WILLIAM I. ROBINSON , University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Crisis and Latin America” 2004 Accessed 7-11-13 EJS
As transnational capital integrates the world into new globalized circuits of accumulation, it has broken down national and regional autonomies, including the earlier pre-globalization models of capitalist development and the social forces that sustained these models. Through internal adjustment and rearticulation to the emerging global economy and society, local productive apparatuses and social structures in each region are transformed, and different regions acquire new profiles in the emerging global division of labor. Economic integration processes and neo-liberal structural adjustment programs are driven by transnational capital's campaign to open up every country to its activities, to tear down all barriers to the movement of goods and capital, and to create a single unified field in which global capital can operate unhindered across all national borders (Chossudovsky, 1997; Green, 1995; Robinson, 2001a, 2001b). Neo-liberalism can be seen in this regard as a mechanism that adjusts national and regional economies to the global economy by creating the conditions, including an appropriate macroeconomic and policy environment, the legal framework, and so on, for internal productive reorganization and insertion into the global economy.In Latin America, the pre-globalization model of accumulation based on domesticmarket expansion, populism and import-substitution industrialization (ISI) correspondedto the earlier nation-state phase of capitalism. This was a particular variant of the modelof national capitalism that prevailed for much of the 20th century. Regulatory andredistributive mechanisms provided the basis for the post-WWII national economiesaround the world, whether the Keynesian "New Deal"/social democratic states in theFirst World, the developmentalist states of the Third World, or the socialist-oriented redistributive states of the Second World. In Latin America, the pre-globalization modelput into place national circuits of accumulation and expanded productive capacity in thepost-WWII years. Surpluses were appropriated by national elites and transnationalcorporations but also redistributed through diverse populist programs, ranging frompackets of social wages (social service spending, subsidized consumption, etc.),expanding employment opportunities, and rising real wages.But the model became exhausted and its breakdown, starting in the late 1970s, paved the way for the neo-liberalmodelbased on liberalization and integration to the global economy, a "laissez faire"state, and what the current development discourse terms "export-led development (Bulmer-Thomas, 1996; Green, 1995; Robinson, 1999).
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B-Engaging in the globalized economy ignores the social costs brought about capitalism and the inevitability of its failure.
PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS ,former Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury and Associate Editor of the Wall Street Journal ,“The Social Costs of Capitalism” May 31 2013 Accessed 7-11-13
When I was a graduate student in economics, the social cost of capitalism was a big issue in economic theory. Since those decades ago, the social costs of capitalism have exploded, but the issue seems no longer to trouble the economics profession.Social costs are costs of production that are not born by the producer or included in the price of the product. There are many classic examples: the pollution of air, water, and land from mining, fracking, oil drilling and pipeline spills, chemical fertilizer farming, GMOs, pesticides, radioactivity released from nuclear accidents, and the the pollution of food by antibiotics and artificial hormones.Some economists believe that these traditional social costs can be dealt with by well-defined property rights. Others think that benevolent government will control social costs in the interests of society.Today there are new social costs brought by globalism. For developed countries, these are unemployment, lost consumer income, tax base, and GDP growth, and rising trade and current account deficits from the offshoring of manufacturing and tradable professional service jobs. The trade and current account deficits can result in a falling exchange value of the currency and rising inflation from import prices. For underdeveloped countries, the costs are the loss of self-sufficiency and the transformation of agriculture into monocultures to feed the needs of international corporations.Economists are oblivious to this new epidemic of social costs, because they mistakenly think that globalism is free trade and that free trade is always beneficial.Economists are also unaware of the social costs of deregulation. The ongoing financial crisis which requires massive public subsidies to “banks too big to fail” is a social cost resulting from government accommodating Wall Street pressure to deregulate the financial system by repealing the Glass-Steagall Act, by removing the position limits on speculators, by preventing the CFTC from regulating derivatives, and by turning the Anti-Trust Act into dead-letter law and permitting massive economic concentrations. The social costs of successful corporate lobbying is enormous. But economists who believe that markets are self-regulating imagine that an enormous gain in efficiency has occurred, not massive social costs.In order to keep the deregulated financial system afloat, the Federal Reserve has monetized trillions of dollars of debt over the last several years. Real interest rates have been driven into negative territory. Retirees are unable to earn any interest income on their savings and have to draw down their capital in order to cover their living expenses.The liquidity injected into financial markets by the Federal Reserve’s policy of quantitative easing has produced huge bond and stock market bubbles. When they pop, more American wealth will be wiped out and more jobs will be lost.Consider just one example of the social costs of jobs offshoring. When US corporations produce abroad the goods and services that they market to Americans, the goods and services that flow into the US arrive as imports. Thus, the trade deficit rises dollar for dollar.The trade deficit means that the US has imported more than it has earned in foreign currencies by exporting. For most countries this would be a problem, but not for the US.The US dollar is the world reserve currency, which means that it is the means of international payment and that foreign central banks hold US dollars as reserves to secure the values of their own currencies.With the passage of time, this advantage becomes a disadvantage, because foreigners use the dollars gained from their trade surpluses to buy up American income-producing assets. They buy US Treasury bonds and US corporate bonds, and the interest income leaves the country. They purchase US companies, and the profits, dividends and capital gains leave the country. They lease Chicago’s parking meters and American toll roads, and the revenues flow abroad.
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C- Capitalism justifies endless exploitation.The economic imbalances of societies are at the heart of environmental destruction and warfare.
(Mark Carey, assistant professor of history at Washington and Lee University where he teaches Latin American and environmental history. He won the 2008 ¶ Leopold-Hidy Prize for his article, "The History of Ice: How Glaciers Became an ¶ Endangered Species (Environmental History, July 2007), April 2009, “Latin American Environmental History: Current Trends, Interdisciplinary Insights, and¶ Future Directions”, Jstor, 7/6/13 SS, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40608469)
DISASTER SCHOLARS ARE AMONG the most prominent to blur nature-culture ¶ dichotomies, and this is a research area where historians have made important ¶ historiographical contributions. They underscore the social roots of catastrophe by demonstrating how marginalized populations suffer disproportionately when catastrophes occur. The same historical processes that make populations vulnerable to so-called "natural" disasters-such as race and class divisions or land and resource ¶ loss- also contribute to warfare and revolutionary movements. Within nations and ¶ on a global scale, power imbalances and economic inequality are thus at the center of disasters and wars. Disaster studies in Latin America generally focus on earthquakes, floods, and ¶ weather-related catastrophes such as hurricanes, El Niño, and drought.77 Earthquake ¶ research tends to focus on single events, such as Lima in 1746, San Juan, Argentina in ¶ 1944, Huaraz, Peru in 1970, or Mexico City in 1985, among others.78 Scholars examining ¶ these earthquakes uncover not only the disaster impacts but also the politics of relief ¶ and reconstruction. Charles Walker, for example, argues that the 1746 earthquake- ¶ tsunami in Peru provided a clean slate for enlightened leaders to implement new ¶ reforms that challenged elite authority and reigning social hierarchies.79 Provocative ¶ studies on Caribbean hurricanes have unearthed both the social underpinnings of disaster vulnerability and the short- and long-term implications of disasters, such as Cuba's altered economy and closer relations with the United States following the ¶ three deadly 1840s hurricanes that Louis Pérez examines.80 El Niño scholarship has ¶ increasingly expanded beyond Peru to emphasize scientific, political, social, and even ¶ cultural aspects.81 ¶ Drought research is notable for its integration of climatic data into social analysis. ¶ Georgina Endfield links the changing climate to human vulnerability in colonial Mexico. This approach not only grounds her analysis in the social landscape of New ¶ Spain but also merges climate and water issues with disaster and agrarian studies. In a study of a recent El Niño event in Mexico, Hallie Eakin also focuses on household ¶ vulnerability to identify which regions, families, and communities were best (and least) ¶ able to adapt to extreme weather events. Both Eakin and Endfield demonstrate how ¶ climatic vulnerability was produced historically and stemmed from social, political, and economic conditions rather than simple "acts of God."82 Scholars have also studied ¶ drought in Northeast Brazil.83 While analyzing drought's profound impact on people, ¶ land, and livelihoods, they also analyze techno-scientific responses and the politics and ¶ discourse of disaster. Many of these studies increasingly probe the power dimensions of ¶ drought. Timothy Finan reveals how Brazilian elites manipulated drought discourse to ¶ accumulate wealth and power.84 Globally, Mike Davis suggests that millions died in late ¶ nineteenth century El Niño events-which generated drought in Brazil-because of the ¶ "fatal meshing of extreme events between the world climate system and the late Victorian ¶ world economy": western European imperial powers had taken control of local people's land and labor, and thus their ability to grow and procure food.85 Climatic disasters ¶ sometimes produced surprising historical changes, too. Glacier melting that triggered ¶ massive floods and avalanches in Peru also fostered new scientific studies, inspired ¶ innovative engineering projects, jump-started economic modernization campaigns, and ¶ provided platforms for fresh political agendas from within and beyond the Andes.86 ¶ Wars account for another type of disaster. And environmental analyses of war in Latin America, which tend to focus on post-i96os Central America, echo Davis's ¶ condemnations of the ways in which the global economy and geopolitics create vulnerable populations and cause disasters. In contrast to most environmental histories of warfare that examine the effects of weapons, science, technology, and military resource consumption, the small historiography on Latin America emphasizes the environmental dimensions leading to war as well as consequences.87 William Durham's ¶ analysis of the 1969 Honduras-El Salvador Soccer War illuminates the role of ecology ¶ and environmental conflicts. He shows how resource scarcity and land loss drove ¶ 300,000 Salvadorans to emigrate into an already strained situation in Honduras.88 ¶ Daniel Faber makes this point more broadly and emphatically, arguing that "Marxist ¶ and socialist theory should place the ecological crisis at the center of any analysis ¶ of revolution and imperialism in Central America."89 For Faber, capitalism produces multiple environmental effects that include warfare as well as the overexploitation of natural resources and the transformation of the peasantry from subsistence to the capitalist export sector. These social studies of warfare and disasters in Central America ¶ link with more recent scholarship on environmental justice.90 They also point to the ¶ importance of understanding social relations and power dynamics- the fundamentals ¶ of social history- inherent in past human-environment interactions.
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D- Reject the aff, creating space for the germination of alternative politics
Aparicio and Blaser ’08 (Juan Ricardo Aparicio, Associate Professor of Languages and Sociocultural Studies at the University of the Andes, Phd. In Anthropology from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Mario Blaser, professor of Anthropology at University of California, Davis, “The ‘Lettered City’ and the Insurrection of Subjugated Knowledges in Latin America, Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 81, No. 1 (Winter ’08), JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/30052740 SM)
The rejection of the modern state and capitalist market as organizing vectors of social life also expresses a rejection of representation as the overarching logic for politics. In effect, as Zibechi (2005) argues, the legitimacy of the state rests on the claim of being the ultimate representation and suture of a fragmented social body. Thus, representation "operates in the absence of social ties." Similarly, the legitimacy claimed for the capitalist market by neoliberal ideologues like Hayek (1973) is that, through pricing, it provides the perfect representational mechanism to sort out the competing interests of individuals. Closely related to these conceptions of the political is the idea that the necessary dispersion produced by the inherent diversity of perspectives in human society can be overcome by appealing to a supposedly unified reality. Here is where modern politics also functions as a politics of truth. In effect, although not in theory, the claim that the state or the market constitutes the suture of a fragmented society is related to a claim that they operate on the basis of true knowledge produced by expert institutions, that is, that their actions respond to an accurate representation of a single and undisputable reality which of necessity overcomes differences. By contrast, the presence of strong social ties, forged through communal life within the territory, provides an alternative vector through which the social can be realized. For example, the former Bolivian minister of education and Indigenous intellectual Felix Patzi sees in the communal system, which still constitutes the basis of Aymaras' and Quechuas' ayllu economies, a basis for the construction of present-day alternatives to the neoliberal system, and to modern politics in general. A central characteristic of the communal system is that it tends to avoid concentration of power or the emergence of a power that can position itself in a relation of exteriority to the community (Patzi 2004:181).s Thus, even though the communal system does not imply a complete lack of hierarchies and internal stratification, it can nevertheless be contrasted with the state-form associated with modern politics. For instance, while modern politics addresses the internal differences of society through overarching institutions that are based on the principle of representation and stand as an external power to the society they govern, communal politics addresses differences through institutions that are based on the principle of relationality and operate by delegating tasks rather than power (see Patzi 2004; Zibechi 2006). Moreton-Robinson explains that in Indigenous cultural domains "relationality means that one experiences the self as part of others and that others are part of the self" (2000:16). When political, economic and intellectual institutions such as communal assemblies, communal labor, communal rituals, and the delegation of tasks embody this principle, they tend to operate by ceaselessly co-adjusting internal differences through consensus which can then be translated into
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directives given to delegates that "command by obeying" the assemblies. In this way the separation between society and its political, economic, and intellectual "organs" is forestalled. This is precisely what the communal system and the insurrectional patterns of mobilization share in common. The effort to sustain and/or generate institutions that foster communal bonds and avert the emergence of powers exterior to the community, all the while attending to everyday needs, is evident in a variety of settings including the Zapatistas' autonomous Mayan communities in Chiapas, Mexico (Earle and Simonelli 2005; Stahler-Sholk 2007); the recovered factories and neighborhood organizations of unemployed workers in Argentina (Fernandez 2006; Neuhaus and Calello 2006); many of the rural and urban grassroots organizations that supported the coming to power of Evo Morales in Bolivia (Mamani Ramirez 2005; Zibechi 2006); and Black communities in the Colombian pacific region (Escobar In Press), to mention a few. In a way, we can say that what the insurrectional patterns of mobilization are doing in these settings is to produce and strengthen communities by performing the principles of the communal system as best as they can.