**AT: Nuclear Terrorism 13 1NC: Nuclear Terrorism 13

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WNDI 2010

Johnson/Butler Impact Defense

**AT: Nuclear Terrorism** 13

1NC: Nuclear Terrorism 13

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Some State Will Give Weapons 16

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Steal a Nuke 19

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Create Their Own 21

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Create Their Own 22

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Create Their Own 23

**AT: Bio Terrorism** 27

1NC: Bio Terrorism 27

1NC: Bio Terrorism 27

1NC: Human Rights 30

1NC: Women’s Rights/Patriarchy 32

Impact Defense:

**AT: Middle East**

AT: Middle East Wars

Middle East wars don’t escalate – historically & regional armies aren’t able to mount offensives.

Yglesias, 2007

[Matthew Yglesias is an Associate Editor of The Atlantic Monthly, “Containing Iraq,” The Atlantic, 12 Sep 2007, http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2007/09/containing_iraq.php]

Kevin Drum tries to throw some water on the "Middle East in Flames" theory holding that American withdrawal from Iraq will lead not only to a short-term intensification of fighting in Iraq, but also to some kind of broader regional conflagration. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, as usual sensible but several clicks to my right, also make this point briefly in Democracy: "Talk that Iraq’s troubles will trigger a regional war is overblown; none of the half-dozen civil wars the Middle East has witnessed over the past half-century led to a regional conflagration." Als

o worth mentioning in this context is the basic point that the Iranian and Syrian militaries just aren't able to conduct meaningful offensive military operations. The Saudi, Kuwait, and Jordanian militaries are even worse. The IDF has plenty of Arabs to fight closer to home. What you're looking at, realistically, is that our allies in Kurdistan might provide safe harbor to PKK guerillas, thus prompting our allies in Turkey to mount some cross-border military strikes against the PKK or possibly retaliatory ones against other Kurdish targets. This is a real problem, but it's obviously not a problem that's mitigated by having the US Army try to act as the Baghdad Police Department or sending US Marines to wander around the desert hunting a possibly mythical terrorist organization. 

No risk of Middle East war.

Susan Maloney and Ray Takeyh, 6/28/2007. Senior fellow for Middle East Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Studies at the Brookings Institution and senior fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Why the Iraq War Won’t Engulf the Mideast,” International Herald Tribune, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0628iraq_maloney.aspx.

Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.
No global escalation

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