[Samuel W. Bodman and James D. Wolfensohn, ChairsJulia E. Sweig, Project Director, The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, July 2011
Independent Task Force Report No. 66 “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations”, http://www.cfr.org/brazil/global-brazil-us-brazil-relations/p25407?cid=emc-BrazilTF_pressrelease-taskforce-07_13_11,
Brazil’s investment in health research is providing tangible benefits and important successes in developing interventions for disease, including HIV/AIDS and the so-called neglected diseases that disproportionally affect low- and middle-income countries(such as malaria, tuberculosis, and leprosy). The Task Force encourages the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the National Institutes of Health to foster partnerships with their Brazilian counterparts to help build global health capacity and collaborate in scientific research projects that could help generate novel diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines.
John D. Steinbruner, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, “Biological Weapons: A Plague Upon All Houses,” FOREIGN POLICY n. 109, Winter 1997/1998, pp. 85-96, ASP.
It is a considerable comfort and undoubtedly a key to our survival that, so far, the main lines of defense against this threat have not depended on explicit policies or organized efforts. In the long course of evolution, the human body has developed physical barriers and a biochemical immune system whose sophistication and effectiveness exceed anything we could design or as yet even fully understand. But evolution is a sword that cuts both ways: New diseases emerge, while old diseases mutate and adapt. Throughout history, there have been epidemics during which human immunity has broken down on an epic scale. An infectious agent believed to have been the plague bacterium killed an estimated 20 million people over a four-year period in the fourteenth century, including nearly one-quarter of Western Europe's population at the time. Since its recognized appearance in 1981, some 20 variations of the HIVvirus have infected an estimated 29.4 million worldwide, with 1.5 million people currently dying of aids each year. Malaria, tuberculosis, and cholera-once thought to be under control-are now making a comeback. As we enter the twenty-first century, changing conditions have enhanced the potential for widespread contagion. The rapid growth rate of the total world population, the unprecedented freedom of movement across international borders, and scientific advances that expand the capability for the deliberate manipulation of pathogens are all cause for worry that the problem might be greater in the future than it has ever been in the past. The threat of infectious pathogens is
Impact – Economy
Relations solve economy
[Diego, 8-9-12, U.S.-Brazil Energy Partnership Offers Great Potential, http://www.freeenterprise.com/us-brazil-energy-partnership-offers-great-potential]
The U.S.-Brazil energy partnership has the potential to foster energy security, economic growth, and job creation—priorities for both countries. Reflecting this shared vision, President Barack Obama and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff last year launched theU.S.-Brazil Strategic Energy Dialogue (SED), a presidential-level mechanism to strengthen bilateral cooperation in this area.¶ We at the Brazil-U.S. Business Council applaud this effort towards a bold bilateral partnership in energy. We have been vigorously engaged in energy cooperation to deepen the commercial pillar of the U.S.-Brazil partnership, with an emphasis on trade and investment promotion.¶ In this context, we worked closely with the White House, the U.S. Department of Energy and other federal government agencies to launch the SED in August 2011. On that occasion, deputy secretary of energy Daniel Poneman met with private sector representatives in both São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and officially launched the dialogue in Brasília.¶ Further recognizing the importance of our energy partnership, this week, I moderated a panel featuring key U.S. and Brazilian government officials at the 13th edition of the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo’s Annual Energy Conference— Brazil’s largest energy-related event.¶ During the panel, the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy, along with the U.S. Department of Energy, announced the next meeting of the SED in Washington, D.C. this coming October. The Ministry also announced that the private sector will be, for the first time, officially incorporated in the dialogue’s program of work – a longstanding request of the Brazil-U.S. Business Council and our partners in the U.S. and Brazil.¶ The Brazil-U.S. Business Council also launched this week its latest report: “The U.S.-Brazil Energy Partnership: Bolstering Security, Growth, and Job Creation.” In this report, we talk about the state of the partnership and offer recommendations for both countries to take advantage of the benefits it could bring.¶ The potential is there for this energy partnership to develop into one of the world’s greatest and bring real benefits for the citizens and economies of both countries. It’s great to see the governments and private sectors of both countries’ taking steps toward it.
Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crisis could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) finda strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increase incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.