Comparing Russia's Constitutional Drafts: Some of the old and some of the new went into the final draft of Russia's proposed constitution by Ariel Cohen
Drafting a constitution is an elaborate process, reflecting the basic political philosophy of its drafters as they spell out not only the panoply of rights afforded to the constitution's subjects but the fundamental relationship between the state and its citizens as well.
For modern nation-states whose administration and governance is divided among various territorial divisions, replacing a constitution presents another level of complexity for the constitutional drafters when they must consider how to incorporate the rights and responsibilities spelled out in the new basic law into a viable federal principle.
Russia's recent encounter with such weighty issues is complicated by both the disparate groups of " founding fathers" involved in the process of drafting a constitution and the " subjects" the basic law is meant to address. In the former case, there were until only recently two distinct sets of officials promulgating their own version of Russia's new constitution, offering fundamentally different visions of how the Russian Federation would be governed in the future-the country's now defunct legislature, the Supreme Soviet, and Boris Yeltsin and his presidential advisers. In the latter case, the subjects include not only Russia's citizenry as a whole, but the Federation's administrative units-its republics and regions-which have been clamoring for more economic and political autonomy even prior to the collapse of the USSR in 1991.
Further complicating matters is the highly politicized atmosphere in which these constitutional alternatives were crafted. In order to garner support for their own separate versions of Russia's constitution, these two groups attempted to guarantee the Federation's subjects an extensive set of rights and privileges-social rights in the case of individual citizens, and escalating degrees of autonomy for the Federation's republics and regions.
The Origins of Russia's Constitutional Dilemma
The attempt to replace the Russian Federation's outdated basic law, a legacy of the Brezhnev era's 1978 Soviet Constitution, began with the First Congress of People's Deputies, which created a Constitutional Commission in June 1990 under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet.1 Over the course of many months, the Commission, headed by its executive secretary Oleg Rumyantsev (hence, the term " Rumyantsev draft" for the successive proposals from the Constitutional Commission),2 submitted a number of drafts for the Congress's approval, but all met with stiff resistance from several directions.
One official who eventually came to dislike the Commission's successive drafts the most was Yeltsin, who disagreed with the pro-legislature tilt of the drafts and feared they would not give him enough presidential powers. The other source of opposition came from the leaders of the Federation's republics and regions, who complained that the draft did not enshrine the new rights for these territories laid out in the Federal Treaty, actually a collection of three treaties for the different types of administrative territories of the Federation that codified the new status of the republics and regions and divided up powers between the Federation's provinces and the central government in Moscow.
Though Yeltsin was at the time chairman of the Constitutional Commission, he turned to Sergei Shakhrai, his trusted legal adviser, to develop an alternative draft providing more presidential powers. Yeltsin also appealed to the Constitutional Commission to do the same. Although the Commission accepted 20 amendments Yeltsin had proposed to its latest draft, he was still unhappy with the Commission's revised constitutional project.
As a way of breaking the impasse in the Constitutional Commission, Yeltsin suggested the constitution be submitted to a popular referendum. Since Yeltsin eventually realized that such a move would only serve to destroy any chances of trying to work with the legislature and Russia's provinces in resolving the more contentious issues in the draft basic law, and because of the legislature's resistance, the constitution was not mentioned in the referendum. Rather, the 25 April 1993 poll, which was finally approved as a popular vote of confidence for both Yeltsin and the legislature, gave Yeltsin the mandate he needed to push ahead with a draft more to his liking.3 Four days later, the full text of another constitutional draft was released, this one prepared by Shakhrai; Sergei Alekseev, the former chairman of the USSR Committee for Constitutional Oversight; August Mishin, a specialist on American constitutional law; and Anatoly Sobchak, the reformist mayor of St. Petersburg. Dubbed the " presidential draft" or " Yeltsin draft," owing to its approval by Yeltsin, this proposal retained about 60 percent of the Rumyantsev draft.4
To counter the stiff resistance that greeted the release of the presidential draft of the constitution, and to break the deadlock in the Constitutional Commission, Yeltsin issued a decree calling for the convocation of a Constitutional Assembly (konstitutsionnoe soveshchanie), whose task during its June-July 1993 session was to consider both drafts and their amendments and hopefully strike a compromise, which it did in the 12 July 1993 release of its own draft (henceforth, the " Constitutional Assembly" draft).5 After Yeltsin's October victory in the showdown with the Khasbulatov-Rutskoi parliamentary faction, he returned to the Assembly and directed it to make significant changes to its draft. This is the version, published in early November (henceforth referred to as " Yeltsin's second draft," or " the new Yeltsin draft"), which will go to Russia's voters for their approval in the December 12 elections.
There are two substantive areas this article addresses. The first addresses the basic political and philosophical orientations reflected in the different constitutional drafts regarding positive and negative rights, specifically as these rights pertain to Russia's economic and social development. The second is a territorial extension of this examination-how these basic orientations pertain to a federal principle in Moscow's relationship with the country's republics and regions. At stake are widely divergent views over basic rights and responsibilities governing Russia's social and economic development. The fundamental difference between Rumyantsev's and Yeltsin's versions of the constitution lies in the definition and extent of property and social rights. Rumyantsev's is informed by social-democratic notions and subscribes to the view of the country as trying to engineer a " social market" -state-directed and federally regulated. Yeltsin's first version ostensibly attempts to foster a relatively more liberal capitalist conception of property rights and social policy, but still retains some very troubling restrictive provisions in this regard. Yet, the subtext for all this constitutional wrangling resided in the political battle between Yeltsin and the legislature over who would wield more power in governing the Federation.
These philosophical orientations find their most conflictual expression in relation to Russia's 89 territories, whose increasingly influential leaders demand more autonomy-and, in many cases, outright independence. One crucial issue was how the rights and responsibilities were exercised under a new federal principle, enshrined in the Federal Treaty as an addendum to all constitutional proposals except Yeltsin's new constitutional draft-an exception whose importance is explained below.
While Yeltsin has summarily ended the initial phase of debate over the various constitutional proposals, it is instructive to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the competing drafts, especially with regard to the Constitutional Assembly's compromise draft and the new Yeltsin draft of the constitution.
Federation and Property
In all available drafts, the Russian Federation retains vast rights to control and regulate economic life and property. For example, Article 71 of the Constitutional Assembly draft provides the Russian Federation exclusive jurisdiction over federal property; and financial, currency, and credit policy, as well as " foundations of price policy." The Federation is exclusively in charge of federal taxes and federal funds for regional development,6 Article 72 provides that the Russian Federation and subjects of the Federation will have joint jurisdiction over:
Issues of ownership, use, and administration of land, minerals, water, and other natural resources; determination of the status of federal natural resources by mutual agreement, taking into account the need to preserve and sustain historically evolved traditional forms of economic operations and use of natural resources in the territories in question;7
Application of this article would not only create problems in the implementation of private land ownership, but would also open wide opportunities for the involvement of federal and regional bureaucrats in property-related decisions. In short, Article 72 of the Constitutional Assembly draft would inhibit economic development and the creation of wealth in the Russian Federation.
Even more draconian are some of the provisions of the Federal Treaty, an integral part of both the Constitutional Assembly's and Yeltsin's first draft of the constitution. The proposed treaty, which must be ratified by all republics, is the same as the one signed on 31 March 1992 and is currently attached to the amended 1978 constitution presently in force. The Treaty contains language referring to the Supreme Soviet instead of the Federal Assembly (Federalnoye Sobranie), an indication of how outdated it really is.
Article III of the Federal Treaty states that:
. . . land, its mineral wealth, flora and fauna, are the patrimony (dostayanie)-property (sobstvennost')-of peoples who live on the territory of the respective republics. Questions of ownership (vladenie), use, and distribution (rasporyazhenie) of mineral wealth, water, and other natural resources are regulated by the fundamental laws of the Russian Federation and laws of the republics within the Russian Federation. Status of federal natural resources will be defined by mutual agreement between federal organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of the republics." 8
The article obviously creates a severe limitation to private ownership of land, and is therefore a brake to economic development overall, and to extractive industry and agricultural development specifically.
Articles 35-36 of Yeltsin's new constitutional draft specifically refer to the rights of private property and land ownership. It will be the task of future Russian legislators to draft a workable land law that will allow creation of a real estate and land market in the Russian Federation. Such a law, unlike its restrictive predecessor that was passed by the Supreme Soviet, will contribute greatly to the development of private agriculture and construction in Russia, and will hopefully lead to the resolution of chronic food and housing shortages that were endemic to the former Soviet Union.
The first Yeltsin draft also contained some restrictive provisions regarding property-related rights. For instance, it is not clear from one section in Article 62 whether the federal government will only regulate or directly own and manage the nuclear, space, transportation and telecommunications industries. Yet another section of Article 62 allows the federal government to establish " price policy foundations." It is unclear whether this means price regulation, and how it affects private and foreign businesses.
Article 63 provides for the right to introduce by law " some and temporary" (otdel'nye i vremmeniye) limits on the circulation of goods, services and financial means " if it is needed to provide for security, protection of life and health, protection of nature and cultural values." Article 64 states that the introduction of a " burdensome" tax that makes it impossible for the taxpayer to receive " normal" income from his activity or to keep Ms property, is not allowed. While the intention is laudable, the provision might inundate the courts as, quite predictably, many will feel that their taxes are " burdensome."
It is clear that some of the limitations on property rights in the first Yeltsin draft were not sufficiently thought through. While the project attempts to protect private property, it leaves too many loopholes to limit entrepreneurship and does not provide enough security for business activities.
The Rumyantsev project speaks of Russia being a sovereign, lawful (pravovoye), democratic, federative social state.9 The Rumyantsev10 and communist drafts proclaim political and economic pluralism. The codewords " social state," " economic pluralism," and " equality of all forms of property" suggest preservation of the status quo and protection of the state's ownership of the means of production. At least the communist project is more forthright when it declares that Russia will be a " Soviet socialist" state.
In addition, the Rumyantsev draft proclaims that the basis of the economy of the Russian Federation is a " social market," where variety and equality of forms of property, as well as " benign" competition, are guaranteed.11 The state, according to this project, regulates economic life in the interest of man and society,12 while economic relations are built on a social partnership between man and the state, worker and employer, producer and consumer.13 Under the Rumyantsev project, property rights cannot contradict the " social good" ;14 forced expropriation is allowed under " proven social necessity," with compensation provided in cases specified by law.15 The notion of a " social state" has also made its way into Yeltsin's new draft.16
To provide for an adequately functioning economy, Russian legislators and the government will have to put in place a system of modem civil and commercial law. In addition, they will have to ensure that a functioning administrative law is adopted and applied. Without these, Russia will not make it into the ranks of the developed countries.
Federation and Social Rights
Entitlements are social rights that are much harder to enforce in a court of law than negative rights which protect the individual. However, entitlements are constantly overemphasized in the constitutions of East European and Soviet successor states. The various drafts of the Russian constitution have been vague in the delineation of authority between the federal government, the republics, and the regions as far as providing and funding entitlements are concerned.
Multiple privileges, such as rights to free medical care and free education for all are difficult to provide. While the future legislature will deliberate over socioeconomic priorities, entitlements, that are by nature very expensive, should not be cast in iron in a fledgling constitution.
The Constitutional Assembly draft declares that Russia is a " social state, the policies of which are aimed at the satisfaction of the spiritual and material needs of the individual and at the provision of the well-being for the individual and society." 17 Similar language is found in both Rumyantsev's and the second Yeltsin draft.
Positive rights are granted to Russia's citizenry in Article 7 of the Rumyantsev draft. They are further elaborated in Articles 36-43. Rights to " work under conditions corresponding to requirements of safety and hygiene," minimum wages, holidays, and recreation are guaranteed.18 Care for children and elderly parents is constitutionally protected.19 The broadest social security rights are proclaimed in the Constitutional Assembly draft,20 as is the right to free or subsidized housing for the needy and " other citizens specified by law," provided by the state.21 Free medical care,22 a " pleasant environment," 23 free education,24 and even the right to " participate in cultural life and the enjoyment of institutions of culture and access to cultural values" are also constitutionally guaranteed.25
The Rumyantsev draft also creates a constitutional burden for the state as far as the protection of labor and health, calling for a " subsistence minimum," and broadly specifying " support" of the family, motherhood, fatherhood, childhood, invalids and the elderly, the development of a social services system, establishing state pensions, allowances, " and other guarantees of social protection." 26 The same article also proclaims that the state conduct a " humane demographic policy," creating " necessary conditions for the cultural development of man and society, and providing ecologic safety and rational utilization of nature." 27
Chapter IV28 of the Rumyantsev draft declares numerous economic, social, and cultural " rights and liberties," such as free medical care, paid vacation, " ecologically pleasant surroundings," " compensation for damage caused to one's health or property by environmental transgression/' social protection, pensions, the right to free housing for the " needy and other citizens specified by law," and education, including free college education. According to this draft, the state will be obliged to ensure freedom of artistic and technical creativity, alongside of entitlements to participate in cultural life and to enjoy state and local cultural institutions.
The first Yeltsin draft is abundant with promises of entitlements;29 but it also imposes duties to pay taxes30 and to protect the environment.31
According to the Constitutional Assembly draft, the central government is responsible for the formulation and implementation of overall social policy.32 However, questions regarding health care, education, and social services will be jointly decided by federal and regional authorities. It is worth mentioning here that even if federal and provincial authorities could agree on the contentious task of establishing such a mechanism, it would most likely be quickly overwhelmed by numerous conflicts between different government agencies regarding which one must pay to provide constitutionally guaranteed services to a particular territorial jurisdiction.
According to high-level Russian politicians, issues of federalism are the ones most prone to conflict in the process of drafting a Russian constitution. Unfortunately, these issues have proven to be the most difficult to resolve.
The preambles of all three drafts considered prior to the events on October 4 open with the following description of the constitution's creator:
We - the multinational people of the Russian Federation, united by common fate on our land, honoring the memory of the forefathers, who passed to us love of the Fatherland, shining faith in goodness and justice, . . . preserving historically formed state unity, . . . endeavoring to ensure . . . the prosperity of Russia . . .
Several comments are appropriate here. " Common fate" for the Russians was military conquest for the Tatars and the Chechens, or a sad subjugation for the Khanty-Mansi people. " Honoring memory of forefathers" would seem more appropriate to the constitution of a Confucian empire, not a liberal democracy. Then there is " shining faith" -the wording seems to have been taken from a Russian Orthodox service.
Further, " preserving historically formed (istoricheski slozhivsheyesia) state unity and reviving Russia" would surely prompt some to argue that this state unity was achieved and enforced by sword and fire. This is an ethnocentric statement that will hardly prove acceptable to most of the non-Russians. As to " reviving Russia," Russian national revival may well not be the goal of the non-Russians.
All three pre-October drafts of the constitution proclaim Russian as the official language, with languages of the republics allowed alongside Russian. " All" non-Russians are guaranteed a right to preserve, study and develop their native languages.33
The Rumyantsev draft contains a very broad mechanism to annex neighboring lands: " A state that recognizes the constitution of the Russian Federation can be accepted into the Russian Federation according to its request." 34 The Constitutional Assembly's and the first Yeltsin drafts require passage of a federal constitutional law (with a qualified majority) to allow a new state to join.35On the other hand, it is quite clear that a state wishing to leave the Russian Federation cannot do so " upon requests as the right to secession is not recognized even for Chechnya and Tatarstan, two republics which did not sign the Federal Treaty-an addendum to all three constitutional drafts.
The first Yeltsin and Constitutional Assembly drafts declare that the status and territory of a Federation " subject" cannot be changed without its consent. Mutually accepted border changes between the subjects are permissible. Subjects of the Federation have a right to initiate referendums regarding their borders. Apparently, neighboring subjects can force referendums on each other.36
One innovation in the Constitutional Assembly draft is the possibility that " separate deals" can be negotiated between Federation members and the federal government. Such arrangements, (" peculiarities of status" ) can be stipulated in " treaties on delineation of jurisdiction and authority" ; however, such treaties must comply with the federal constitution.37
According to the Rumyantsev draft, the territory of a republic, krai, oblast, autonomous oblast and district cannot be diminished without the consent of its populace, undertaken by referendum and supported by an expression of the will of the citizenry of the Russian Federation as a whole. The implications for the Russian government's ability to negotiate a settlement with Japan over the Kurile Islands are clear.38
According to all three pre-October drafts, the Russian Federation has jurisdiction over a large number of policy issues, including state, economic, ecological, cultural, and national development,39 federal transportation, roads, information and communications, and space exploration.40 Especially in the Rumyantsev draft, such federal prerogatives are defined too broadly and could be interpreted to the detriment of regions and republics.
All three of these drafts require the republics and regions to accept the fundamentals of law promulgated by the federal government in matters of joint jurisdiction.41 The dilemma is how much central control is necessary to guarantee a " united economic space," and what constitutes excessive intervention. These questions are especially relevant, taking into account over 70 years of Soviet diktat by the center to oblasts and republics, and 400 years of centralized Russian empire prior to that.
Neither constitutional draft defines a clear mechanism of dispute resolution between republics and the central government in the question of common authority besides the conciliatory role of the president and Ms " right" to forward issues to courts.42 The regions' struggle to advance their status in the Federation to that of the republics was one way they attempted to assure greater political clout for themselves. Such equality is already established in Article 72 of the Constitutional Assembly draft. Currently, the constitutions of several republics contradict the 1978 Russian Federation constitution. Tatarstan declared itself an " associate state" inside the Federation, despite the lack of such status in the constitution. Komi, Sakha (Yakutia) and other scarcely populated, resource-rich territories adopted articles in their constitutions that contradict the Russian Federation constitution. According to the Rumyantsev draft, however, federal organs of the Russian Federation must enforce compliance with federal laws.43 Similar powers are found in the Constitutional Assembly and presidential drafts.44
Article 66 of the first Yeltsin project establishes that the head of the executive branch of a republic or region is part of the unified executive system of the Russian Federation. This is equivalent to making a state governor in the United States a federal employee. The Constitutional Assembly draft dropped this affiliation. However, both the first Yeltsin project (Article 73) and the Constitutional Assembly draft (Article 83) establish the nomination of presidential representatives to the regions. These provisions would most likely meet stiff resistance from elected regional authorities.
Taxes have become a divisive issue between the federal and the local governments. The republics and regions are protesting high levels of taxation, which they are obligated to collect and pass on to the central government in exchange for dwindling subsidies from Moscow. There are increasing calls for local dispensation of revenues, which will impair the center's ability to finance federal programs. Under Yeltsin's first draft, the republics are " over-represented" in the upper house of the draft's proposed legislature in proportion to their share of the Federation's total population; yet they would have been denied a say on taxation (Article 101). Conflicts almost certainly will ensue over these issues.
The Constitutional Assembly draft provides that a federal taxation system and general principles of taxation within the Russian Federation will be defined by federal law.45 As republics and regions will have a veto power over such laws, it seems quite likely that Moscow and the provinces will reach some sort of compromise on this issue. However, both the Constitutional Assembly draft and the new Yeltsin draft require that the government provide " findings" (zaklucheniye) before any draft laws are submitted to the State Duma, the lower house of the drafts' proposed legislature.46
With the exception of the new draft, all constitutional projects abound with references to the old Leninist-Stalinist treatment of the " nationality question," with its doctrine of ethno-territorial autonomy and the " right of nations to self-determination." 47 But, in essence, all the proposed constitutional projects deny the right to secede, even to those republics which were annexed " under duress" (such as Chechnya, which fought a 150-year war against Russia and the USSR); to those republics which have serious ethnic and religious qualms about being a part of the Russian state, such as Tatarstan, where Sunni Moslem Turks predominate; and to those not joining as signatories to the Federal Treaty.48 Other republics want to negotiate local autonomy, and should be able to do so. This will prevent their eventual demands for independence, as was the case with the republics of the former Soviet Union. Thus, not recognizing the right to secession in cases where the Federal Treaty is not signed, or is repudiated following a procedure specified by law, may be a mistake. Russia cannot and does not need to add more prolonged conflicts within its borders.
Federations cannot be enforced. If they are, as in the case of the former Soviet Union, they are de facto empires. Russia has hopefully abandoned its imperial legacy, and should not try to start another. Federations come into being as a result of the free agreement of their constituent parts.
Up until recently, Russia's citizens were offered a choice among the communist project, a democratic-socialist hybrid (the Rumyantsev draft), and a " soft" capitalist approach put forth in the first Yeltsin constitutional draft. The Constitutional Assembly draft and the second Yeltsin draft are attempts to reconcile social democracy with capitalism. While the communists are attempting nothing less than a return to centralized Soviet control in their constitutional vision, the Rumyantsev draft proposes a presidential republic with a strong parliament; both Yeltsin proposals and the Constitutional Assembly draft offer a very strong federal presidency.
Relations between the central government in Moscow and the republics and regions, as well as relations among the republics and regions themselves, are the thorniest issues Russia now faces. In all three constitutional projects considered prior to October's events, the republics and regions were not granted enough freedom to forestall the emergence of separatist movements. Under the new Yeltsin draft, prospects for the natural development of Russia's local elites, and for Russian federalism in general, have greatly diminished. The latest draft creates an extremely powerful, centralized state that most of the republics are likely to fight-overtly or covertly. The recent announcement from Tatarstan that it will not observe the new constitution is a case in point.
On the other hand, the property rights of resource-rich republics, attempting to turn themselves into " Siberian Kuwaits," may be overprotected. Remedying all of this without crushing the republics' autonomy would have required painstaking revision of the Federal Treaty. Last summer, reform-minded parliamentarians and analysts in Moscow were of the opinion that due to tactical considerations any alterations of the Federal Treaty and tampering with minority rights would be impossible.49 At the time, the conflict between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet was in full bloom, and Yeltsin needed the republics' support against the Khasbulatov-Rutskoi coalition. After his October victory over the rebel legislators, however, Yeltsin turned to a radical constitutional solution, removing both the Federal Treaty and the notion of republic sovereignty from Ms latest proposal for Russia's basic law. Obviously, such a radical solution is not in the long-term interest of very influential provincial elites. If such a solution is imposed by force, it might cause long-term systemic instability in the Russian Federation.
In all drafts of Russia's new constitution, the old Leninist-Stalinist ethno-territorial nationality policy, with its " right of self-determination," is preserved to a great degree. With political and economic emergencies preoccupying its elites, Russia is perhaps too busy to reconsider old notions of ethnicity espoused by an ideology otherwise rejected. The Indian and Swiss constitutional and federal models, as well as the Austro-Hungarian experience with ethnic autonomy, should be strongly considered in attempts to develop federal laws and policies answering Russia's reality.
It is clear that the United States hardly has the means to influence events in Moscow. The most it can do is to offer qualified advice to the drafters and share two hundred years of American experience with Russia's fledgling democracy. The U.S. does not wish to see the emergence of an authoritarian, aggressive Russian state, nor will it benefit from a total collapse of Russia's renewed political and social institutions and the ensuing chaos.
A federal, democratic, prosperous, developing, and free-market Russia is in the interests of all, especially the Russian people. A constitutional draft that establishes not only effective checks and balances for all three branches of Russia's government but also enduring institutions that can clearly define and accommodate Moscow's interests and those of the country's provinces is the most desirable, although not necessarily the most likely, outcome.
For the recent history of constitutional process see Vera Tolz, " Drafting the New Russian Constitution," RFE-RL Research Report 2, No.29 (16 July 1993). p. 1.
Constitutional Commission Draft Constitution, FBtS Central Eurasia Daily Report Supplement, PBIS-SOV-93-091-8(13 May 1993).
This was a logical direction for Yeltsin to take and had been suggested by several commentators. See Sergei Alekseev. " Drama Vlasti v Rossii," Izvestia (29 April 1993), p. 6; Ariel Cohen, " After Yeltsin's Victory: What Next?" Executive Memorandum No. 354. 29 April 1993. Heritage Foundation.
Izvestia. 30 April 1993.
Proyekt Konstitutsii Rossiiskoy Federatsii, 12 July 1993, (hereafter, the Constitutional Assembly draft); also published In FBIS-USR-93-096, 26 July 1993, based on publication in Rossiiskiye vesti, 15 July 1993, pp. 3-66,
Constitutional Assembly draft, Article 71 (h).
Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 72 (Я).
Federal Treaty, Article III, para. 3. Where are these natural resources defined? Such limitations will be protested by resource-rich republics.
Article l.para. 1.
Article 9. para. 1.
Article 9, para. 2. One wonders who is in charge of such regulations. The bureaucrats? The lawmakers? Will the Constitutional Court be called upon to decide?
Article 9. para. 3. It Is unclear how the Supreme Court will test laws and government activities In light of this " wise" guidance by the lawmakers.
Article 57, para. 1.
Article 57, para. 3. This will clearly discourage foreign Investors, as the article does not provide the standard protection clause for expropriation. Who will decide that the social necessity is 'proven" ? What If the reason for expropriation was not specified by law? If this Is a protected constitutional right, why limit It by a " regular' state law?
Amended Yeltsin draft, 9 November 1993, Article 7; published In Rossiiskaya gazeta. 10 November 1993. pp. 3-6.
Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 7.
Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 36.
Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 37.
Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 38.
Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 39.
Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 40.
Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 41.
Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 42.
Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 43.
Article 8, para. 2.
Article 6, para. 3.
Chapter IV: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and Liberties. Articles 34-42.
Yeltsin draft, Articles 43-49.
31. Article 53.
Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 71 (f).
Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 68; Rumyantsev draft. Article 83 para. 2-5; Yeltsin draft. Article 59. The Constitutional Assembly and the Yeltsin draft are more restrictive concerning the use of non-Russian languages In official business than the Rumyantsev draft.
Article 74 (2). Abkhazia, parts of Ukraine, northern Kazakhstan, or Trans-lstria will not be covered by such a mechanism, as they are not independent states. What happens if a government of such a territory 'proclaims' a state and then applies to join the Russian Federation, remains to be seen. Former Soviet republics wishing to join the Russian Federation, such as Belarus, could be accepted Into the Federation by passing a Supreme Soviet law.
Article 76 (2). Sergei Baburin. a member of Rumyantsev commission who had made a career for himself by torpedoing Russo-Japanese relations and fighting for " Russia, one and indivisible," might have had something to do with the adoption of this article.
Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 72(a); Rumyantsev draft. Article 77; Yeltsin draft. Federal Treaty. Chapter II (2) and (3).
Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 85.
Articles 78-V. 78-VI, 78-VII, 79-III, 79-V, 79-VI, etc.
Yeltsin draft. Article 67. last paragraph, establishes that the " President and government of the Federation take measures according to this constitution to ensure fulfillment of the authority of the federal state power in the whole territory of the Russian Federation.' The same language is found in the Constitutional Assembly draft. Article 78.
Article 71 (h).
Rumyantsev draft. Article 7; Yeltsin and Constitutional Assembly drafts. Federal Treaty, Preamble.
Rumyantsev draft. Article 74; Yeltsin draft. Article 56; Federal Treaty.
Personal Interviews In Washington. D.C. and Moscow, 15 May-16 July 1993.
Ariel Cohen is Salvatorl Fellow In Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Heritage Foundation In Washington. D.C. He received his L.L.B. degree from Bar-Ilan University Law School. Israel, and is completing his Ph.D dissertation for the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.