uniforme en date du 17 avril 1997 relatif au droit des sociétés commerciales et du groupement d’intérêt économique applicable depuis le 1er janvier 1998.

Loi n° 90-07 du 26 juin 1990 sur les sociétés d’économie mixte.

3 Examples include APIX (the investment promotion agency), APS (Agence de Presse Sénégalaise), the Institute of Food Technology, etc.

4 See the Accounting and Auditing ROSC for additional details.

5 Article 2, Loi 90-07 du 26 juin 1990 relative à l'organisation et au contrôle des entreprises du secteur parapublic et au contrôle des personnes morales de droit privé bénéficiant du concours financier de la puissance publique

6 Liquidations rules and procedures for public enterprises are set by law n° 84-64 of 16/08/1984 and the AUSGIE.

7 Article 36, Loi 90-07.

8 http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa_sen_fre.pdf

9 AUSCGIE §740.

10 AUSCGIE §905.

11 AUSCGIE §893, 894, 895.

12 AUSCGIE §161, 889, 890, 891.

13 Article 18, Law 90-07. Prohibited issues include internal rules, investment plans, budgets and provisional accounts, acquisitions and sales of assets, investments (see Article 11).

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