Advantage one is Ambiguity —



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0. 1AC A5
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Frydenborg ’21 — Brian E. Frydenborg (Independent Writer/Analyst; M.S. in Peace Operations, George Mason University); “NATO Is in a Cyberwar with Russia and Must Expand Article 5 to Include Cyberwarfare or Risk Losing and Diminishment;” Small Wars Journal; September 24th, 2021; https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/nato-cyberwar-russia-and-must-expand-article-5-include-cyberwarfare-or-risk-losing-and
NATO considers “cyber defencepart of NATO’s core task of collective defenceand has since 2014, when the Alliance first specifically articulated the possibility of invoking Article 5 in reaction to cyberattacks (but onlyon a case-by-case basis”). NATO has since “pledge[d] to ensure the Alliance keeps pace with the fast evolving cyber threat landscape and that our nations will be capable of defending themselves in cyberspace as in the air, on land and at sea,” repeatedly reiterating that Article 5 being invoked in response to a cyberattack is a possibility, including just this September 2020 and in June 2021.
Yet official working papersconferences, interviews, statements, and raising possibilities are no substitute for a concrete, clear policy, and NATO simply does not have this.
The vague idea seems to be that if a cyberattack was “serious” enough, Article 5 could be activated, but this seems myopic: death by a thousand cuts is still death and has the same effect as decapitation, so tolerating many smaller attacks, thereby transmitting a clear indication that there will not be a collective Article 5 response to them, is just bad policy. It is also most decidedly not the case for armed attacks, in which any by a nation-state or sponsored by one would trigger Article 5. Years of unrelenting cyberwarfare has done more damage to NATO than any Soviet Army did during the Cold War, in part, because of Article 5: the USSR and then Russia did not dare use armed force to strike any NATO country for fear of Article 5’s unequivocal guarantee of a collective response, even in 2015 when NATO-member Turkey shot down a Russian military jet over Syria.
Yet when it comes to cyberwarfare, NATO is practically inviting Russia to attack and get away with it, with the Alliance quite consistently demonstrating an unwillingness, even inability under its existing framework to collectively respond to Russia’s cyberaggression. As the aforementioned UK Russia report noted, “Russia is not overly concerned about individual reprisal” against its aggressive acts, including its cyberattacks, with even the U.S. demonstrably inspiring little hesitation.
Clearly, pretending cyberwarfare is not war and allowing cyberwarfare in real-world practice to be kept out of NATO’s Article 5leaving individual members states flailing independently and ineffectively against an organized, determined, and capable de facto enemy content to stand down its conventional military against NATO while unleashing its cyberunits upon it with impunityhas failed.
At the end of New York Times cybersecurity reporter Nicole Perlroth’s recent book This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends—the indispensable, terrifying, definitive account of the development of cyberwarfare and the mess in which we currently find ourselves—the author warns that “many will say” that “these…critical assignments of our time” to deter and defend ourselves from cyberwarfare “are impossible, but we have summoned the best of our scientific community, government, industry, and everyday people to overcome existential challenges before. Why can’t we do it again?…We don’t have to wait until the Big One to get going.”
As a main advantage of the West over Russia is that people like the West a lot more than Russia—materializing in close economic, diplomatic, and military ties Russia can only dream of—the easiest way for the West to face and fight this dire and metastasizing cyberthreat from Russia is by leveraging its alliances, and, most of all, this means involving NATO and doing so in a big way. 
As there is no statute of limitations on cyberattacks and the just-proposed framework not precluded by the current NATO treaty, NATO would even be in its full rights (and is overdue) to now invoke Article 5 against Russia for its cyberwarfare so that this cyberwarfare will result in far more pain for Russia than any damage it inflicts.

Specifically, that leads to attacks against United States critical infrastructure — sanctions because of Ukraine has emboldened them



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