But Klansmen whipped a Columbus County woman in 1951

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Klan activity did not have a deep or a continuous history in Virginia. Since Radical Republicans never controlled the state, there was little incentive for Democrats to sponsor insurgency.1 The Second Klan however, enlisted 20,000 members around the growing industrial cities of Norfolk, Newport News and Lynchburg, as well as the southeastern counties of Princess Anne and Nansemond, the tobacco counties extending from Halifax to Patrick County, and the neighboring counties of Roanoke and Wythe. In the southeastern part of the State, there were reports of scattered raids and floggings. Although the order endured into the 1930s, Virginia elites consistently denounced the Klan, maintaining segregation without sponsoring vigilantism. No large scale Klan organizing took place after national disbandment in 1944,2 but Klansmen whipped a Columbus County woman in 1951(430) and bombed three homes in Norfolk County in summer 1953(434).3

By the mid-1950s, relatively less non-labor intensive industry had grown up along an ‘urban corridor’ reaching from Alexandria, through Fredricksburg, Richmond and the Chesapeake.4 As of 1960 more than 22% labor force was engaged in manufacturing and while economic inequalities persisted, income disparities were narrower and. competition for jobs less intense than in Deep South industrial strongholds such as Birmingham or Bogalusa. Consequently, working class whites in Virginia were more moderate than in the Deep South.5

Voter discrimination was thus less pervasive and registration was less restrictive in Virginia’s urban centers, and blacks were occasionally elected to minor public offices.6 Due to litigation, poll tax elimination, Supreme Court decisions and voter campaigns black registration tripled, from 15,000 to 48,000 voters, between 1940-1947.7 In Richmond for example, where blacks made up 40% of the local population in late 1950s and early 1960s, the number of registered black voters rose from 22% in 1950 to 23% in 1960, to 25% in 1962, to 26% in 1964. The Voting Rights Act raised this figure to 34% in 1966, by which time blacks had become increasingly able to endorse candidates for office.8 Due to the importance of the rising black vote quiet integration took place during 1947-1956. Schools began half-hearted desegregation in 1960, parks desegregated in 1960, and merit based non-racial city employment policies began in 1962. Sit-ins from 1959-1961 forced lunch counter desegregation.9 By 1967, Richmond would desegregate the police and fire departments, and three of the nine City Council members, including the vice-mayor, were black.10

Statewide, 45.7% of blacks were registered in 1964.11 In 1964-1965, Supreme Court reapportionment decisions led to redistricting of the State Assembly, eliminating the solid segregationist majority. The Voting Rights Act finally denied any possibility of creating new devices to disenfranchise blacks and politicians became “necessarily somewhat responsive to greatly increased black political power.”12 The state’s literary test was voided in August 1965.13 Governor Godwin, whose 1965 election margin had been insured by the black vote, denounced the Klan and quietly participated with the federal government’s 1965 efforts to bring compliance with the first school desegregation guidelines. By 1966, the black vote had become a major factor in Virginia politics, surpassing the Southside as the state’s most powerful political block, so candidates at all levels confronted much larger black electorate. This limited opposition to the far more sweeping desegregation guidelines of 1966. Incentives for acceding to segregationist demands greatly diminished as blacks turned against the Byrd machine.14 The Federal Government presence near Washington DC and the major naval base at Norfolk also contributed to moderation.15

Large non-mechanized tobacco farms and fruit producing truck farms, employing black sharecroppers, day laborers and domestics, dominated the Southside agricultural section of the state. Along with poor whites, blacks were excluded from politics through a poll tax, literacy tests, and economic intimidation.16 Moreover, until the mid-1960s, planters dominated state politics,17 undertaking “evasion and delays,” to maintain segregation.18 A statewide anti-integration group, the Defenders of State Sovereignty, which emerged to forbid state support of public schools and create a publicly supported system of white private schools after Brown, received support from the governor.19

The low level of industrial competition and the dominance of the overwhelming dominance of the landed black belt elite in state politics, fundamentally shaped the state’s response to civil rights initiatives, pushing key state officials toward intransigence, “overshadowing the weak anti-rights response among working class whites.” The legalistic counterattack included several anti-NAACP statutes, formation of new institutions designed to solidify public support for segregation, harassment of civil rights organizations, and hampering of their lawsuits.20 Virginia “pioneered the strategy of Massiv Resistance in 1956” closing schools ordered to desegregate and providing state tuition grants for white students attending “private” schools. In late 58 early 59 officials closed public schools in Norfolk, Charlottesville and Warren County. In January 1959 after courts ruled that Virginia could no longer order closing of public schools, token desegregation began in Arlingoton, Alexandria and Norfolk, but private tuition grants sustained private schools in Price Edward County, where all public schools were closed. REWORD ALL THIS 21The legislature returned to a ‘local option’ pupil assignment policy,22 and provided resources for private schools, until a 1964 reversal resulting from tenacious black legal efforts.23

Yet the prospect of closing state’s public schools also shifted political argument toward acceptance of token integration in the more racially moderate cities. A moderate coalition of business leaders, educators, and middle class whites emerged to support open schools, defeat militant segregationists, and implement a decentralization policy that allowed for token integration in tha late 1950s. Racial moderates elected to the state legislature eventually moved state policy from total defiance of Brown to nominal compliance at the local level.24

Token school desegregation began in Richmond,25 but Warren City Charlottesville, and Norfolk closed some schools, effecting 12,000 white students. Prince Edward County closed its schools for five years, from 1959-1964.26 In general segregationism remained entrenched. As of May 1961, only .09% of black students attended desegregated schools in Virginia, rising to a token 1.63% in 1964.27
Once racial crisis was at hand, local businessmen sought to broker a compromise that invariably included some dismantling of the walls of Jim Crow (restate): Norfolk (date?)28 1958-9, VA business leaders played a crucial role in persuading Governor Jim Lindsay Almond, elected on a massive resistance platform in 1957, to abandon the cause (reword).29 [check if related to public facilities or school deseg].

The Supreme Court ordered desegregated schools opened in May 1964,30 and a federal District Court restrained Prince Edward County from processing tuition grants for segregated private schools.31 Token desegregation began in 25 county and city systems, bringing 5000 blacks into 80 of 128 formerly schools.32 In September 1965 after only four of Virginia’s 138 school divisions were found in compliance,33 many divisions began freedom of choice in all grades and a few finally agreed to abolish separate schools. Significant change now began as the number of blacks attending desegregated schools doubled.34 Since most of the major cities were already desegregating under court order, the brunt of federal pressure from the Office of Education was concentrated on rural schools,35 with Southside Counties now pressed to open as many grades as possible under freedom of choice.36 The lure of money from the Elementary and Secondary Education Act helped to spur desegregation, because federal funds amounted to as much as one-third of existing school budget in some of those Counties.37

The issuance of greatly strengthened guidelines in early 1966 posed “a basic threat to racial status quo,” because they “raised the price of federal aid from token integration to restructuring of the entire federal system on nondiscriminatory lines.” Free choice plans were now deemed “worthless” unless twice as many blacks were brought into previously all-white schools. School segregation ceased in regions with few blacks, and adjacent areas prepared to follow suit. Elsewhere however, Virginia educators were “incensed” by the new guidelines, which also included new demands for faculty integration.38 Segregationist attitudes hardened in areas surrounding Southside Counties such as Sussex, which lost federal funds but maintained segregation.39 In the “Basically . . . moderate” area of Henrico County for example, political protest over integration was magnified by “serious overrepresentation of the county’s rural areas on a mal-apportioned board of supervisors” and a series of Klan rallies.40

Combined with the lack of job competition in industrial cities, the success of massive resistance meant that that Klan vigilantism remained limited until 1965-1966.41 Despite the existence of Klan organizing in the 1950s,42 the success of massive resistance meant that vigilantism was limited to cross burnings on the lawns of civil rights activists in Richmond in 1955 and Charlottesville in 1956.43 In July 1961, Wilbur L. Scrum organized a Dixie Klan unit in Colonial Heights.44

In 1963, NAACP activist Lester Banks was assaulted after he sought service in a segregated restaurant.45 Although several violent incidents occurred in Virginia, including an interracial fight between 250 high school students at a department store in Portsmouth during the 1960 sit-ins, they were relatively rare. Between 1954 and 1965, only ten incidents of private violence, seven incidents of intimidation, and two cases of property damage occurred. While not insignificant, the violence was sporadic, suggesting that white vigilantes remained weak and unorganized.46

Ever since Klan activity first arose in the early 1950s, business, religious and even Confederate organizations had opposed it.47 In 1958, two Norfolk blacks had even [state or federal?] won reversals of check-forger convictions on the ground that the trial judge had refused to allow their lawyers to ask prospective jurors specific questions relating to racial prejudice.48 In Hampton, 600 demonstrators were allowed to march in 1960, and cross burners were arrested. Sitdown protests occurred in Newport News and Richmond without incident.49 An official policy of “soft suppression” neutralized the civil rights movement’s strategy of provoking white violence, and the movement faltered.50

Southside legislators passed several laws to discourage civil rights protesters, and state officials encouraged suppression of protests in Danville and Farmville through the use of non-violent arrests and legal harassment. In Prince Edward County, where the black population comprised 45% of the total, segregationists dominated discussion, limited dissent and applied social pressure on whites to attend private schools. The physical violence that did occur in response to direct action campaigns was official, and limited to a particularly brutal incident in June 1963, when Danville police attacked fifty protesters with clubs and fire hoses, hospitalizing forty-seven people. Mass arrests, $5000 fines, prison sentences, and the cutting off of unemployment benefits eventually broke morale and demonstrations petered out.51

Combined with the success of massive resistance, the fact that mobilization for direct action civil rights campaigns was relatively low in Virginia between 1954 and 1965 meant that there was little incentive for segregationists to engage in violence.52 Militancy arose in 1965-1966, in response to federal enforcement of school desegregation.53 Violence was employed against civil rights activists in Amherst in September 1965. In November, four black civil rights workers were fired upon, wounding one.54

The UKA began organizing in Virginia in spring 1965, forming several klaverns in the Portsmouth-Chesapeake area under the leadership of Sandy Coley. North Carolina Grand Klokard (lecturer) Marshal Kornegay was transferred to Virginia and became Grand Dragon. He established a headquarters in South Hill near the North Carolina Border, and launched an intensive recruiting drive in Southern Virginia, where black voter registration drives had recently taken place.55 At the inaugural rally in Caswell City on August 20, 200 people turned out to hear North Carolina Klan leaders J.R. Jones and George Dorsett lambast Martin Luther King as a Communist and President Johnson and the Supreme Court as dictators who forced racial mixing.56 4000-5000 persons gathered to hear Kornegay and J. R. Jones at a Klan rally near Victoria in early September 1965, an interracial street fight in Hearst resulted in serious injury to one black citizen.57

A coalition of civil rights groups called “upon all elected and public officials . . . candidates for public office . . . religious and civic leaders to repudiate the Ku Klux Klan.”58 Suffolk Mayor Kermit R. Kelley denounced Klan organizing and urged Virginians to avoid meetings.59 but Kenbridge Chamber of Commerce issued a statement that it would refuse to be “coerced.”60 Lt. Governor Mills E. Godwin denounced Klan activity as “repugnant” and warned that any unlawful activity would be met with strict and prompt law enforcement.61 Kornegay vowed that he would expand the Klan in Virginia without the governor’s help and denounced the Justice Department, the Supreme Court and the FBI.62

By the November election, more than thirty rallies had been held, each attracting between 200 and 1000 people.63 A total of perhaps 30,000 people attended thirty-eight UKA rallies by the end of 1965.64 Attendance varied greatly, with 1500 people attending a Nansemond County south of Holland in October.65 In Black Belt counties such as Sussex, where plantation-style economic dependence remained commonplace, and local whites presumably maintained order through personal networks, average attendance was closer to 200.66 A civil rights worker was beaten at one rally near Victoria and a cross burning occurred in Richmond.67 In November, several black civil rights workers were fired upon near headquarters of the Virginia Student Civil Rights Committee in Victoria.68 Candidates from both political parties denounced the order.69

In January 1966 however, the ADL warned of a 75% increase in Virginia Klan membership.70 As new guidelines implemented the Virginia Klan was fastest growing in the South, with membership scattered in 100 Klaverns around the state and the Fiery Cross widely circulated. Only three other states claimed more members by the end of the year. In some areas, ominous calling cards began to appear.71 Kornegay was an effectve Klan organizer.72 More than 100 rallies too place between August 1965 and August 1966 with some of them attracting thousands of people. Working with ten full-time organizers, Kornegay established 25-40 klaverns incorporating 500 Klansmen, mostly in the Southside with a few around Richmond and several in Fairfax County. Rallies pulled in several hundred dollars each day and “the Klan’s statewide bank account, -“apparently-under the sole control of Kornegay was reported to be ‘in the low four figures.’”73 10/21 petersburg, 250; 11/29/66, 400 in Emporia.74

According to the HUAC, by March 1966 ten full time organizers had recruited at least 190 Klansmen. By mid August, the UKA had held more than 100 rallies in the state. In December, Journalists reported that at least 175 Klan rallies had taken place during the previous eighteen months, and that between twenty-five and forty klaverns had been operating. They estimated statewide Klan membership to be 2000, with 8000-10000 sympathizers.75 HUAC found thirty-two Klaverns operating at one time or another between 1964-1966, and estimated UKA membership at 1250 in 27 Klaverns as of January 1967.76 As late as May 1967, 2000 people gathered east of Richmond to hear Kornegay, Shelton, and a number of other national UKA leaders.77

Klaverns existed in most of the southern counties, Newport News, Hampton, Portsmouth and Chesapeake, Franklin City in the West and Fairfax in the North. Ninety percent of Klansmen were active in triangle stretching from Richmond south to the North Carolina border. Between 1966 and 1968, the UKA held more than 200 rallies, conducting 70 cross burnings at 30 localities. Eighty illegal cross burnings were perpetrated on public property or on private property without permission. Two or three blacks were beaten, and at least were two shot at. The automobile of a white couple sympathetic to civil rights was destroyed, one church was bombed a black business was vandalized and many threats were made.78

The Norfolk Minister’s Association condemned the Klan.79 In April 1966, militant black youths threw rocks at Klansmen who were rallying within earshot of the black community of St. Juliens, and apparently fired buckshot into the home of Fred L. Cooper, a black resident of who had attempted to quiet them. The Chesapeake City Council passed an anti-Klan ordinance that moved future Klan rallies away from the black community.80 As of August, 1966, the UKA had still failed to organize a unit there.81

In the third week of October 1965 HUAC exposed the fact that Marshall Kornegay had received income from his UKA recruiting lectures, as well as a group medical insurance plan he had promoted in North Carolina.82 Employment and tax info and income from UKA as of 65. Checks from units. Gets 150$ A WEEK. Memb know this?83 HUAC also exposed the locations of UKA Klaverns at Lunenburg, Victoria, Mecklenburg, Chase City, Chase City Fellowship Club, Nanesmond, Holland, Norfolk, Portsmouth, Warwick and Newport News.84 Cross burnings and violent rhetoric.85

The FBI began to penetrate the Virginia UKA, contain its growth, and deter violence in January 1966.86 By March, the Norfolk division had identified 50 Klansmen belonging to seven units, as well as numerous Klan associates.87 A May 1966 NCDT bulletin explicitly targeted Kornegay because of his successful recruiting and his attempt to harass FBI agents, attempting to “create the illusion that a vociferous chapter of the NCDT is vigorously growing in Virginia.”88 ADD FROM DOM TRANQ. See B->S 5/4/66 mailed 20. As a result of receiving the letter, one officer turned over all records and papers to x of the Roanoke unit.89 6/14 Norfolk mailed 50 NCDT letters.90 [14] of he Nansemond County unit blamed the FBI, and several Norfolk Klansmen announced that they were dropping out of the UKA because they could not risk their jobs, sinc either a civil rights group orthe FBI was aware of their membership.91

5/66 35 “Trying to Hide your identity?” mailed from Norfolk.92 Most members of unit 32 Smithfield considered them to be a joke, while one member of unit 14 Suffolk-Nansemond assumed that a civil rights organization was responsible.93 Others became concerned that some group was aware of their Klan connection because of he leters and cards.94 68 postal cards, then 110 of spending money and 48 from Norfolk.95 Jewish guy and anti-Klan couple gets a card of different color, UKA is doing ci.96 52 invisible govt cards in July and two Klansmen quit Klan for Patriotic Party.97 50 invisible government to Norfold div klansmen in July 66.98 259 post cards supplied by Columbia on 8/29.99 November NCDT letter lambasting Shelton because of solicitation of funds (see Dir->New orleans 11/25/66) sent to Portsmouth unit # 20, Smithfield unit # 32, an Suffolk-Nansemond # 14.100

Agents also warned a female civil rights worker and local authorities about a Klan plot against her life, so that she could take protective measures. Informants followed the plot closely and she was not targeted.101

To prevent the UKA from recruiting or otherwise exerting influence in local communities, FBI agents helped local authorities prevent the Klan from printing and posting of propaganda, and holding meetings, rallies and fundraising events. In March 1966, for example, agents tipped off local police in Richmond and Norfolk, so that they could arrest three Richmond Klansmen, and two Smithfield Klansmen while they were posting Klan signs and leaflets.102 Alerts issued to police in Smithfield, resulted in two more posting arrests in July, resulting in twenty dollar fines. In June, police also charged two men with posting 20 Klan recruitment posters along Alexandria and Arlington roads. Several other Virginia municipalities passed anti-posting ordinances during these months, and South Hill Virginia officials also denied a UKA rally permit.103 Klansmen tried to disrupt a NAACP voter registration rally on the courthouse lawn in Amelia, resulting in arrests and fines.104 A Virginia Klansman [7] pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon and larceny in North Carolina.105

In June 1966 the FBI disrupted the Klan's printing operation in Chase City. The local UKA unit had sent a letter to the President of the Chase City Retail Merchant's Association "requesting her to reconsider her intention to endorse the hiring of Negro clerks and sales ladies in the local stores in Chase City." Two members of the Retail Merchants Associaiton and a member of the Bi-racial Committee of Chase City were "quite certain" that the UKA letter and other literature being distributed in the Chase City area had been printed on Clarkesville Times presses. FBI laboratory studies found "strong indications" that this was indeed the case.106 Since FBI sources in the community indicated that the owner of the Times was “vehemently opposed to the Klan and its activities,” agents sent him a letter stating that "no doubt you have heard that your man, [15], is active in Ku Kluc Klan activities. . . . But do you know he has been printing Klan material in the “Clarkesville Times” office?"107

National companies with branches in Virginia were also encouraged to exert their influence in the state. FBI agents reasoned that for many Northern business executives, investment decisions were somewhat dependent upon suppression of Klan activities. In June, an anonymous letter on scented paper was sent to the President of the Chrysler corporation from a "female stockholder." It advised that the Virginia UKA had raffled off a Chrysler automobile and that the corporation's "reputation" had suffered as a result.108

Richmond field office agents then took a more direct tack at the end of June, sending 15 letters that purported to be from the UKA to Virginia State Assembly members. The letter advised them: "For the first time you are being given the opportunity to serve the only organization which can save Virginia from the nigger . . . in your name, the United Klans of America has purchased a raffle ticket."109 The Bureau wanted to "convey the impression that the UKA is attempting to use members by publicly connecting them to a Klan function" and thereby "cause denouncements."110

[frustration: at a Klan rally in Clover Virginia on June 18, in response to duces tecums, say are going to subpoena FBI records and expose the FBI. Claim agents had left a party and while speeding, wrecked a car.111]

June 1966 UKA unit solicits help of ANP for May rally in Camp Hill. Publicity caused a rupture with national, and unit pulls out to form MKKKK leaving UKA with only ine foothold in MD, in the DC area, Unit #33, Fairfax County VA. This unit split in its sympathies, and disolved into bitter conflict with the UKA folding and some members joining the MKKKK.112

In spring 1966, David Lewis Millard complained of FBI harassment and claimed he was fired from his job at the Nansemond City Fire Department because he refused to inform to the FBI.113

July 16 Price edward County Kornegay says it is Klan policy to shoot FBI agents who appear at rallies.114

The denial of the South Hill rally and parade permit that July had meanwhile created a rift between Marshall Kornegay and his second in command, evidently the same Klansman who had been targeted in May for his use of Clarkesville Times printing presses. Kornegay had assumed that [6] had made the proper arrangements for the rally, but [6] did not inform him when the permit was denied. State police went to the rally and confronted Kornegay because [6] had declared to them that the UKA would march without a permit. Determining in August that a "power struggle" had ensued over this incident, the Bureau sent a letter postmarked from South Hill on September 14, to Virginia's Exalted Cyclopses and state officers in order to capitalize on Kornegay's anger.115 Purportedly authored by [6], the letter accused Kornegay of a propensity for high living, girl friends and un-Christian behavior and a use of overly violent rhetoric. It enjoined recipients to withhold Klan funds from the Grand Dragon and "redeem the Klan from the North Carolina playboy."116 A second letter accusing a Klansmen of adultery was also forwarded to Shelton from South Hill.117 A third letter mailed from Portsmouth to an officer closely associated with Shelton, complained about the rally rhetoric employed by Kornegay and a Klansman named Long, who had attacked President Johnson and the First Lady at a Chesapeake rally, alienating potential UKA recruits.118

All this created “a great deal of distrust among Klan officials and members in Virginia,” as they suspected each other of informing.119 In particular, a "great deal of distrust" was stirred up against Kornegay by the letter mailed to 13 Virginia State officers on September 14.120 Dissention against state leaders existed in the Norfolk area, but it was especially strong in Victoria and Chase City, where Klansmen were so dissatisfied with financial mismanagement and a dictatorial attitude on the part of Kornegay, that they refused to send funds to the state treasury.121 Kornegay's antagonist in those areas was "highly regarded” in Victoria and “enjoy[ed]a loyal following" among local Klansmen.122 Kornegay was “quite upset about these rumors” and threatened violence against any Klansmen who repeated them.123

Informants were therefore directed to continue to question Kornegay's morals and his management of funds, even as a Kornegay antagonist worked to spread dissention to the Hopewell area. [6] contacted klaverns throughout the Richmond Province to obtain contribution figures, so that he could accost Kornegay and demand an accounting.124 After Kornegay spoke out against his critics at a UKA rally, informants were instructed to demand that Kornegay transfer the title of Klan equipment from his name to that of the UKA, and to demand that funds henceforth be channeled to the UKA treasurer rather than to the Grand Dragon.125 At a November meeting, state officials and Titans threatened to break away from the UKA and Kornegay was forced to make concessions regarding the future management of the Klan. This included establishing a board of directors that would ostensibly return management to the membership.126 In December, after [6] and his family placed Klan leaflets on telephone poles in the Norfolk area and a local serviceman removed them, [6] retaliated by placing fish heads in his automobile and draping toilet paper over his property. After the Klansman’s 12 year old son threw stones at the serviceman’s daughter and another local girl, and the serviceman filed charges against him in Juvenile court, [6] approached the Klan for financial assistance.127 When the Virginia UKA chose not to support him, even though it had previously supported the Grand Kludd in a criminal case, [6] filed charges to the Imperial office against [deletion] and resigned from the Klan.128 Norfolk field office agents now placed a snitch jacket on [3, 5] by sending two identical Christmas cards from Portsmouth to Kornegay and [10] “a Klan activist, who is close to the Virginia Grand Dragon.”129 A note inside that card declared that [5] had informed on a Klansman who had applied for a State trooper position, preventing him from achieving that job. Since he had also pressed charges against Kornegay to the Imperial Wizard, [5] could not be trusted by [8] and was in fact a "stoolie to the police."130

Subsequently, agents of the ATTD, Treasury Department, Norfolk, interviewed [8,5] in response to an FBI tip that [6] might be in possession of a machine gun. [5] was very cooperative, informing ATTU agents that the Titan operated the Klan whenever the Grand Dragon was not present, and that he had quit the Klan. He claimed that he opposed violence and that he had helped Chesapeake and Portsmouth police in their investigations.131
In October, agents mailed a letter from a "loyal citizen and businessman of Amelia County" predicting that "the Klan would deprive Amelia of a much needed industry” to "leading businessmen" in surrounding counties, members of the Amelia County Board of Supervisors and the State and local Chambers of Commerce. The letter asserted that "childish actions" by a "very small group of hoodlums" have "caused out-of-state officials of the Amelia Dress Corporation to question whether their decision to come to Amelia was worthwhile."132

This Corporation was the first large textile firm to open a factory in Amelia, Virginia. In March 1966 it had entered into a contract with the local Garment Worker's Union, which allowed the corporation to operate for one year without interference in order to see if a permanent status for the company could be arranged. When the ADC laid-off ten of its eighty workers in the late summer, however, someone in plant management had received throwaway letters and stickers which threatened that "The Ku Klux Klan is Watching You." This had caused a "furor in the higher echelon of plant management," and worry among union members that "the Amelia Dress corporation could possibly move away from the county because of the Ku Klux Klan." Unorganized anti-Klan gossip had begun to circulate among workers, potentially causing injury to the UKA’s “aura of respectability” in Amelia.133 According to a Bureau source who had "long attempted to fight” the Klan, but had become discouraged, fifteen recipients of the letter contacted him and stated that they were "in complete agreement with its content." Encouraged, the source asserted that he would join a new County Planning Board and "attempt to enforce zoning regulations and local laws against the inroads of the KKK."134

Fallout from the letter caused Klansmen to blame each other, with one Powhatan County Klansman no longer frequenting the Amelia area. Klan officials issued a rebuttal to what they termed an "insidious, malicious and naive piece of propaganda" with "discernably political undertones." Asserting that the letter writer was “naïve” because the UKA was not small, but "growing," and that the organization engaged in "benevolent activities" the letter excoriated the “businessman” as a coward for not having signed his letter.135 FBI agents quickly responded with a second letter. As with concurrent NCDT bulletins,136 this letter denounced vigilantism, ridiculed the UKA leadership and attempted to reach out to the rank and file. It proclaimed:
You are right, I am naive. I am so naive that I still get a lump in my throat when the flag of our nation and our state goes by in a parade . . . [but] not naive enough to sign so that my business can be destroyed and my lawn littered with Klan crosses. . . . In my original letter, I called the KKK a 'small group of hoodlums.' I repeat this, for many persons in the Klan are not real members--they are interested onlookers and will have no part in the Klan cross burnings, violence and other acts of terror.137

It labeled production of the stickers "disgusting and juvenile" and asserted that the throwaway “suggests one thing-- secrecy and terrorism." The Klan's contributions, this second letter asserted, were engaged in "burning crosses and shotgun firings." A Klan counter-rally on the courthouse steps had only served to "dignif[y] the NAACP" and the Klan had "made a carnival atmosphere at trials following the rally.”138

Meanwhile, the Norfolk field office sent a letter from a "Credit Card Customer" in Raleigh to the AMOCO Oil Company, which criticized the fact that a manager of McClenny’s truck stop in Suffolk Virginia, a prospective member of unit 14, was allowing the UKA to hold rallies on company property.139 On October 26, they composed a note to [8] on piece of a brown paper bag with a crayon, and "crudely placed [it] in [an] old style brown envelope," which declared that there was a "pimp" in Virginia Beach unit #34 who was "playing for the law."140 Norfolk agents mailed a second letter from Suffolk in early 1967 to a Raleigh UKA officer, and signed by “A Klansman- Unit #14,” to give the impression that [7] had wrote it. This letter accused [6], a failed restaurant owner, of accusing [Kornegay?] for stealing funds while [6] was in fact embezzling himself.141

In November, agents informed Henrico County police about plans for erecting a tent at an upcoming Klan rally. Police informed local authorities, who issued an arrest warrant against [14], the owner of the property, for violating a zoning regulation.142 In December, agents sent a fictitious letter to the editor of the South Hill Enterprise, to expose and embarrass [4, 6] a local Klansman who operated a business in the area. The letter counteracted a letter that the Klansman had written, by invoking the name of Jesus Christ to criticize the Klan’s embrace of anti-Semitism and vigilante violence.143

As in Florida and North Carolina, local law enforcement agencies worked to prevent interracial violence and harassed the Klan by enforcing local ordinances. In general, federal officials and local anti-Klan groups credited State Police and city authorities for effectively deterring Klan activity.144

In fall 1966, a Virginia prosecutor dismissed a civil suit that the wife of Klan leader Michael Desmond had launched against NAACP branch-president Nathaniel Lee Hawthorne, charging him with felonious assault for an alleged rock throwing incident during a march by about 100 robed Klansmen.145 When black residents armed themselves with shotguns and stood guard after a crossburning in the Fairfax County community of Falls Church, police arrested 14 juvenile suspects.146 In August 1966, Hopewell police escorted forty marchers protesting plans for a garbage dump in a black residential area, thereby preventing more than one hundred white counter-demonstrators, headed by twenty-two robed Klansmen, from engaging in more than shouting and jeering.147

After the Richmond City Council issued a statement that the Klan was unwelcome in the city,148 an City Councilman Howard H. Carwile received harassing phone calls as did high school students who had written sympathetically to him. Carwile called for laws against solicitation of funds for Klan, the rental of private property for Klan rallies, or building of a Klan Headquarters in the state.149 He conferred with Governor Godwin, who once again denounced the Klan and confirmed that the State Police were reporting on unlawful or potentially violent activities.150 In December, after a series of cross burnings including nine around Richmond, the Governor offered a $1000 reward for aid in the arrest and conviction of cross burners. He announced creation of joint-action plan between law enforcement officials to assemble information, coordinate police activities at State Police Headquarters in Richmond, and watch known Klan members. Three days later a burning cross was propped against wall at governor’s mansion, stirring previously silent local City Councilmen to denunciation.151

Thus, Despite COINTELPRO’s success in exposing Klan activity in local media, facilitating arrests by local authorities, and fostering dissention and resignations, Klan vigilance continued to occur in Virginia. In August 1966 nine Klansmen counterpicketed the Action Coordinating Committee to End Segregation at a Buckingham County rental office in Arlington.152 One Klansmen threw a bottle, hitting a female ACESS protester in the face.153 In September, four or five men terrorized a Roanoke man and his female companion in Franklin, vandalizing their car in a field where Klan rallies were often held as the couple stopped to read a KKK sign.154 In October, Klansmen pass out literature at angry school board meeting of 500 in Bedford.155 More significant, someone bombed a black church in Henrico County.156 At a Klan rally near Orange however, Kornegay denounced the bombing as a “dastardly crime,” offered a $200 reward for apprehension of those responsible, and offered to rebuild church with Klan workers and materials.157

During the first week of November, a black gunman fired eight shots from ambush, wounding two white men at UKA rally in Roanoke Rapids attended by 200-300 people and heavily guarded by 150-200 Highway Patrolmen. Carlisle Massy Slater, who was observed carrying a shotgun at the rally, was arrested and charged with being dangerously armed and terrorizing.158 The Klan had held 155 meetings in the preceding 16 months and burned 68 crosses at Klan meetings in 28 areas.159 Knowledgeable sources estimated that Klan membership is about 2000 with 8000 to 10,000 in close sympathy. Unofficial counts during the last 18 months showed up to x hundred 75 Klan rallies.160

1967 was a year of change: In January, a State Penitentiary Guard and one other member of Richmond unit #69 were charged with cross burning in Richmond.161 Two arrested in Richmond by a police intelligence squad who witnessed them ignite a cross in front of the North American Transmission Co.162 Two Klansmen were later convicted of threatening bodily harm against a former Klansman who had testified against them in court, and the Klan revoked the bond they had put up to support them, so as to avoid further negative publicity.163 A week later, Klan speakers verbally attacked the Governor and burned a cross on private property in the Bedford County community of Moneta just minutes before Godwin dedicated a dress factory.164 In January, speakers at an NAACP speakers at a planning conference called for self-defense and lambasted the Attorney General for fighting civil rights activists instead of fighting the Klan.165

An all-white jury delivered Virginia’s first cross burning conviction against Henrico County resident Wilson Price, who was sentenced to three years in prison in March.166 In April, a Southside ministirial association publiclly denounced Klan activities, resulting in cancellaiton of a raly scheduled for Lawrenceville.167
Kornegay complained that police and FBI agents had "threatened arrests," "taken down license numbers," and limited traffic movement at Klan rallies and protested that arrested Klansmen had received "excessive bail." He accused the FBI of "a conspiracy" in "contacting Klan members and their employers on their jobs in an effort to get them fired." Reportedly, Godwin warned Kornegay that his group would remain under extraordinary police vigilance.168 Within a month, the FBI disseminated information to the Virginia State Police, which the Governor had ordered to coordinate all State investigations of the Klan, that Suffolk Klansmen were disconnecting the lights over their license plates while driving to and from UKA meetings, to frustrate police surveillance. Police issued two summonses for "improper lights" and Klansmen became "quite irritated" at police harassment.169

Prompted by eighteen cross burnings in Richmond, as well as information on Klan activities provided by the FBI, Governer Mills E. Goodwin offered a $1000 reward for information in December 1966. FBI cooperation with the State Police intensified. When informants provided information that Klansmen were planning cross burnings in the Richmond area, the FBI disseminated information to Richmond and Henrico County police. Using surveillance, police caught five Klansmen, and they were jailed in January 1967. Two FBI agents were assaulted in the course of one investigation and Klansmen were later convicted on charges of assaulting a Federal officer and obstructing justice in a Richmond court. In May, after informants learned of plans to arrange an 'accident' for a female civil rights activist, the FBI advised both the activist and State authorities so that they could take protective measures.170

Shelton charged that two FBI agents had " forced their way into " the home of Robert R. Long, Grand Kludd (chaplain) of the Virginia Realm on November 21, "using abusive tactics" against Long, his wife, and his children. Claiming that the agents had produced no warrant, Shelton warned that the FBI was becoming a "Gestapo-type police force " in the United States. The agents charged Long with assault on a federal officer.171 In March, three Richmond Klansmen were convicted of attempting to “influence, intimidate and impede” and FBI agent in the performance of his duties.172 Grand Kludd Long pled guilty and was sentenced to jail for 30 days and resigned from his position the Klan. Thomas E. Lanning received a six-month sentence for harassing and photographing FBI agent Wilson P. Waddy, while Robert Guy Saunders who had been sentenced to 12 months on an illegal whisky conviction in 1965, lost his parole status and was forced to serve 11 months.173 Klan Chaplain Rev. Ray Long Richmond, was also found guilty of assaulting an FBI agent and received 30 days in a federal prison. He resigned his position but continued to attend meetings.174

After the FBI disseminated informant provided information on cross burnings and shootings in April, Richmond police arrested seven Klansmen and Minutemen and seized an arsenal of guns, black powder and dynamite fuse wire, as well as four crosses, lumber and burlap. A Chesterfield County couple was charged with firing shotgun into an occupied black home on September 5 and seven other Klansmen were charged with cross burnings. In June, one shooter received a year in jail and a $100 fine, and Richmond police arrested a Richmond Klansman charged him with with cross-burning and attempting to dynamite a Richmond restaurant. Extensive coverage in the local media adversely effected the UKA’s image and “greatly upset” Klan officers throughout the state. One leader spoke out at a July fourth State Klan rally, warning that the UKA would not tolerate such violations of the law.175

Two other Klansmen were charged in an internecine shootout between two Klan factions. Chesapeake GD Ronald Lee Ivy of Portsmouth was charged with possession or use of a machine gun, and attempted murder of Jack George, reportedly a former KKK official. Charles Reese Rowland was charged with aiding and abetting the crime and both were charged with illegal transportation of firearms.176 In July, Portsmouth police arrested seventeen white men and four juveniles, including Chesapeake UKA officer Ronald L. Ivy, and confiscated 13 guns, 2000 rounds of ammunition, ax handles, knives, nightsticks, and a Klan robe, possibly heading of street disorders.177.178

Most informants in women’s units indicated that they are in complete dissatisfaction with [Kornegay]. A Grand Board had been set up to audit the Klan’s finances and [14/15] of Petersburg is a member and very close to state leaders. Interviewed try to develop her [14] as an informant. She [5] was uncooperative.179

On Independence Day 1967, Henrico County Police arrested Kornegay, automobile dealer and UKA officer Wilbur Louis Scrum, and two other UKA state officers, one of them from Unit # 27, Petersburg, for operating an illegal lottery, and confiscated a 1967 Plymouth Barracuda. At a rally and demonstration at Darbytown four days later, another member of the Petersburg unit attacked the X, and [6] was expelled from the rally, raising further speculation about FBI informants.180 Klansmen speculated that the July 4 raffle had been “rigged,” furthering internal dissatisfaction over Kornegay’s “management of Klan funds and high living and driving of fancy automobiles,” as the Grand Dragon proposed to raise dues.181 A unit officer and two other Klansmen eventually pled guilty to "setting up, promoting and taking part in" the lottery. They were each sentenced to sixty-day jail sentences (later suspended) and a $50 fine.182 Agents directed informants to “fully exploit the continuing dissatisfaction among rank and file members with [Kornegay] so as to cause expulsion of additional units from the UKA in Virginia.”183

But vio: Shawesville Virginia. Church vandalism. Attempted arson. --black church?184 Merchants at a suburban Richmond shopping center asked Henrico County police to stop all KKK demonstrations at the Willow Lawn shopping center after complaining about robed Klansmen literature pass out in front of stores.185 In August, 17 Klansmen arrested after “gathering in large crowd a Giant Open Air market, cursing and causing a commotion” in Portsmouth. $300 and three months for disorderly conduct. Pd found large assortment of gus and ammunition, include Ivy. City curfew imposed.186 In October, Two black men were charged with inciting a riot after a Klan appearance pled guilty and received 12 month sentences and $500 fines each. The appearance of 42 robed Klansmen from Nansemond County, Suffolk, Chesapeake and Norfolk had causde a melee involving as many as 400 blacks at a grocery store in the predominantly black section of Franklin (pop 8000). The twelve-man police force had been swiftly augmented by 15 riot-trained state troopers, who quelled rock-throwing but sporadic vandalism throughout the night and the next day left two injured.187

Local opinion molders also received continuous prompting to disrupt Klan activities. In June, an anonymous letter from a "an upset K of P member" was sent to the Knights of Pythias Fraternal Organization to prevent the Chesapeake Unit #41 from renting their hall. As in concurrent NCDT letters, the UKA was characterized as a "neo-Fascist and nazi-type organization.”188

In mid-July, agents sent a letter from Franklin to [8] to create confusion among state officers and accomplish the dismissal of [7] from state office by accusing him of stealing membership application fees.189

In fall 1967, Norfolk agents reviewed bank account information and confirmed informant reports that the Franklin Unit 40 was making hundreds of dollars in profit by holding weekly Country Music dances. Since local residents in this small community were unaware that the Isle of Wight County Klan was sponsoring these dances, agents sent a letter to the Carrsville Community center officials from a "resident" advising that the dances were Klan sponsored. After some fights broke out at a dance in February, officials terminated the lease.190 Information that the Henrico Klan was sponsoring a country music show in October was also "leaked," and the school principal canceled the dance. Klansmen attempted to move the dance to a theater, but after agents "leaked" the information once again, the owner demanded a large insurance premium, causing the organizers to lose $300.191 Another Country Music dance to be held in Alberta Virginia was similarly disrupted, resulting in a large financial loss.192 A letter from an "interested businessman” prevented the UKA from using a War Memorial Building jointly owned and operated by the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Amelia, and a similar building was denied the UKA by officials in Powhatan.193

A letter mailed to various Klan officals from Suffolk in March 1967, worded in a way so as to implicate X as the sender, caused friction and the firing of 12 as a paid UKA employee.194

In August-September, interviews of most Women’s Auxiliary Unit 21-L Richmond had such a demoralizing effect that the unit ceased to function. 195

As financial troubles continued to mount, two former Klansmen who had loaned large sums of money to the UKA “on signed personal notes to [Kornegay]” and [5] demanded repayment, creating “a great deal of friction.” Kornegay banned [5] from the Klan and expelled two local Klavern units. This created dissention, because Kornegay had previously “spent considerable sums of money and legal fees” to support several of the Klansmen whom he had also banned. An especially bitter rift developed between Kornegay and [6], a former UKA member and “self-styled Minuteman” after signs advertising a Klan county music show were posted on Minutemen literature in the Richmond area and Kornegay publicly forbid any Klansman to join the Minutemen.196

In September, the Christian Science Monitor reported that the Virginia UKA was $23,000 in debt, mostly due to legal fees.197 When the UKA planned a country music show to raise money to pay off the $5000 note, to be held in Highland Springs in on October 20. On October 19 and 20, 1967 "unidentified persons" posted numerous handbills and posters in the Highland Springs, Sandston and Darybytown area of Henrico County publicizing the function as being sponsored by Unit #77 as a fund raising drive to payoff [Bureau deletion]. Some of the handbills were printed over Minutemen literature and advised that tickets could be purchased at [4]'s store. Due to adverse publicity over the handbill posting, the UKA lost $300 on the venture.198

Kornegay blamed [6] for the posting and banned him from the Klan as a "troublemaker" due to his "open support for the Minutemen." He also made a public announcement banning any Klansman from joining the group. [6] became incensed over his banishment, and he vowed to get Kornegay removed and to "harass and disrupt the Klan." He sent Minutemen literature to various Klansmen as well as a letter soliciting help to "fight communism in the KKK," causing a "great deal of turmoil." Kornegay responded at a public rally, declaring that he was "going to get all the enemies of the Klan" and specifically named [6] as an enemy. He also blamed [6] for all the rumors of financial mismanagement. Kornegay made four or five references to the Minuteman problem in his weekly newsletter, "creating a great deal of disruption" in the Richmond area, an area where in the past he had found a great deal of support.199

To take advantage of this situation, Richmond agents sent a letter from "A True Patriot," to fifty UKA members in Virginia, which asserted that "THE KLAN IS A WORSE ENEMY THAN IS THE PLAN FOR AN AMERICAN RED UTOPIA."200 Kornegay "claims to be a defender of all that is holy and one hundred percent truly American" but was really, according to this missive:
. . .a Wolf in Sheep's clothing . . . more interested in lining his pockets with money, hard earned and given by true patriots . . . [and] like the carpetbaggers and scalawags who came upon this great country in the most infamous and dark chapter of American history with ideas and schemes designed only to further themselves and none else.201
The letter enjoined “True Patriots” to “Join the Minutemen” and
. . .rally together and fight to our last breath, using every means at our disposal to rid our country of this insidious plague of mankind.202
This letter was "instrumental" in causing expulsions of Klansmen in various UKA units, including eight members of unit 68 in Richmond, “because of alleged Minutemen leaning” and giving support to [6], thus widening the rift even further.203

Numerous Klansmen were also receiving literature from the White People's Party and other organizations during this period, and some Klansmen were being billed for subscriptions to various mail order publications and items that they had not ordered. Kornegay stated that [6] was responsible for this, and began to label anyone who questioned his leadership a supporter of [6], ordering all such persons expelled. Matters took a violent turn on February 4, 1968, when [4, 6], the self-proclaimed Minuteman from Hopewell Unit #36. fired his .38 into a Klan officer's dwelling and the officer returned fire, striking [6] in the head with shotgun pellets.204

In the wake of the violence, FBI agents mailed the following throwaway leaflets to one hundred UKA members:
Organize and Infiltrate
You are living in a world of wolves in sheep's clothing. The present leadership of the Klan is composed almost entirely of carpetbaggers, con men and self-centered schemers whose only aim is to line their own pockets with money of true American Patriots.

People in Richmond and Petersburg Virginia who gave and loaned money . . . get nothing but abuse when they ask for an explanation.

. . . Where was Marshall R. Kornegay when the true patriots needed his help when they were arrested, harassed and intimidated in Virginia?
The throwaway urged recipients to “learn your friends and enemies . . . organize to spread the truth,” and “oust the wolves," declaring, "Communism is our enemy, look for it in the Klan."205 Ten Virginia Klansmen received the “Pure Klan” letter that attacked the UKA Imperial leadership around this same time.206

The mailing had an "immediate and direct effect" upon Klan officials in Virginia. The membership split over support for Kornegay versus [6]. One third of an internal Klan news bulletin was devoted to a statement against "trouble makers who are attempting to tear the Klan down," arguing that they worked for the ADL. Kornegay devoted more than half of a March 1968 Province meeting to a lengthy harangue, and one source reported that Kornegay "seemed quite possessed and greatly disturbed over the letters and fact that a great deal of the members have begun to comment on them." Since a large proportion of the leaflets were mailed to members of Unit #68, where several expulsions had taken place due to alleged sympathy for [6], ill feeling and distrust mounted within that particular unit.207

Agents then sent a third communication, entitled "WHAT KIND OF FOOLS DOES HE THINK WE ARE," which made similar accusations, and critiqued the various failed revenue-raising ventures that Kornegay had undertaken over the previous eight months.208 In late April, Kornegay attempted to explain how he had spent Klan funds and refute all allegations of financial mismanagement in a two-page memo to all Klansmen. In late July, he announced that he would not seek reelection upon completion of his term, according to informants, “due to the many factions . . . caused by FBI informants and harassment.”209 Meanwhile, [6] continued printing literature and advertisements for disgruntled Klansmen demanding repayment of the loan, and FBI agents interviewed Klansmen. [11], a member of the Petersburg ladies unit whom agents had interviewed, was accused by husband of informing in August, shaking up members of units 27 and 16-L and 83, who did not know who to trust.210 By October, according to statements made by [13] at a Hopewell #36 meeting, FBI interviews had led to a sharp decrease in membership in units throughout Province #3.211

Kornegay chose Robert Hudgins, a little known Klansman as his replacement, causing additional dissatisfaction and statements that "[8] will be nothing but a puppet to [Kornegay]." The Bureau forwarded information to the Justice Department indicating that Kornegay had only quit so that if he was found guilty of Contempt of Congress, he would be able to "purge himself of this by publicly stating he is no longer associating with the Klan."212

In December, letter was sent to UKA state leaders to further the turmoil created by the resignation and the activities of [6]. Written in such a way as to imply that [11] had authored it, the letter stated that Kornegay had bargained with Satan for personal ambition and greed, that the elevation of Hudgins as a “stand in” was a farce, and that Klansmen should demand an open election.213

Some of the recipients blamed [6] for this letter, a belief that was reinforced after someone apparently reproduced it. By February great number of rank and file members in the Richmond area were criticizing Kornegay, especially after he refused to furnish records and attend the UKA election in Danville. At late-January Province meeting at Unit # 77 headquarters in Richmond, Province 1 voted to stop its payments to the National and State UKA offices. Some of those in attendance members blamed [5] for the most recent letter, while members who had backed [7], believed that [5] and [6] had worked together in preparing this letter to disrupt the election of [deletion]. [14] of unit #77 and [10] quit the UKA, in protest over “treatment afforded to [12].”214

The letters had awakened rank and file members to “fleecing," by their leadership and were "effective in preventing a great number of prospective members in the Warsaw, Virginia area from joining” thus preventing a new unit from being chartered.215

3/69 members of Klavern 41 fought over the Titan’s autocratic policies and the fact that Klavern membership had declined from 74 t 31 over the previous four months. Discussion of rumors that [4] had remained in a room with a black man while hospitalized because the man had helped him, also infuriated some of the members. In April, agents sent a letter to several members of units 20 and 41, South Virginia, which compared[4] with the new EC of klavern #41. It complained that [4], the province 2 Titan and [4] “are worse than Kornegay,” that [4] had stolen funds before transferring from the #41 Portsmouth unit to unit #20. In May, the wife of a Suffolk County Klansman received an anonymous letter signed “a member of unit 41,” which responded to the notional communication. The letter denounced her husband, precipitating rumors and stories about marital infidelity with a woman in Chesapeak or Portsmouth. As a result, [5] either resigned or was dismissed as [deletion] after a long meeting with Hudgins at a May 1969 UKA rally in Chesapeake. Unruly discussions about the resignation, the allegations of an affair with a former member of the Chesapeake ladies unit who had recently become an officer in another klavern, and the question of who would now fill the vacant Titan post, took place at a unit #20 meeting.216 The confusion had “practically wrecked the Klan in Province II” by may, as informants reported that “everyone seems completely befuddled and at a loss as what to do,” even as unit a#41 and unit #20 stopped working together. Meanwhile, attendance at Klavern 41 meetings dropped even further to between 12 and 16.217

[1968 violence: South Hill church arson caps campaign of harassment and intimidation that drives out two ministers. After white churches hold joint service on thanksgiving with Catholic church w one black member, vandalism. Then April, three grocery stores that closed in observance of funeral fired on and black home w people asleep inside set afire. Also worked to ease deseg in BB. Church arson in may, now his second church. S Hill had taken steps to restrict klan parades and posters and people stopped renting their land to Klan.218] Fall 1968 state compulsory school attendance comes back into effect. After a decade, effecting the roughly 2/3 of State school districts, including all school systems in north Virginia, that had enacted their own ‘local option’ attendance rules over the past few years. Other laws brought the Klan under regulation by the State Corporation Commission and “tightened” cross burning laws.219

As the new Grand Dragon made a concerted effort to project a new image and actively sought favorable media coverage in the Spring of 1968, Richmond agents planned to exploit [5]'s earlier statements indicating that he had known that Kornegay was spending money on wine, women and high living. Information that revealed the “true identity” of a UKA Province 3 run tire company in Emporia was leaked to suppliers creating operational and financial difficulties. Informants were directed to exploit this, as well as the conviction of Henrico County Klansmen who had assaulted a fellow member of his unit.220 [intent on creqating new image, VA klan emph const law at open meeting to which pres invited. Hudgins emph SC school prayer decision and bussing, and campus agitators221] Pilot carries UKA views of things.222

Directory: drabbs
drabbs -> With the complicity of
drabbs -> The fbi, cointelpro-white hate, and the Ku Klux Klan in North Carolina, 1964-1971
drabbs -> 2 From October 1871 into 1873, mass arrests and federal prosecutions “broke the back of the Ku Klux Klans” after which Southern violence took on new form
drabbs -> Tennessee was traditionally moderate on racial issues, reacting to
drabbs -> 2 From October 1871 into 1873, mass arrests and federal prosecutions “broke the back of the Ku Klux Klans” after which Southern violence took on new form
drabbs -> The fbi, cointelpro-white hate and the Decline of Ku Klux Klan Organizations in Mississippi, 1964-1971
drabbs -> Chapter ? ‘A negative and Unwise Approach’: Private Detectives, Vigilantes and the fbi counterintelligence, 1910-1972
drabbs -> Fbi covert Operations and Suppression of Ku Klux Klan Violence, 1964-1971

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