CURRENT US-SINO RELATIONS ARE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY
ASIA PULSE, December 17,1997 [HEADLINE: USIS - TALKS WITH CHINA TO IMPROVE PORT ACCESS (The following is a release by the US Information Service\\jan]VT99
Maritime discussions between the United States and the People's Republic of China have set the stage for improved access by each nation's shipping, lines to the other's ports and cargoes, according to the U.S. Maritime Administration. "Our maritime discussions with China will further enable our world-class U.S. intermodal carriers to improve their operations in China," Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater said in a press release issued December 12. "We have reinvigorated our productive working relationship with China, based firmly on the principle of reciprocity."
CHINA IS TRYING TO INCREASE ITS INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE
Sir Leon BRITTAN, Vice-President of the European Commission, February 2, 1998 "ID Engaging China EU China Academic Network Annual Conference London\\jan]VT99
It is often the case that dramatic internal economic or political change can lead to an equally dramatic realignment of a country's external relationship with the outside world. I can think of no clearer example of this than the way in which the momentous internal changes taking place today in China are being reflected in a significant shift in China's relationship with the rest of the world. China the Middle Kingdom is breaking out of its traditional insularity and embarking on an unprecedented process of engagement in international affairs. I am firmly of the view that this process represents one of the greatest strategic challenges for foreign policy makers in Europe, the United States. Asia and elsewhere and that the way it unfolds will be one of the determining factors shaping the international order of the 21st Century.
CHINA'S GOAL IS TO MAKE ASIA IT'S SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, RELEGATING THE US TO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE ONLY
DR. MICHAEL PILLSBURY, ASSOCIATE FELLOW NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, SEPTEMBER 18,1997 [BEFORE THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE SUBJECT CHINESE VIEWS OF FUTURE WARFARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. Federal News Service\\jan]VT99
The second aspect of PLA views of future warfare is the requirement to exploit the Revolution in Military Affairs so that China can even more rapidly and effectively "defeat the superior with the inferior. " One statement never found in PLA open source writing is any declaration that China will one day be the world's leading military power. Rather, the eventual end state of the current Post Cold War transitional period is always proclaimed to be "multipolarity" among five "equal" powers each of which will have its own sphere of influence. One bold author explains that by mid-21st century, even the declining United States will still be left its own sphere of influence, namely Latin American and Canada. Several PLA articles and a book published by the Academy of Military Science provide equations with which to calculate the future trends in "comprehensive national power" that will lead to this world of five equal powers.
MAINTAINING US-SINO RELATIONS REQUIRES THAT BOTH SIDES ACT WITH A SPIRIT OF TRUST
Xinhua news agency, October 5, 1997 [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts October 8, 1997. HEADLINE: Minister urges USA to abandon trade status reviews\\ an]VT99
The strong growth of the Asia-Pacific economies provide a good chance for cooperation between China and the United States, both of which are on the Pacific rim. The recent 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party provided a blueprint for future development in China, which will open even wider to the rest of the world, creating new opportunities for expanded economic cooperation and trade with all other countries. As Iona as both China and the United States cherish the hardwon progress and act positively and in a spirit of trust, eliminate prejudice, reduce differences and create the future together, they will push Sino-US economic and trade relations to a new level.
CHINA IS ULTRA SENSITIVE TO PERCEIVED THREATS TO ITS POWER
William T. Pendley, 1997; [retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral, is a Professor of International Relations at the Air War College in Alabama and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the East Asia/Pacific Region. Edited by Kim R. Holmes and James J. Przystup. Heritage Foundation Reports. June 2, 1997 SECTION: BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND DETERRENCE; Strategies For U.S. Relations With China; Pg. HEADLINE: CHAPTER 2; China as International Actor\\jan]VT99
Many factors underscore the fact that China has yet to attain great power status. The reality of its day-to-day relations with foreign countries rules out any immediate appearance that it has been restored to its "rightful place" on the international stage as a leading power or primary actor. At best, China has achieved status as a major regional power, holding limited roles in the global political, economic, and security spheres. This disconnect between the vision of China's role in the international system and the reality of its position adds to Beijing's hypersensitivity to pressures and perceived slights from the international community -- especially any perceived interference in its internal affairs.
INTERNAL LINKS TO KOREA SCENARIO
CHINA AND US CAN MANAGE KOREA
Tat Yan Kong & Dae Hwan Kim, Prof. Oriental & African Studies at Univ. of London- Prof. Economics at Inha University in Incheon South Korea, 1997 The Korean Peninsula in Transition, "Introduction Aspects of the Transition and Theoretical Considerations" // JAD-VT99
American relations with the other major Asian power, China, structures the room for manoevre available to North Korea. The decline of China’s strategic importance to the US since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have reactivated latent differences between the Chinese and the Americans over social order and individualism. This has reinforced the political interdependence between China and the surviving communist systems, Vietnam and North Korea. Relations between them have improved accordingly.
US CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA COOPERATION KEY TO SOLVING TENSIONS IN KOREA
Ralph Cossa and Jane Khanna, Directors of the Pacific Forum, 1997 International Affairs, "East Asia: Economic Interdependence and Regional Security", April// JC-VT99
While tensions have yet fully to subside on the Korean Peninsula, the immediate nuclear crisis has at least temporarily been defused. Pyongyang seems willing if not eager to improve relations with Washington and Tokyo, even as it remains ins reluctant to renew its once-promising dialogue with Seoul. Cooperation between the United States, South Korea and China in offering to engage North Korea in four-party talks aimed at replacing the current armistice With a permanent peace treaty also holds out promise for future progress, now that the dust caused by last autimn's North Korean submarine incident has begun to settle.
US-SINO COOPERATION CRITICAL TO SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF NORTH KOREA
James Lilley, Dir. Asian Policy Studies, former Ambassador to China, Much 20, 1996 Congressional Hcarings, Security Challenges posed by China\\MB-VT99
It seems to me also that China and the United States must work very closely - I have just come back from South Korea - to solve that terrible problem in North Korea. It is very dangerous, as General Luc has pointed out. You face a situation where you could have implosion in terms or the regime collapsing violently or turn ing to external means to desperately strike out at their neighbor. China and the United States are both very important in containing North Korea, and we have to work together on this. We have got to have high-level talks soon on military transparency. We have to discuss candidly our perception of Chinese military buildup and power projection and the so-called United States containment policy.
US-CHINA COOPERATION EQUALS KOREAN STABILITY.
Chai-Jin Lee, Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont McKenna College, 1996 China and Korea: Dynamic Relations//PK-VT99
Needless to say, it is ultimately incumbent on the leaders of both Koreas to learn from the tragic history of international victimization of Korea and to shape their own destinies toward each other and toward China and other major powers. The must desirable ways for both North and South Korea to bring about a bright future for the Korean people are to engage in bona fide dialogue and cooperation a nd to establish a viable system of checks and balances among the four major powers concerned with Korea. In view of the asymmetry of national interests and historical experiences of these powers in regard to Korea and the changing nature of policy priorities that they demonstrate toward their Korean partners, both North and South Korea should be able to use the competing external forces to build 2 mutually beneficial relationship that would eventually 211%. culminate in peaceful national reintegration. In this Context China, along with the United States, seems to have both the intention and the Capacity to provide a stable and supportive external environment for the Korean Peninsula .
TENSE RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA CREATE A VOLATILE WAR SITUATION
Daryl M. Plunk, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Asian Studies Center, 1997 direction on Asian Studies Center Backgrounder," After broken promises, time to change North Korea", No. 149, May 15, MB-VT99
Instead, relations between Seoul and Pyongyang are as strained as ever, the North's economy is in free-fall, and many of North Korea's citizens are starving. The Administration's policies, which purport to seek North-South reconciliation and North Korean economic reform and political openness, arc having the opposite impact on both counts. Concerns are mounting that the North's desperation could explode into war, or that political instability there could lead to a chaotic and violent collapse of the regime.
LACK OF KOREAN UNIFICATION INCREASES RISK OF WAR NOT ONLY WITHIN BUT AMONG. THE US AND CHINA.
Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, Research Fellows for SSAAR 1995 A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific, Adelphi Papers 299 \\ JW-VT99
Deterring war on the Korean peninsula is the most critical short-term US security interest in the region. Until unification of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the north and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south is accomplished, the risk of conflict on the peninsula is likely to increase as North Korea's communist regime struggles to maintain its ideological legitimacy and overcome a deteriorating economy. A new Korean conflict would cause substantial casualties among both South Korean and US forces, increase the risk of direct Sino-American military confrontation in North-cast Asia, and pose a direct threat to Japan.
STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, JAPAN, US, AND RUSSIA CREATE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR NUCLEAR CONFLICT.
Stephen Kirby, Dean of Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences at Manchester Metropolitan University 1996 North Korea in the New World Order "Regional Power Factors and the Nuclear Issues' jad-VT99 15
All four powers have a strategic interest in the Korean peninsula, and the nuclear issue has sharpened these interests and the importance of being involved at the centre. Differences thrown up by the nuclear problem, and by other matters external to the Korean peninsula, especially America's perceived arrogance and aspirations as the lone superpower, have given new vigour to cold war tics. But the security order in the area is still in the process or being shaped, with much depending on how the nuclear issue develops. This is primarily because of the responses or other actors in the region if it continues unabated, and the implications or these for regional security. For instance, Japan, the ROK and Taiwan could all go nuclear
NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION WOULD LEAD TO A MILITARY CRISIS.
Gerald Segal, Senior Research Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1997 Peace and Security in Northeast Asia, Nuclear Forces in Northeast Asia//JC-VT99
One of the few things that does Seem clear about the Korean problem is that North Korea is motivated primarily by worries about the survival Of its regime. It finds itself increasingly falling behind the South in all forms of competition and, most Important, in economic competition. Whether North Korea is actually acquiring nuclear weapons or not, it apparently feels that the threat of doing so seems to get American and Japanese attention. The danger is that by engaging in such a high-risk strategy of survival, it may bring about a major political and military crisis that will engulf the region.
INTERNAL LINKS TO TAIWAN SCENARIO
US-SINO RELATIONS WILL DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT TAIWAN IS WILLING TO OPEN UP TALKS WITH CHINA
'Lien Ho Pao', Taipei, in Chinese 24 Jan 98, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 31, 1998 [SECTION: Part 3 Asia-Pacific; CHINA RELATIONS; HEADLINE: Policy meeting decides now is not the time to resume cross-strait Talks. SOURCE: Source: p2\\jan]VT99
In its evaluation of the situation, Taiwan also takes into consideration the development of relations between the United States and communist China. The "Clinton-Chiang [Jiang Zemin] talks" are likely be put off until around November. The timing of both the cross-strait talks and the "Clinton-Chiang talks" also have an impact on the overall strategy. Therefore, the public's expectations for the timing of the resumption of talks may be proved wrong.
CHINA WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES SO THAT WE WILL STAY OUT OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE
Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, January 30, 1998 [HEADLINE: JAPAN IMPROVING DEFENSE TIES WITH CHINA (JAN 3 O/DY)\\j an]VT99
According to Western military sources in Beijing, the Chinese Communist Party adopted a resolution in that month to seek improved relations with Japan, after the party hailed President Jiang Zemin's U.S. visit the previous month as an epochal event. Beijing has felt compelled to seek better relations with Japan and the United States after missile drills it carried out in the Taiwan Straits in March 1996 drew two U.S. aircraft carriers and heightened tensions. Western diplomats in Beijing say China's diplomatic efforts are aimed at preventing Japan and the United States from interfering in the Taiwan issue.
TENSIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN CAN ARISE QUICKLY
James F. Hoge, Jr., Editor of Foreign Affairs, Winter 1997 [Foreign Affairs. SECTION: Pg. V HEADLINE: Editor's Note; A Test of Wills Over Taiwan. November, 1997 /December, 1997\\ an]VT99
How quickly tensions surrounding the island's future can escalate became clear in 1995 and 1996 when China mounted a campaign of intimidation that included bellicose warnings, military invasion exercises, and missile tests in the waters off Taiwan. The coordinated show of hostility was prompted by China's perception that the "renegade province" to which Chiang Kai-shek's defeated Nationalist forces retreated in 1949 was sliding into independence with U.S. acquiescence. Since 1949, the ruling Nationalists have adhered to the idea that Taiwan is part of China, but they insist reunification can be accomplished only after China becomes a democracy and a market economy. Independence as an alternative has grown significantly only in recent years.
A SINO-TAIWAN WAR WOULD AFFECT THE ENTIRE WORLD
Takashi Kawachi, September 24,1997 [Mainichi Daily HEADLINE: China still wary of Japan-US defense ties\\jan]VT99
If China, a military superpower, and one of only a handful of nations which possesses nuclear weapons, engages in an all-out war with Taiwan, an economic superpower which is frantically trying to build up its defense capabilities, this would have dire consequences not only for Japan, but also for Asia and the rest of the world.
THE US WOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN A CHINA/TAIWAN CONFLICT
RAMON MYERS, September 12, 1997 [Journal of Commerce. HEADLINE: Building a Pacific alliance\\jan]VT99
The United States has maintained a policy of ambiguity toward the dividedChina problem ever since breaking diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1978 and recognizing Beijing (and acknowledging, that Taiwan is part of China).
The United States has advocated the two Chinese sides settle their differences peacefully, warning that the use of armed force would threaten U. S. interests and elicit an American response.
TAIWAN COULD TRIGGER A US-SINO WAR
Robert A. Manning, September 28, 1997 [senior fellow at the Progressive Policy, Institute, was a State Department policy advisor from 1989-93 . Los Angeles Times. HEADLINE: THE WORLD; U.S., JAPAN DEEPEN DEFENSE TIES--AND CHINA GETS NERVOUS\\jan]VT99
But such rhetoric may have other purposes, like keeping Japan from enlarging its military horizons, wringing more economic concessions from Tokyo and constraining the expansion of the U.S.-Japan alliance, not ending it. Whatever the truth of the matter, China's real concern is Taiwan, which could trigger a direct U.S.-China military confrontation.
CHINA IS WILLING TO USE FORCE TO RECLAIM TAIWAN
ASIA PULSE, December 02,1997 [HEADLINE: BEIJING STEPS UP PRESSURE ON TAIWAN AFTER ELECTIONS\\j an]VT99
The strong showing of a pro-independence party in elections in Taiwan last weekend prompted Beijing today to issue one of its strongest warnings that it was prepared to use force to reclaim Taiwan. Foreign Ministry spokesman Tang, Guoqiang stepped up China's rhetoric on what it regards as its "renegade province", after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won 12 of 23 seats decided in city and county elections on Saturday. He repeated that the threat of force was intended against "foreign forces" seeking to achieve Taiwanese independence, but added the clear message that it would also target pro-independence forces within Taiwan. We will work hard for the peaceful reunification of the motherland but we will not renounce the use of force," Tang told a regular press briefing when asked about the election results.
CHINA IS WILLING TO USE FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN EVEN IT MEANS A MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES
Fei-Ling Wang; assistant professor of international affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, 1998 [The Washington Quarterly. Winter. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. I ; Pg. 67 HEADLINE: To Incorporate China: A New Policy for a New Era\\jan]VT99
Of course, China does not completely lack real and even ambitious demands, the most pressing of which relate to Taiwan. Developments since 1995, when Taiwan president Lee Tung-Hui visited the United States, and especially since 1996 when the Chinese military conducted massive exercises in the Taiwan Strait and Washington sent two carriers to the scene, highlighted the explosive nature of this issue. Unifying the motherland and eliminating domestic political rivalries in Taiwan would ensure the CCP political legitimacy, and they therefore constitute vital national and political interests. In fact, the CCP leadership has said it will use force to prevent Taiwanese independence even at the risk of openly opposing the U. S. military.
CHINA HAS REITERATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO TAKE TAIWAN BY FORCE
Agence France Presse, December 02, 1997 [HEADLINE: China warns force is still an option over Taiwan\\jan]VT99
China's Foreign Ministry warned Tuesday that force was still an option to recover Taiwan if the island made moves toward official independence. "We will work hard for peaceful reunification of the motherland, but we cannot renounce the use of force," spokesman Tang Guoqiang said when asked about the surprise win in local elections of Taiwan's pro-independence par-ties. He said such force would be targeted against "international and foreign forces as well as Taiwan forces advocating independence." Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which supports official independence for the island, won 12 of the 23 local administrative posts, doubling its previous share. The ruling Kuomintang party (KMT) garnered just eight constituencies, losing half its previous seats, while the remaining three were taken by independent candidates. "Whatever the outcome of the elections held in Taiwan these cannot change the fact that Taiwan is a part of China," Tang said. "Reunification is the common aspiration of people on both sides of the Strait and any attempt to create one China and one Taiwan or two Chinas is against the interests of all Chinese people and is doomed to failure," he added.
CHINA WILL NOT RENOUNCE THE USE OF FORCE IN THE DISCUSSION OF REUNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 13, 1997 [HEADLINE: Chinese president offers negotiations on Taiwan. SOURCE: Source: Xinhua news agency, Beijing, in English 0259 gmt 12 Sep 97\\jan]VT99
"All opinions and proposals can be put forward as long as they are in the interest of the reunification. The question of the reunification of the motherland should be solved by us Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait," he added. "We shall adhere to the basic principles of 'peaceful reunification' and 'one country, two systems' and the eight-point proposal on developing relations between the two sides and promoting 'or the peaceful reunification of the motherland. We shall stick to the principle of' one China' and oppose splitting, the 'independence of Taiwan', the attempt to create 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan' and any interference by foreign forces. We shall not allow any forces whatsoever to change Taiwan's status as part of China in any way," Jiang said. "We shall work for peaceful reunification, but we shall not undertake to renounce the use of force, " Jiang said, adding that this is not directed against the compatriots in Taiwan, but against the schemes of foreign forces to interfere with China's reunification and to bring about the "independence of Taiwan" .
THESIS: Before adopting the affirmative plan we should consult with Russia and ask their opinion. The consultation counterplan does that. When using that counterplan, also use this disadvantage to create a net benefit for competition.
A. AFFIRMATIVE ACTS WITHOUT CONSULTING WITH RUSSIA
B. THIS UNILATERAL ATTEMPT TO IGNORE RUSSIA IS AN EXTREMELY UNWISE POLICY
ALL POTENTIAL SITUATIONS WHERE RUSSIA IS HUMILIATED MUST BE AVOIDED
Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
At the same time, Western leaders should consider ways of avoiding actions that, without any real bearing on their countries' security, humiliate Russians by making them keenly aware how impotent they have become under democracy.
CUTTING OFF CONTACTS WITH RUSSIA IS THE WORST POLICY -- WE NEED CONSISTENT COOPERATION
Fred Hiatt, editorial page staff of The Washington Post, The Moscow Times, April 11, 1998, HEADLINE: Perils of Disengagement , acs-VT99
It's just as wrongheaded, though, to cut off contacts and aid, or threaten to do so, whenever Russia displeases U.S. policy-makers or congressmen, whether in its policy toward Iraq, Iran or Latvia. The West must keep engaging with Russia - opening markets to its new businesses, for example - to show that a nonbullying foreign policy can have rewards.
C. IF RUSSIA IS NOT INTEGRATED INTO THE GLOBAL SYSTEM, IT WILL IMPLEMENT A HARD-LINE POLICY OF LAND COLLECTION
Valery V. Tsepkalo, Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, March, 1998 /Apnil, 1998 [Foreign Affairs. SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 107. HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia \\ jan]VT99
If the West does not support integration, Russia will implement a hard-line policy of "land collection" on its southern and western flanks. It will also adopt a confrontational attitude toward Western nations and probably China; Moscow will again begin supporting any state that opposes U.S. interests. It will likely start with Muslim nations like Iran, Iraq, and Libya and groups like the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as Cuba and North Korea. The weakness of Russia's conventional forces will probably lead it to rely on veiled threats of nuclear blackmail, using the above countries and groups, among others. Such a policy will allow Moscow back into the negotiation process in the Middle East and on the Korean peninsula, marking its return to serious international policymaking. It would also mobilize and unite Islamic elements in Russia and the CIS, cutting the ground out from under Muslim separatists by casting Russia as the ally and friend of Islam. At one stroke, it would counter both the West and China, which is dealing with Muslim unrest of its own in Xinjiang province and elsewhere.