Charting a new Way for Australian Multiculturalism Emeritus Professor Laksiri Jayasuriya am



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Charting A New Way for
Australian Multiculturalism



Emeritus Professor Laksiri Jayasuriya AM

Honorary Senior Research Fellow

University of Western Australia

From : Jayasuriya, L (2005) ‘Charting A New Way for Australian Multiculturalism’. Migrant Action.




Charting a New Way for Australian Multiculturalism

Laksiri Jayasuriya AM



Introduction

The advent of multiculturalism ranks as a notable experiment of social engineering. Nevertheless, this social ideal has been under critical public scrutiny for sometime. The problematic nature of multiculturalism as a contested notion of public policy arises from two alternative ways of conceptualising multiculturalism. First, as a philosophy of migrant settlement catering to the needs of new comers through public policies designed to help their integration into the socio cultural structures of Australian society. Secondly, as a constitutive principle of the Australian nation, one which is central to how we regard ourselves as being Australian in a multicultural nation, i.e., as Australian citizens in a diverse and plural society. In other words, how do we as citizens in a liberal democracy deal with difference? How can the ideology of multiculturalism respond to the ‘new pluralism’ of Australian society?

The Multicultural Philosophy: From the Whitlam to Howard

Cultural Pluralism- An Ideology of Migrant Settlement

From the outset, Australian multiculturalism has been characterised by two distinctive features: one was that of a migration for settlement linked to the idea of a common citizenship1; the second was the fact that it was oriented to catering to the symbolic and expressive needs of the culturally different2. Firstly, as an inclusionary citizenship, these policies granted full protection of the law and most of the citizenship rights to all Permanent Residents or ‘denizens’3. This was what guaranteed a ‘fair go’ for the newcomers by recognizing that all legal immigrants were no longer treated as ‘aliens’, but as citizens (Jordens 1997; Castles 1998).


However, the enjoyment of the rights and entitlements of citizenship by immigrant settlers was conditional on the newcomers accepting the common structures of society –its legal and political institutions, system of administration and rule of law, and English as the official language. While this was a limitation imposed on the manifestation of ‘difference’, this was the key to their incorporation into the commonalities of Australian society. This conditional multiculturalism (Kymlicka 1998), along with the conferment of the social rights of citizenship, accounts for the successful social integration of new settlers.4
Furthermore, from the outset, the doctrine of cultural pluralism also sought to embody the values and ideals of a liberal political culture and humane society. These included an ‘equality of respect’, the human dignity of all persons – expressed as a mutual respect for, and understanding of, one another and equal regard for every member of society as a human being (Krygier 1996). Underlying this was the belief that a sense of social/ethnic identity may, at least for first generation settlers, co-exist with a sense of national identity of being an Australian. Importantly, multiculturalism has evolved primarily as a doctrine of cultural pluralism. This refers to the ‘preservation of the communal life and significant patterns of the culture’ (Gordon (1981) of immigrant groups subject to the proviso that this is within the context of accepting the rules and practices inherent in Australian citizenship.
Cultural pluralism was built around notions of culture and ethnicity and generating an identity politics which has governed the practice of policies of ethnic affairs and migrant welfare especially from the Fraser era onwards. This identity politics, based on an essentialist view of ethnicity and cultural groups/communities (Jayasuriya 1992; 2000) and also drawing on various forms of cultural relativism, privileged cultural maintenance and cultural celebration. The fallout from this has been a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ attitude and this trend has been reinforced by diaspora nationalism (i.e., linkage back to cultures of home countries) among some migrant groups.
This model of culturalist multiculturalism, despite modifications introduced in the Hawke-Keating era and also by the Howard government, has enjoyed bipartisan endorsement. While the Hawke-Keating policies still remained aligned to the identity politics and the ethos of culturalist multiculturalism inherited from the Fraser era, the underlying tenor of its policies was clearly one of a ‘managerial multiculturalism’.5 This was ‘a policy for managing the consequences of diversity in the interests of the individual and society’ (OMA 1989) which Keating refers to as a ‘productive dividend’.6 This rationale was associated with the prevailing culture of economic rationalism, and advocated the virtues of productive diversity (and later ‘economic efficiency’), to assist trade and business activity. By channelling multicultural policies towards enhancing Australia’s competitive advantage, Keating was clearly attempting to reorient the ideology of multiculturalism in the national interest by adding to its foundations in an inclusionary citizenship.
Towards a Normative Multiculturalism
What this does is to provide the first signs of making multiculturalism something more than catering to migrant welfare needs, and dominated by identity politics. Accordingly,

Keating’s understanding of the philosophy of Australian multiculturalism was essentially the same as the key principles governing Australian social ad political institutions. The latter he identified as ‘the constitution and the rule of law, parliamentary democracy, freedom and speech and religion, English as the national language, equality of sexes and tolerance’ (Keating 2000: 262). This endorsement of the ideology of multiculturalism with a focus on membership in the political community was importantly couched – to use the language of Baubock (1994) – as a ‘republican citizenship’ rather than the later Howard conceptualisation in terms of a ‘national citizenship’.


When we come to the Howard era, as I have argued elsewhere (Jayasuriya 1998; 2000), we find that New Agenda (NMAC 1997; 1999) policy prescription only serves to fine tune and reform the edges of the National Agenda of the Hawke-Keating era. This is, indeed, a classic instance of the aphorism, plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose!

But there are two critically significant points of difference. Unlike, the Hawke-Keating document, Howard’s New Agenda is stated not in terms of rights based citizenship but is more oriented towards ‘civic duties’ – the mutual obligations and responsibilities of citizens (Jayasuriya 1998).


The overarching theme of Howard’s New Agenda is ‘reconciling unity and diversity’ by the simplistic solution of denying the migrant experiences, the vibrant pluralism of society and re-affirming the cultural values of the dominant anglo celtic heritage as signifying the homogeneity of the ‘cultural nation’. This, in many respects, is reminiscent of Henry Parkes’ celebrated slogan – ‘One People, One Destiny’ – at the time of Federation – the only difference being that British identity is replaced by a new sense of Australian identity and citizenship arising from membership of a political community, constructed in terms of core cultural values, the inviolable cultural heritage of the Australian nation and citizenship.
Multiculturalism in Crisis

Multiculturalism as public policy
Until quite recently, this orthodoxy of Australian multiculturalism proved to be effective as a successful policy of migrant settlement for a variety of reasons, First and foremost, from its inception this policy ethos had a corporatist flavour; it was a state directed policy, a carefully monitored and regulated aspect of public policy which had the endorsement of capital and labour – employer organizations and the unions, Equally significant was that these policies were developed and consolidated in conditions of relative economic affluence. These policies were also carried out with the active participation of the new ethnic middle class, co-opted by governments to promote an agenda of identity politics.
For two main reasons, the dominant groups in the mainstream of Australian society were also inclined to give this form of cultural multiculturalism lukewarm support as a way of managing diversity. One was because what was promoted was a highly depoliticised multiculturalism which afforded little occasion for social conflict and disruption. Indeed, the oft repeated theme of this period was the need for ‘social cohesion’, along with the slogan ‘multiculturalism for all’ (Zubryzcki 1982). The main objective of the latter was to highlight the limits of difference within a framework of universal citizenship. The overriding concern was to prevent any form of ‘structural pluralism’ or social pluralism (Martin 1971; Committee on Community Relations

1975).
Secondly, and more importantly, there was the expectation that in the long run, differences would disappear and there would be a ‘melting pot’. The growing incidence of intermarriage, particularly among some ethnic groups (Penny & Khoo 1996; Giorgas & Jones 2002) is repeatedly used by critics of multiculturalism (see Galligan & Roberts 2004) as evidence of ‘a melting pot’, meaning ethnic assimilation or ‘anglo-conformity’ This thinking, however, fails to recognise that what we may have with inter-ethnic marriages are mixed identities or half breeds as revealed by some studies overseas (Lambert & Taylor 1990). As Penny & Khoo (1996), rightly observe, there are a variety of adaptations resulting from inter-marriage between ethnic groups.


What has given this hidden assimilationism, evident in much of the public understanding of the multicultural discourse, an additional impetus was the resurgent new nationalism (Davidson 1997). This held out the prospect of restoring the ruptured ideal of cultural homogeneity by constructing a sense of Australianess7, as one commentator put it, based on the ‘cricket test’! This was also clearly the thrust of the Hanson critique of multiculturalism, but equally of the Howard Agenda for Australian multiculturalism, evident in the failed exercise of the Constitutional Preamble, and the conditions under which John Howard embraced the ‘m’ word (Kelly 1997).
From the point of view of migrant settlers, the inclusionary citizenship built into the doctrine of cultural pluralism was also attractive to new settlers because of the tangible benefits of political and social citizenship available to citizens and ‘denizens’ alike. The inherent fairness of the political and legal institutions, the generosity of the state in guaranteeing new settlers the social benefits of citizenship which accrued from the wage earners’ welfare state, i.e., a minimum level of economic security and a social wage proved to be the most effective social glue, binding newcomers to Australian society and providing a sense of belonging. This clearly suggests that social solidarity and being a stakeholder resides in the political culture and not in some set of arbitrary cultural values derived from a historic past (Jayasuriya 2000).

The Paradox of Pluralism and the Backlash

Yet, despite the success of this orthodox model of multiculturalism, it has been subject to critical scrutiny from across the political spectrum and also by the general public. The public perception of the practice of Australian multiculturalism remains confused and shrouded in uncertainty (DILGEA 1988; Sawer 1990). Neither is it seen as serving effectively the needs and aspirations of the ethnic minorities. There is no doubt that Australian multiculturalism is in a state of crisis. As suggested earlier, this is mainly due to two features. The first arises from the fact that the ideology of multiculturalism derived from the 1980s confronts a new social reality, especially a new pluralism; second, perhaps more importantly, that the contradictions and tensions inherent in the doctrine of cultural pluralism relate to the paradox of pluralism.

In short, multiculturalism, as a ‘public policy regime’ which evolved in the 1970s and

1980s had three essential components: i) it reflected the economic climate and regime that went along with a ‘Fordist’ manufacturing sector that served to produce for the internal market; ii) it was enmeshed with ‘welfare state’ politics; and, iii) it catered largely to the interests of first generation migrants of mostly European origin. However, right through the 1980s and 1990s the deep structural changes in the Australian economy shifted it to a more competitive outward oriented economy, one where full employment and generous expansive welfare provisions could not be taken for granted

(Beilharz 1989: Graycar & Jamrozik 1993).


Along with these structural changes there was a ‘new pluralism’ characteristic of Australian society. This was marked by new waves of migrants, mostly non-Caucasian groups from Asia, Middle East, and Africa, the emergence of second and third generations of migrants, and a distinct religious pluralism (Carey 2003) rarely acknowledged in the conventional multicultural discourse. Contrary to the view that ‘Australia remains relatively homogeneous with ethnic groups being progressively integrated into mainstream culture (Galligan et al. 2001: 185), there is clearly an increased pluralisation of Australian society (Markus 1988). This has led to a blurring of boundaries in social functioning, creating a ‘mixed’ cultural landscape, a hybridity and mixed identities. This policy regime of multiculturalism was clearly unresponsive to the needs and interests of this new social reality.
On the other hand, the paradox of pluralism linked to cultural pluralism, as identity politics, revolves around the issues of equality and difference. The first concerns the constructions of identity which draw on contested views about the meaning of culture, and ethnicity. It is beyond the brief of this essay to engage in an extended analysis of these issues which are more fully explored in Jayasuriya (1992; 2000). In brief, the main point is that identity politics, by regarding the concept of culture in essentialist terms (i.e., as an immutable fixed entity), offers a reified, static, unreal view of culture which fails to capture the lived reality of culture as a form of cultural practice. This view of culture has placed the emphasis on the expressive/affective dimensions of culture and ethnicity – the need to belong and maintain one’s cultural identity (lifestyles).
In contrast, ethnic identity is best viewed as a ‘politico-economic resource’ that can be mobilised in the pursuit of group interests. What we experience therefore, are mixed identities arising from the intersection of class, gender, ethnicity/race, which creates an entirely different understanding of identity politics. Therefore, once you recognize the contingent nature of identity, it is clear that identities are determined in the political realm, i.e., the public domain rather than the private domain. But this is exactly what the inherent privatisation of the cultural model ignores.
What lies at the heart of the paradox of pluralism is the coexistence of identity politics with notions of equality and universalism, arising from a common citizenship; hence the dilemma surrounding the conjunction of cultural pluralism and the ‘politics of universalism’ inherent in the practice of multiculturalism. But the dilemma of cultural pluralism is that the universalism inherent in identity politics seeks to avoid or minimise the very differences that it promotes. The assumption of a sanitized homogeneity arising from the universalism inherent in identity politics confronts the very difference that it seeks to avoid or minimise.
In other words, the celebration of difference, of culture and ethnic identity, sits uneasily alongside the universalism promoted by a common citizenship. Hence, the paradox: identity politics creates the very divisions and ethnic structures—be they in sport, religion, or the arts – it seeks to avoid. The latter are integral to the social and political reality of a diverse and pluralist society. This incidentally underlies the perceptive and insightful observation of Jean Martin many years ago, that there can be no cultural pluralism without some sort of social pluralism (Martin 1971).
It is this policy orientation which has been mainly responsible for the backlash against multiculturalism in the wider community accusing it of tribalism and breeding cultural ghettoes and of a diaspora nationalism8, all of which have been seen as endangering social cohesion and social solidarity (Blainey 1984; Weekend Australian 2002). In a nutshell, the problem is that multiculturalism, as a form of identity politics, seeks to emphasise a privatised cultural difference while existing within a ‘public realm’ where these differences are not recognised.
REFRAMING CITIZENSHIP FOR A NEW PLURALISM

From Identity Politics to the Politics of Identity
The starting point of any restructuring of multiculturalism or developing a new rationale rests on a) an acceptance of the stark reality of pluralism, and b) a preparedness to build on the positive achievements of cultural pluralism such as equality of respect, mutual understanding, tolerance, and an inclusionary citizenship. What we have today is a pluralistic community which is both ‘racial’, ‘ethnic’, and religious in composition, and this must surely include the Aboriginal people who have been left out in the multicultural consciousness as constituting a defining component element of a pluralistic society.

However defined, the reality we confront is that minority groups — be they racial, religious, cultural or ethnic — are status devalued groups operating in the public domain, but marginalised from the power structures and treated pejoratively. Therefore, in refashioning our understanding of diversity and pluralism we need to move away from the identity politics of the past towards a politics of identity which views difference in terms of the minority status of ethnic groups as groups who have to contend with inequalities and disadvantage, reminiscent of the late 1960s.

This shift entails a move away from a narrowly conceived a-political ‘cultural pluralism’ to a more democratic pluralism which confronts the problematic nature of what has been described as ‘the tensional nexus of democracy (democratic citizenship) and multiculturalism’ (Jayasuriya 2000). This form of democratic pluralism is contingent upon re-negotiating the concept of citizenship, and requires us to go beyond an understanding of citizenship merely as legal status embodying rights, civil, political, and social rights. Rather, citizenship, has to be understood normatively as conferring a distinctive sense of identity, of belonging and enjoying full and equal membership status in a pluralistic community. The principles and ideals of a democratic pluralism based on a redefined and revitalised sense of Australian citizenship must perforce extend the meaning and understanding of a ‘common citizenship’ to recognize the full participation of the ‘different’.

The logic rationale of the WA Charter of Multiculturalism9 incorporates this new thinking about citizenship and carves out a new domain. In espousing the principles and ideals of a democratic pluralism it embodies 4 key principles—Civic Ideals or Virtues, Fairness, Equality, and Participation and is built around three pillars or key notions. These are participation, recognition, and representation. Participation alongside the politics of recognition, among other things, leads importantly to questions of representation, i.e., of who represents what and leads to questions of reordering the


A Radical Citizenship
Put simply, by reframing citizenship in this manner, we acknowledge that when a society is socially differentiated, citizenship must equally be so. The notion a democratic pluralism posits a political and enabling multiculturalism within a framework of citizenship that ‘treats all members as equal and also recognizes their separate identities’ (Taylor et al 1992). Premised on the existence of a ‘shared political culture’, this allows for a ‘differentiated citizenship’ (or a multicultural citizenship) which is socially integrative and acknowledges the reality of a society differentiated by gender, class, and ethnicity. Hence differences between individual citizens or a group of citizens need to be recognized and taken account of in catering to citizens’ needs. All citizens, by virtue of their shared common citizenship, enjoy a sense of shared belonging by their membership of the political community based on public virtues such as democratic spirit of tolerance, the rule of law, respect for liberty, etc.

In short, it is this civic culture arising from a liberal political order that binds the nation and integrates varied segments of society. To quote Habermas, a leading political theorist of our time,

… the political culture must serve as the common denominator for a constitutional patriotism which simultaneously sharpens awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which exist in the multicultural society (Habermas 1994: 198-99).

A radical view of citizenship, incorporating a differentiated citizenship flows from the political rather than the cultural nation. What is’ therefore, crucial for social solidarity in a pluralistic society committed to a liberal political culture is the homogeneity of the political nation conceived of as a ‘self governing’ political and moral community, and not a cultural nation derived from core cultural values of a single unifying ethnic core of the dominant groups in society.

This difference in how we constitute the Australian nation may be summarized by contrasting the vision on Australian identity in the Howard era — as deriving from the anglo celtic heritage —and the Hawke Keating era in terms of our being a uniquely Australian nation; one which is geographically located out of the western orbit but still retaining a distinctive political culture which has its origins in western liberal political ideals. The contrast, therefore, is between an ‘ethnic nationalism’, one based on core anglo-celtic values and a ‘civic nationalism’ (Ignatieff 1993) embodying a civic culture linked to democratic political values and social institutions. In this context, as Macgregor et al. (2004) rightly point out ‘a strong sense of Australian nationalism requires symbols that can speak meaningfully to the nation’. As these authors argue the Eureka Legend may well provide us with a powerful national symbol for constructing a national story, which are salient ad sensitive to the new pluralism.

In other words, for those who do not share the Howard vision, the real basis of unity, social cohesion and social solidarity rests on an identity which derives from an acceptance and identification of a common set of social and political institutions, not shared values – a mythical set of core cultural values. Clearly, the unity and cohesion of society rests in the political consensus and the common possession of rights and entitlements associated with full and equal membership of the political community. What matters is the political nation, and not the cultural nation (Jayasuriya 1991).

It is in this context that a constitutional document, embodying the aspiration of ‘we the people’ as a pluralistic society, acquires crucial significance in forging social solidarity and constructing our identity as a nation, as a truly multicultural society (Jayasuriya 2003). The constitutional document is what is most likely to give legitimacy and credibility to a sense of Australian identity, as a distinct nation in a pluralistic society; and at the same time it is a document that binds citizens in a common belonging through the principles and values enshrined in the constitution.

We need, as a matter of priority, to have an ‘Australian conversation’ to reorder the political foundations of Australia as a pluralistic society, governed by a rights-based democracy and committed to liberal political values. As the Premier of WA, Dr Geoff Gallop (2003) observed in his recent Walter Murdoch Address, entitled Living with Difference:

Australia has the opportunity to show the rest of the regions that it is possible to have a robust democratic civic culture and at the same time respects and values of religion and cultural pluralism.

This must serve to articulate a new philosophy for Australian multiculturalism as a ‘plural society … held together and legitimated by a common understanding of a citizenship’ (Miller 1995). There is, indeed, a compelling case for devising constitutional ways and means for incorporating the rights element in the Australian political culture as a means of safeguarding and protecting the rights and freedoms of minorities (Charlesworth 2002). This needs to be strengthened by giving political legitimacy to a pluralistic citizenship and inscribing it in statutory form via a Bill of Rights or an Australian Charter of Rights (Jayasuriya 2002). Such an Act will help to include both indigenous and non-indigenous groups in the multicultural discourse, and facilitate the separate but linked development of an Aboriginal and a multiculturalism consciousness.

Australian multiculturalism, as an integral and defining aspect of the Australian nation needs to be embodied in a legislative statute, and this is best accompanied via a Bill of Rights inscribing a radical new ideal of a pluralistic citizenship (Jayasuriya 2002). As the late Jean Martin concluded from her pathfinding research many decades ago, if Australian ‘pluralism is to be more than a cardboard façade [it is] to be acknowledged as a potential political force [and it needs to assume] some kind of political responsibility and make their experience forcefully relevant at the level of political decision making’ (Martin 1971).

REFERENCES
Baubock, R. (ed.) (1994) From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining Status of Immigrants in Europe. Averbury: Aldershot.

Blainey, G. (1984) All for Australia?, Melbourne: Methuen Hayes.

Castles, S. (1998) ‘Democracy and Multicultural Citizenship: Australian Debates and their Relevance for Western Europe’. In Baubock. R (ed.) From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the Status of Immigration in Europe. Aldershot: Averbury.

Charlesworth, H. (2002) Writing in Rights: Australia and the Protection of Human Rights. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Davidson, A. (1997) ‘Multiculturalism and Citizenship: Silencing the Migrant Voice’. Journal of Intercultural Studies 18 (2).

Gallop, G. (2003) ‘Living with Difference: Does Multiculturalism Have A Future?. Walter Murdoch Lecture, Murdoch University, Perth.

Giorgas, D. and F.L. Jones (2002) ‘Intermarriage Patterns and Social Cohesion among First, Second and Later Generation Australians’. Journal of Population Research 19 (1).

Gordon, M. (1981) ‘Models of Pluralism’. The Annals. American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 454.

Ignatieff, M. (1993) Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism. New London: ABC Books.

Jayasuriya, L. (2003) ‘Fine de Siècle’. In L. Jayasuriya, D. Walker & J. Gothard (eds) (2003) Legacies of White Australia: Race Culture and Nation. Perth: University of WA Press.

Jayasuriya, L. (2002) ‘Taking Rights Seriously in Australia’. Dialogue 21 (3).

Jayasuriya, L. (2000) ‘Australian Multiculturalism and Citizenship: Towards a New Paradigm’. In Ethnic Affairs Commission, NSW, Building the Reconciliation Bridge. Sydney: EAC/NSW.

Jayasuriya, L. (1998) ‘NMAC and Multiculturalism: Plus ça Change, Plus C’est La Même Chose!’. Australian Language Matters 6 (1).

Jayasuriya, L (1992) ‘The Problematic of Culture and Identity in Social Functioning’. Journal of Multicultural Social Work. 2 (4).

Jayasuriya, L. (1991) ‘State, Nation and Diversity in Australia’. Current Affairs Bulletin 66 (6).

Jordens, Ann-Marie (1997) Alien to Citizen. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Keating, P. (2000) Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia Pacific. Macmillan.

Kelly, P. (1997) ‘The Curse of the M-Word’. The Australian August 30-31.

Krygier, M. (1996) ‘The Sources of Civil Society’, Quadrant, October.

Kymlicka, W. (1998) Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Lambert, W.E. and D.H. Taylor (1990) Coping with Cultural and Racial Diversity in Urban America. New York: Praeger.

Macgregor, D. et al. (2004) Imagining Australia: Ideas for the Future. Sydney; Allen & Unwin.

Martin, J. (1971) ‘Migration and Social Pluralism’. In K. Wilkes (ed.), How Many Australians? Canberra: AGPS.

Miller, D. (1995) ‘Citizenship and Pluralism’. Political Studies 23.

NMAC (National Multicultural Advisory Council) (1997) Multiculturalism: The Way Forward. AGPS.

NMAC (1999) Australian Multiculturalism for a New Century: towards Inclusiveness. AGPS OMA (1989) National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia. Canberra: AGPS.

Penny, J. and S. Khoo (1996) Intermarriage: A Study of Migration and Intermarriage. BIMPR. Canberra: AGPS.

Taylor, C et al. (1992) Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Zubryzcki, J. (1982) Multiculturalism for All Australians. Canberra: AGPS.


 This article is drawn from “Australian Multiculturalism: Past, Present and Future” (2003). See www.socialwork.arts.uwa.edu.au/_data/page/33070/diversity.pdf) and “Politics of a New Pluralism” (2004) at: www.arts.uwa.edu.au/SocWkWWW/).

I am greatful to Neelima Choahan for editing and abbreiating the texts of thse two papers.




1 This is contrary to John Howard’s apparent discovery and recent endorsement of

‘Australian Multiculturalism’ as an integral feature of Australian citizenship. By any reckoning, all versions of multiculturalism have been framed within the framework of Australian citizenship. This was explicitly acknowledged in the Lippman Report (Committee on Community Relations 1975) as far back as the early 1970s. See also Zubryzcki 1995; Castles 1998).




2 Recently there has been a significant departure from these policies with the increasing number of short term contract labour or transilient migration (see Khoo 2002).


3 ‘Denizen’ is a term introduced by Hammar (1990) to identify permanently resident foreigners who still enjoy some rights of citizenship. In Australia, those with Permanent residence status who are denied some rights, e.g., right to vote and access to some public service appointments are denizens.


4 See Jayasuriya (1993) for the Australian approach through ‘industrial citizenship’ to confer ‘social rights’ to immigrant settlers in a ‘residua list welfare state’.

5 This characterization is borrowed from Davidson (1997).

6 The main proponents were Cope and Kalantzis (1996).


7 This was advocated by the UK Home Secretary, Norman Tebbit, who argued that you cannot be accepted as being English unless you support England in Test matches!


8 See R. Skeldon (1998) for a similar situation that has arisen in the context of Canadian multiculturalism.


9 See WA Government Office of Multicultural Interests (OMI) website, www.omi.wa.gov.au/omi Charter for details.



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