1974 – Supreme Court changed membership and the new majority was deferential to business interests, non-judgmental about bigness and industrial concentration and demanding of πs in their proof that a merger would harm competition
In merger cases more concerned about competition and less about concentration
Lost Potential Entrant Effect: potential entrant has a moderating effect on oligopolistic behavior; if it enters the market, there would be no replacement to moderate such effect
Entrenchment: fear that Clorox would benefit from P&Gs economies of scale and become a better competitor and lower prices and deter new entrants efficiencies blocked the merger!
Are efficiencies a complete defense or partial defense to an anticompetitive merger?
W/n make same assumptions about merger causing price increases
Decided same day as General Dynamics and completely reevaluates P&G analysis
Actual Entry Effect: but for the merger, Δ would have entered the market as a new competitor and stirred up competition; this d/n make the market worse off by declining to enter de novo; Requires proof of:
High concentration and oligopoly behavior in pre-existing market