Anthropocentrism K

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Anthropocentrism K

***1NC*** 2

***Links*** 8

Economy 9

Sustainability” 10

Sustainability (policy specific) 11

Warming 13

Ships 14

Science 15

Policy 16

Link of Omission 17

Resources/Oil 19

Environmental Protection 21

Deep Ecology 23

Shipping/Trade 24

Water 25

***Impacts*** 27

Extinction (pollution) 28

Value to life 29

O/W Case 30

Ontological Damnation 32

Turns Case 33

Total Domination 34

Suffering 35

Extinction (ecological collapse) 36

Hierarchies 37

***Alt*** 38

Alt -> Embrace non-anthropocentric ethics 39

Alt-> embrace deep ecology 41

Alt -> Become members of the biotic community 43

Alt -> Social Ecology 44

The alt creates a mindset shift 45

K is first step to solving all impacts 46

***Framework*** 47

Debate Key 48

Policy debate bad 50

Our K = good debate 52

Education Impact 54

***A2s and 2NC Tricks*** 55

A2: Perm 56

State cooption bad 56

Util kills the perm 57

Perm= Unethical 59

A2: Anthro Inevitable/Human Nature 60

A2: case O/W 61

Human extinction good 62

Vote neg on presumption 64

Ethics before truth 65

***Aff Answers*** 67

Human centered thinking good 68

Calculative thought good 69

Government action good 70

Incrementalism Good 71

Perm solves the environment 72

Dominating nature good 73

Radical alts fail 74

root cause” thinking bad 75

Cede the political/Perm solves 76

Perm solves (individual+government good) 77

Perm solves (some domination of nature good) 78

Anthropocentrism good (‘nature’ bad) 79

Anthropocentrism good, k2 space colonization 80

Anthropocentrism good, k2 VTL 81

The K = genocide 82


The aff grounds their justifications for the plan in an ideology that has brought the planet to the brink of catastrophe: anthropocentrism

Sivil 2k

Richard Sivil studied at the University of Durban Westville, and at the University of Natal, Durban. He has been lecturing philosophy since 1996. “WHY WE NEED A NEW ETHIC FOR THE ENVIRONMENT”, 2000,

Three most significant and pressing factors contributing to the environmental crisis are the ever increasing human population, the energy crisis, and the abuse and pollution of the earth’s natural systems. These and other factors contributing to the environmental crisis can be directly linked to anthropocentric views of the world. The perception that value is located in, and emanates from, humanity has resulted in understanding human life as an ultimate value, superior to all other beings. This has driven innovators in medicine and technology to ever improve our medical and material conditions, in an attempt to preserve human life, resulting in more people being born and living longer. In achieving this aim, they have indirectly contributed to increasing the human population. Perceptions of superiority, coupled with developing technologies have resulted in a social outlook that generally does not rest content with the basic necessities of life. Demands for more medical and social aid, more entertainment and more comfort translate into demands for improved standards of living. Increasing population numbers, together with the material demands of modern society, place ever increasing demands on energy supplies. While wanting a better life is not a bad thing, given the population explosion the current energy crisis is inevitable, which brings a whole host of environmental implications in tow. This is not to say that every improvement in the standard of living is necessarily wasteful of energy or polluting to the planet, but rather it is the cumulative effect of these improvements that is damaging to the environment. The abuses facing the natural environment as a result of the energy crisis and the food demand are clearly manifestations of anthropocentric views that treat the environment as a resource and instrument for human ends. The pollution and destruction of the non-human natural world is deemed acceptable, provided that it does not interfere with other human beings. It could be argued that there is nothing essentially wrong with anthropocentric assumptions, since it is natural, even instinctual, to favour one’s self and species over and above all other forms of life. However, it is problematic in that such perceptions influence our actions and dealings with the world to the extent that the well-being of life on this planet is threatened, making the continuance of a huge proportion of existing life forms "tenuous if not improbable" (Elliot 1995: 1). Denying the non-human world ethical consideration, it is evident that anthropocentric assumptions provide a rationale for the exploitation of the natural world and, therefore, have been largely responsible for the present environmental crisis (Des Jardins 1997: 93). Fox identifies three broad approaches to the environment informed by anthropocentric assumptions, which in reality are not distinct and separate, but occur in a variety of combinations. The "expansionist" approach is characterised by the recognition that nature has a purely instrumental value to humans. This value is accessed through the physical transformation of the non-human natural world, by farming, mining, damming etc. Such practices create an economic value, which tends to "equate the physical transformation of ‘resources’ with economic growth" (Fox 1990: 152). Legitimising continuous expansion and exploitation, this approach relies on the idea that there is an unending supply of resources. The "conservationist" approach, like the first, recognises the economic value of natural resources through their physical transformation, while at the same time accepting the fact that there are limits to these resources. It therefore emphasises the importance of conserving natural resources, while prioritising the importance of developing the non-human natural world in the quest for financial gain. The "preservationist" approach differs from the first two in that it recognises the enjoyment and aesthetic enrichment human beings receive from an undisturbed natural world. Focusing on the psychical nourishment value of the non-human natural world for humans, this approach stresses the importance of preserving resources in their natural states. All three approaches are informed by anthropocentric assumptions. This results in a one-sided understanding of the human-nature relationship. Nature is understood to have a singular role of serving humanity, while humanity is understood to have no obligations toward nature. Such a perception represents "not only a deluded but also a very dangerous orientation to the world" (Fox 1990: 13), as only the lives of human beings are recognised to have direct moral worth, while the moral consideration of non-human entities is entirely contingent upon the interests of human beings (Pierce & Van De Veer 1995: 9). Humanity is favoured as inherently valuable, while the non-human natural world counts only in terms of its use value to human beings. The "expansionist" and "conservationist" approaches recognise an economic value, while the "preservationist" approach recognises a hedonistic, aesthetic or spiritual value. They accept, without challenge, the assumption that the value of the non-human natural world is entirely dependent on human needs and interests. None attempt to move beyond the assumption that nature has any worth other than the value humans can derive from it, let alone search for a deeper value in nature. This ensures that human duties retain a purely human focus, thereby avoiding the possibility that humans may have duties that extend to non-humans. This can lead to viewing the non-human world, devoid of direct moral consideration, as a mere resource with a purely instrumental value of servitude. This gives rise to a principle of ‘total use’, whereby every natural area is seen for its potential cultivation value, to be used for human ends (Zimmerman 1998: 19). This provides limited means to criticise the behaviour of those who use nature purely as a warehouse of resources (Pierce & Van De Veer 1995: 184). It is clear that humanity has the capacity to transform and degrade the environment. Given the consequences inherent in having such capacities, "the need for a coherent, comprehensive, rationally persuasive environmental ethic is imperative" (Pierce & Van De Veer 1995: 2). The purpose of an environmental ethic would be to account for the moral relations that exist between humans and the environment, and to provide a rational basis from which to decide how we ought and ought not to treat the environment. The environment was defined as the world in which we are enveloped and immersed, constituted by both animate and inanimate objects. This includes both individual living creatures, such as plants and animals, as well as non-living, non-individual entities, such as rivers and oceans, forests and velds, essentially, the whole planet Earth. This constitutes a vast and all-inclusive sphere, and, for purposes of clarity, shall be referred to as the "greater environment". In order to account for the moral relations that exist between humans and the greater environment, an environmental ethic should have a significantly wide range of focus. I argue that anthropocentric value systems are not suitable to the task of developing a comprehensive environmental ethic. Firstly, anthropocentric assumptions have been shown to be largely responsible for the current environmental crisis. While this in itself does not provide strong support for the claim, it does cast a dim light on any theory that is informed by such assumptions. Secondly, an environmental ethic requires a significantly wide range of focus. As such, it should consider the interests of a wide range of beings. It has been shown that anthropocentric approaches do not entertain the notion that non-human entities can have interests independent of human interests. "Expansionist", "conservationist" and "preservationist" approaches only acknowledge a value in nature that is determined by the needs and interests of humans. Thirdly, because anthropocentric approaches provide a moral account for the interests of humans alone, while excluding non-humans from direct moral consideration, they are not sufficiently encompassing. An environmental ethic needs to be suitably encompassing to ensure that a moral account is provided for all entities that constitute the environment. It could be argued that the indirect moral concern for the environment arising out of an anthropocentric approach is sufficient to ensure the protection of the greater environment. In response, only those entities that are in the interest of humans will be morally considered, albeit indirectly, while those entities which fall outside of this realm will be seen to be morally irrelevant. Assuming that there are more entities on this planet that are not in the interest of humans than entities that are, it is safe to say that anthropocentric approaches are not adequately encompassing. Fourthly, the goals of an environmental ethic should protect and maintain the greater environment. It is clear that the expansionist approach, which is primarily concerned with the transformation of nature for economic return, does not meet these goals. Similarly, neither does the conservationist approach, which is arguably the same as the expansionist approach. The preservationist approach does, in principle satisfy this requirement. However, this is problematic for such preservation is based upon the needs and interests of humans, and "as human interests and needs change, so too would human uses for the environment" (Des Jardins 1997: 129). Non-human entities, held captive by the needs and interests of humans, are open to whatever fancies the interests of humans. In light of the above, it is my contention that anthropocentric value systems fail to provide a stable ground for the development of an environmental ethic

Unquestioned anthropocentrism is the root cause of violence and exploitation

Johns 98

David M. Adjunct Assistant Professor of Political Science Portland State Univ. B.S. Political Science and Anthropology 1976, Portland State University; M.A. Political Science 1978, J.D. Law, 1980, Columbia University.The Relevance of Deep Ecology to the Third World (1990) Some Preliminary Comments in The great new wilderness debate By J. Baird Callicott, Michael P. Nelson

All human centered value systems necessarily fall prey to the easy rationalization of militarism. If one is concerned only with humans, with the perpetuation and protection of particular social systems against internal or external threats, the constraints placed upon the consumption of nature are weakened. Even when limits on resources may temper overconsumption generally, there is a real tendency in this sphere of "national security" to literally let the future take care of itself and commit all to the current struggle. Certainly aesthetic regard for nature falls by the wayside. If the machine needs oil, then drill. The Soviet Union, as an example, has some of the strictest environmental legislation in the These laws also provide a giant loophole for any endeavor related to the security of the state, virtually negating restrictions!' Most countries start with weaker laws to begin with before embracing the exceptions. There are many human-centered value systems, religious and secular, critical of militarization—and all are largely ineffective. The failure comes in part from the wedding of values to structures of power—be they church or state—that depend upon force for their survival. Insofar as these pacifistic values arc taken up by those "outside" these structures they provide some check. But because they are human-centered—the point of opposing militarization is to end human waste and suffering—it is easy to neutralize them by appeal to other human values and other forms of suffering even worse than war or the costs of deterrence. The other great weakness is that much pacifistic thinking does not address adequately the roots of militarism, something I attempt to do below. If one values nature in and for itself, then human goals and needs are placed within the context of a larger community. The value placed on the integrity of that community militates heavily against any human-centered rationalization for exploitation. A biocentrism view quite simply limits the conversion of ecosystems and biomass to human use to any extensive degree. Although such a view may seem utopian, because it poses a threat to the survival of particular social systems or the system of historical social systems, it does not pose a threat to tic survival of the species as some would argue. Quite the opposite, the threat to both us and the planet comes from this system of systems. It is here that biocentrism provides understanding which human-centered approaches cannot, for the latter accept fundamental values which justify the very structures that give rise to the outcomes they criticize. Consider the roots of militarism. Because modern militarism is panicularly virulent, attempts to understand and criticize this blight are often limited to the modern period. Certainly the combination of enlightenment arrogance, science, and technology, embedded in the international political economy resulting from the European expansion, has produced a very dangerous world."' It is, however, necessary to look more deeply into human history to grasp the underlying dynamic of militarism. While it may have reached new proportions, it is not new, but rather an essential feature of something very old: civilization.'It is inseparable from social systems based upon hierarchy (class, gender, and ethnic), control of nature, the denial of self, and the emotions and bonds which constitute the self. It is an essential feature of those societies in which the state exists, the process by which the state attempts to substitute itself for authentic human community is well underway, and conflict between communities has been replaced by the institutionalized conflict of center and periphery and between competing centers." Civilization, and the process of its formation and emergence in the neolithichic, is the story of the human attempt to adapt through various strategies of control—control of nature and of people through technology and social organization. It is this attempt to control nature that separates us from it, that constitutes the core of our alienation from it, and that becomes the foundation for social development that includes patriarchy, class domination, statism, and militarism. While most, but by no means all human centered value systems eschew militarism, civilization is held as a crowning achievement. Some value systems praise the military spirit, while the majority that condemn it usually do so as a necessary evil, i.e.. they simultaneously justify it to one degree or another. The point to be made here is that civilization is based upon and is constituted by relationships of domination that invariably and necessarily produce the conflict and inequality which make militarism inevitable. Certainly some human-centered theory recognizes aspects of the roots of militarism. and it recognizes the terrible price humans have paid, even if ignoring the price nature has paid. Nevertheless, critics maintain a fervent faith in the human mission to manage, in the human ability to disentangle what is inextricably linked. They speak from within the perspective of civilization and cannot see that they must transcend the precarious ground on which they (we) teeter." Critical theory shares much in common with liberal theory in this area. Some Marxist analysis of the genesis of modern Militarism is sound. The notion that many human ills would be solved with due end of class society is also appealing. But the end of class is not the end of the state or of domination, and hence not the end of social systems which produce militarism. (Nor is the end of capitalism the end of class.) The control of nature and the human control of social and cultural evolution are values deeply embedded in most Marxism. Although it has developed useful models for understanding social transformation, the assumptions, perspective, and the content of the transformative vision arc very much within the human-centered tradition that is part of the problem.'" Some feminism gets much closer to the source of the problem in its cri- tique of hierarchy generally and in particular in its understanding of the central role of patriarchy to militarism and to producing humans amenable to domination. At times. however, feminist theory falls into a kind of intraspecific dualism, i.e., human males are the problem (while at the same time claiming credit for the fact that females created agriculture, which became the economic foundation for the emergence of hierarchy), ignoring that systems adapt to and alter the environment, and individuals adapt to (even while they resist) the roles created by the system's division of labor.' Even where this dualism is not at issue, most feminism, like Marxism, remains human-centered. Values such as community, spontaneity, and integration of emotion and intellect militate against the worst features of mainstream human-centered values, but still fail to take account a the re-lationship with nature as fundamental to all hierarchical systems. Or they remain anthropocentric and fail to address the separation front nature which not only makes possible the superexploitation of the biosphere for the maintenance of the military apparatus. but also underlies the social structures which produce militarism. While Marxism, feminism, and other critical social theory have contributed much to understanding the dynamic of our civilization, they tend to miss the point that if nonhuman life is not valued for itself, then life is not valued for itself. Any system of values that does not transcend nature-as-other cannot limit destruction of the biosphere as effectively as one that embraces nonhuman life as intrinsically valuable. Nor can such a value system help to heal the fundamental split in the human psyche which makes possible civilization and militarism. Biocentrism is not alone in grasping that the dynamic of human evolution over the last six or seven thousand years may be at a dead end. Certainly the huge growth in human numbers. the displacement of "simpler" societies by more "complex" ones, ones with greater capacity to exploit nature, capture and use energy, and so on suggests that the underlying dynamic is highly adaptive, at least at first glance. What is increasingly clear. however, is that if this dynamic continues we stand a very good chance of killing ourselves along with a good portion of the rest of the planet. The latter is well under way—it's business as usual. Biocentrism offers a direction for human society based upon a thoroughly fundamental transformation which stresses the centrality of finding our place in nature. Such a transformation is as fundamental as the neolithic or industrial revolutions. A life-centered or planet-centered value system requires that we move toward transcending the split with nature both within our own psyches and in our material relationships: how we consume and alter the biosphere. Far fewer humans, far lower levels of consumption for many. much improved levels for others, the recreation of authentic communitics that reintegrate the human into the natural, and the abandonment of the instrummentalities of control—these are a few of the implications of such an ethic. In contrast, a human-centered approach focuses on wiser if not greater human control. In its more progressive forms we hear words like stewardship rather than ownership; nevertheless, underlying both is the notion that we can replace nature with our intellect. that we can manage our way out of any problems, that We as a species are not only unique (as every species and ecosystem is), but that our uniqueness means we are godlike, better than the others. In short, it is the same arrogance. the same split that has brought us to the current crisis

The alternative is to question anthropocentric logic as a prior consideration to policy action

DeLuca 05

Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Utah, author of Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism and numerous articles exploring humanity-nature relations and technology, 2005, “Thinking with Heidegger Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice”, in Ethics & the Environment 10.1 p. 67-87

The question moves, then, from asking whether a strategy is effective or moral, to asking, "Does a strategy contribute to machination?" As our discussion should have made clear, machination is about a logic, not a particular machine. (This same point is true of Heidegger's later critique of technology.) Heidegger's critique of the logic of machination has the advantage of being able to be clearly distinguished from any particular machine or technology. Machination, to reiterate, is a logic characterized by calculation, giganticism, acceleration, and technicity wherein animals, plants, and the earth become objects, mere resources, and humans, also, are reduced to the service of a ravenous progress. To ask if a strategy contributes to machination, then, is to ask [End Page 76] whether it contributes to the degradation of the earth and the hollowing-out of the world, a particularly pressing question for environmentalists. Obviously, then, the mainstream strategy of setting up headquarters in the political center (Washington, D.C.) of global capitalism—arguably the finest manifestation of the logic of machination; and adopting such practices as lobbying, trading favors, making cash donations, doing fund-raising, hiring MBAs and lawyers to run operations, exchanging board memberships with major corporations, producing glossy magazines funded by advertising from car companies and other suspect sources, practicing media spin and public relations as if environmental groups are no different (except poorer) than GE, Exxon, Monsanto, and Union Carbide, is suspect. Mainstream groups have consciously adopted the politics, organizational structure, and discourse of machination. Yet even the practices of radical grassroots groups that eschew central organization and its attendant dangers deserve scrutiny. Beginning with Greenpeace in the 1970s and intensifying in the 1980s with the emergence of wilderness and environmental justice groups, the radical environmental movement has increasingly relied on managing images and manipulating media, in fact practicing what could be considered an oppositional grassroots public relations. If public relations, along with advertising, is the discourse of machination, a discourse of empty words in service of giganticism (bigger is better) and progress (newer is better), what are the consequences when radical environmental groups deploy that very discourse in efforts to reach the public through mass media? What are the consequences when Greenpeace champions the cause of furry baby harp seals at the neglect of less photogenic indicator species? Are the effects of this any different from when the much more compromised World Wildlife Fund (WWF) adopts the panda as its symbol and cause celebre? What are the consequences when Earth First!, the environmental justice group Kentuckians For The Commonwealth, and other grassroots groups conform to the constraints of the mass media (stunning images, sound bites, conflict focus, emotional appeals, and so on) and deploy the practices of public relations in order to stage image events? Is it possible to fundamentally challenge machination while using the techniques of machination? These are not rhetorical questions. I do not have the answers and I do not think there are easy answers. Instead, Heidegger offers the environmental movement the admonishment to question what [End Page 77] it takes for granted, to think about the presuppositions and practices that are reflexively deployed as a matter of course

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