First are the Links: Despite the attempts of the 1AC to prioritize the environmental protection over resource extraction the 1AC is just a continuation of existing anthropocentric mindsets because the act of valuing nature for the benefit of humans merely further entrenches the domination. It makes the environment and its inhabitants instrumentally valuable, instead of recognizing nature as valuable in itself. The absence of nature is in itself anthropocentric. Yeuk-Sze explains,
Suppose that putting out natural fires, culling feral animals or destroying some individual members of overpopulated indigenous species is necessary for the protection of the integrity of a certain ecosystem. Will these actions be morally permissible or even required? Is it morally acceptable for farmers in non-industrial countries to practise slash and burn techniques to clear areas for agriculture? Consider a mining company which has performed open pit mining in some previously unspoiled area. Does the company have a moral obligation to restore the landform and surface ecology? And [W]hat is the value of a humanlyrestored environment compared with theoriginally natural environment?It is often said to be morally wrong for human beings to pollute and destroy parts of the natural environment and to consume a huge proportion of the planet's natural resources. If that is wrong, is it simply because a sustainable environment is essential to (present and future) human well-being? Or is such behaviour also wrong because the natural environment and/or its various contents have certain values in their own right so that these values ought to be respected and protected in any case? These are among the questions investigated by environmental ethics. Some of them are specific questions faced by individuals in particular circumstances, while others are more global questions faced by groups and communities. Yet others are more abstract questions concerning the value and moral standing of the natural environment and its nonhuman components. In the literature on environmental ethics the distinction between instrumental value and intrinsic value(meaning “non-instrumental value”) has been of considerable importance.The former is the value of things as means to further some other ends, whereas the latter [being]is the value of things as ends in themselvesregardless of whether they are also useful as means to other ends. For instance, certain fruits have instrumental value for bats who feed on them, since feeding on the fruits is a means to survival for the bats. However, it is not widely agreed that fruits have value as ends in themselves. We can likewise think of a person who teaches others as having instrumental value for those who want to acquire knowledge. Yet, in addition to any such value, it is normally said that a person, as a person, has intrinsic value, i.e., value in his or her own right independently of his or her prospects for serving the ends of others. For another example, a certain wild plant may have instrumental value because it provides the ingredients for some medicine or as an aesthetic object for human observers. But if the plant also has some value in itself independently of its prospects for furthering some other ends such as human health, or the pleasure from aesthetic experience, then the plant also has intrinsic value. Because the intrinsically valuable isthat which is good as an end in itself, [the]it is commonly agreed that something's possession of intrinsic value generates aprima facie direct moral dutyon the part of moral agents to protect itor at least refrain from damaging it (see O'Neil 1992 and Jameson 2002 for detailed accounts of intrinsic value). Many traditional western ethical perspectives, however, are anthropocentric or human-centered [as] in that either they assign intrinsic value to human beings alone(i.e., what we might call anthropocentric in a strong sense) or they assign a significantly greater amount of intrinsic value to human beings than to any nonhuman things such that the protection or promotion of human interests or well-being at the expense of nonhuman things turns out to be nearly always justified (i.e., what we might call anthropocentric in a weak sense). For example, Aristotle (Politics, Bk. 1, Ch. 8) maintains that “nature has made all things specifically for the sake of man” and that the value of nonhuman things in nature is merely instrumental. Generally, anthropocentric positions find it problematic to articulate what is wrong with the cruel treatment [the]of nonhumananimals, except to the extent that [it]such treatment may lead tobad consequences for human[s] beings. Immanuel Kant (“Duties to Animals and Spirits”, in Lectures on Ethics), for instance, suggests that cruelty towards a dog might encourage a person to develop a character which would be desensitized to cruelty towards humans. From this standpoint, cruelty towards nonhuman animals would be instrumentally, rather than intrinsically, wrong. Likewise, anthropocentrism often recognizes some non-intrinsic wrongness of anthropogenic (i.e. human-caused) environmental devastation. Such destruction might damage the well-being of human beings now and in the future, since our well-being is essentially dependent on a sustainable environment (see Passmore 1974, Bookchin 1990, Norton, Hutchins, Stevens, and Maple (eds.) 1995). When environmental ethics emerged as a new sub-discipline of philosophy in the early 1970s, it did so by posing a challenge to traditional anthropocentrism. In the first place, it questioned the assumed moral superiority of human beings [and] to members of other species on earth. In the second place, it investigated the possibility of rational arguments for assigning intrinsic value to the natural environment and its nonhuman contents. It should be noted, however, that some theorists working in the field see no need to develop new, non-anthropocentric theories. Instead, they advocate what may be called enlightened anthropocentrism (or, perhaps more appropriately called, prudential anthropocentrism). Briefly, this is the view that all the moral duties we have towards the environment are derived from our direct duties to its human inhabitants. The practical purpose of environmental ethics, they maintain, is to provide moral grounds for social policies aimed at protecting the earth's environment and remedying environmental degradation. Enlightened anthropocentrism, they argue, is sufficient for that practical purpose, and perhaps even more effective in delivering pragmatic outcomes, in terms of policy-making, than non-anthropocentric theories given the theoretical burden on the latter to provide sound arguments for its more radical view that the nonhuman environment has intrinsic value (cf. Norton 1991, de Shalit 1994, Light and Katz 1996). 1
Second are the Impacts: A. Anthropocentrism is epistemically suspect – including other perspectives and points of reference is uniquely key to forming a cogent basis for our knowledge. This implies that the critique comes prior to aff framework since we need a stable epistemology to form normative truths and discern between right and wrong. Das explains,
Parallax describes the apparent change in the direction of a moving object caused by alteration in the observer's position. In the graphic work of M.C. Escher, human faculties are similarly deceived and an impossible reality made plausible. While not strictly a scientific theorem, anthropocentrism, the assessment of reality through an exclusively human perspective, is deeply embedded in science and culture. Improving knowledge requires abandoning anthropocentricityor, at least, acknowledging its existence. Anthropocentrism's limits derive from thephysical constraints of human cognitionand specific psychological attitudes. Being human entails specific faculties, intrinsic attitudes, values and belief systems that shape enquiry and understanding. The human mind has evolved a specific physical structure and bio-chemistry that shapes thought processes. The human cognitive system determines our reasoning and therefore our knowledge. Language, logic, mathematics, abstract thought, cultural beliefs, history and memories create a specific human frame of reference, which may restrict what we can know or understand. There may be other forms of life and intelligence. The ocean has revealed creatures that live from chemo-synthesis in ecosystems around deep-sea hydrothermal vents, without access to sunlight. Life forms based on materials other than carbon may also be feasible. An entirely radical set of cognitive frameworks and alternative knowledge cannot be discounted. Like a train that can only run on tracks that determine direction and destination, human knowledge may ultimately be constrained by what evolution has made us. Knowledge was originally driven by the need to master the natural environment to meet basic biological needs—survival and genetic propagation. It was also needed to deal with the unknown and forces beyond human control. Superstition, religion, science and other belief systems evolved to meets these human needs. In the eighteenth century, medieval systems of aristocratic and religious authority were supplanted by a new model of scientific method, rational discourse, personal liberty and individual responsibility. But this did not change the basic underlying drivers. Knowledge is also influenced by human factors—fear and greed, ambition, submission and tribal collusion, altruism and jealousy, as well as complex power relationships and inter-personal group dynamics. Behavioural science illustrates the inherent biases in human thought. Announcing a boycott of certain "luxury" scientific journals, 2013 Nobel laureate Dr. Randy Schekman argued that to preserve their pre-eminence they acted like "fashion designers who create limited-edition handbags or suits…knowing scarcity stokes demand". He argued that science is being distorted by perverse incentives whereby scientists who publish in important journals with a high "impact factor" can expect promotion, pay rises and professional accolades. Understanding operates within these biological and attitudinal constraints. As Friedrich Nietzsche wrote: "every philosophy hides a philosophy; every opinion is also a hiding place, every word is a mask". Understanding of fundamental issues remains limited. The cosmological nature and origins of the universe are contested. The physical sourceand nature of matterand energy are debated. The origins and evolution of biological life remain unresolved. Resistance to new ideas frequently restricts the development of knowledge. The history of science is a succession of controversies—a non geo-centric universe, continental drift, theory of evolution, quantum mechanics and climate change. Science, paradoxically, seems to also have inbuilt limits. Like an inexhaustible Russian doll, quantum physics is an endless succession of seemingly infinitely divisible particles. Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle posits that human knowledge about the world is always incomplete, uncertain and highly contingent. Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorems of mathematical logic establish inherent limitations of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems of arithmetic. Experimental methodology and testing is flawed. Model predictions are often unsatisfactory. As Nassim Nicholas Taleb observed: "You can disguise charlatanism under the weight of equations … there is no such thing as a controlled experiment." Challenging anthropocentrism does not mean abandoningscience or rational thought. Itdoes not mean reversion to primitive religious dogma, messianic phantasms or obscure mysticism. Transcending anthropocentricity may allow new frames of reference expanding the boundary of human knowledge. It may allowhuman beings tothink more clearly, consider different perspectivesand encourage possibilities outside the normal range of experience and thought. It may also allow a greater understanding of our existential place within natureand in the order of things. As William Shakespeare's Hamlet cautioned a friend: "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy". But fundamental biology may not allow the required change of reference framework. While periodically humbled by the universe, human beings remain enamoured, for the most part, withthe proposition that they are the apogee of development. Butas Mark Twain observed in Letters from Earth: "He took a pride in man; man was his finest invention; man was his pet, after the housefly." Writing in The Hitchhikers' Guide to the Galaxy, the late English author Douglas Adams speculated that the earth was a powerful computer and human beings were its biological components designed by hyper-intelligent pan-dimensional beings to answer the ultimate questions about the universe and life. To date, science has not produced a conclusive refutation of this whimsical proposition. Whether or not we can go beyond anthropocentrism, it is a reminder of our limits. As Martin Rees, Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics, at Cambridge and Astronomer Royal, noted: "Most educated people are aware that we are the outcome of nearly 4 billion years of Darwinian selection, but many tend to think that humans are somehow the culmination. Our sun, however, is less than halfway through its lifespan. It will not be humans who watch the sun's demise, 6 billion years from now. Any creatures that then exist will be as different from us as we are from bacteria or amoebae."
B. Anthropocentrism is the original and foundational hierarchy that structures all other forms of oppression. Without the domination of animal’s humans would have never developed the technologies to oppress all life considered to be lesser than human – it is the controlling impact. Best explains,
Hierarchy emerged [when]with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establishtheir dominanceover animals through“domestication.” In animal domestication(often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gainedincreasing controlover the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traitsand controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. Toconquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developednumerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonizationof Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, themetaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal[s]slaves were applied with equal crueltyand force to humanslaves. Stealing Africans from their native environmentand homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains aroundslaves’ bodies, shipping themin cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skinwith a hot iron to mark them as property,auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrorsand countless others inflicted on black slaves were developedand perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. C. Anthropocentrism results in both the extinction of life on Earth, but also our ontological death – it corrupts and bankrupts our relationships with the natural world while also making ecocide inevitable. The kritik holds the internal link to aff solvency, as it’s impossible to protect the environment with an anthropocentric mindset. Gottlieb explains,
Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisonedand notjust becausewe have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence alsoviolates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other – as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being in which self and other can no more be conceivedas fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely oursense of belonging to natureas system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but revealsand furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but acelebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together.And, although this new ecological Holocaust-- this creation of planet Auschwitz – is under way, it is not yet final.We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But only if we see that worldnot as an other across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love; neither for our selves nor for the other, but for us all.2 Ontological death outweighs aff impacts because it symbolizes the destruction the basis for our very being and thusly, our moral agency. By killing nature we mine as well be killing ourselves because we fail to recognize that humanity is not distinct from nature, but rather, interdependent with it.
Thirdis the Alternative: The alternative is to embrace a form of deep ecology that proscribes a radical break away from the humanist mindsets by developing countries that justify anthropocentrism. Only the radical suicide of ecological distinctions between the human and non-human solves. Nash explains,
Karl Marx, of course, had studied this last form of hierarchy and proposed a revolutionary remedy. Bookchin began where Marx stopped. He recommended [D]iscarding ecologicalas well as economic class distinctionsalong with the governments that sanctioned and sustained them. This meant revolutionand, here again, Bookchin transcended Marx. The nineteenth-century revolutionary called for a government of and by the working class; Bookchin wanted no government at all. His objective was not to seize powerfor one group or another but to dissolve it entirely as an apparatus by which people relatedto each other and, as a species, to nature. As early as 1965 Bookchin linked anarchism and ecology. Both. perspectives, he believed, stressed the equal value of every part of the community and the necessit[ates]y of maximizing individual freedom so that every component could fulfill its potential. "I submit," Bookchin wrote in "Ecology and Revolutionary Thought" (1965), "that an anarchist [the] community would approximate a normal ecosystem; it would be diversified, balanced and harmonious." 6 The means to this end, he explained in his major work, The Ecology of Freedom (1982), was through an "ethics of complementarity" derived from an "ecological vision of nature." Bookchin's utopia was not only based on ecological models; it included the ecosystem. He sought [in]a "new and lasting equilibrium with nature" just as he did with other humans. Bookchin was under no illusion about the fact that his ecoanarchism necessitated the wholesale replacement ofhis civilization's "institutional and ethical framework.” He also knew that this was another word for revolution. "I would like to ask," he wrote in 1974, "if the environmental crisis [has] does not have its roots in the very constitution of societyas we know it today, if the changes that are needed.., do not require a fundamental, indeed revolutionary,reconstitution of society along ecological lines?" 9 It was from this perspective that Bookchin, like the deep ecologists whom he anticipated, criticized most manifestations of American conservation and even large parts of modern environmentalism. As one of the first of the radical environmentalists, and as an avowed revolutionary, Book-chin remained profoundly suspicious of those who would save the world by banning aerosol cans or staging Earth-Day cleanups. He regretted that by 1980 "ecology is now fashionable, indeed faddish--and with this sleazy popularity has emerged a new type of environmentalist hype' campaigns but did not challenge the mental pollution that Bookchin regarded as the root of the problem. Dismissing charges that environmentalist demands were too radical, he argued "they are not radical enough." Specifically, Bookchin continued, "'environmentalism' does notbring into question the underlying notionof the present society that man must dominate nature; itseeks to facilitate[s] domination bydeveloping techniques for diminishing the hazards caused by domination.” The only meaningful, long-termsolution: was toreplace the modern world's "odious morality" with aholistic, environmental ethic that had as its basis respect for allpeople and all nature. Armed with new definitions of right and wrong [will], ecoanarchists couldtear down the old order and erect the new.
The permutation always fails; half-hearted measures to reject anthropocentrism are nonsensical since they require one to still allow for a human-centric mindset, which is in itself a manifestation of the ideology. Only by having a radical revolution against anthropocentric mindsets solves – my evidence is comparative. Best 2 explains,
Revolutionary environmentalism is based on the realization that [P]olitics as usual just won’t cut it anymore. We will always lose if we play by their rules rather than invent new forms of struggle, new social movements, and new sensibilities. The defense of the earth requires immediate and decisive: logging roads need to be blocked, driftnets need to be cut, and cages need to be emptied. But these are defensive actions, and in addition to these tactics, radical movementsand alliances must be built from the perspective total liberation. A new revolutionary politics will build on the achievements of democratic, libertarian socialist, and anarchist traditions. It will incorporate radical green, feminist, and indigenous struggles. It will merge animal, earth, and human standpoints ina total liberationstruggle againstglobal capitalism and its omnicidal grow-or-die logic. Radical politics must reverse the growing power of the state, mass media, and corporationsto promote egalitarianism and participatory democratizationat all levels of society – political, cultural, and economic. It must dismantle all asymmetrical power relations and structures of hierarchy, including that of humans overanimals andthe earth. Radical politics is impossible without the revitalization of citizenship and there-politicization of life, which begins with forms of education, communication, culture,and art thatanger, awaken, inspire, andempower people toward action and change.
Fourth is Framework: A. Because the ballot gives the judge the power to determine what is endorsed as truthful in this round, the judge is implicitly assuming the role of the intellectual, which by definition means that their primary obligation is to reflect on and deconstruct truth. Foucault explains,
It seems to me that what must now be taken into account in [T]he intellectual is not the ‘bearer of universal values.’Rather, it’s the personoccupying a specific position – but whose specificity is linked, in a society like ours, tothe general functioning of an apparatus of truth. In other words, the intellectual has a three-fold specificity: that of his class position (whether as petty-bourgeois in the service of capitalism or ‘organic’ intellectual of the proletariat); that of his conditions of life and work, linked to his condition as an intellectual (his field of research, his place in a laboratory, and political and economy demands to which he submits of against which he rebels, in the university, the hospital, etc.); lastly, the specificity of the politics of truths in our societies. And it’s with thislast factor that [their] his position can take ona general significanceand that his local, specific struggle can have effects and implications which are not simply professional or sectorial. The intellectual can operate and struggle at the general level of that regime of truth which is so essential to the structure and functioning of our society. There is a battle‘for truth,’ or at least ‘around truth’– it being understood once again that by truth I do not mean ‘the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted,’ but rather ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true’, it being understood also that it’s not a matter of a battle ‘on behalf’ of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truthand theeconomic and political role it plays. It is necessary to think of the political problems of intellectuals not in terms of ‘science’ and ‘ideology’, but in terms of ‘truth’ and ‘power’. And thus the question of the professionalization of intellectuals and the division between intellectual and manual labour can be envisaged in a new way. All this must seem very confused and uncertain. Uncertain indeed, and what I am saying here is above all to be taken as a hypothesis. In order for it to be a little less confused, however, I would like to put forward a few ‘propositions’ – not firm assertions, but simply suggestions to be further tested and explained. ‘Truth’ isto be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. ‘Truth’ is linkedin a circular relation withsystem of powers whichproduces and sustainit, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A regimeof truth. This regime is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism. And it’s this same regime which [is], subject to certainmodifications, operates in the socialists countries (I leave open here the question of China, about which I know little). Theessential political problem for the intellectualis not to criticizethe ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or to ensure that his ownscientific practice is accompanied by a correct ideology, butthat of ascertaining the possibility ofconstitution a newpolitics of truth. The problem is not changing people’s consciousness’s – or what’s in their heads – butthepolitical, economic, institutional regime of theproduction of truth. It’snot a matterof emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth fromthe forms of hegemony, social economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.
B. Engaging in a deconstructive thought is a pre-requisite to all other forms of thought because asymmetrical power relations corrupt the meaning of truth. Rather than act as a judgment, truth must combat judgment to have a cogent and valuable meaning. Deleuze3 explains,
Combat is not a judgment of God, but the way to have done with God and with judgment. No one develops throughjudgment, but through a combat that implies no judgment. Existence and judgment seem to be opposed on five points: cruelty versus infinite torture, sleep or intoxication versus the dream, vitality versus organization, the will to power versus a will to dominate, combat versus war. What disturbed us was that in renouncing judgment we had the impression of depriving ourselves of any means of distinguishing between existing beings, between modes of existence, as if everything were now of equal value. But is it not rather [J]udgmentthat presupposes preexisting criteria(higher values), criteria that preexist for all time (to the infinity of time), sothat it can neither apprehend what is newin an existing being, noreven sensethe creation of a mode of existence?Such a mode is created vitally, through combat, in the insomnia of sleep, and not without a certain cruelty toward itself: nothing of all this is the result of judgment. Judgment prevents the emergence of any new modes of existence. Forthe latter creates itself through its own forces, that is, through the forces it is able to harness, and is valid in and of itselfinasmuch as it brings the new combination into existence. Herein, perhaps, lies the secret: to bring into existence and not to judge. If it so disgusting to judge, it is not because everything is of equal value, but on the contrary because what has value can be made or distinguished only by defying judgment. What expert judgment, in art, could ever bear on the work to come? It is not a question of judging other existing beings, but of sensing whether they agree or disagree with us, that is, whether they bring forces to us, or whether they return us to the miseries of war, to the poverty of thee dream, to the rigors of organization. As Spinoza had said, it is a problem of love and hate and not judgment; “my soul and body are one...What my soul loves, I love. What my soul hates, I hate...All the subtle sympathizing’s of the incalculable soul, from the bitterest that to passionate love.” This is not subjectivism, since to pose the problem in terms of force, and not in other terms, already surpasses all subjectivity.