In 2003, in an effort to reduce the risk of “al Qaeda-inspired” recruitment, radicalization and related terrorist incidents, the United Kingdom launched the Preventing Violent Extremism Strategy (Prevent). It was considered one of the best in the world when it was first implemented. At its core, Prevent focused on radicalization and recruitment prevention (rather than simply HVE detection) and acknowledged the importance of enlisting the community in the fight against terrorism. In the words of Charles Farr, the head of the U.K.’s Office for Security and Counter-terrorism, Prevent was “the Government’s recognition that as a nation, we cannot arrest our way out of the terrorist threat we face” nor can we “protect ourselves physically to the point where the threat is mitigated entirely.” That is sage wisdom for America’s challenges with terrorism, but we need to also look at the results of the British program. The Prevent strategy was criticized (and ultimately failed in its initial form) for four primary problems: The strategy’s concept of radicalization: There was a lack of consensus or conceptual clarity on the definition of radicalization. A narrow focus on Muslims: The original program looked exclusively at the Muslim community, essentially labeling all Muslims as potentially “at risk” while ignoring other groups engaged in extremist activities.The implementation methodology: The program funded efforts in Muslim communities based on the size of the Muslim population in a given area. Inasmuch as the additional risk factors were ignored (particularly other sources of extremism), the community perceived that the program was intended to “spy on Muslims.” Negative program consequences: In considering the Muslim population (irrespective of behavior), the program inadvertently created a relationship of mistrust. This compromised the goal of community engagement and support and potentially helped create an environment ripe for extremist recruitment based on the resentment of the British government. One major error with Prevent was a failure to engage stakeholders before implementation so as to determine challenges unique to the communities it was meant to help. What is more, evaluation of Prevent occurred only after widespread criticism of the strategy’s shortcomings. At that point, the challenge became not just creating an effective strategy but also rebuilding the community trust that is central to addressing HVE. Looking to the United States, it would seem we are heading down a similar (and ultimately futile) path. The much-debated CVE Pilot Programs in Los Angeles, Minneapolis and Boston have engendered widespread backlash in those cities because the perception is that CVE is focused exclusively on Muslim populations. Yet, in Britain, we saw how approaching communities based on religion or country of origin neutralizes an effort before it gets out of the gate. To be sure, Muslim-identity extremism is a threat, but it is not the only nor even the greatest threat. Consider two recent studies assessing the threat from HVE: In 2014, a National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Center’s report found that law enforcement views the anti-government Sovereign Citizen movement as the top terrorist threat, followed by Muslim extremists and militia/patriot group members. In 2015, the New America Foundation reported that since September 11, 2001, nearly twice as many victims have been killed by anti-government adherents, white supremacists and other non-Muslim extremists than by radical Muslims: 48 were killed by non-Muslim extremists, compared with 26 self-proclaimed jihadists. As explained in my book, Homegrown Violent Extremism, terrorism is the product of an alienated individual, a legitimizing ideology and an enabling environment. The environment (i.e., the community) is most susceptible to positive influence to reduce the risk of HVE. The issue of an enabling environment must be addressed in terms of enhancing social morality, responsibility and community integrity, with the intended outcome of facilitating community-based efforts to identify and explore solutions to continuing challenges. If CVE becomes synonymous with countering violent Muslim extremism, we are doomed to fail and will not even address the greatest terrorist threats in this country. The United States can enhance its security posture by implementing strategies that work with communities. It begins with those residents having a seat at the table to contribute to policy development, implementation and evaluation that will ultimately affect them. The community holds the key to the success of any program intended to counter violent extremism. Let’s get this right.
fails – broadly allows government to crush all dissent or inevitably targets only Muslims
Saylor, 2015, [directs the department to monitor and combat Islamophobia at the Council on American-Islamic Relations]
(Corey, July 15, "Is countering violent extremism ready for a $40 million investment?" The Hill thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/247908-is-countering-violent-extremism-ready-for-a-40-million)
House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Mike McCaul’s (R-Texas) proposed new Office for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in the Department of Homeland Security would redirect 40 million taxpayer dollars over four years into a dubious expansion of government programming. We all want to prevent violent extremism. But currently, CVE programming fails to provide meaningful solutions that would substantively interdict barbaric acts. A 2014 National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) document titled ‘Countering Violent Extremism” serves as food for thought. Its expert authors sayCVE’s ends are “not easy to quantify.” This means return-on-investment metrics will be elusive. The report authors then offer risk factors to help public service providers identify at-risk youth such as “Parent-Child Bonding, Empathic Connection,” “Presence of Emotional or Verbal Conflict in Family” and “Parent Involvement in Child’s Education.” As these factors encompass issues with which most American families have struggled at some point, their use in identifying at-risk individuals is nearly non-existent. On this subject, McCaul’s proposal assigns the office to the task of “identifying risk factors that contribute to violent extremism.” But such efforts at classification have already been attempted. In 2008, the UK’s counter-intelligence and security agency, M15, concluded that “it is not possible to draw up a typical profile of the ‘British terrorist’ as most are ‘demographically unremarkable.’" Similarly, in its 2010 report titled “Preventing Violent Extremism,” Britain’s House of Commons’ Communities and Local Government Committee said, “Regarding the Government’s analysis of the factors which lead people to become involved in violent extremism, we conclude that there has been a pre-occupation with the theological basis of radicalisation, when the evidence seems to indicate that politics, policy and socio-economics may be more important factors in the process.” This pre-occupation with religion raises another problem with expanding the scope of DHS programming. While the security field’s current focus is on Daesh (ISIS), this has not and will not always be the case, and we join other security and civil liberties organizations in our concern that the program’s scope may be expanded at-will in ways not envisioned by its current advocates. In February, 2009 the Missouri Information Analysis Center (MIAC), a DHS “fusion center,” issued a report labeling common ideologies or affiliations as warning signs of being a “right-wing extremist” or member of a domestic paramilitary group. According to the MIAC report, any U.S. citizen could potentially be a domestic terrorist if they are in favor of “strong state rights,” hold “anti-abortionist” or “anti-Immigration” views, are in strong opposition to “the collection of federal income taxes” or “the Federal Reserve Banks,” or support third-party presidential candidates like Ron Paul. The report also noted that "It is not uncommon for militia members to display Constitutional Party, Campaign for Liberty or Libertarian material" or the “Gadsden Flag.” Setting the enormous costs of monitoring everyone who dislikes paying their taxes or votes for Ron Paul aside, such broad-swath categorizations of what might constitute subversive behavior risk criminalizing anyone who holds views with which the government disagrees, a chilling prospect. Finally, it is worth noting what has already happened on the ground in those areas in which CVE programming has been proposed; after all, CVE can only work if it is widely accepted as effective by the communities in which it would profess to build ties. Last year, former U.S. Attorney General Holder announced a CVE initiative, designating Los Angeles, Boston, and Minneapolis as pilot cities. While the program was supposed to target all forms of violent extremism, in practice only Muslims were actually examined. In all three cities, local Muslim community leaders, who have longstanding records of supporting efforts to make our nation more secure, engaged in the U.S. attorney-led meetings aimed at shaping local CVE frameworks. In time, however, they distanced themselves from the project as they formed a deeper understanding of CVE’s problematic realities. In Los Angeles, both the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California, an umbrella organization of mosques and Muslim organizations serving the Muslims of Southern California, and the Muslim Student Association of the West Coast (MSA West) voted to oppose the narrow scope of the federal government's CVE program. In Minnesota, nearly 50 Muslim organizations joined together to urge law enforcement to “consider our grave concerns” and discontinue this stigmatizing, divisive, and ineffective initiative. A “top leader of Boston’s Muslim community” opted against the local framework because it targeted only American Muslims and was “founded on the premise that your faith determines your propensity towards violence.” Given that one of the goals of violent extremists is to transform our nation into their vision of an authoritarian state, Americans must be vigilant that the measures we fund to stop them do not ultimately themselves fulfill these aims. CVE, with its call for teachers, guidance counselors, public health workers, and police officers to assess a person’s thoughts, rather than actions, to identify violent extremists, does not represent an effective solution for these very real threats.
focus on Muslim terrorism falls victim to media hype and ignores real threats
Kurzman and Schanzer 6/16/15, [Professor of Sociology at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill who specializes in Middle East and Islamic studies; Associate Professor of the Practice in the Sanford School of Public Policy ]
(Charles and David, "The Growing Right-Wing Terror Threat" www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/opinion/the-other-terror-threat.html)
THIS month, the headlines were about a Muslim man in Boston who was accused of threatening police officers with a knife. Last month, two Muslims attacked an anti-Islamic conference in Garland, Tex. The month before, a Muslim man was charged with plotting to drive a truck bomb onto a military installation in Kansas. If you keep up with the news, you know that a small but steady stream of American Muslims, radicalized by overseas extremists, are engaging in violence here in the United States. But headlines can mislead. The main terrorist threat in the United States is not from violent Muslim extremists, but from right-wing extremists. Just ask the police. In a survey we conducted with the Police Executive Research Forum last year of 382 law enforcement agencies, 74 percent reported anti-government extremism as one of the top three terrorist threats in their jurisdiction; 39 percent listed extremism connected with Al Qaeda or like-minded terrorist organizations. And only 3 percent identified the threat from Muslim extremists as severe, compared with 7 percent for anti-government and other forms of extremism. The self-proclaimed Islamic State’s efforts to radicalize American Muslims, which began just after the survey ended, may have increased threat perceptions somewhat, but not by much, as we found in follow-up interviews over the past year with counterterrorism specialists at 19 law enforcement agencies. These officers, selected from urban and rural areas around the country, said that radicalization from the Middle East was a concern, but not as dangerous as radicalization among right-wing extremists. An officer from a large metropolitan area said that “militias, neo-Nazis and sovereign citizens” are the biggest threat we face in regard to extremism. One officer explained that he ranked the right-wing threat higher because “it is an emerging threat that we don’t have as good of a grip on, even with our intelligence unit, as we do with the Al Shabab/Al Qaeda issue, which we have been dealing with for some time.” An officer on the West Coast explained that the “sovereign citizen” anti-government threat has “really taken off,” whereas terrorism by American Muslim is something “we just haven’t experienced yet.”Last year, for example, a man who identified with the sovereign citizen movement — which claims not to recognize the authority of federal or local government — attacked a courthouse in Forsyth County, Ga., firing an assault rifle at police officers and trying to cover his approach with tear gas and smoke grenades. The suspect was killed by the police, who returned fire. In Nevada, anti-government militants reportedly walked up to andshot two police officers at a restaurant, then placed a “Don’t tread on me” flag on their bodies. An anti-government extremist in Pennsylvania was arrested on suspicion of shooting two state troopers, killing one of them, before leading authorities on a 48-day manhunt. A right-wing militant in Texas declared a “revolution” and was arrested on suspicion of attempting to rob an armored car in order to buy weapons and explosives and attack law enforcement. These individuals on the fringes of right-wing politics increasingly worry law enforcement officials. Law enforcement agencies around the country are training their officers to recognize signs of anti-government extremism and to exercise caution during routine traffic stops, criminal investigations and other interactions with potential extremists. “The threat is real,” says the handout from one training program sponsored by the Department of Justice. Since 2000, the handout notes, 25 law enforcement officers have been killed by right-wing extremists, who share a “fear that government will confiscate firearms” and a “belief in the approaching collapse of government and the economy.” Despite public anxiety about extremists inspired by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, the number of violent plots by such individuals has remained very low. Since 9/11, an average of nine American Muslims per year have been involved in an average of six terrorism-related plots against targets in the United States. Most were disrupted, but the 20 plots that were carried out accounted for 50 fatalities over the past 13 and a half years. In contrast, right-wing extremists averaged 337 attacks per year in the decade after 9/11, causing a total of 254 fatalities, according to a study by Arie Perliger, a professor at the United States Military Academy’sCombating Terrorism Center. The toll has increased since the study was released in 2012. Other data sets, using different definitions of political violence, tell comparable stories. The Global Terrorism Database maintained by theStart Center at the University of Maryland includes 65 attacks in the United States associated with right-wing ideologies and 24 by Muslim extremists since 9/11. The International Security Program at the New America Foundation identifies 39 fatalities from “non-jihadist” homegrown extremists and 26 fatalities from “jihadist” extremists. Meanwhile, terrorism of all forms has accounted for a tiny proportion of violence in America. There have been more than 215,000 murders in the United States since 9/11. For every person killed by Muslim extremists, there have been 4,300 homicides from other threats. Public debates on terrorism focus intensely on Muslims. But this focus does not square with the low number of plots in the United States by Muslims, and it does a disservice to a minority group that suffers from increasingly hostile public opinion. As state and local police agencies remind us, right-wing, anti-government extremism is the leading source of ideological violence in America.
ex kurtzman -
different media angles, inherent biases all cover up real violence – turns case and reinscribes muslim stereotypes
Shane, 6/24/15, [Washington reporter at New York Times]
(Scott, "Homegrown Extremists Tied to Deadlier Toll than Jihadists in US Since 9/11, www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/us/tally-of-attacks-in-us-challenges-perceptions-of-top-terror-threat.html)
WASHINGTON — In the 14 years since Al Qaeda carried out attacks on New York and the Pentagon, extremists have regularly executed smaller lethal assaults in the United States, explaining their motives in online manifestoes or social media rants. But the breakdown of extremist ideologies behind those attacks may come as a surprise. Since Sept. 11, 2001, nearly twice as many people have been killed by white supremacists, antigovernment fanatics and other non-Muslim extremists than by radical Muslims: 48 have been killed by extremists who are not Muslim, including the recent mass killing in Charleston, S.C., compared with 26 by self-proclaimed jihadists, according to a count by New America, a Washington research center. The slaying of nine African-Americans in a Charleston church last week, with an avowed white supremacist charged with their murders, was a particularly savage case. But it is only the latest in a string of lethal attacks by people espousing racial hatred, hostility to government and theories such as those of the “sovereign citizen” movement, which denies the legitimacy of most statutory law. The assaults have taken the lives of police officers, members of racial or religious minorities and random civilians. Non-Muslim extremists have carried out 19 such attacks since Sept. 11, according to the latest count, compiled by David Sterman, a New America program associate, and overseen by Peter Bergen, a terrorism expert. By comparison, seven lethal attacks by Islamic militants have taken place in the same period. If such numbers are new to the public, they are familiar to police officers. A survey to be published this week asked 382 police and sheriff’s departments nationwide to rank the three biggest threats from violent extremism in their jurisdiction. About 74 percent listed antigovernment violence, while 39 percent listed “Al Qaeda-inspired” violence, according to the researchers, Charles Kurzman of the University of North Carolina and David Schanzer of Duke University. Homegrown Terrorism In the United States since Sept. 11, terrorist attacks by antigovernment, racist and other nonjihadist extremists have killed nearly twice as many people as those by Islamic jihadists. A photo from a white supremacist website showing Dylann Roof, the suspect in the Charleston, S.C., church shooting.Federal Hate Crime Charges Likely in South Carolina Church ShootingJUNE 24, 2015 An honor guard carried the coffin of State Senator Clementa C. Pinckney, a shooting victim, in Columbia, S.C., on Wednesday.Charleston Families Hope Words Endure Past ShootingJUNE 24, 2015 State flags line the Capitol subway tracks in Washington.Calls to Cut Ties to Symbols of the SouthJUNE 23, 2015 The Council of Conservative Citizens was most visibly active in South Carolina during a fierce debate in 2000 over flying the Confederate battle flag on the grounds of the State House in Columbia, picketing in support of continuing to display the emblem.Council of Conservative Citizens Promotes White Primacy, and G.O.P. TiesJUNE 22, 2015 Earl Holt III, president of the Council of Conservative Citizens, in a 2013 image taken from the council's website.White Supremacist Who Influenced Charleston Suspect Donated to 2016 G.O.P. CampaignsJUNE 22, 2015 A photo from a white supremacist website showing Dylann Roof, the suspect in the Charleston, S.C., church shooting.Dylann Roof Photos and a Manifesto Are Posted on WebsiteJUNE 20, 2015 A scene from a vigil at Morris Brown African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, S.C., for the victims.Many Ask, Why Not Call Church Shooting Terrorism?JUNE 18, 2015 “Law enforcement agencies around the country have told us the threat from Muslim extremists is not as great as the threat from right-wing extremists,” said Dr. Kurzman, whose study is to be published by the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security and the Police Executive Research Forum. John G. Horgan, who studies terrorism at the University of Massachusetts, Lowell, said the mismatch between public perceptions and actual cases had become steadily more obvious to scholars. “There’s an acceptance now of the idea that the threat from jihadi terrorism in the United States has been overblown,” Dr. Horgan said. “And there’s a belief that the threat of right-wing, antigovernment violence has been underestimated.” Counting terrorism cases is a subjective enterprise, relying on shifting definitions and judgment calls. If terrorism is defined as ideological violence, for instance, should an attacker who has merely ranted about religion, politics or race be considered a terrorist? A man in Chapel Hill, N.C., who was charged with fatally shooting three young Muslim neighbors had posted angry critiques of religion, but he also had a history of outbursts over parking issues. (New America does not include this attack in its count.) Likewise, what about mass killings in which no ideological motive is evident, such as those at a Colorado movie theater and a Connecticut elementary school in 2012? The criteria used by New America and most other research groups exclude such attacks, which have cost more lives than those clearly tied to ideology. Some killings by non-Muslims that most experts would categorize as terrorism have drawn only fleeting news media coverage, never jelling in the public memory. But to revisit some of the episodes is to wonder why. In 2012, a neo-Nazi named Wade Michael Page entered a Sikh temple in Wisconsin and opened fire, killing six people and seriously wounding three others. Mr. Page, who died at the scene, was a member of a white supremacist group called the Northern Hammerskins. In another case, in June 2014, Jerad and Amanda Miller, a married couple with radical antigovernment views, entered a Las Vegas pizza restaurant and fatally shot two police officers who were eating lunch. On the bodies, they left a swastika, a flag inscribed with the slogan “Don’t tread on me” and a note saying, “This is the start of the revolution.” Then they killed a third person in a nearby Walmart. And, as in the case of jihadist plots, there have been sobering close calls. In November 2014 in Austin, Tex., a man named Larry McQuilliams fired more than 100 rounds at government buildings that included the Police Headquarters and the Mexican Consulate. Remarkably, his shooting spree hit no one, and he was killed by an officer before he could try to detonate propane cylinders he drove to the scene. Some Muslim advocates complain that when the perpetrator of an attack is not Muslim, news media commentators quickly focus on the question of mental illness. “With non-Muslims, the media bends over backward to identify some psychological traits that may have pushed them over the edge,” said Abdul Cader Asmal, a retired physician and a longtime spokesman for Muslims in Boston. “Whereas if it’s a Muslim, the assumption is that they must have done it because of their religion.” On several occasions since President Obama took office, efforts by government agencies to conduct research on right-wing extremism have run into resistance from Republicans, who suspected an attempt to smear conservatives. A 2009 report by the Department of Homeland Security, which warned that an ailing economy and the election of the first black president might prompt a violent reaction from white supremacists, was withdrawn in the face of conservative criticism. Its main author, Daryl Johnson, later accused the department of “gutting” its staffing for such research. William Braniff, the executive director of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, said the outsize fear of jihadist violence reflected memories of Sept. 11, the daunting scale of sectarian conflict overseas and wariness of a strain of Islam that seems alien to many Americans. “We understand white supremacists,” he said. “We don’t really feel like we understand Al Qaeda, which seems too complex and foreign to grasp.” The contentious question of biased perceptions of terrorist threats dates back at least two decades, to the truck bombing that tore apart the federal building in Oklahoma City in April 1995. Some early news media speculation about the attack assumed that it had been carried out by Muslim militants. The arrest of Timothy J. McVeigh, an antigovernment extremist, quickly put an end to such theories. The bombing, which killed 168 people, including 19 children, remains the second-deadliest terrorist attack in American history, though its toll was dwarfed by the roughly 3,000 killed on Sept 11. “If there’s one lesson we seem to have forgotten 20 years after Oklahoma City, it’s that extremist violence comes in all shapes and sizes,” said Dr. Horgan, the University of Massachusetts scholar. “And very often, it comes from someplace you’re least suspecting.”
A version of this article appears in print on June 25, 2015, on page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Most U.S. Attacks Are Homegrown and Not Jihadist. Order Reprints| Today's Paper|Subscribe
vague policy focus papers over entrenched inequality – Britain proves
Joppke, 2009, [German political sociologist, Professor and chair in General Sociology at the University of Bern, Switzerland]
(Christian, Feb 16, "Limits of Integration Policy: Britain and her Muslims" Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies: Vol. 35, No. 3, March 2009, pp. 453-472 Taylor and Francis)
-vs islamophobia w/o CVE mechanism proves their approach is symbolic/token gesture
This essay examines a paradox: while the British state has done more than other European states to accommodate the claims of Muslim minorities, recent polls have shown British Muslims to be more disaffected and alienated than other Muslims in Europe. This raises the question of the limits of integration policy, which is obvious but rarely posed. I argue that, more than reflecting an adverse reality, the neologism ‘Islamophobia’ has functioned as a symbolic device of the British state to recognise the Muslim minority. However, the policy focus on Islamophobia had two negative consequences: first, it deflected from the real causes of disadvantage; secondly, it fuelled the quest for ‘respect and recognition’ that stands to be disappointed in a liberal state. I take the latter to be the main limit of integration policy as revealed by the British case. Keywords: Immigrant Integration; Multiculturalism; Muslims in Britain and Europe; Discrimination; Liberalism A recent survey of ‘how Westerners and Muslims view each other’ in thirteen Western and non-Western countries (Pew 2006) contains a striking puzzle: while there is the good news that European Muslims have more positive opinions about Europe than Muslims in traditionally Muslim countries, Britain stands out as the Western country whose Muslim minority is the most negatively disposed toward the non-Muslim majority. Conversely, and a surprise if one considers that the notion of ‘Islamophobia’ is of British vintage (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997), British non-Muslims espouse rather favourable views of British Muslims. Germany is at the opposite end, with a hostile majority but a docile Muslim minority. And, surprising for all who followed the French headscarf troubles and banlieue unrest, the best of all (European) worlds seems to be France, where Muslims and non-Muslims hold relatively benign views of one another. Further underlining the BritishFrench Christian Joppke is Professor of Political Science at The American University of Paris. Correspondence to: Prof. C. Joppke, The American University of Paris, 6 rue du Colonel Combes, 75007 Paris, France. E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org. ISSN 1369-183X print/ISSN 1469-9451 online/09/030453-20 # 2009 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/13691830802704616 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies Vol. 35, No. 3, March 2009, pp. 453472 Downloaded by  at 14:15 26 July 2015 contrast, almost half of British Muslims (47 per cent) found that there is a ‘conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society’, whereas close to three-quarters of French Muslims (72 per cent) deny that there is any such conflict (Pew 2006: 3). The BritishFrench contrast is paradoxical if one considers the British mantra that ‘our diversity is our strength’ and the smug response by British officials to the French anti-headscarf law of 2004, billed by London’s left-wing mayor, Ken Livingstone, as ‘the most reactionary proposal to be considered by any parliament in Europe since the Second World War’ (Guardian, 13 July 2004: 4). In her informative study of the European Muslim elite, Jytte Klausen comes to similar results. She describes Europe’s political Muslim elite as pragmatic, integration-minded and optimistic, with ‘little time for left-wing ideas about global citizenship and transnational identities’ (Klausen 2005: 19). But again there is one exception: Britain, whose Muslim leaders were found to be ‘exceptionally unhappy with current policies’ (Klausen 2005: 63). Moreover, within her typology of ‘approaches to the integration of Islam’, her British Muslim interviewees came out as staunchly ‘neo-orthodox’, defined by a clear ‘No’ to the questions as to whether Islam is ‘compatible’ with Western values and whether Islam should be ‘mainstreamed’ for a better fit with its European host societies (Klausen 2005: 87). In line with this, 70 per cent of her interviewed British Muslim leaders came out in favour of ‘legal dualism’, that is, of applying religious Sharia rules in private law, such as marriage and divorce*a stance that was rejected by even larger majorities of Muslim leaders in most other Western European countries (Klausen 2005: 192). Finally, British Muslims’ integration deficits stand out in a recent survey by the UK think-tank Policy Exchange, which found that 31 per cent of surveyed British Muslims ‘feel more in common’ with Muslims in other countries than with fellow citizens (Policy Exchange 2007: 38), and that a considerable 13 per cent in the younger age bracket (1624) ‘admire organisations like Al Qaeda that are prepared to fight against the West’ (Policy Exchange 2007: 62).1 Attitudes were found to be particularly extreme among the young, which suggests that the rift between Muslims and the majority society is growing. Accordingly, only 19 per cent of the interviewed Muslims over 55 years think that apostasy should be ‘punishable by death’, while almost twice as many (36 per cent) of the 1624-year-olds think so; a mere 18 per cent of Muslims over 55 advocate polygamy for Muslim men, compared to 52 per cent in the 1624 age bracket; and, while not a few older Muslims think that ‘homosexuality is wrong and should be illegal’ (50 per cent), even more of the very young think that way (71 per cent). Indeed, as a Financial Times columnist summarised the Policy Exchange findings, ‘(t)his is the clearest report we yet have from any European country that the rift between Muslims and non-Muslims is deepening, not disappearing’ (Caldwell 2007). Since home-grown Islamic terrorism has struck Europe, there has been much debate about a general failure of European societies to successfully integrate their postwar immigrants, especially those of Muslim origin. Unfailingly, this debate is conducted in terms of a presumed failure of states to integrate immigrants, with the 454 C. Joppke Downloaded by  at 14:15 26 July 2015 reverse hope that, by means of revamped integration policies, states will eventually resolve the problem. Rarely is the question of the limits of state policy posed. But one should at least consider that one of the most successful immigrant societies in the world, the United States, has integrated her immigrants, at least in the past halfcentury, without any explicit state policy, relying instead on flexible markets and the fabled assimilatory powers of American mass culture. Even if one brushes this aside as American exceptionalism, putting high hopes on the state is still strangely countertide. For example, consider the retreat of the state on so many policy fronts, from economic to welfare policy; and, not even to mention the ‘state-as-diminished-byglobalisation’ mantra, consider the polycentric nature of functionally differentiated societies, which have ‘neither peak nor centre’ (Luhmann 1986: 16782), so that the entire idea of state-led integration appears misguided from the start. The question of the limits of integration policy is obvious but rarely posed. Britain is a particularly interesting case in this respect. This is because the British case shows a puzzling disjunction between an apparently ill-adapted and dissatisfied Muslim minority and a rather accommodative state policy, which has rarely been far from what organised Muslims want the state to do. Formulated as a counter-factual, if you look for a place in Europe where you would not expect Muslim integration to pose a particular problem, you would expect this place to be Britain. Of all European societies, Britain has perhaps gone the furthest in accommodating her ethnic minorities by means of explicit state policy, Muslims included. Britain was the first European country to devise remedial ‘race relations’ policies for her immigrants, whose logic of combating not just personal insult and injury but structural exclusions in key societal sectors became the European mainstream only 40 years later. This first and paradigm-setting anti-discrimination policy in Europe was framed within a consensual view of Britain as a multicultural society, where ‘diversity’ was extolled as a virtue long before this happened elsewhere.
discourse of islamophobia is totalizing and stigmatizing – ignores alt causes
Joppke, 2009, [German political sociologist, Professor and chair in General Sociology at the University of Bern, Switzerland]
(Christian, Feb 16, "Limits of Integration Policy: Britain and her Muslims" Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies: Vol. 35, No. 3, March 2009, pp. 453-472 Taylor and Francis)
The Runnymede report defines Islamophobia as certain ‘closed’ views of Islam, which are distinguished from ‘open views’ in terms of eight binary oppositions, such as ‘monolithic/diverse’, ‘separate/interacting’, or ‘inferior/different’ (the first adjective always marking a ‘closed’, the second an ‘open’ view). This makes for an elastic definition of Islamophobia, with little that could not be packed into it. Consider the eighth binary opposition, ‘Criticism of West rejected/considered’. If ‘criticisms made by Islam of ‘‘The West’’ (are) rejected out of hand’, there is an instance of Islamophobia, the non-biased attitude being that ‘criticisms of ‘‘the West’’ and other cultures are considered and debated’. Is it reasonable to assume that people enter debate by putting their point of view to disposition? Under such demanding standards, only an advocate of Habermasian communicative rationality would go free of the charge of Islamophobia. However, the real problem is to leave unquestioned the exit position, ‘criticism of the West’. In being sweeping and undifferentiated, such a stance seems to be no less phobic than the incriminated opposite. If the point of the Runnymede report is to ‘counter Islamophobic assumptions that Islam is a single 456 C. Joppke Downloaded by  at 14:15 26 July 2015 monolithic system’, it seems inconsistent to take for granted a similarly monolithic ‘criticism of ‘‘the West’’’, which the ‘West’ is asked to ‘consider and debate’. There is a double standard here, in that ‘the West’ is asked to swallow what on the other side would qualify as phobia. Moreover, if in terms of the lead binary opposition, ‘monolithic’ versus ‘diverse’, a ‘closed’ and thus Islamophobic view of the Islam is to consider the Islam ‘as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities’, one has to retort that this is precisely the view of Islam that Jytte Klausen (2005) found dominant among the British Muslim elite. In her study, 71.4 per cent of her interviewees espoused a ‘neoorthodox’ view of integration, according to which ‘the basic tenets of Islam are not for ‘‘modification’’’ and ‘Islam is what it is’, so that the idea of a ‘Westernised’, British or European Islam is rejected out of hand (Klausen 2005: 100). As the very notion of Islamophobia suggests, the ‘trouble with the idea is that it confuses hatred of, and discrimination against Muslims on the one hand with criticism of Islam on the other’ (Malik 2005). Tellingly, the first six of Runnymede’s Islamophobia-defining stances denote ‘wrong’ attitudes toward Islam as belief system, while only the last two address discrimination against people. Accordingly, the notion has been attacked for stifling free speech and ‘end(ing) up defending the nastiest and most right-wing part of the Muslim community’ (Hari 2006). In the wake of the Danish Cartoon Affair, where such risks were promptly apparent, a group of 12 prominent writers*mostly liberal Muslim intellectuals, including Salman Rushdie* consequently declared that ‘Islamophobia’ is ‘a wretched concept that confuses criticism of Islam as a religion and stigmatisation of those who believe in it’. Unsurprisingly, on the basis of a vaguely and contestably defined Islamophobia, the Runnymede report drew a dark picture of British society as permeated by anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiment, expressed in misrepresentations in the media and in everyday life no less than in hate crimes and discrimination in employment and schooling. Once the concept was there, there had to be a reality described by it. Of course, the purported causality is the reverse: ‘(A)nti-Muslim prejudice has grown so considerably and so rapidly in recent years that a new item in the vocabulary is needed so that it can be identified and acted against’ (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997: 1). In fact, the true success of the report was to introduce the word ‘Islamophobia’ into the public vocabulary, and even outside Britain it ‘has become a popular summary explanation for the difficulties that Muslims face’ (Klausen 2005: 58). Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Britain was Islamophobic when the concept was launched in the mid-1990s, what has been the development since? A good measure is the follow-up report by the Runnymede’s Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia: Issues, Challenges and Action (2004). The report comes to optimistic conclusions, at least with respect to measures that fall within the ambit of state policy. If one considers only non-EU domestic measures, a new question on religion was included in the 2001 census after ‘much lobbying’ by Muslim organisations (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 2004: 75). Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 457 Downloaded by  at 14:15 26 July 2015 This allows for monitoring by religion analogous to already existing ethnic monitoring. Secondly, a 2001 amendment to the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act created the new legal term of ‘religiously aggravated’ offence, thus adding ‘religious’ to already existing protection from ‘racially’ motivated offences. This was complemented, two years after the publication of Runnymede’s 2004 progress report, by the 2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act, which extended the 1986 Public Order Act to create a new offence of incitement to religious hatred. Whereas the 2001 amendment of the Crime and Disorder Act had outlawed direct acts of offending or harassing Muslims, the new law added to this the incitement of others to do so. There was, again, logic to this extension, because Jews and Sikhs were already protected via ‘race’. However, the 2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act became widely criticised, especially by writers, intellectuals and entertainers, as injurious to free speech. The government pointed out that the law was ‘about protecting people, not faiths’, and that this was not a ‘new blasphemy law’.2 As in the entire campaign against Islamophobia, the line distinguishing between people and their beliefs is nevertheless unclear. Moreover, as one critic pointed out, the analogy between race and religion does not really work: ‘There is no possible rational objection to blackness. There are many possible rational objections to religion ... and some of the greatest thinkers in modern history have held them’ (Garton Ash 2005). Multiply withdrawn and re-introduced, and eventually realised only in a watered-down version,3 the 2006 Act was the Labour government’s attempt to reconcile the unison opposition by British Muslims to the war on Iraq, by ‘trying to deliver an agenda that has shown consideration and respect for Muslims’.4 Taking effect not long after the so-called Danish Cartoon Affair of Autumn 2005, the Act could not be tested for its claimed irrelevance for free speech: in an astounding act of self-censorship, all major British newspapers refused to reprint the incriminated cartoons. For Tariq Modood (2006: 3) this ‘restraint in the uses of freedom directed against religious people’ epitomised ‘some progress (in Britain) since the Satanic Verses affair’. Not even including this latest legislative advance, the Runnymede’s 2004 ‘review of progress’, much of it achieved at the presumed height of Islamophobia after 9/11, is impressive. While the Muslim Council of Britain lamented that the ‘government has done little to ... protect its Muslim citizens and residents from discrimination, vilification, harassment and deprivation’ (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 2004: 3), in reality perhaps no European government has gone further than the British in protecting Muslims from these vices. And Muslims have clout in Britain. For instance, the domestic incorporation of the EU Employment Directive in December 2003 went along with a stunning victory of the Muslim lobby over gay rights, no small feat in the land of Virginia Wolf and Oscar Wilde. At the behest of the Muslim lobby, the 2003 UK Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) regulations, which implement the sex-related part of the EU Employment Directive, contain a clause that allows religious organisations to refuse employment to a known homosexual, if such refusal is in line with religious script. As the Times 458 C. Joppke Downloaded by  at 14:15 26 July 2015 commented, ‘Gay rights campaigners have been snubbed by the government for fear of upsetting Muslim voters who are regarded as more important to Labour’s election campaign’ (quoted in Klausen 2005: 74). The Causes of Disadvantage The notion of Islamophobia cannot be meaningfully decoupled from an actor’s intent to harm or discriminate. A phobia, after all, is an irrational fear: this can only be the disposition of an actor. Islamophobia inherits this limitation from its closest historical progenitor, ‘anti-Semitism’. However, in its subject-centredness Islamophobia falls short of the model that it aspires to emulate, ‘racism’, which has increasingly come to denote an objective fact built into the anonymous workings of institutions. This weakness might well have been strength, because there are good reasons to be sceptical of the construct of ‘institutional racism’ in which ‘racism’ is an objective outcome separate from actors’ intentions. Unfortunately, the advocates of the concept of Islamophobia are generally not fond of conceptual subtleties, applying the latter, like ‘racism’, to generic discrimination that afflicts Muslims qua Muslims. Accordingly, the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia suggested the existence of ‘institutional Islamophobia’, analogous to the notion of institutional racism, defining the former as ‘those established laws, customs and practices which systematically reflect and produce inequalities in society between Muslims and nonMuslims’ (2004: 14). However, considering only the key sector of employment, it is difficult to argue that Muslims are systematically discriminated against and disadvantaged because they are Muslims. One study found that only 26 per cent of Pakistanis and 23 per cent of Bangladeshis had full-time work in 1994,5 which are the lowest rates of all ethnic groups in Britain (Brown 2000). However, at the same time, 41 per cent of Indian Muslims had full-time work. Factoring in similarly good showings by Middle-Eastern Muslims, one must conclude that being ‘Muslim’ cannot be the cause of the disadvantage that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis face. Instead, it is more likely that their relative disadvantage is due to a combination of demographic and social-structural factors, such as the relative youth of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations, their concentration in economically depressed regions and sectors, and the low skill level and traditionalist profiles of the first immigrant generation (Policy Exchange 2007: 68). Finally, if one considers the particularly low employment level of Muslim women, religion may very well be involved in this*however, as a factor of choice, not of discrimination. 2005 Labour Force Survey figures show that only 23 per cent of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women aged 1634 actually want to work. Conversely, Muslim women who want to work are relatively successful and thus do not seem to suffer inordinately from discrimination: 25 per cent of Muslim women in employment are working in managerial or professional jobs, which is a higher proportion than Christian women at 21 per cent (Policy Exchange 2007: 69). Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 459 Downloaded by  at 14:15 26 July 2015 When seeking to explain why British Muslims fare worse in socio-economic terms than other ethnic groups, a ‘conspiracy of silence’ prevents ‘honest discussion’ of internal cultural factors that may be responsible for this (Lewis 2002: 134). Take the example of Bradford, which has the third-largest Muslim community in Britain after London and Birmingham, and which was one of the sites of the 2001 race riots that led to a massive questioning of British multiculturalism. One authoritative review found Bradford in a ‘very worrying drift towards self-segregation’, with ‘communities ... fragmenting along racial, cultural and faith lines’, but where political etiquette and a discourse of victimisation prevented ‘talking openly and honestly about problems’, lest one risked being labelled ‘racist’ (Ouseley 2001). In one description in the Yorkshire Post of 22 November 2002, ‘Bradford is an Asian city*or, more precisely, a Kashmiri city. Four decades after the first immigrants came here, their families still read newspapers published in Urdu, the conversation around the breakfast table is conducted in Punjabi, the Shalvar kameez is preferred to the suit, purdah is practiced in the majority of homes and the faithful are summoned up to worship...by the cry of the muezzin’. In this ‘Asian city’, South Asian Muslims further ‘self-segregate’ around a handful of inner-city wards, which provide all of the city’s 13 Muslim councillors (in 2001) and whose schools are up to 90 per cent frequented by Muslim students (Lewis 2002).