Advantage one is Ambiguity —

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0. 1AC A5
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Frydenborg ’21 — Brian E. Frydenborg (Independent Writer/Analyst; M.S. in Peace Operations, George Mason University); “NATO Is in a Cyberwar with Russia and Must Expand Article 5 to Include Cyberwarfare or Risk Losing and Diminishment;” Small Wars Journal; September 24th, 2021;
How to Revise Article 5 and the NATO Treaty Overall
With Russia’s rampant cyberwarfare only intensifying and its obvious pattern as a hostile bad-faith actor, it is absolutely necessary for a paradigm shift in the international system for deterring cyberattacks. Because NATO is the premier Western defensive alliance, crystalizing cyberwarfare’s relationship to Article 5 is a must, the only way for NATO to maintain credible collective defense in the twenty-first century. 
To this end, “or cyberattackmust be added after every occurrence of the words “armed attackin Article 5 (e.g., “The Parties agree that an armed attack or cyberattack against one or more of them…”).
In a longform, earlier version of this proposal, I have proposed a new detailed Article 15 that defines cyberwarfare in the Article 5 context and who/what would be covered. Any attacks that cause damage and harm would be included, as would digital information warfare/disinformation campaigns. Yet fairly standard espionage operations will not be included (say, China’s hacking) unless either the scale is so exceptional (as was the case with Russia’s unprecedented SolarWinds hack) or if what is hacked is weaponized or threats to weaponize that information are made.
By “weaponized,” I mean any action that tries to coerce, influence, or target publiclyTargets that would trigger Article 5 include all NATO citizens, residents, or entitiespublic sector or privateor anyone operating on NATO member state territory, as NATO cannot tolerate its territory being used for any such attack. Any attacks targeting family, friends, or connections of these folks for the same purposes would also be covered. This would apply to all state or state-sponsored cyberattacks, while terrorist or non-state actors would also be covered under certain actions but other activities would default to being handled by normal counterterrorism and/or law enforcement agencies.
Expanding Article 5 is necessary and overdue. The early twenty-first century’s second decade has been something of a Wild West, with Russia using the lawlessness of the cyber domain to its devastating effect. The time for lawlessness is over, and revising NATO’s Article 5 as suggested herein will not only clarify the rules for NATO enemies and rivals, but also for the members of a NATO Alliance itself that is in desperate need of clarity and strength on this issue. It will also make NATO once again an alliance that instills fear in the minds of Russian leaders (as it did with Stalin and subsequent Soviet leadership) who would engage in reckless acts of aggression against NATO or its states, even if “just” through cyberwarfare.

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