4. Perm doesn’t access the federalism net benefit – ensures tyranny.
[Erin Ryan, Associate Professor of Law at Lewis & Clark Law School, 2007, Maryland Law Review 66.3, pg. 511-512, ‘Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area’, http://works.bepress.com/erin_ryan/5/, TB]
Indeed, the historic progression of the various models of federalism that informed Supreme Court interpretation over the twentieth century reflects a pendulum-like attempt to achieve the proper balance between underlying federalism values, each model perhaps overcompensating for the excesses of its predecessor.15 After the Great Depression crippled the capacity of state and local governments to cope with unprecedented levels of social and economic despair, the Supreme Court adopted a model of federalism that exalted the problem-solving value at the expense of the check-and-balance value to approve pragmatic New Deal legislative programs that expanded federal jurisdiction into traditionally local arenas. Cooperative federalism, the predominant model of federalism since World War II, recovers some of the balance through a partnership-based approach to regulation in areas of interjurisdictional overlap, allowing state and federal governments to take responsibility for interlocking components of a collaborative regulatory program. However, cooperative federalism has also been criticized as an overly pragmatic model that insufficiently protects anti-tyranny values.16 Responding to concerns that cooperative federalism is, at best, undertheorized (and at worst, more coercive than collaborative), the New Federalism reestablishes the supremacy of the check-and-balance value over all others in an effort to bolster the line between state and federal authority against pressures (some perhaps political, others genuinely interjurisdictional) that would blur the boundary.