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**Brazil Leadership**

Yes Brazil Leadership

Brazilian influence grows ever stronger

John Paul Rathbone FT's Latin American editor 2011 “Foreign Relations: Brazilian influence grows ever stronger”

Brazil is very important to Peru,” says Rafael Roncagliolo, Peru’s new foreign minister, who describes his approach as “absolutely pragmatic” and as focused on “strengthening regional ties”.¶ He adds: “Nonetheless, while there are many opportunities, there are also problems and threats. One problem is the need to remove commercial barriers and tariffs. One threat is drugs: we don’t want to have the same supply relationship with Brazil as Mexico does with the US.”¶ Peru is currently the world’s largest producer of cocaine and Brazil – a rising consumer in its own right – is increasingly an important onward shipment point to Europe’s fast-growing market for illegal drugs.¶ Whatever the concerns, it appears that the links are only going to get stronger, especially if Brazil’s early courtship of Mr Humala is anything to go by.¶ Political image-makers from Brazil’s Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ party) advised Mr Humala on campaigning strategy and tactics. After he won the election, the first visit Mr Humala made as president was to Brasília.¶ What is most extraordinary is that perhaps no country other than Brazil would have been able to get away with the same strategy. It would have been unthinkable for Venezuela or the US, for example, to have played a similar role in Peru without a huge outcry.It speaks to the might of Brazilian “soft power” – and the country’s huge gravitational pull on a continent where it accounts for half the landmass and its neighbours cannot help but spin into its orbit.

Brazil is quickly expanding its influence in South America

Vieira. PhD in International Relations (Department of International Relations, LSE)MA in International Relations (Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro)BA in Social Sciences (Department of Sociology and Politics, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro) Lecturer in International Relations Department of Political Science and International Studies ‘08

Since the beginning of the Lula administration in 2003, Brazilian foreign policy has been re-oriented towards a renewed and more extended approach to regional politics. Under Lula, Brazil’s foreign policy approach to South America has been outlined by a kind of ‘pragmatic solidarity’ towards its neighbours. Rather than a purely altruistic approach to regional relations, Brazilian diplomacy has delivered a number of ‘regional public goods’ (both material and symbolic) to win over the support of neighbours traditionally reluctant to recognise Brazil’s leadership role in the region.1 [1] This foreign policy strategy has been named by Rubem Barbosa, former Brazilian Ambassador in Washington and London, as diplomacy of ‘generosity’.2 [2]¶ As a regional power, Brazil sought to enhance political influence by engaging in a number of diplomatic missions throughout the region. Brazilian diplomacy has intervened in several domestic and international crises involving Venezuela, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Haiti. In 2004, Brazil sent a small force to war-torn Haiti taking over from American and French forces commanding the UN peacekeeping operation (MINUSTAH) in that Caribbean island. The key leadership role played by Brazil in Haiti, under the auspices of the UN, has significantly raised Brazil’s international profile as a regional power.3 [3]¶ Rather than being based on classical power attributes or ‘hard power’, Brazil’s influence in regional politics has been achieved through “normative leadership” and the use of ‘opinion-shaping instruments’.4 [4] In this regard, the strategy of leading by example has been a strong feature of Brazilian foreign policy. In 1998, for example, during a ceremony in the US State Department to mark Brazil’s accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Brazilian Foreign Minister, Luis Felipe Lampreia, hailed Brazil’s example as a force for peace and co-operation in South America. In his words,¶ We believe Brazil has a positive role to play in the world. Brazil is proud to live in harmony with all its ten neighbors, and to have done so uninterruptedly for well over a century. South America today is at once the least-armed region in the world and we have accelerated economic integration. We are setting an example of cooperation and solidarity.5 [5]¶ Brazil’s investment in ‘soft power’ as a means to increase its regional and global stature is illustrated by its willingness to promote democratic rule and the peaceful resolution of conflicts through the strengthening of multilateral mechanisms. More recently, it played an important role within the ‘Rio Group’6 [6] while mediating disputes between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela over the killing of a key member of the Farc guerrilla group by the Colombian armed forces within Ecuadorian territory.7 [7]¶ The revival of ‘Bolivarianism’ by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela as an alternative source of regional identity is a clear sign of a division in the process of region building led by Brazilian diplomacy. However, the attractive power of Brazil’s economy and its pragmatic stance on regional and global politics have outflanked Venezuela’s ‘Bolivarian revolution’ in the struggle for the hearts and minds of Latin American neighbours. Under Lula, the Brazilian government has invested in the diversification of Brazil’s already powerful industrial sector and spent political energy trying to establish new (and reinforcing old) regional institutions. Moreover, the recent discovery of massive oil reserves in Brazil’s Southern coast has allowed Lula to minimize the importance of Venezuela’s only “trump card” to win regional influence.8 [8]¶ Notwithstanding the Brazilian government’s increasing political engagement in South America, the actual recognition of its regional leadership role should not be taken for granted. According to Lima and Hirst, for example,¶ The expansion of Brazil’s political involvement in local crises, together with growing trade and investment activities with its South American neighbours, has not led to any easy or automatic acknowledgement of the country’s regional leadership in world affairs.9 [9]¶ The advent of open regionalism, which flowed from changes to the international political economy of trade and the reconciliation between newly democratising governments in Brasilia and Buenos Aires in the late 1980s, resulted in the formation of a common market in the southern cone (Mercosur). While trade initially surged within the region, the dominance of the Brazilian economy over the others was underscored by the unilateral decision to devalue its currency in 1999, a move that precipitated a meltdown in the Argentine economy and demonstrated that even the newly founded benevolent relationship could have a negative impact upon its neighbours.¶ In May 2006, the nationalisation of the gas and oil sectors by the Bolivian president Evo Morales negatively affected bilateral relations with Brazil whose investments, through the state-owned giant Petrobras, are close to US $1 billion. Moreover, Brazil has struggled to gain support among its neighbours for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, with Argentina and Mexico openly rejecting Brazilian claims. More recently, Argentina has angered Brazilian trade representatives by joining forces with India, China and Indonesia to block a trade agreement at the latest Doha round of trade talks. Buenos Aires in turn has accused Brazil of betrayal by moving away from Mercosur’s commonly agreed position on the liberalization of the industrial sector.¶ Bilateral diplomatic relations with the United States, the hemispheric hegemonic power, are also a key element of Brazil’s regional engagement. For the US, Brazil has small strategic interest in South America, if compared with India, for example, which is geographically located in a crucial region for the US’ ‘War on Terror’. However, bilateral links have been growing due to co-operation in the strategic area of biofuels. Moreover, the Bush administration has strongly invested in Brazil as an alternative source of regional leadership given the divisive role played by Venezuela in regional politics. Diplomatic relations between Brasilia and Washington have also been marked by tensions, mostly as a result of the growing American military involvement in the Colombian conflict in the shared Amazon region. The protection of Brazil’s sovereignty over the Amazon area has become a central aspect of Lula’s national defence strategy and the US military presence in the Colombian Amazon is seen as a potential threat to regional stability. Similarly, Lula has strongly reacted against criticism by transnational environmentalists, backed by Western governments, who place responsibility for the protection of the Amazon rain forest beyond the authority of the Brazilian government.¶ In spite of persistent suspicion towards Brazil’s actual interests in regional politics, its global stature and regional assertiveness has instilled admiration and respect by smaller states in the region. Similarly, its macro-economic stability and democratic credentials have worked as a powerful ‘soft power’ instrument vis-à-vis Brazil’s neighbours. Even Argentina, its most strident rival, has been trying to emulate some of Brazil’s foreign and domestic policy successes. In this respect, South-South alliances, such as the India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), represent an important asset to Brasilia’s goal of consolidating its position of leadership in South America. The recognition of this trilateral arrangement by the international community at large will further legitimate the new role of Brazil as a global leader and as the proper representative of South American interests.

Yes Brazil Leadership – Trade

Brazil has strong interest and leadership in the Doha Round

Saulo Nogueira, “THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND BRAZIL IN THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT ROUND”, Institute for International Trade Negotiations,28/09/09,

The DDR fits well within the national trade policy of increasing exports and expanding

market access for agricultural products, while limiting and challenging the agricultural¶ subsidies of the developed nations. This explains why Itamaraty has placed the¶ multilateral negotiations at the core of the country’s trade policy. Several times ForeignRelations minister Celso Amorin has stated that the Doha negotiations were the core ofnational trade interest while the bilateral and other negotiations were merely ‘options’.¶ Nonetheless, after the various halts in the multilateral negotiations, a growing number¶ of critics have been pointing out that placing all bets on the Doha Round has turnedcostly, as other nations sign trade deals while Brazil remains without any, significant,trade agreement (Veiga, 2005).¶ Even though the Brazilian government has faced some criticisms over the recent¶ legislations that were implemented, but revoked, aiming at curbing imports, the position¶ and statements made by Itamaraty and President Lula continue to be of condemning¶ protectionism during this economic crisis and increasing efforts of closing the DohaRound as soon as possible. Therefore, the demands made by the national sectors¶ continue to find space in strategy formulation of Itamaraty, even though the latter must¶ place these demands within the current context of the financial crisis. Also, the¶ government has condemned some stimulus packages adopted by countries, like the US,¶ that discourage imports from Brazil.¶ Conclusion¶ The political and macro-economic contexts of Brazil during the previous multilateral¶ negotiations and the historic context of the economy explain the positioning of the tradenegotiators during the Uruguay and the Doha Round. The two main factors that explain¶ the positioning of Brazilian trade negotiators are: a trade policy that had been devised to¶ open the Brazilian market significantly which was approved by President Collor, during¶ the Uruguay Round, and the floating exchange rate of the Real which made Brazilian¶ exports more competitive abroad, during the Doha Round, together with the high¶ international agricultural commodity prices (Veiga, 2007). Both of these made the tradenegotiators participate actively during the multilateral talks, all the while defendingnational interests of key sectors. The Brazilian leadership undertaken during the DohaRound in the agricultural topics can be attributed to the strong interest in this sector thathas grown fast over the past decade, thereby becoming more politically relevant among¶ the trade policy developers. Its better technical capacity allowed it to lead, together with

the Indian negotiators, the G-20 group of developing countries in questioning the

agricultural subsidies, while seeking significant tariff cuts, thereby allowing developing

countries to gain more room in international agricultural trade.

Brazil has high economic influence in Cuba

Raúl Zibechi is a columnist and international analyst for La Jornada, “Brazil's President Flexes Clout in Cuba Trip: Rousseff Offers Closer Economic Ties, Reflecting Nation's Bid for Greater Regional Leadership; Human Rights Remain Issue”, The Gaurdian, 2 October 2012

Brazil—President Dilma Rousseff offered closer economic cooperation to Cuba during a visit to the communist island on Tuesday, marking Brazil's highest-profile bid to transform its growing economic might into diplomatic leadership in Latin AmericaBrazil's state development bank is financing a $680 million rehabilitation of Cuba's port at Mariel. Work on the port is being managed by the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht SA, which may also provide support for Cuba's sugar industry, Brazilian officials have said.¶ Cuban President Raúl Castro, left, and his Brazilian counterpart, Dilma Rousseff, review the honor guard at Revolution Palace in Havana on Tuesday.¶ Ms. Rousseff's closer engagement of Cuba—she is visiting the island before a trip to the White House— is the latest example of Brazil's strategy to expand its regional influence by offering subsidized loans to poorer nations. In recent years, Brazil has disbursed tens of billions of dollars around Latin America, and as far away as Africa.¶ But none of these efforts have the same symbolic resonance as in Cuba, which has opposed the U.S. since shortly after Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution and remains a lightning rod in U.S. domestic politics and a sticking point for U.S. relations with other Latin nations.¶ "This is about growing Brazil's soft power on the international scale and raising Brazil's role in the world," said Matthew Taylor, a Brazil specialist at the American University's School of International Service. "Brazil is taking on a bigger role in the hemisphere in terms of aid and finance, and by helping out Cuba they really draw attention to this new role they are playing."¶ Although the U.S. has been the predominant power broker in Latin America since the introduction of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, experts say the U.S. doesn't oppose Brazil's bid for regional influence. Many analysts say they believe Brazil could become a stabilizing force in a region known for political and economic volatility.¶ In Cuba, for example, Brazil may provide a more moderate alternative to the impoverished island's main economic benefactor, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. Mr. Chávez, a self-described foe of the U.S., delivers some 100,000 barrels of oil and refined products to Cuba a day in exchange for the services of Cuban doctors for Venezuelans in poor neighborhoods, along with other barter arrangements.¶ Cuba, meanwhile, is desperate for economic lifelines. Raúl Castro, who has taken over the presidency from his ailing brother Fidel, has experimented with limited economic overhauls in order to bring life into a moribund economy, where citizens are still issued ration books that allow them access to some basic foods at subsidized prices.¶ "The more normal Cuba's economic relations are, the easier normalization with the U.S. will be in the future," said Archibald Ritter, an expert on the Cuban economy at Canada's Carleton University.

No Brazil Leadership

Brazil will fail to reach out to Cuba and Venezuela

Carlos Pascua is a Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, “New Directions in Brazilian Foreign Relations”, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 28, 2007,

The principal challenge within Washington is relative ignorance of the choices facing Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (President Lula), whose second term in office began in January 2007. The authors noted President Lula’s outreach to Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba and efforts to develop a South-South strategy during his first term, combined with lesser emphasis on the relationship with the United States and the developed world. This had produced little results and generated frustration and criticism within the Brazilian business community and the media. The nationalization of Petrobras assets in Bolivia, Fidel Castro’s criticism of ethanol production, and Hugo Chávez’s critical comments on the Brazilian Senate created uncertainty within Brazil on the future direction of its foreign policy as a tool of national development.

Brazil lacks regional influence in Latin America

Carlos Pascua is a Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, “New Directions in Brazilian Foreign Relations”, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 28, 2007,

Based on a recent task force and report published by the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI), he believed that Brazil lacked the committed economic and political resources to play a leadership role in the hemisphere. Venezuela now challenged Brazil to become the leader in South America, and consequently, Brazil’s claim to regional leadership had been largely rhetorical. In the face of Venezuelan assertions as a petro-power and increased political turbulence in the region, Brazil has to clarify its national interests and develop a realistic strategy. In the day-to-day pursuit of its national interests, Brazil had failed to develop a coherent and realistic strategy for South America. No proper regulatory framework existed for the development of financial services, nor had the Foreign Ministry tackled the increasing flow of illegal immigration, goods and arms. The government had turned a blind eye to Venezuelan arms purchases —which were dangerous given the very sophisticated missile weaponry and naval capability that President Chávez sought to acquire. Rather than assume a global outreach, Brazil’s leaders in foreign policy had to better understand the changes within the hemisphere and devote greater attention to relations with neighbors.

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