Congressional oversight is necessary for a pragmatic, flexible approach to threats executive discretion results in knee-jerk policy failure

Download 498.36 Kb.
Size498.36 Kb.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   12


Deterrence Adv

AT: Deterrence Wrong

Deterrence theory is effective as a heuristic despite flaws

Lupovici 10 Amir, assistant professor in the Department of Political Sciences at Tel Aviv University, International Studies Quarterly, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory--Toward a New Research Agenda",

The first three waves of deterrence theory made some significant theoretical contributions not only to the study of deterrence but with regard to security studies in general. These theories constituted how scholars thought about deterrence for many years, and in this way they helped to solidify the realist school of international relations (Jervis 1979:290–291).5 Essential influences of the third wave can also be seen in the framing of theoretical issues, such as enduring rivals (Huth and Russett 1993; and compare Lieberman 1995 with Stein 1996), conventional deterrence (Mearsheimer 1983; Shimshoni 1988), extended deterrence (Huth 1988), and psychological and cognitive understanding of decision making (Jervis 1985; Lebow and Stein 1987, 1989; Morgan 2003:134–142, 149–151; see also Levy 1992).6 Furthermore, the methodological impact of this wave can also be seen (Achen and Snidal 1989:161; Lebow and Stein 1990:346–351), not only in the field of security studies but in international relations and political science as well (Maoz 2002:172–174; see also King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:24, 134– 135).¶ The first three waves of deterrence theory also significantly influenced policymaking. The un-intuitive implications of deterrence literature were evident in the strategies and relations of the superpowers, in particular with regard to the strategy of MAD aimed at stabilizing relations between opponents, as demonstrated in the SALT agreements of 1972 (Adler 1992; Garthoff 1994:647, 849– 852; Evangelista 1999). Deterrence theories allowed policymakers to organize strategic knowledge into a clear conceptual framework that was easier to ‘‘sell,’’ providing them with strategic language and jargon (Jervis 1979:291; Kaplan 1991:171–172) that included concepts such as massive retaliation, invulnerability, assured destruction, counterforce, pre-emptive strike, first strike, second strike, and flexible response. While some of these concepts were not completely new (Quester 1966:1–2; Chilton 1985:115), they gained influence primarily in the context of deterrence.¶ Scholars, mainly of the first two waves, based the idea of deterrence upon apolitical and ahistorical arguments (Jervis 1979:322–323; Kaplan 1991:109; Trachtenberg 1991:40, 44–46), and as a result paid very little attention to its operation in reality. Ironically, this obfuscation of empirical contradictions and problems led to the consensus on its validity.7 As Adler argues, ‘‘because the science of nuclear strategy has no empirical reference points and data banks, it cannot be falsified’’ (Adler 1992:107).8 In other words, deterrence could become a heuristic tool, supplying simple, and even simplistic, solutions to complicated foreign policy problems. This made it more attractive than other strategic options to decision makers. Moreover, the concept of deterrence could force rationality on decision making, so that deterrence practices became a convincing—and even justifiable—option (Kaplan 1991:72–73; Morgan 2003:13).

Specifically true for North Korea

Lupovici 10 Amir, assistant professor in the Department of Political Sciences at Tel Aviv University, International Studies Quarterly, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory--Toward a New Research Agenda",

However, some scholars highlight the possibility of successfully deterring rogue states (see Lebovic 2007:26–103). More specifically, they emphasize that Smith’s arguments, rather than undermining deterrence strategy, can in fact work to successfully implement it. For example, Morgan argues that threatening the regime can have a deterrent effect, and he further contends that ‘‘a state that is not a great power but has WMD should be easier for the US to deter than one without them.’’ Morgan suggests that WMD encourages a cautious policy and simplifies the risks involved for the actors (Morgan 2003:271–273; see also Waltz 1995). This type of argument has also been made regarding specific states, such as Iran (in Adler 2009:101), Iraq (Nolan and Strauss 1997:33; Jervis 2003:323–324; Morgan 2003:271), and North Korea (Nolan and Strauss 1997:34–35).

AT: Goodman

Goodman votes aff –tailored deterrence incentivizes a defensive military posture by our adversaries and reduces offensive modernization

Goodman 5, Prof of Law @ Harvard, American Journal of International Law, April, 99 A.J.I.L. 507

Second, consider strategies for operationalizing deterrence. One concern is that some forms of deterrence may interact negatively with nonincentive-based mechanisms. Moore's conception of deterrence includes military threats, international criminal prosecutions, and trade inducements. According to the emulation model, however, the first of these -- the use of military force -- may have perverse effects. If deterrence strategies help instill or deepen the belief that "modern states" brandish military force to achieve political objectives, other states might aspire to obtain and exercise similar symbols of power. n36 Additionally, emphasizing military threats may conflict with the mechanism of democratic-norm projection. Recall that the empirical evidence suggests that the latter is important not only for war prevention, but also for inhibiting interstate conflicts short of war. The logic of the mechanism assumes that democratic norms of conflict resolution must be cultivated and developed. It also assumes that norms strengthened or weakened in one setting will affect their application in other settings. Hence, honing the skills associated with threatening violence to achieve policy outcomes (as required by military deterrence) may erode the development of cooperative, democratic norms for averting and resolving international crises. Finally, if social effects are important, one would want to compare the option of rewarding desirable behavior (positively framed incentives) with the option of penalizing undesirable behavior (negatively framed incentives). n37 Paying leaders not to commit the crime of aggression versus punishing leaders who commit the crime of aggression might make little, if any, difference in a pure incentive model. Some studies suggest, however, that negative incentives may be considerably less effective than positive incentives under conditions in which social norms already inspire voluntary cooperation. n38 In this respect, the point would not be to abandon incentive-based mechanisms, but to tailor them more effectively. Third, under certain circumstances, some mechanisms may be fundamentally incompatible. For example, incentive-based strategies may directly conflict with emulation-based strategies. According to the emulation model, under certain conditions states begin to internalize social norms disfavoring the use of force. Over time, such behavior may be described as "intrinsically motivated." n39 Recent empirical studies suggest, however, that [*514] using rewards or punishments can "crowd out" intrinsic motives for engaging in appropriate behavior. n40 An explicit incentive-based policy can suggest that the preferred behavior (for example, forgoing weapons of mass destruction, military aggression, and saber rattling) is not self-evidently appropriate or that the broader social environment does not adequately value self-motivated adherence to the rule. n41 Accordingly, strategies that focus on ratcheting up the severity, certainty, or timing of punishments -- such as preventive self-defense as a method of deterrence n42 -- may make the undesirable behavior (for example, developing WMDs) seem more acceptable to actors who care about following community norms. Indeed, in terms of aggregate effects, studies show that if the locus of control shifts from intrinsic impulses to extrinsic motivation, overall levels of socially desirable behavior can decline. n43 In addition to these crowding-out effects, the use of explicit incentives can undermine voluntary cooperation by introducing an element of deep distrust into socially produced modes of reciprocal behavior. n44 That is, actors may enjoy high levels of cooperation on the basis of shared social norms until an explicit incentive (a carrot or stick) is introduced as an instrument for obtaining cooperation.¶ Fourth, some of the above factors also raise concerns about cycling effects -- the prospect of states passing into and out of democratic forms of government. For example, promoting the symbolic importance of a community of democratic states may amplify negative reactions and intergroup hostilities when a democratic regime is toppled. As the most recent Nuclear Posture Review Report indicates, anxieties will already be raised when a regime change involves a state that possesses WMDs. In discussing "unexpected contingencies" that might prompt U.S. nuclear strikes, the report notes that "contemporary illustrations might include a sudden regime change by which an existing nuclear arsenal comes into the hands of a new, hostile leadership group." n45 Such a scenario is even more dangerous if it involves misperceptions by the United States and its allies of the threat represented by the overthrow of a democratic regime.

Goodman’s critique of Moore links more to the alternative

Goodman 5, Prof of Law @ Harvard, American Journal of International Law, April, 99 A.J.I.L. 507

Whenever possible, international-regime design should be closely tethered to empirical research and, in particular, consideration of the mechanisms that influence state behavior. Although Moore's work pushes the discussion in that direction, he stops short of the necessary analysis. Considerable empirical evidence suggests that a broad range of cultural and material factors must be taken into account in understanding why states go to war. Uncovering the principal mechanisms and their potential interactions is critical to discerning the true nature of the war puzzle and fashioning international institutions to address major parts of it.

Share with your friends:
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   12

The database is protected by copyright © 2020
send message

    Main page