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International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, ‘Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers’,
Canberra/Tokyo. First published November 2009. Reprinted December 2009.
For electronic copies of this report, please visit
Printing: Paragon, Canberra
Design: ZOO, Canberra
Table of contents Co-chairs’ Preface ix
Synopsis: A Comprehensive Action Agenda xv
PART I: seizing the moment 1
1. Why This Report, and Why Now 3
The Problem: A Global Threat Defying Complacency 3
The Opportunity: Renewing the Momentum for Action 5
This Commission’s Role: A Comprehensive Action Agenda 8
PART II: assessing nuclear threats and risks 11
2. The Risks from Existing Nuclear-Armed States 13
The Destructive Capabilities of Existing Weapons 13
Numbers and Classes of Existing Weapons 15
Missiles and Missile Defence 23
Alert Status of Existing Weapons 26
System Vulnerabilities 28
Attitudes to Using Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament 29
3. The Risks from New Nuclear-Armed States 31
Why Non-Proliferation Matters 31
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Under Strain 32
Risks of a Proliferation Surge 36
4. The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism 39
Possible State and Non-State Actors 39
Availability of Weapons and Material 40
Assessing the Risk of Nuclear Terrorist Attack 46
5. The Risks Associated with Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 48
Likely Scale of the Civil Nuclear Energy Renaissance 48
Assessing the Proliferation Risks of Nuclear Energy Expansion 50 PART III: formulating policy responses 57
6. Disarmament: Making Zero Thinkable 59
Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons 59
Rethinking Deterrence 61
Rethinking Other Justifications for Retaining Nuclear Weapons 68
7. Disarmament: A Two-Phase Strategy for Getting to Zero 72
Why a Two-Phase Approach is Necessary 72
The Minimization Phase 73
The Elimination Phase 76
8. Non-Proliferation: Constraining Demand and Supply 78
Limiting the Demand for Nuclear Weapons 78
Limiting the Supply of Weapons, Materials and Technology 81
9. Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 83
Improving Safeguards and Verification 83
Improving Compliance and Enforcement 87
Strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency 90
10. Strengthening Non Proliferation Disciplines Outside the NPT 93
Non-NPT Treaties and Mechanisms 93
Applying Equivalent Obligations to States now Outside the NPT 98
11. Banning Nuclear Testing 101
Importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 101
Addressing Verification and Stockpile Reliability Concerns 103
12. Limiting the Availability of Fissile Material 107
The Proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 107
Pre-Existing Stocks 110
Fissile Material in Civil Programs 111
13. Sustaining an Effective Counter-Terrorism Strategy 114
Counter-Terrorism Strategy Generally 114
Securing Loose Weapons and Material 116
“Dirty Bombs”: Improved Control of Radioactive Material 119
Nuclear Forensics 121
14. Responsible Nuclear Energy Management 124
Sharing the Benefits of Nuclear Energy 124
The Three Ss: Managing Safeguards, Security and Safety 125
Prospects for Proliferation-Resistant Technology 126
Industry as a Non-Proliferation Partner 128
15. Multilateralizing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 132
The Argument for Multilateralization 132
Assurance of Supply Proposals 134
Fuel Bank Proposals 137
Multilateral Facility Proposals 138
The Way Forward 142
PART IV: from policy to action: A comprehensive agenda 147
16. A Package for the 2010 NPT Review Conference 149
The Importance of the Review Conference 149
Updating the “Thirteen Practical Steps” on Disarmament 150
Specific Measures to Strengthen the NPT and IAEA 156
The Middle East and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones 156
17. Short Term Action Agenda: To 2012 –
Achieving Initial Benchmarks 161
Defining Short Term Objectives 163
Reducing Weapon Numbers: U.S. and Russian Leadership 165
Multilateral Disarmament: Preparing the Ground 167
Nuclear Doctrine: Beginning to Limit the Role of
Nuclear Weapons 172
Force Postures: Movement on De-alerting and Deployment 178
North Korea and Iran 182
18. Medium Term Action Agenda: To 2025 – Getting to the
Minimization Point 186
Defining Medium Term Objectives 187
Reducing Weapon Numbers 189
Parallel Security Issues: Missiles, Space, Biological and
Conventional Weapons 195
Nuclear Doctrine and Force Postures: Consolidating Change 199
Other Elements in the Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament Agenda 200
19. Longer Term Action Agenda: Beyond 2025 – Getting to Zero 203
Defining “Zero”: The Nature of the Task 204
General Conditions for Moving from Minimization
to Elimination 205
Overcoming Specific Concerns of Particular States 209
20. Mobilizing and Sustaining Political Will 213
The Elements of Political Will: Leadership, Knowledge,
Strategy and Process 213
Identifying the Key Actors 219
Focusing the Campaign: A Nuclear Weapons Convention? 222
Sustaining the Momentum: An Ongoing Monitoring
Notes and Sources 233
Annex A: Commission Recommendations 251
Annex B: Members of the Commission 265
Annex c: How the Commission Worked 273
Index 283 BOXES
2-1 Impact of Strategic Nuclear Bombs on London and Mumbai 14
2-2 Nuclear Arsenals 2009 20
3-1 Key Elements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 33
4-1 Basic Nuclear Weapon Designs: “Gun” and “Implosion” 41
4-2 Impact of Terrorist Nuclear Explosions in London
and Mumbai 43
5-1 Reactors Planned, Proposed and Under Construction 2009 49
5-2 The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Basic Terminology Non-Specialists
Need to Know 53
7-1 The Comprehensive Action Agenda: Timelines 73
10-1 Major Non-Proliferation Measures Complementing the NPT 95
13-1 Priority Issues for the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit 115
16-1 “A New International Consensus on Action for
Nuclear Disarmament” 153
16-2 Nuclear Weapon Free Zones 157
17-1 The Short Term Action Agenda – To 2012 161
18-1 The Medium Term Action Agenda – To 2025 186
19-1 The Longer Term Action Agenda – Beyond 2025 203 Co-Chairs’ Preface
Eliminating nuclear weapons, and all the other security threats and risks associated with the use and misuse of nuclear energy, is as daunting a policy challenge as it is possible to imagine. Showing how to destroy the curse but retain the blessing of nuclear energy is not the easiest task that we, or our fellow Commissioners, have ever undertaken.
The nuclear problems the world has to address are immensely large, complex and difficult. Every state with nuclear weapons has to be persuaded to give them up. States without nuclear weapons have to neither want nor be able to acquire them. Terrorists have to be stopped from buying, stealing, building or using them. And in a world where, for good reason, the number of power reactors may double in the next twenty years, the risks associated with purely peaceful uses of nuclear energy have to be effectively countered.
Sceptics abound, telling us that nuclear disarmament, in particular, would be so hard to achieve it is pointless even to try. More troublingly, there are still voices saying that it is dangerous to try, because a world without nuclear weapons would be less safe than the one we have now. And with governments, high-level panels and commissions, think tanks and researchers working over these issues since the dawn of the nuclear age, we know that brand new ideas and approaches are in short supply.
But try to tackle these issues we must. No weapon ever conceived is as terribly indiscriminate and inhumane in its impact as an atomic or hydrogen bomb: no one listening, as we have, to the harrowing testimony of the hibakusha – the surviving victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki – could ever want to see their experience repeated. And nuclear weapons are the only ones ever invented that have the capacity to wholly destroy life on this planet.
There remains no simpler or more compelling articulation of the case for action than that first put by the Canberra Commission over a decade ago: so long as any state has nuclear weapons, others will want them; so long as any such weapons remain, it defies credibility that they will not one day be used, by accident or miscalculation or design; and any such use would be catastrophic for our world as we know it.
Nuclear threats and climate change are the two great global issues of our age, and both defy complacency. In responding to these problems, business-as-usual is simply not an option. Policies must change, and attitudes must change. Above all, there has to be tackled head-on the mindset, still tenacious, that the clock cannot be turned back, that nuclear weapons will be around forever, and that they continue to have a unique deterrent utility that somehow outweighs their disastrous downside. A very different idea has to become equally firmly embedded in the minds of policymakers and all those in the wider community who influence them: nuclear weapons may not be able to be uninvented, but in a sane and civilized world they can, and must, be outlawed.
When we were assigned the task of leading this Commission in July 2008, we saw its task as being primarily to energize a high-level international debate – to try to reverse the sleepwalk into which international nuclear policy had largely fallen since the burst of arms control energy that accompanied and immediately followed the end of the Cold War, and in particular to try to ensure that there would be no repetition at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review (NPT) Conference scheduled for May 2010 of the failure of its predecessor in 2005, and the World Summit of that year, to agree on anything at all.
There had been the beginnings of a new debate with the publication of the Shultz-Perry-Kissinger-Nunn “gang of four” article in January 2007, arguing from a hard-headed realist perspective that nuclear weapons had outlived any usefulness they might have had, but in mid-2008 global policymakers were still not focusing. By the beginning of 2009, however, things had changed. Newly elected U.S. President Barack Obama launched a series of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security initiatives – to which President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia, in particular, was immediately responsive – and nuclear issues were squarely back on the global agenda.
With the long-needed international debate well and truly now under way, this Commission’s role had to be more than just another call to attention. The need now is not just to identify the problems and point in the general direction of the right solutions. It is to bring all the complex, inter-related threads together; analyse in rather more detail both the opportunities and constraints that would be involved in moving forward; and try to map with rather more precision who should be doing what, when and how in responding to the whole range of nuclear threats and risks with which the world is now confronted. Central to our approach is the sense that the debate needed to focus squarely on specific action plans – short, medium and longer term – and that, above all, those plans have to be realistic. Idealistic, yes; pushing the envelope beyond most governments’ comfort zones, yes; but also pragmatic, recognizing the many obstacles – political, practical and technical – that would need to be surmounted, and adjusting time-frames and ambitions accordingly.
It will be for others to judge how well this report succeeds in meeting these objectives. Some will undoubtedly see us as not being ambitious enough; others as excessively so. What we hope will be clearly apparent to everyone is the sense of urgency we feel about the need to tackle the problems here described, and our determination to keep clearly in sight the ultimate goal. That must be not to merely reduce or minimize nuclear threats and risks, but to eliminate them completely. The international community can only rest when we have achieved a world without nuclear weapons, and be confident that it will remain that way.
The consensus text on which we have agreed reflects our shared view of what is both desirable and politically achievable in the world as we know it today and want it to be. Although participating in their personal capacity, and not as representatives of their respective governments, Commissioners naturally brought to the table many different professional, policy and national interest perspectives, and the text on which we have agreed does not necessarily reflect in every respect their preferred positions. But we knew we could not begin to expect consensus in the wider international community on these issues if we could not find it among ourselves.
That the report we now present is a unanimous one is a tribute to the commitment brought to this effort by all our fellow Commissioners. We express our deep gratitude to them for the extraordinary qualities of knowledge, experience and judgment they brought to the preparation of this report over a year of long and often gruelling meetings. One very sad moment in the life of the Commission came with the news in December 2008 of the death of our colleague Ali Alatas, and we take this opportunity to pay particular tribute to this extraordinarily gifted and influential statesman, who we know passionately shared our dedication to achieving a nuclear weapon free world.
We have many others to thank, beginning with Australian and Japanese Prime Ministers Kevin Rudd and Yasuo Fukuda who had the vision to initiate this Commission, and the willingness to give it the ongoing support (continued by the latter’s successors Taro Aso and Yukio Hatoyama) to ensure that it could really add value to the international nuclear debate. We also thank Foreign Ministers Stephen Smith, Masahiko Koumura, Hirofumi Nakasone and Katsuya Okada, for placing staff of their ministries at the Commission’s disposal when so many other issues, from climate change and counter-terrorism to the global economic crisis, were demanding their attention. Japan and Australia have special interests in nuclear policy – as respectively the only country to have suffered the horror of nuclear attack, and the possessor of the world’s largest reserves of uranium, the source of nuclear fuel, which carries with it the responsibility to ensure that this resource is not misused – and it is the Commission’s hope that, with the support of the perhaps unusual combination of these two governments behind it, our report will have real and continuing traction.
The Commission could not have begun to have done its work effectively without the tireless and professional efforts of its Secretary, Ian Biggs, the Australian Secretariat he led within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and on the Japanese side Toshio Sano and his team within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The organizational demands involved in putting together multiple Commission and Regional Meetings all over the world and physically producing a report of this length, all in just over a year, were intense almost beyond measure; but our joint team rose to the challenge admirably.
The research and consultations on which this report is based, and the way in which we went about our task, are described in detail in Annex C, “How the Commission Worked”, which also identifies all the key individuals, including those in the Canberra and Tokyo Secretariats, from whose help we benefited. We profited enormously from the advice and input of the distinguished members of our Advisory Board, nearly all of whom participated in one or more of our full Commission meetings; the Associated Research Centres, which helped us greatly both in marshalling the necessary material and arguments and, where their home countries were involved, in organizing our crucial Regional Meetings; and our NGO Advisers, who ensured that we were fully alert to civil society as well as government sentiment as we went about our task. We are particularly grateful to those of our members, advisers and staff who, at our request, produced the initial drafts of different sections of the report from which we wrote the Co-chairs’ text: Commissioners Alexei Arbatov and François Heisbourg; Advisory Board members and research consultants John Carlson, George Perkovich, Nobuyasu Abe, Lawrence Freedman, Shinsuke Kondo, Martine Letts, Patricia Lewis and V.R. Raghavan; Research Coordinator Ken Berry; Secretariat staff Ian Biggs, Toshio Sano and John Tilemann; and Australian experts Malcolm Coxhead and Steve McIntosh.
The Commission was intended to build upon, and take further, the work of distinguished earlier commissions and panels, and we acknowledge particularly in this respect the important reports of the 1996 Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the 1999 Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, the 2004 UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, the 2006 Blix Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, and the 2008 Zedillo Commission of Eminent Persons on the future of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Many of our Commissioners, Advisory Board members and researchers were associated in one way or another with these earlier enterprises, and we have learned much from them.
Also deserving our warmest gratitude are all the participants in our Regional Meetings, who provided a wonderfully rich flow of information, ideas and diverse political perspectives, as well as an excellent real-world sounding board against which to test our own evolving ideas; the industry representatives who participated in our consultation in Moscow in June 2009, for enabling us to test the ground truth of our approach to the civil nuclear-energy sector; the hibakusha, or survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombs, who movingly and memorably, in Washington and Hiroshima, told Commissioners of their experiences; the International Crisis Group and the University of Melbourne and the Japanese Diet, for allowing each of us, respectively, to devote time to this Commission while still in their employ; and the Australian and Japanese Ambassadors, High Commissioners, Chargés d’Affaires and missions in so many capitals, for their hospitality, programming skills and contacts as the Commission has moved around the world over the last year.
We thank finally each other, and again our fellow Commissioners, for believing in a world without nuclear weapons, and working tirelessly to make it both believable and achievable for policymakers worldwide.
Yoriko Kawaguchi Co-chairs
November 2009 synopsis:
A COMPREHENSIVE ACTION AGENDA
A. WHY THIS REPORT, AND WHY NOW
Nuclear weapons are the most inhumane weapons ever conceived, inherently indiscriminate in those they kill and maim, and with an impact deadly for decades. They are the only weapons ever invented that have the capacity to wholly destroy life on this planet, and the arsenals we now possess are able to do so many times over. The problem of nuclear weapons is at least equal to that of climate change in terms of gravity – and much more immediate in its potential impact.
So long as any state has nuclear weapons, others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain, it defies credibility that they will not one day be used, by accident, miscalculation or design. And any such use would be catastrophic. It is sheer luck that the world has escaped such catastrophe until now.
Maintaining the status quo is not an option. The threats and risks associated with the failure to persuade existing nuclear-armed states to disarm, to prevent new states acquiring nuclear weapons, to stop any terrorist actor gaining access to such weapons, and to properly manage a rapid expansion in civil nuclear energy, defy complacency. They must be tackled with much more conviction and effectiveness than the world has managed so far.
There have been many major international commission, panel, research institute and think tank reports addressing these issues. What makes this report distinctive is, hopefully, its timeliness; comprehensiveness; global consultative reach; attention to pragmatic realities as well as ambitious ideals; intended accessibility to non-specialist policymakers; and strong action orientation, reflected in the short, medium and longer term action agendas that bind together its specific policy proposals.
With new U.S. and Russian leadership seriously committed to disarmament action, there is a new opportunity – the first since the immediate post-World War II and post-Cold War years – to halt, and reverse, the nuclear weapons tide once and for all. This report describes, not just rhetorically but in the detail that global policymakers need, how that opportunity can and should be seized. [Section 1]
B. NUCLEAR THREATS AND RISKS
Existing Nuclear-Armed States. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War there are at least 23,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, with a combined blast capacity equivalent to 150,000 Hiroshima bombs. The U.S. and Russia together have over 22,000, and France, the UK, China, India, Pakistan and Israel around 1,000 between them. Nearly half of all warheads are still operationally deployed, and the U.S. and Russia each have over 2,000 weapons on dangerously high alert, ready to be launched immediately – within a decision window of just 4-8 minutes for each president – in the event of perceived attack. The command and control systems of the Cold War years were repeatedly strained by mistakes and false alarms. With more nuclear-armed states now, and more system vulnerabilities, the near miracle of no nuclear exchange cannot continue in perpetuity. [Section 2]
New Nuclear-Armed States. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) system has been under severe strain in recent years, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) struggling with verification, compliance and enforcement failures, and backward steps occurring in the world’s most volatile regions. India and Pakistan joined the undeclared Israel as fully-fledged nuclear-armed states in 1998; North Korea is now likely to have some half-dozen nuclear explosive devices; and Iran probably now has weapon-making capability, with real potential for generating a regional proliferation surge should it choose to cross the weaponization red-line. [Section 3]
Nuclear Terrorism. Terrorist groups exist with the intent, and capacity, to create massive nuclear destruction. With manageable technology long in the public domain, and black market sourcing, a Hiroshima-sized nuclear device could possibly be detonated from a truck or small boat inside any major city. A “dirty bomb”, combining conventional explosives with radioactive materials like medical isotopes, would be a much easier option: while not generating anything like the casualties of a fission or fusion bomb, it would have a psychological impact at least equal to 9/11. [Section 4]
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.The likely rapid expansion of civil nuclear energy in the decades ahead, not least in response to climate-change concerns, will present some additional proliferation and security risks. Particularly if accompanied by the construction of new national facilities for enrichment at the front end of the fuel cycle and reprocessing at the back end, it could mean a great deal more fissile material becoming potentially available for destructive purposes. [Section 5]
C. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
Delegitimizing nuclear weapons. The critical need is to finally transform perceptions of the role and utility of nuclear weapons, from occupying a central place in strategic thinking to being seen as quite marginal, and ultimately wholly unnecessary. There are good answers to all the familiar deterrence and other justifications for retaining nuclear weapons.
It is neither defensible nor sustainable for some states to argue that nuclear weapons are an indispensable, legitimate and open-ended guarantor of their own and allies’ security, but that others have no right to acquire them to protect their own perceived security needs.
“Extended deterrence” does not have to mean extended nuclear deterrence. [Section 6]
A phased approach. Achieving a nuclear weapon free world will be a long, complex and formidably difficult process, most realistically pursued as a two-phase process, with minimization the immediate goal and elimination the ultimate one. [Section 7]
Short term (to 2012) and medium term (to 2025) efforts should focus on achieving as soon as possible, and no later than 2025, a “minimization point” characterised by very low numbers of warheads (less than 10 per cent of present arsenals), agreed “no first use” doctrine, and force deployments and alert status reflecting that doctrine. [Sections 17, 18]
Analysis and debate should commence now on the conditions necessary to move from the minimization point to elimination, even if a target date for getting to zero cannot at this stage be credibly specified. [Section 19]
Action Consensus. The 2010 NPT Review Conference should agree on a 20-point statement, “A New International Consensus for Action on Nuclear Disarmament”, updating and extending the “Thirteen Practical Steps” agreed in 2000. [16.6-11; Box 16-1]
Numbers. No later than 2025 U.S. and Russian arsenals should be reduced to a total of 500 nuclear warheads each, with at least no increases, and desirably significant reductions, in the arsenals – now totalling some 1,000 warheads – of the other nuclear-armed states. A global maximum of 2,000 warheads would represent a more than 90 per cent reduction in present arsenals. [ 18.1-3]
All nuclear-armed states should now explicitly commit not toincrease the number of their nuclear weapons. [17.15-16]
Doctrine. Pending the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, every nuclear-armed state should make as soon as possible, and no later than 2025, an unequivocal “no first use” (NFU) declaration. [17.28]
If not prepared to go so far now, each such state – and in particular the U.S. in its Nuclear Posture Review – should at the very least accept the principle that the “sole purpose” of possessing nuclear weapons is to deter others from using such weapons against that state or its allies.
Allied states affected by such declarations should be given firm assurances that they will not be exposed to other unacceptable risks, including from biological and chemical weapons. [17.28-32]
New and unequivocal negative security assurances (NSAs) should be given by all nuclear-armed states, supported by binding Security Council resolution, that they will not use nuclear weapons against NPT-compliant non-nuclear weapon states.[17.33-39]
Force Deployment and Alert Status. Changes should be made as soon as possible to ensure that, while remaining demonstrably survivable to a disarming first strike, nuclear forces are not instantly useable. Stability should be maximized by deployments and launch alert status being transparent. [7.12-15; 17.40-50]
The decision-making fuse for the launch of any nuclear weapons must be lengthened, and weapons taken off launch-on-warning alert as soon as possible. [17.43]
Parallel Security Issues.Missile defence should be revisited, with a view to allowing the further development of theatre ballistic missile defence systems, including potential joint operations in areas of mutual concern, but setting severe limits on strategic ballistic missile defences. [2.30-34; 18.28-30]
Conventional arms imbalances, both quantitative and qualitative, between the nuclear-armed states, and in particular the relative scale of U.S. capability, need to be seriously addressed if this issue is not to become a significant impediment to future bilateral and multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. [18.34-36]
Continuing strong efforts should be made to develop more effective ways of defending against potential biological attacks including building a workable verification regime, and to promote universal adherence to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. [17.29; 18.32-33]
Ongoing attempts to prevent an arms race in outer space (PAROS) should be strongly supported. [18.31]
Testing. All states that have not already done so should sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) unconditionally and without delay. U.S. ratification is a critically needed circuit-breaker: it would have an immediate impact on other hold-out states, and add major new momentum to both disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.
Pending the CTBT’s entry into force, all states should continue to refrain from nuclear testing. [Section 11]
Availability of Fissile Material. All nuclear-armed states should declare or maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapon purposes pending the negotiation and entry into force as soon as possible of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
On the question of pre-existing stocks, a phased approach should be adopted, with the first priority a cap on production; then an effort to ensure that all fissile material other than in weapons becomes subject to irreversible, verified non-explosive use commitments; and with fissile material released through dismantlement being brought under these commitments as weapon reductions are agreed.
As an interim step, all nuclear-armed states should voluntarily declare their fissile material stocks and the amount they regard as excess to their weapons needs, place such excess material under IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable, and convert it as soon as possible to forms that cannot be used for nuclear weapons. [Section 12]
D. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF NON-PROLIFERATION
Nuclear non-proliferation efforts should focus both on the demand side – persuading states that nuclear weapons will not advance their national security or other interests – and the supply side, through maintaining and strengthening a comprehensive array of measures designed to make it as difficult as possible for states to buy or build such weapons.
NPT Safeguards and Verification. All states should accept the application of the IAEA Additional Protocol. To encourage universal take-up, acceptance of it should be a condition of all nuclear exports. [9.7]
The Additional Protocol and its annexes should be updated and strengthened to make clear the IAEA’s right to investigate possible weaponization activity, and by adding specific reference to dual-use items, reporting on export denials, shorter notice periods and the right to interview specific individuals. [9.8-9]
NPT Compliance and Enforcement. In determining compliance, the IAEA should confine itself essentially to technical criteria, applying them with consistency and credibility, and leaving the political consequences for the Security Council to determine. [9.15]
The UN Security Council should severely discourage withdrawal from the NPT by making it clear that this will be regarded as prima facie a threat to international peace and security, with all the punitive consequences that may follow from that under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. [9.20]
A state withdrawing from the NPT should not be free to use for non-peaceful purposes nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired while party to the NPT. Any such material provided before withdrawal should so far as possible be returned, with this being enforced by the Security Council. [9.21-22]
Strengthening the IAEA. The IAEA should make full use of the authority already available to it, including special inspections, and states should be prepared to strengthen its authority as deficiencies are identified. [9.24]
The IAEA should be given a one-off injection of funds to refurbish the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory; a significant increase in its regular budget support, without a “zero real growth” constraint; and sufficient security of future funding to enable effective medium to long term planning. [9.25-27]
Non-NPT Treaties and Mechanisms. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should develop a criteria-based approach to cooperation agreements with states outside the NPT, taking into account factors such as ratification of the CTBT, willingness to end unsafeguarded fissile material production, and states’ record in securing nuclear facilities and materials and controlling nuclear-related exports. [10.3-9]
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) should be reconstituted within the UN system as a neutral organization to assess intelligence, coordinate and fund activities, and make both generic and specific recommendations or decisions concerning the interdiction of suspected materials being carried to or from countries of proliferation concern. [10.10-12]
Extending Obligations to Non-NPT States. Recognising the reality that the three nuclear-armed states now outside the NPT – India, Pakistan and Israel – are not likely to become members any time soon, every effort should be made to achieve their participation in parallel instruments and arrangements which apply equivalent non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. [10.13-16]
Providedthey satisfy strong objective criteria demonstrating commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, and sign up to specific future commitments in this respect, these states should have access to nuclear materials and technology for civilian purposes on the same basis as an NPT member. [10.17]
These states should participate in multilateral disarmament negotiations on the same basis as the nuclear-weapon state members of the NPT, and not be expected to accept different treatment because of their non-membership of that treaty. [10.18]
Priorities for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The primary focus should be on reaching agreement on:
a new 20-point statement, “A New International Consensus for Action on Nuclear Disarmament”, updating and extending the “Thirteen Practical Steps” agreed in 2000;
measures to strengthen NPT safeguards and verification, compliance and enforcement, and the IAEA (as above);
forward movement on the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, with the UN Secretary-General convening an early conference of all relevant states to address creative and fresh ways to implement the 1995 resolution;
strengthened implementation of nuclear security measures (see Meeting Terrorism Challenge below); and
further support for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. [Section 16]
E. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Effectively countering terrorism of any kind involves a complex mix of nationally and internationally coordinated protection and policing strategies (most immediately important in dealing with the threat of nuclear terrorism), and also political, peacebuilding and psychological strategies (necessary to address the underlying causes of terrorist behaviour).
At the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, and in related policy deliberations, the main need is to focus on the effective implementation of existing agreed measures rather than the development of new ones. [Section 13; Box 13-1]
All states should agree to take effective measures to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and facilities, including by adopting and implementing the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, accelerating delivery of the Cooperative Threat Reduction and associated programs worldwide, and making a greater commitment to international capacity building and information sharing. [13.5-16]
On the control of material useable for “dirty bombs”, further efforts need to be made to cooperatively implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, with assistance to states in updating legislation and licensing practice and promoting awareness among users.[13.17-21]
Strong support should be given to the emerging science of nuclear forensics, designed to identify the sources of materials found in illicit trafficking or used in nuclear explosions. [13.22-25]
F. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY
The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should continue to be strongly supported as one of the three fundamental pillars of the NPT, along with disarmament and non-proliferation. Increased resources should be provided, including through the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme, to assist developing states in taking full advantage of peaceful nuclear energy for human development.
Proliferation resistance should be endorsed by governments and industry as an essential objective in the design and operation of nuclear facilities, and promoted through both institutional and technical measures – neither is sufficient without the other. [Section 14]
Nuclear Energy Management. Support should be given to the initiative launched at the 2008 Hokkaido Toyako G8 Summit for international cooperation on nuclear energy infrastructure, designed to raise awareness worldwide of the importance of the three Ss – safeguards, security and safety – and assist countries concerned in developing the relevant measures. [14.4-6]
New technologies for spent fuel treatment should be developed to avoid current forms of reprocessing altogether. [12.26]
The increasing use of plutonium recycle, and the prospective introduction of fast neutron reactors, must be pursued in ways which enhance non-proliferation objectives and avoid adding to proliferation and terrorism risks. [14.9-15]
International measures such as spent fuel take-back arrangements by fuel suppliers, are desirable to avoid increasing spent fuel accumulations in a large number of states. [14.13]
Multilateralizing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle – in particular through fuel banks and multilateral management of enrichment, reprocessing and spent fuel storage facilities – should be strongly supported. Such arrangements would play an invaluable role in building global confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and provide an important foundation for a world free of nuclear weapons, for which a necessary requirement will be multilateral verification and control of all sensitive fuel cycle activities. [Section 15]
G. MOBILIZING AND SUSTAINING POLITICAL WILL
The will to do something difficult, sensitive or expensive will rarely be a given in international or domestic politics. It usually has to be painfully and laboriously constructed, case by case, context by context, with four main elements needing to come together:
leadership: without which inertia will always prevail – top down (from the major nuclear-armed states, particularly the U.S. and Russia), from peer groups (like-minded states worldwide) and bottom up (from civil society);
knowledge: both specialist and general, of the nature, magnitude and urgency of the nuclear problem: requiring better education and training in schools and universities, and stronger advocacy directed to policymakers, and those in the media and elsewhere who most influence them;
strategy: having a confident sense that there is a productive way forward: not just general objectives, but realistic action plans with detailed paths mapped and target benchmarks set; and
process: having the institutional and organisational means at hand – “campaign treaties”, or other research and advocacy structures – to advance the relevant strategy in practice. [Section 20]
Nuclear Weapons Convention. Work should commence now, supported by interested governments, on further refining and developing the concepts in the model convention now in circulation, making its provisions as workable and realistic as possible, with the objective of having a fully-worked through draft available to inform and guide multilateral disarmament negotiations as they gain momentum. [20.38-44]
Report Card. To help sustain political will over time, a regular “report card” should be published in which a distinguished international panel, with appropriately professional and broad based research support, would evaluate the performance of both nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states against the action agendas identified in this report. [20.49-50]
Monitoring and Advocacy Centre. Consideration should be given to the establishment of a “Global Centre on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament” to act as a focal point and clearing house for the work being done on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues by many different institutions and organizations in many different countries, to provide research and advocacy support both for like-minded governments and for civil society organisations, and to prepare the “report card” described above. [20.51-54]
THE COMPREHENSIVE ACTION AGENDA
THE SHORT TERM ACTION AGENDA TO 2012: ACHIEVING INITIAL BENCHMARKS
Early agreement on a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on treaty, with the U.S. and Russia agreeing to deep reductions in deployed strategic weapons, addressing the issue of strategic missile defence and commencing negotiations on further deep cuts in all classes of weapons.
Early movement on nuclear doctrine, with all nuclear-armed states declaring at least that the sole purpose of retaining the nuclear weapons they have is to deter others from using such weapons against them or their allies (while giving firm assurances to such allies that they will not be exposed to unacceptable risk from other sources, including in particular chemical and biological weapons).
All nuclear-armed states to give strong negative security assurances to complying non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, supported by binding Security Council resolution, that they will not use nuclear weapons against them.
Early action on nuclear force postures, with particular attention to the negotiated removal to the extent possible of weapons from “launch-on-warning” status.
Early commitment by all nuclear-armed states to not increasing their nuclear arsenals.
Prepare the ground for a multilateral disarmament process by all nuclear-armed states conducting relevant studies; engaging in strategic dialogues with the U.S., Russia and each other; and commencing a joint dialogue within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament work program.
A positive outcome for the May 2010 NPT Review Conference, with member states reaching agreement on measures to strengthen the NPT regime, including improved safeguards, verification, compliance and enforcement; measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the IAEA; “A New International Consensus for Action on Nuclear Disarmament” statement on disarmament issues; and measures to advance the implementation of the Middle East and other existing and proposed Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.
Satisfactory negotiated resolution of the North Korea and Iran nuclear program problems.
Movement toward strengthening non-proliferation regimes outside the NPT, and applying equivalent disciplines to NPT non-members.
On Both Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
Bring into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
Conclude negotiations on an Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
On Nuclear Security
Bring into force the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, accelerate implementation of the cooperative threat reduction and associated programs designed to secure dangerous nuclear weapons, materials and technology worldwide, and achieve greater commitment to international capacity building and information sharing.
On Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
Movement toward greater multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle, and government-industry cooperation on proliferation-resistant technologies and other measures designed to reduce any risks associated with the expansion of civil nuclear energy.
Promotion of international cooperation on nuclear energy infrastructure to raise awareness worldwide of the importance of the three Ss – safeguards, security and safety – and assist countries concerned in developing relevant measures.
THE MEDIUM TERM ACTION AGENDA TO 2025:
GETTING TO THE MINIMIZATION POINT
Progressive achievement of interim disarmament objectives, culminating by 2025 in a “minimization point” characterized by:
low numbers: a world with no more than 2,000 nuclear warheads (less than 10 per cent of today’s arsenals);
agreed doctrine: every nuclear-armed state committed to no first use;
credible force postures: verifiable deployments and alert status reflecting that doctrine.
Progressive resolution of parallel security issues likely to impact on nuclear disarmament negotiations:
missile delivery systems and strategic missile defence;
space based weapons systems;
conventional arms imbalances.
Development and building of support for a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention to legally underpin the ultimate transition to a nuclear weapon free world.
Complete implementation (to extent already not achieved by 2012) of short term objectives crucial for both disarmament and non proliferation:
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in force;
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiated and in force, and a further agreement negotiated to put all fissile material not in weapons under international safeguards;
Measures to strengthen the NPT regime and the IAEA agreed and in force;
Nuclear security measures in force, and cooperative threat reduction and associated programs fully implemented;
Progressive implementation of measures to reduce the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of civil nuclear energy.
THE LONGER TERM ACTION AGENDA BEYOND 2025:
GETTING TO ZERO
Create political conditions, regionally and globally, sufficiently cooperative and stable for the prospect of major war or aggression to be so remote that nuclear weapons are seen as having no remaining deterrent utility.
Create the military conditions in which conventional arms imbalances, missile defence systems or any other national or intergovernmental-organisation capability is not seen as so inherently destabilizing as to justify the retention of a nuclear deterrent capability.
Create verification conditions that will ensure confidence that any violation of the prohibition of nuclear weapons would be readily detected.
Create the international legal regime and enforcement conditions that will ensure that any state breaching its prohibition obligations not to retain, acquire or develop nuclear weapons will be effectively penalized.
Create fuel cycle management conditions that will ensure complete confidence that no state has the capacity to misuse uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing for weapons development purposes.
Create personnel oversight conditions to ensure confidence that individuals’ know-how in the design and building of nuclear weapons will not be misapplied in violation of prohibition obligations.
ABACC Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
DUPIC Direct Use of Pressurized Water Reactor Spent Fuel in CANDU reactor
FAS Federation of American Scientists
FMCI Fissile Material Control Initiative
FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
G8 Group of Eight (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States)
G-20 Group of Twenty (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and the European Union)
GCR2P Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
GICNT Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
GIF Generation IV International Forum
GLCM ground-launched cruise missile
GNEP Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
GWe gigawatts (billion watts) electrical
HEU high enriched uranium
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAN International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
ICJ International Court of Justice
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMS CTBT International Monitoring System
INF Treaty Intermediate and Short Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
IRBM intermediate range ballistic missile
ISIS Institute for Science and International Security