Domestic surveillance successfully checks terror incidents now. Prefer longitudinal studies

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public pressure

In the wake of domestic terror, politicians face enormous political pressures to increase torture, internment, and surveillance of suspected ethnicities

Fearon, 3

(James D. Fearon is Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor in Stanford University’s School of Humanities and Sciences, Professor of Political Science, and a Senior Fellow at the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies. His research focuses mainly on armed conflict and political violence. Fearon is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a program member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, “Catastrophic terrorism and civil liberties in the short and long run”,, October 9, 2003, ak.)

What will our politicians do? Will they judiciously consider how to construct and reform our institutions to monitor and control the application of the new government powers that will be increasingly necessary to reduce the risk of catastrophic terrorism? Or will they respond in a disconnected and frenzied fashion, ratcheting up arbitrary and 8 unchecked government powers of surveillance, investigation, and detention with each new attack? I suspect the answer will depend on a largely unpredictable factor: the pace and success of terrorist attacks in the coming years. If we manage to go for five years or so without another major homeland terrorist attack, then prospects are relatively good that Congress and the country will recover some equanimity and confront the problems of legislative and judicial reform from a more long-run perspective. If and when a Democrat wins back the White House, and if the Republicans still control part or all of Congress, then the Republicans are sure to want to revisit the powers granted to or assumed by Bush since post 9/11. I would hope that the Democrats would be more willing to go along as a matter of serving their constituents’ preferences. If, on the other hand, terrorists of whatever stripe “get lucky” one or more times in the near future, then we will see more of what Laura Donohue calls “the counterterrorist spiral.”9 After a dramatic terrorist attack, politicians face extremely strong pressures to “do something,” which for reelection purposes needs to be highly visible and easily explainable to voters. Changing laws to give greater powers to law enforcement fits the bill, and has almost always been the immediate response of democratic governments to major terrorist attacks. Donohue notes that in the case she knows best, Northern Ireland, counterterrorist laws put on the books in reaction to big attacks have tended to stay on the books. Politicians don’t want to risk being called “soft on terrorism” in the midst of a conflict. The result has been a ratchet effect, or spiral, to the great detriment of civil liberty. Over the course of the last century, the United States has faced a succession of apparent domestic security threats that led to spasms of legislation and police action. In retrospect, these spasms were widely viewed as having been misguided and unconstitutional. It is instructive to consider these in thinking about the likely future course of civil liberties law in the face of catastrophic terrorism. In a hysterical response to a few package bombs, the Palmer Raids of 1919-20 locked up thousands essentially on the presumption that they were communists or anarchists. During World War II, citizens and non-citizens of Japanese ancestry were locked up as potential traitors in camps in the western deserts. After World War II, suspected association with the Communist Party was, for a time, grounds for active government persecution and FBI harassment. Most recently, after the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing and after 9/11, Congress passed a series of acts of questionable constitutionality, while the president has used executive authority to detain thousands of unnamed noncitizens who have no legal recourse or representation, both noncitizens living in the U.S. and hundreds captured in “non-war” in Afghanistan. The constitutional lawyer David Cole points to a pattern, or evolution, in these several episodes.10 In the midst of each one, the U.S. courts and judicial system acquiesced to or deliberately authorized laws that, shortly afterwards, they and many others saw as clearly unconstitutional. After the great fears had waned, the courts crafted and fleshed out new constitutional doctrines intended to prevent future abuses along the lines of the last episode. Thus, during and after World War I, U.S. laws explicitly criminalized advocating certain political views, such as communism or even opposition to the draft. In the 1917 Supreme Court opinion known for the famous line about there being no constitutional right to cry fire in a crowded theatre if there was no fire, Oliver Wendell Holmes was actually arguing (successfully) that the state could jail a person for distributing leaflets opposing the draft for “the Great War.”11 Later rulings clarified that such laws were simply inconsistent with the First Amendment right of freedom of expression. Understanding these judicial precedents, in the McCarthy era the state criminalized not opinions and speech, but associations. “Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist party?” After the hysteria subsided, Supreme Court rulings in 1957 and 1961 asserted what should have been asserted from the start – that this was clearly unconstitutional. Cole argues that in the present episode, since Oklahoma and 9/11, government has evolved new tactics for restricting civil liberties that do not criminalize speech, and that target freedom of association only indirectly. He focuses on laws that make it a criminal act for one to provide “material support” to a “terrorist association,” even if one does not intend that the support supplied be used for terrorist purposes. The executive branch (via the State Department) decides what a “terrorist organization” is, according to no legally defined or justiciable criteria. Cole notes that since 9/11, almost every criminal “terrorism” case brought by the government has charged the defendant under the “material support” provisions.12 Cole finds depressing this historical pattern of Fear-induced civil rights abuses, post-Fear judicial action to prevent the repetition of such abuses, and then, with the next Fear, government invention of new ways to get around the Bill of Rights. He says there is no “progress,” just the repetition of history. To the contrary, I would view it as notable progress if, over time, our political system is able to improve itself by forcing government abuse of the constitution to take ever more subtle forms. The more interesting question is whether the self-correction part of the cycle will continue to operate in the present case, with the threat of catastrophic terrorism. In the past, the Fear had to subside for self-correction to occur. But if the risk of catastrophic terrorism is a technological problem that will grow more and more pressing over time, then will the Fear ever subside enough to allow the political space necessary for our political class to come to grips with it in an intelligent way? Or will periodic major terrorists attacks produce a permanent condition akin to counterinsurgency, in which both public and politicians acquiesce to what would once have been considered massive civil rights violations by a more powerful and arbitrary state? All I can say is that I certainly hope not, and that I hope that U.S. foreign policy is revised in ways that will genuinely lower rather than possibly increase the short-run risk of more attacks. But, unfortunately, I’m not sure if we have all that much control here. To a great extent we are hostage to the terrorists’ luck, or lack thereof.

civil liberties

Even an infinitesimal risk of our disad should outweigh the aff – all of their harms assume “potential” surveillance and ignore that another domestic terror attack would decimate the civil liberties that exist now

Friedman, 13

(Thomas L. Friedman became The New York Times foreign affairs Op-Ed columnist in 1995. He joined the paper in 1981, after which he served as the Beirut bureau chief in 1982, Jerusalem bureau chief in 1984, and then in Washington as the diplomatic correspondent in 1989, and later the White House correspondent and economic correspondent. Mr. Friedman was awarded the 1983 Pulitzer Prize for international reporting (from Lebanon) and the 1988 Pulitzer Prize for international reporting (from Israel). He also won the 2002 Pulitzer Prize for commentary. Mr. Friedman is the author of “From Beirut to Jerusalem,” which won the National Book Award in 1989. He has written several other books, including “Hot, Flat and Crowded,” an international best seller. Born in Minneapolis, Mr. Friedman received a B.A. degree in Mediterranean studies from Brandeis University in 1975. In 1978 he received a master’s in modern Middle East studies from Oxford, “Blowing a Whistle”,, June 12, 2013, ak.)

I’m glad I live in a country with people who are vigilant in defending civil liberties. But as I listen to the debate about the disclosure of two government programs designed to track suspected phone and e-mail contacts of terrorists, I do wonder if some of those who unequivocally defend this disclosure are behaving as if 9/11 never happenedthat the only thing we have to fear is government intrusion in our lives, not the intrusion of those who gather in secret cells in Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan and plot how to topple our tallest buildings or bring down U.S. airliners with bombs planted inside underwear, tennis shoes or computer printers. Yes, I worry about potential government abuse of privacy from a program designed to prevent another 9/11 — abuse that, so far, does not appear to have happened. But I worry even more about another 9/11. That is, I worry about something that’s already happened oncethat was staggeringly costlyand that terrorists aspire to repeat. I worry about that even more, not because I don’t care about civil liberties, but because what I cherish most about America is our open society, and I believe that if there is one more 9/11or worse, an attack involving nuclear materialit could lead to the end of the open society as we know it. If there were another 9/11, I fear that 99 percent of Americans would tell their members of Congress:Do whatever you need to do to, privacy be damned, just make sure this does not happen again.” That is what I fear most. That is why I’ll reluctantly, very reluctantly, trade off the government using data mining to look for suspicious patterns in phone numbers called and e-mail addressesand then have to go to a judge to get a warrant to actually look at the content under guidelines set by Congress — to prevent a day where, out of fear, we give government a license to look at anyone, any e-mail, any phone call, anywhere, anytime. What we don't need is to give up our freedoms just to address levels of paranoia that are, frankly, infantile. So I don’t believe that Edward Snowden, the leaker of all this secret material, is some heroic whistle-blower. No, I believe Snowden is someone who needed a whistle-blower. He needed someone to challenge him with the argument that we don’t live in a world any longer where our government can protect its citizens from real, not imagined, threats without using big data — where we still have an edge — under constant judicial review. It’s not ideal. But if one more 9/11-scale attack gets through, the cost to civil liberties will be so much greater. A hat tip to Andrew Sullivan for linking on his blog to an essay by David Simon, the creator of HBO’s “The Wire.” For me, it cuts right to the core of the issue. “You would think that the government was listening in to the secrets of 200 million Americans from the reaction and the hyperbole being tossed about,” wrote Simon. “And you would think that rather than a legal court order, which is an inevitable consequence of legislation that we drafted and passed, something illegal had been discovered to the government’s shame. Nope. ... The only thing new here, from a legal standpoint, is the scale on which the F.B.I. and N.S.A. are apparently attempting to cull anti-terrorism leads from that data. ... I know it’s big and scary that the government wants a database of all phone calls. And it’s scary that they’re paying attention to the Internet. And it’s scary that your cellphones have GPS installed. ... The question is not should the resulting data exist. It does. ... The question is more fundamental: Is government accessing the data for the legitimate public safety needs of the society, or are they accessing it in ways that abuse individual liberties and violate personal privacy — and in a manner that is unsupervised. And to that, The Guardian and those who are wailing jeremiads about this pretend-discovery of U.S. big data collection are noticeably silent. We don’t know of any actual abuse.” We do need to be constantly on guard for abuses. But the fact is, added Simon, that for at least the last two presidencies “this kind of data collection has been a baseline logic of an American anti-terrorism effort that is effectively asked to find the needles before they are planted into haystacks, to prevent even such modest, grass-rooted conspiracies as the Boston Marathon bombing before they occur.” To be sure, secret programs, like the virtually unregulated drone attacks, can lead to real excesses that have to be checked. But here is what is also real, Simon concluded: “Those planes really did hit those buildings. And that bomb did indeed blow up at the finish line of the Boston Marathon. And we really are in a continuing, low-intensity, high-risk conflict with a diffuse, committed and ideologically motivated enemy. And, for a moment, just imagine how much bloviating would be wafting across our political spectrum if, in the wake of an incident of domestic terrorism, an American president and his administration had failed to take full advantage of the existing telephonic data to do what is possible to find those needles in the haystacks.” And, I’d add, not just bloviating. Imagine how many real restrictions to our beautiful open society we would tolerate if there were another attack on the scale of 9/11. Pardon me if I blow that whistle.

More attacks create programs that encroach on civil liberties.

Khanna 13 – Derek Khanna, Yale Law Fellow & Congressional staffer for the House Republican Study Committee, 2013 (“If PRISM Is Good Policy, Why Stop With Terrorism?” The Atlantic, Jul. 4th , Accessed 6/15/15, JL)

The government's policies in the NSA's PRISM program reflect perhaps the perfect storm of public-policy conundrums. This surveillance seems to offer short-term advantages, with the real costs hidden, diffuse, unknown, and, seemingly, far in the future. What, many ask, is the real price of giving up privacy? The government has presented PRISM, and other similar surveillance programs, as a solution to a danger and fear -- terrorism -- which is almost impossible to comprehend: Terrorism is everywhere and nowhere; the battlefield is across the globe; the threat is omnipresent. It is difficult for the average person to perceive and understand until it is splashed across television screens. Terrorism is by definition designed to "shock and awe." It is theatre of the macabre. The government has used this fear to justify unprecedented intrusions into our privacy, including monitoring who we call, our location data, and allegedly even the contents of our communication (if there is a 51 percent chance that one party to the communication is foreign). Our personal calling data, emails, letters, credit-card transaction data -- everything seems fair game. The fact that the NSA wants this much information shouldn't be surprising. The old maxim that to a hammer every problem looks like a nail is appropriate here. A spy agency specializing in "signals" intelligence is always looking for more phone calls, emails, and other signals-based data to analyze. The more data NSA receives, the more powerful it becomes. The most worrying facet of this story is the willingness of some Americans and members of Congress to so quickly disregard the Fourth Amendment and our liberty in the name of terrorism. Not so long ago, the U.S. faced arguably higher stakes, and more significant dangers, but made the opposite choices -- choices more consistent with our founding principles. Throughout the Cold War there was a real threat of apocalyptic proportions. The Soviet Union assembled and deployed more than 45,000 nuclear warheads, enough destructive power to annihilate the United States and end humanity as we know it. The U.S. government did plenty of reprehensible things during the Cold War, including trying to assassinate elected leaders, subverting democracies, and wiretapping political rivals and "subversives" such as Martin Luther King Jr. As a result of these scandals, along with Watergate, the American people responded and demanded accountability through the Church and Pike Committees of the 1970s in the House and Senate.* Will they do the same today? The most worrying facet of the PRISM story is the willingness of some Americans and members of Congress to so quickly disregard the Fourth Amendment in the name of terrorism. If the justification for PRISM and associated programs is predicated on their potential effectiveness, why shouldn't such logic be applied elsewhere? Here are several other even more effective public-policy solutions that also violate the Fourth Amendment in similar ways and are just as reprehensible. There is some dispute over whether PRISM and other reported programs are legal or Constitutional. I believe, and have argued, that third-party records should be protected under the Fourth Amendment, so that access to these records requires a warrant. This is not the perspective the courts have taken. But if we are going to use personal data obtained through PRISM for terrorism purposes in a way that violates our privacy and which I would argue violates the Fourth Amendment, why not do it for other legitimate purposes? 1. Child Pornography: Whenever the FBI receives a computer for a routine search, it searches the computer for known "hashes" of video and picture files of child pornography. This allows it to quickly and easily search every computer brought in, time permitting, for known child pornography. Of course the FBI receives many computers through warrants, but this is still a small percentage of all computers. Since the NSA seems to have access to a substantial amount of web traffic, what if it used spare capacity for "deep packet inspection" technology to identify known child-pornography pictures and videos? Software would only flag the transfer if there were a 100 percent certainty of it being the exact same file. (Since this is a hypothetical, let's assume the technology exists and can be implemented.) Laws against child pornography are partially designed to dry up the market for child exploitation. This policy could greatly reduce child pornography, catch potential pedophiles, and reduce existing child exploitation. From a legal perspective, the courts have found that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy for contraband; therefore, if such a search only finds contraband then it may be on more solid legal territory. Should the government be able to use technologies like PRISM and related exposed programs to find child pornography? 2. Speed Limits: Many accidents are related to reckless driving, and speeding can make them significantly more dangerous and deadly. What if instead of enforcing speed limits by stationing police officers to patrol our streets, a relatively ineffective and costly method of enforcement, the government instead monitored the speed of all cars in real time using cellphones. If NSA data on phone location were analyzed in real time, it could potentially determine the speed of any user. All phones traveling below 20 mph would be excluded on the assumption that they're not driving. All phones traveling faster than 20 mph would be plotted to discern what road they are traveling on and what the speed limit is for that road. The government could then identify drivers who were speeding and send them tickets in the mail, text them to slow down (then ticket them for opening it while driving!), or dispatch an officer to catch them. Further data analysis could identify potential drunk driving for police investigation, based upon erratic driving patterns or when phones were at known bars for several hours before being in a vehicle. Such policies could potentially save tens of thousands of lives and increase revenues from speeding fines while reducing the costs of patrolling the road. Should the government be able to use technologies like PRISM and related exposed programs to make our roads safer? 3. Illegal Downloading: Millions of Americans have used BitTorrent or other technologies to illegally download music, movies, TV shows, and software. While torrents can be used to download non-copyrighted and copyrighted digital goods, a substantial amount (one study found 89 percent) of the traffic appears to be used for illegal downloading. NSA PRISM level surveillance could be of use in identifying which users are using BitTorrent, then identifying the users who have uploaded or downloaded the most, and identifying whether their downloads involved illegal content. (Again, let's assume the technology is available.) This information could be forwarded to the Department of Justice for prosecution (or more crafty lobbyists could get the information forwarded to a private entity like the RIAA or MPAA for lawsuits). Should the government be able to use technologies like PRISM and related exposed programs to protect copyright holders? **** If the barometer for violating the Fourth Amendment is efficacy, then why should these not also be up for discussion? The answer is clear: The Fourth Amendment was not designed for efficacy. It was designed for privacy and to defend our liberty. If that's not the case, why even stop with these examples? Most of our phones have cameras and microphones that, at least in some circumstances, can be turned on remotely that would surely provide invaluable information for intelligence and law enforcement (the FBI has used this for organized crime prosecution, remotely turning on the microphone of phones to record non phone-call conversations). Information given to the government for the NSA may be made available to other agencies such as the IRS, why wouldn't it be? We already know that it has been shared with foreign agencies (e.g., Dutch intelligence, German intelligence, and British intelligence). Even if a court were to find that PRISM data violates the Fourth Amendment, courts have traditionally held that even information that was illegally obtained can be used in court to impeach testimony -- in other words, it could plausibly be admissible to catch a tax cheat. If elected leaders were angels there would be less need for protection of our privacy. But they are not angels. And as many of us in the technology world know, once something exists in data form it is often retained forever. In an era where data storage is cheap and getting cheaper, American citizens' information will likely be retained indefinitely (the NSA is building that capacity in a Utah facility). At some point this massive repository of information may be hacked, at some point could be available to political appointees looking for partisan gain, or it may be used for "security" reasons against "troublemakers" trying to change our society -- social change often comes through those who are perceived to be dangerous to the state. As James Madison argued in Federalist 51, "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary." But men are not angels and we have experience with elected leaders that are partisan, opportunist, short-sighted and, sometimes, even corrupt. Government's natural inclination is to abuse its power, one critical reason why our Founders limited it. The danger of a surveillance state is not the obscure chance of a truly evil person abusing the system; rather, the actual threat, the real danger, is a person with good intentions who believes that their draconian actions are morally justified and prudent. It is such a leader, perhaps with the best of intentions, who can make the most heinous of mistakes with eyes wide open and belief that the ends justify the means. Those ends never justify eviscerating the Fourth Amendment. * This is not to say that the Church and Pike Committees completely dealt with abuses -- they did not -- but they were a clear step in the right direction and demanding accountability and limits to government abuse.

The aff’s focus on civil liberties doesn’t necessarily preclude security impacts – middle ground is best because unequivocal focus on security is unrealistic and improbable in the wake of public perception

Foreign Policy 15 (January 6th, J.M. Berger, analytical researcher and reporter on terrorism, Brookings Fellow, “Europe Cracks Down After attacks in Paris, Sydney, and Canada, Western countries are flexing counterterrorism muscles. But civil liberties, not would-be jihadis, will be the casualty,” aj

In response to this escalating threat, Western countries are looking at an array of new laws and government powers to deal with the problem. In Europe and Australia, proposals to enhance counterterrorism powers are in full bloom. In the United States, similar ideas of lesser scope are quietly circulating behind the scenes, likely to emerge into public view soon enough. The proposals are varied, but they all increase the power that a government has to act against suspects, decrease the amount of evidence needed to use such power, or both. Among the laws that have been either proposed or enacted: Australia has instituted a variety of new government powers to deal with both foreign fighters and terrorism suspects, the most controversial of which are control orders allowing uncharged terrorism suspects’ civil liberties to be severely curtailed and greatly expanded collection of metadata. France, in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack, is considering new laws that would double down on broad new authorities adopted in September that include restrictions on travel, a ban on publishing material “glorifying” terrorism, online censorship provisions, and the creation of new classes of crimes targeting so-called “lone wolves” by criminalizing a wide range of behavior. British Prime Minister David Cameron has pledged that, if re-elected, he will pursue broad new authorities for surveillance of electronic communications, potentially including bans on widely used encrypted messaging platforms. The European Parliament is reconsidering a previously shelved proposal requiring airlines to provide information on passengers to national governments, albeit with some talk of added civil liberties protections. The Canadian government is considering vaguely defined new counterterrorism powers in the wake of consecutive lone-wolf attacks by supporters of the Islamic State in October. Other specific measures have been discussed or implemented in Germany, Portugal, Greece, Serbia, Kosovo, Cyprus, and elsewhere as other countries worry that they could become the targets of similar attacks. In many ways, this is the continuation of a debate that started on Sept. 11, 2001: What price is freedom willing to pay for security? Most Western countries have enshrined individual liberties as a fundamental principle. But they also accept that the government has a role in preventing crime and risk of harm to citizens. When a tragic, traumatic attack takes place, the balance between these concerns is disrupted. But the 9/11 paradigm of large, complicated terrorist attacks that occur only rarely is giving way to a new dynamic of smaller, simpler plots that take place frequently. The re-evaluation of priorities that took place on Sept. 12, 2001, has become a continuous process of adjustments that are often more reflexive than reflective.

Post-FREEDOM Act public poll proves that general consensus is that civil liberties should not be compromised, even in counter-terror efforts

Gass 6/10 (Nick Gass, POLITICO breaking news reporter, citing a Gallup poll, “Poll: Americans say terrorism shouldn't trump civil liberties,” aj

Americans would appear to agree with Congress’ latest efforts to limit the scope of its anti-terrorism efforts, with more than six in 10 saying that the federal government should take steps to prevent terrorism but not violate civil liberties, according to a Gallup poll released Wednesday. Among all Americans surveyed, 65 percent prioritized civil liberties over counterterrorism efforts, compared with 30 percent who said that the government should take all steps necessary to prevent acts of terror, even if that infringes on civil liberties. Gallup conducted the survey after the USA Freedom Act, which pulled back the government’s ability to collect bulk communications data, was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Barack Obama. Among those identifying as liberal, 48 percent said government efforts violate civil liberties, compared with 41 percent of moderates and 38 percent of conservatives. On a partisan level, 40 percent of Democrats and leaners said those efforts run roughshod over their rights, compared with 42 percent of Republicans and leaners. The results stand in contrast to those from January 2002, just four months after the 9/11 attacks. Even then, however, Americans were at most split over how the federal government should stop future attacks. At that time, 47 percent of Americans said that government should prioritize anti-terrorism efforts, compared with 49 percent who still showed a greater concern for civil liberties. A year after 9/11, Gallup found that 56 percent felt the government should not violate civil liberties in pursuit of anti-terror efforts, and public opinion has remained mostly stable in that direction in the dozen years’ since. The poll was conducted June 2-7 among 1,527 adults nationwide, featuring an overall margin of error of plus-or-minus 3 percentage points.

The public has consistently prioritized personal liberty interests over security interests – statistical analysis

Jones 15 (Jeffrey M. Jones, Hoover Institution assistant director and research fellow, published on Gallup, an American research-based consulting company known for universal public opinion polls, “Americans Still Say Liberties Should Trump Anti-Terrorism,” aj

PRINCETON, N.J. -- The federal government's recent actions to limit the scope of what it can do to prevent terrorism are consistent with Americans' preference to prioritize civil liberties over anti-terrorism efforts when the two come into conflict. Sixty-five percent of Americans say the government should take steps to prevent terrorism but not violate civil liberties, while 30% think any steps to prevent terrorism are justified, even if they violate liberties. In the first few months after 9/11, Americans were more divided on the issue. The latest results are based on a June 2-7 Gallup poll, conducted after Congress passed and President Barack Obama signed into law the USA Freedom Act, designed to replace the expiring and controversial Patriot Act that was passed after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These laws help define the scope of government efforts to prevent terrorist attacks against the U.S. Notably, the new law does not authorize the government to collect data on citizens' electronic communications, a secret program that was exposed by former government contractor and now U.S. exile Edward Snowden. However, the government can still obtain those records from the phone companies if it has a warrant. In January 2002, four months after the 9/11 attacks and with concerns about terrorism still high, 47% of Americans said the government should take all necessary steps to prevent terrorism, even those that violated individual civil liberties, while 49% said anti-terror efforts should stop short of violating civil liberties. A year after the attacks, in September 2002, Americans showed a greater concern for civil liberties, with 62% saying anti-terror efforts should not violate civil liberties and 33% giving anti-terror efforts the higher priority. Since then, opinion has not fundamentally changed, although the 65% who currently prioritize protecting civil liberties is down slightly from 71% in 2011.

In the short and medium run, there is no reason to create laws that compromise civil liberties – only with certainty that non-state groups have the means to attack should we create legal change

Fearon 3 (James D. Fearon, the Theodore and Francis Geballe Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, 10/9/3, “Catastrophic terrorism and civil liberties in the short and long run*, aj

In the short and medium run, it remains quite difficult for individuals or non-state groups to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and virtually impossible to do so without the active assistance of a state. States, moreover, may have strong incentives not to let nuclear materials out of their own control. (Nonetheless, I am terrified that North Korea’s leadership might sell nuclear bombs to the highest bidder, and the fact that something is not in the interest of a state overall doesn’t mean that it will be smart or competent enough to prevent it from happening.) Weapons-grade anthrax is hard to make and hard to deliver in such a way as to kill thousands (although we have seen that it may not be necessary to kill thousands to have a big negative impact on society). This appears to be true as well for a variety of other biological and chemical weapons that have been mentioned as horrible terrorist dangers. This means that in the short run there is simply no good reason to rush into changing the laws in ways that greatly compromise civil liberties. If you face a fundamentally long-run problem, it makes more sense to think about the best feasible long-run outcome and then work backwards to draw out implications for what to do now. How best to change the law and law enforcement to respond to the threat of catastrophic terrorism is a great candidate, I would argue, for analysis and recommendations by a presidential commission composed of constitutional lawyers, congressmen, and lawenforcement experts empowered to make recommendations to relevant congressional committees. This would be far better than the current approach, in which, after each major terrorist attack on U.S. soil, our representatives compete with each other in proposing legal changes to “get tough” on terrorism, the effect of which has been to run roughshod over the Constitution. There is no thinking here about the long-run problem, only the frenzied passing of “position taking” bills, whose actual positive impact on preventing terrorist attacks is often dubious.

Middle ground between privacy and security key

Dragu 11 (Tiberiu Dragu, Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at NYU, holds a PhD in Political Science from Stanford, “Is There a Trade-off between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention,” ARTICLE in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW · JANUARY 2011, aj

Almost everyone -citizens, policymakers, political pundits, and scholars- approaches the formulation of counterterrorism policies as a balancing act between the allegedly competing values of privacy and security (Waldron 2003). Intuitively, this would seem to be the right way to evaluate policies designed to increase national security from terrorism. In the face of a potential large-scale terrorist attack, after all, it is unthinkable that citizens would dismiss security concerns and thus forbid all government surveillance directed at potential terrorists, just as it is unthinkable that they would dismiss all privacy concerns and give the government unlimited surveillance powers. Other than in the case of these two extremes, democratic societies and their governments face inevitable tradeoffs.

“Temporary” reductions in civil liberties during times of emergency often end up being exploited by power-hungry government officials

Dragu 11 (Tiberiu Dragu, Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at NYU, holds a PhD in Political Science from Stanford, “Is There a Trade-off between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention,” ARTICLE in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW · JANUARY 2011, aj

The result regarding the strategic bias of the executive agencies in charge of terrorism prevention contributes to a general understanding of the relationship between government powers and civil liberties in times of emergencies (Rossiter 1948; Rehnquist 2000; Ackerman 2004; Ferejohn and Pasquino 2004; Gross and Aolain 2006; Posner and Vermule 2007; Manin 2008). The very definition of emergency powers implies that when the emergency subsides, and a serious threat no longer exists, the powers will be terminated and rights will be restored. However, the analysis shows that governmental enforcement agencies lack incentive to relinquish their newly acquired powers once the emergency diminishes. To the contrary, because they are always worse off when civil liberties are expanded, and always better off when they are reduced, agencies seek to make the emergency reductions in civil liberties permanent.

Decreasing privacy protections makes for an increased risk of terrorism

Dragu 11 (Tiberiu Dragu, Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at NYU, holds a PhD in Political Science from Stanford, “Is There a Trade-off between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention,” ARTICLE in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW · JANUARY 2011, aj

Reducing privacy protections, so goes the argument, has a chilling effect on terrorism-related activities. Reducing privacy protections might not deter true fanatics such as suicide bombers but it deters donors, fundraisers, facilitators, recruiters, and foot soldiers. That is, it raises the perceived costs of being associated with a terrorist group for individuals who would otherwise willingly provide various kinds of support. In turn, the terrorist support and logistical infrastructure is negatively affected: there are fewer supporters to disseminate propaganda, recruit operatives, raise money, and, if the terrorist organization wants to plan an attack, facilitate immigration, procure supplies, transfer money, forge false identities, facilitate travel, and provide safe houses. Support and logistical networks are essential for terrorist organizations to plan and execute large-scale attacks (Gunaratna 2004). Reducing the level of privacy protections thus increases the terrorist organization’s costs for terrorist activities. In a liberal democracy, the tactical advantage is seemingly conceded to terrorists, who are free to exploit privacy protections, while the authorities are constrained in their efforts to prevent terrorist attacks by those very privacy protections. Consequently, the intuition behind the security rationale for reducing privacy protections seems simple. Because reducing privacy protections decreases the anti-terrorist agencies’ cost of counterterrorism intelligence efforts and increases the terrorist organization’s cost of terrorist activities, reducing privacy protections increases security from terrorism. However, even if we accept the premises of the security rationale, I argue that, when the anti-terrorist agency and terrorist organizations act strategically, reducing privacy protections can lead to less security from terrorism while the anti-terrorism agency prefers reducing privacy even if such a reduction leads to less security from terrorism.

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