Authors : Rachel Ormston Date


Table 1 Trends in free choice national identity 1996–2011



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Table 1 Trends in free choice national identity 1996–2011




1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011




%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

English

52

50

55

65

59

63

57

59

55

60

67

57

60

59

50

61

British

71

68

70

71

67

67

73

70

69

70

68

68

67

67

69

66

Both

29

26

34

44

35

39

37

38

33

38

45

34

38

37

29

37

Base

1019

1153

2695

2718

2887

2761

2897

3709

2684

3643

3666

3517

3880

2917

2795

2859

Source: British Social Attitudes (respondents living in England only), except 1997: British Election Study
However, these findings do not tell us about the relative importance people place on their British and English identities. It might still be that people are becoming more likely to prioritise ‘Englishness’ over ‘Britishness’. Respondents who chose more than one answer were therefore asked which best described how they think of themselves. Here too there is scant evidence of an increasing sense of Englishness. There does appear to have been a slight trend towards prioritising an English rather than a British identity between the pre and post-devolution period (particularly comparing the data for 1992-1997 with subsequent years – Table 2). But there is no evidence at all that this trend has continued in the years since 1999. In fact, at 42%, the proportion of people in England who felt primarily English in 2011 was little different to the proportion who said the same in 1999 (44%), while the proportion who felt primarily British was almost identical (43% compared with 44%).
Table 2 Trends in forced choice national identity, 1992-2011




1992

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011




%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

English

31

34

33

37

44

41

43

37

38

38

40

47

39

41

41

34

42

British

63

58

55

51

44

47

44

51

48

51

48

39

47

45

46

52

43

Base

2125

1019

3150

2695

2718

2887

2761

2897

3709

2684

3643

3666

3517

3880

2917

2795

2859

Sources: 1992 and 1997: British Election Studies; 1996, 1998-2011: British Social Attitudes (respondents living in England only)
A third question on BSA acknowledges the potentially dual nature of English and British identity more explicitly, by asking respondents to choose from a 5 point scale (from ‘English not British’, to ‘British not English’) which position best describes them. Known as the ‘Moreno question’ (after Luis Moreno, who first used this line of questioning in Spain), this question was last asked on BSA of all those living in England in 2009. Again, the proportion in England who felt either ‘English not British’ or ‘More English than British’ was consistently a little higher in the post-devolution period compared with the figures for 1997. However, yet again there was no evidence of a continued upward trend between 1999 and 2009. And there is no evidence of a decrease in the proportion who feel more British than English, which stood at 24% in 1997 and 23% in 2009.
Table 3 Trends in Moreno National Identity, England 1997-2009




1997

1999

2000

2001

2003

2007

2008

2009




%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

English not British

7

17

18

17

17

19

16

17

More English than British

17

14

14

13

19

14

14

16

Equally English and British

45

37

34

42

31

31

41

33

More British than English

14

11

14

9

13

14

9

10

British not English

9

14

12

11

10

12

9

13

Base

3150

2718

1928

2761

1917

859

982

1940

Source: 1997: British Election Study; 1999-2009 British Social Attitudes (respondents living in England only – question not asked in 2010 and asked of respondents born in England only in 2011)
In 2011, the Moreno question was only asked of those BSA respondents born in England. Predictably, people born in England are a little more likely than all those resident there to identify as primarily English – in 2011, 36% felt ‘English not British’ or ‘more English than British’. However, comparable figures for 2008 indicate that again there is no recent upward trend in ‘Englishness’ here – an almost identical proportion (35%) identified as ‘English not British’ or ‘More English than British’ back then.
Table 4 Trends in Moreno National Identity, those both born and resident in England only (2008 and 2011)




2008

2011




%

%

English not British

19

23

More English than British

16

13

Equally English and British

46

44

More British than English

9

7

British not English

7

10

Base

2558

2859

Source: British Social Attitudes survey
So on the first area of potential ‘backlash’, in fact there is very little evidence that devolution in Scotland and Wales has resulted in people in England becoming ever more likely to view themselves as wholly or mainly English. Any modest shift that did occur in this respect happened at around the same time as devolution – and there is certainly no evidence of a more recent increase in feelings of ‘Englishness’.


There is little evidence that devolution in Scotland and Wales has resulted in people in England becoming ever more likely to view themselves as wholly or mainly English.



  1. Is England becoming more resentful of Scotland’s financial position?

The second two of the three areas where unionist critics argued devolution would result in an ‘English backlash’ relate to finance and government. As BSA has more often fielded questions on views of Scotland than on Wales with respect to these areas, the remainder of this paper focuses on perceptions in England of Scotland.


Public spending per head has been higher in Scotland than England for several decades, and the issue certainly pre-dates devolution (Midwinter, 1999). However, critics argue that English resentment over this difference has been intensified by the policies pursued by the Scottish Government since devolution. For example, the fact that people in Scotland benefit from free prescriptions at a time when prescription charges in England continue to increase arguably highlights apparent inequalities in the distribution of resources within the UK.
In order to identify whether such resentment really is widespread among people in England, BSA asked people whether they think Scotland secures more or less than its fair share of government spending. Here, there is some evidence of an increasing ‘backlash’ in English public opinion. In 2000, just 21% of people in England felt that Scotland got either much or a little more than its fair share (Table 5). But by 2008, this figure had almost doubled, to 41%. It has remained at a similar level since (44% in 2011).
Table 5 Attitudes towards Scotland’s share of public spending, 2000-2011

Compared with other parts of the UK, Scotland’s share of government spending is…

2000

2001

2002

2003

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011




%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

… much more than its fair share

8

9

9

9

16

21

18

21

22

… little more than its fair share

13

15

15

13

16

20

22

17

22

… pretty much its fair share

42

44

44

45

38

33

30

29

30

… little less than its fair share

10

8

8

8

6

3

4

3

3

… much less than its fair share

1

1

1

1

1

*

*

1

*

Don’t know

25

23

22

25

22

23

25

28

23

Base

1928

2761

2897

1917

859

982

980

913

967

Source: British Social Attitudes (respondents based in England only)
Given the high profile (at least among the political classes) of recent discussions about Scottish independence and so-called ‘devo max’ (whereby Scotland would remain in the UK, but with effective fiscal autonomy and responsibility for raising its own budget), has popular demand for Scotland to finance its own budget also increased? BSA asked people whether, now it has its own parliament, Scotland should pay for its services out of taxes collected in Scotland. The results show not only that a majority of people in England feel that Scotland ought to raise its own budget, but also that the strength of English feeling on this issue has increased (Table 6). In 2001, 73% agreed Scotland ought to pay for its services out of taxes collected in Scotland, but by 2009 this had increased to 82%. Moreover, the proportion ‘strongly agreeing’ with this statement rose from 20% in 2001 to 36% in 2009.
Table 6 Attitudes in England towards the financial relationship between England and Scotland, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2009

Now Scotland has its own parliament, it should pay for its services out of taxes collected in Scotland

2001

2003

2007

2009

%

%

%

%

Strongly agree

20

22

28

36

Agree

53

52

47

46

Neither agree nor disagree

12

12

14

10

Disagree

11

10

5

6

Strongly Disagree

1

*

1

*

Base

2761

1917

859

980

Source: British Social Attitudes (respondents living in England only) (last asked 2009)
In the second key area where an English ‘backlash’ was anticipated – finance – there is, then, some evidence that the level of resentment in England towards the position of Scotland has grown since devolution was first introduced. The strength of feeling in England over the need for Scotland to take more responsibility for its own finances has also grown over the last 10 years. However, this resentment does not appear to have grown further since around 2007.


There is evidence that the level of resentment in England towards the position of Scotland has grown since devolution – though not in the last few years.



  1. Does England want a different system of government?

What about the impact of Scottish and Welsh devolution on England’s aspirations for its own government? As discussed above, perhaps the most obvious area in which England might express its discontent in this respect is in relation to the voting rights of Scottish and Welsh MPs in the House of Commons. And as Table 7 shows, a majority of people in England (66% in 2010) do indeed agree that Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed to vote in the House of Commons on laws that only affect England. And again, there is some evidence that strength of feeling on this issue has increased, particularly since 2007 – the proportion strongly agreeing rose from 18% in 2000 to 31% in 2010.


Table 7 Attitudes towards the ‘West Lothian’ question, 2000-10

Now that Scotland has its own parliament, Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed to vote in the UK House of Commons on laws that only affect England.

2000

2001

2003

2007

2010

%

%

%

%

%

Strongly agree

18

19

22

25

31

Agree

45

38

38

36

35

Neither agree nor disagree

19

18

18

17

17

Disagree

8

12

10

9

6

Strongly disagree

1

2

1

1

1

Base

1695

2341

1530

739

773

Source: British Social Attitudes (respondents based in England only) (not asked 2011)
But has this dissatisfaction with the voting rights of Scottish MPs in relation to English matters been accompanied by any increase in demand for England to have its own parliament, separate from the House of Commons? The answer is no – at 56%, a majority of people in England believe that the best way for England to be run is for it to be governed as it is now, with laws made by the UK parliament (Table 8). In 2011, just 25% wanted England to have its own new parliament, while only 12% wanted English regional assemblies.
However, while there has been no reduction over the last decade in the proportion favouring the status quo, there has been more change in respect of which option for devolution for England has found most favour. Demand for English regional assemblies seems to have waned from 2004 onwards (when the public in the North East of England voted against the idea of an elected regional assembly for their area – Sandford, 2009). In contrast, support for a new parliament for England as a whole has been relatively higher since around 2008.
Table 8 Attitudes towards how England should be governed, 1999–2011

With all the changes going on in the way different parts of Great Britain are run, which of the following do you think would be best for England?

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

England governed as it is now, with laws made by the UK parliament

62

54

57

56

50

53

54

54

57

51

49

53

56

Each region of England to have its own assembly that runs services like health*

15

18

23

20

26

21

20

18

14

15

15

13

12

England as whole to have its own new parliament with law-making powers

18

19

16

17

18

21

18

21

17

26

29

23

25

Base

2718

1928

2761

2897

3709

2684

1794

928

859

982

980

913

967

* In 2004–6 the second option read “that makes decisions about the region’s economy, planning and housing”. The 2003 survey carried both versions of this option and demonstrated that the difference of wording did not make a material difference to the pattern of response. The figures quoted for 2003 are those for the two versions combined.

Source: British Social Attitudes (respondents living in England only


Finally, what of attitudes in England to the Union? Did the decisive victory of the SNP in the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections, with their clear commitment to securing Scottish independence, have any impact on England’s views about how Scotland should be governed? Data from BSA suggest that there has been a recent increase in the proportion in England who think that Scotland should become an independent country. However, this increase is relatively modest – from 19% in 2007 to 26% in 2011 (Table 10). A clear majority of people in England continue to say they would like Scotland to remain part of the UK.

Table 10 Attitudes towards how Scotland should be governed, 1997–2011

Scotland should …

1997*

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2007

2011




%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

… become independent, separate from UK and EU, or separate from the UK but part of the EU

14

21

19

19

19

17

19

26

… remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has some taxation powers

38

44

44

53

41

50

36

33

… remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament, which has no taxation powers

17

13

8

7

11

8

12

11

… remain part of the UK, without an elected parliament

23

14

17

11

15

13

18

19

Don’t know

8

8

11

10

14

11

15

11

Base

2536

902

1928

2761

1924

1917

859

967

*Sources: 1997: British Election Study; 1999-2011: British Social Attitudes (respondents in England only)
So in the third area where unionist critics predicted an English ‘backlash’ to devolution – government – our findings are mixed. On the one hand, devolution does not appear to have weakened commitment in England to being governed from the House of Commons. However, people in England do want changes – most agree that Scottish MPs should not be able to vote on England only matters, and strength of feeling on this issue has increased in recent years. Finally, on the union as whole, while there is some tentative evidence that English support for Scotland becoming independent has increased recently, a clear majority of people in England continue to want Scotland to stay in the UK.


Devolution does not appear to have weakened commitment in England to being governed from the House of Commons. However, people in England do want changes – most agree that Scottish MPs should not be able to vote on England only matters, and strength of feeling on this issue has increased.

  1. Identity, resentment and constitutional preferences


So far we have seen that there is little evidence of an increasing sense of English national identity or any corresponding decrease in feelings of Britishness among those living in England. However, since around 2007, there has been an increase in concern about Scotland’s share of public spending, slightly higher support for an English Parliament and somewhat more concern in England about the West Lothian question.
These trends clearly cannot have been caused by a rising sense of English national identity, since no such increase is apparent in our data. However, it is still possible that it is among those who feel particularly English that concerns about Scotland’s share of the UK spending pot and the West Lothian question have increased the most. Similarly, perhaps the appetite for an English Parliament has increased particularly among those who feel more English than British. If this were the case it would suggest that, although there is no evidence of a rising adherence to a separate English national identity, identity has nonetheless become more important in explaining attitudes in England towards the current asymmetric system of devolution in the UK. Such a development might indicate that the views of those who identify as English will play an increasingly important role in the debate about the future structure and government of England and the union.
Taking attitudes to Scotland’s share of public spending first, Table 11 shows separately the proportions that said Scotland gets more or less than its fair share among those who, when forced to choose, identified as ‘British’ and as ‘English’. In 2000, there was barely any difference in the responses of these two groups – just over 1 in 5 in each case felt that Scotland got more than its fair share. Subsequently, this figure has increased among both those who identify as ‘British’ and those who identify as ‘English’. However, there is no consistent pattern in terms of differences in the responses of these two groups.2 It is not, therefore, obvious from this data that the increase in the perception that Scotland’s gets more than its fair share emerges primarily out of greater resentment among those who feel more English.

Table 11 Perceptions of Scotland’s share of spending by forced choice national identity, 2000-11.

Compared with other parts of UK, Scotland’s share of govt spending is …

2000

2003

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

… more than fair

22

23

19

26

29

37

37

50

42

43

36

46

44

50

pretty much fair

43

42

46

45

43

35

38

30

30

30

32

29

33

27

… less than fair

10

11

8

8

6

8

3

2

3

4

4

4

3

2

Base

877

822

898

760

408

346

435

428

427

436

464

326

428

421

Source: British Social Attitudes (respondents living in England only).
In contrast with findings on financial resentment, it has always been the case that those who feel more English have been more likely to say they would prefer England to have its own, separate parliament. However, again there is no evidence that feeling more English has become any more strongly associated with demand for an English parliament over time. In 2011, the difference in the proportion opting for an English parliament between those who felt primarily English compared with those who felt primarily British was 8 percentage points – almost identical to the 7 point difference that existed in 1999 (Table 12). And even among those who feel more strongly English, demand for an English parliament remains a minority position (30% in 2011). Thus the modest increase in demand for an English parliament does not appear to reflect a growing desire among those who feel English to see their national identity embodied in new national political institutions. Perhaps rather, as Curtice (2011) has argued, England is simply feeling left out of the devolution settlement.

Table 12 Constitutional preferences for England by forced choice national identity, 1999 – 2011

Which would be best for England?

1999

2003

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

England governed as it is now, with laws made by the UK parliament

67

60

52

49

69

50

56

45

58

45

57

48

58

53

Each region of England to have its own assembly that runs services like health

14

15

27

24

12

16

14

16

12

17

12

15

13

11

England as whole to have its own new parliament with law-making powers

14

21

16

23

11

27

22

34

23

34

21

29

22

30

Base

1186

1208

1785

1447

408

346

435

428

427

436

464

326

428

421

Source: British Social Attitudes (respondents living in England only)
Finally, what of the West Lothian question? Is the increase in the proportion who feel Scottish MPs should no longer be able to vote on English matters fuelled primarily by a growing sense of injustice among those who feel more English than British? Again, it is not clear that it is. While those who feel primarily English rather than British have always been a little more likely to agree that Scottish MPs should not be able to vote on England-only issues, the gap in opinion between these two groups is not significantly more pronounced in 2010 compared with 2001 (albeit it is a little wider in 2010 compared with 2000 – Table 13).

Table 13 West Lothian Question by forced choice national identity, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2010

Now that Scotland has its own parliament, Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed to vote in the UK House of Commons on laws that only affect England.

2000

2001

2003

2007

2010

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

Brit.

Eng.

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

Strongly agree/agree

64

67

54

63

56

65

60

67

64

77

Neither agree nor disagree

19

18

21

15

20

20

17

14

18

11

Disagree/strongly disagree

10

7

15

9

12

7

12

6

9

6

Base

1353

1196

1215

1200

795

732

1715

1393

1489

981

Source: British Social Attitudes (respondents living in England only)
  1. The English lion - not quite roaring yet?


As discussed in the introduction to this report, those who believe that there will be – or has already been – an ‘English backlash’ to devolution in Scotland and Wales argue that this will be reflected in:


  • a heightened sense of English identity and a corresponding decline in feelings of Britishness

  • increasing resentment in England towards the financial deal other countries get from the union, and

  • growing calls for changes to the way England is governed – from removing the voting rights of Scottish MPs in the House of Commons to establishing a separate English parliament.

The latest data from BSA provides little evidence to support the first of these predictions. To the extent that any shift towards a greater sense of English identity did occur, it was both very modest and occurred at around the same time as the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly in 1999. There is certainly no evidence from the 2011 survey that the re-election of the SNP in Edinburgh and the associated increase in debate about Scotland’s position in the union had any immediate impact on feelings about national identity in England.


There is more evidence of increased resentment in England towards Scotland’s share of public spending. However, most of this increase had already occurred by 2007, shortly after the SNP’s first election victory. There is no evidence from the 2010 or 2011 surveys that resentment on this front is continuing to increase. Moreover, at 22%, only a minority of people in England think that Scotland is getting ‘much more’ than its fair share of the UK budget. And if people in England think Scotland should pay for its services out of taxes raised and collected in Scotland, this too is nothing new – a clear majority supported this position from 2001 onwards.
In terms of demand for changes to the way England is governed, while a majority of people in England believe that Scottish MPs should lose their voting rights over England-only issues, again this is not new – it has been reflected in BSA data since the early days of devolution. That said, there is some evidence that the strength of feeling in England on this issue has increased over time, particularly since 2007. This has not, however, been reflected in any reduction in the proportion who want England to be governed from Westminster. Although there has been a small increase in demand for an English parliament since around 2008, this largely reflects a fall in demand for English regional assemblies, rather than any shift away from the status quo. At the same time, although there has recently been a small increase in support in England for Scotland leaving the union, a clear majority continue to want Scotland to stay within the UK.
In conclusion then, public opinion in England has clearly been affected by arguments about devolution in the UK. The West Lothian question has long been a source of disenchantment and if anything public opinion on this appears to have hardened recently. However, debates about devolution do not yet appear to have translated into either majority demand for other changes to the way England is governed, or a substantial increase in support for Scotland leaving the union. Moreover, there is little evidence that such shifts as have occurred have anything to do with feelings of ‘Englishness’.
  1. Reading public opinion – the importance of methodological consistency

The findings in this paper, based on the most recent data from the British Social Attitudes data (published here for the first time), present a somewhat more moderate picture of current public opinion in England and how this is changing than do several other recent surveys. For example, YouGov and ICM both recently found higher levels of discontent with Scotland’s share of public spending than those found by BSA (YouGov/The Sun, 2012, ICM, 2012). As discussed in Ormston and Curtice (2010), when commercial opinion polls ask people in England how they feel about public spending in Scotland, they typically preface their questions by telling respondents that public spending per head is much higher in Scotland (both ICM and YouGov adopted this strategy in their recent polls). Such questions unsurprisingly tend to find a higher level of resentment about Scotland’s share of public spending than our findings indicate. However, what is left unclear by such an approach is whether it taps pre-existing resentment, or whether the question wording itself provokes this reaction. If people in England do not know much about Scotland’s share of public spending, perhaps they are unconcerned about it. It is for this reason that the question included in BSA and reported above avoids leading respondents in this way.


The findings presented here also contrast with the picture presented by IPPR in their recent report, ‘The dog that finally barked’ (Wyn Jones et al, 2012). That report contrasts findings from an internet panel survey conducted in 2011 with data from BSA up to 2009. It argues, among other things, that there has been: a significant increase in ‘Englishness’, with Englishness also becoming increasingly politicised; a very large increase in the proportion that strongly agree that Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote on laws that only affect England; and a large decrease in support for England continuing to be governed as it is now. As will be evident from the discussion above, these findings are not supported by the latest data from BSA.
As the authors of the IPPR report acknowledge, there are significant methodological problems in comparing survey findings based on different sample designs (BSA uses random probability sampling, the IPPR/YouGov survey used quota sampling methods on an existing panel of respondents). There are similarly large problems in comparing data collected using different methods (face-to-face vs internet). Three particular problems with the comparisons drawn between BSA and the IPPR/YouGov survey are worth highlighting here:


  • First, there are differences in the ways in which the samples were selected. Internet panels rely on data from active internet users to infer findings about the population as a whole. Arguably, there may be significant differences that go beyond differences of demographics and education (which can, to an extent, be controlled for in sample selection and weighting strategies) between those who regularly and actively use the internet and the population as a whole. Moreover, since they are based on quota samples drawn from an ‘opt-in’ panel of potential respondents, internet surveys usually side-step around issues of response rates as well as panel attrition (see for example Chang & Krosnick (2009), Schonlau et al (2009), AAPOR (2010)).

  • Second, the comparison of data collected face-to-face with data collected by self-completion online risks being confounded by significant ‘mode effects’ (see, for example, De Leeuw 2005; Vehovar and Manfreda, 2008). How an interview is administered can affect how people respond to the questions asked.

  • Third, many of the IPPR questions did not replicate the earlier BSA questions exactly, making it impossible to draw accurate conclusions as to how public opinion is changing. Examples include:

    • using a 4 point rather than a 5-point agree-disagree scale for the West Lothian question (thus depriving respondents of a ‘neither agree nor disagree’ option), as well as changing the wording of the remaining agree and disagree answer options;

    • in the case of attitudes to how England should be governed, inserting a completely new answer option (‘For England to be governed with laws made by English MPs in the UK Parliament’) to the existing 3 category question;

    • collapsing a 5 point scale asking about attitudes to Scotland’s share of government spending (much more than its fair share/a little more than its fair share/pretty much its fair share/a little less than its fair share/much less than its fair share) to a 3 point scale, and changing the order of the answer options.

The fact that the latest BSA data suggest either no change or far more modest trends than those asserted by IPPR suggests that many of their findings may be artefacts of these differences in data collection methods and question wording, rather than reflecting genuine shifts. This highlights the crucial importance of consistency in tracking change over time – if different questions are asked in a different way, it is not possible to establish whether any differences in the results reflect actual changes in public opinion, or simply differences in methodology.


References

AAPOR (2010), AAPOR Report on Online Panels.

http://www.aapor.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=AAPOR_Committee_and_Task_Force_Reports&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=2223
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Notes


British Social Attitudes survey fieldwork typically takes place over the summer and early autumn. Fieldwork for 2011 took place between June and October, and for 2010 between June and November. Further details about the survey can be found on the NatCen Social Research website, www.natcen.ac.uk.


1 In some cases data for 1997 is taken from the 1997 British Election Study, which was conducted using the same methods and the same question wording as BSA.

2 In 2003, 2007, 2008 and 2010 rather more of those who identified primarily as ‘English’ compared with those who identified as ‘British’ felt that Scotland got more than its fair share. But in 2009 and 2011 the differences between these two groups were much smaller.





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