The next president could repeal an xo and the military would just ignore it.
Pope 11 [Robert S. Pope, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Former Research Fellow, Belfer International Security Program, 2009–2010 Interagency Task Forces The Right Tools for the Job Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2011]
Large changes to the national security system above the single agency or department level would most certainly require action by the president and Congress. Some have argued that a presidential executive order would be sufficient to enact the proposed reforms.93 While an executive order might change the interagency system during the current administration, history indicates it would be unlikely to remain under the next president.94 For example, President Clinton’s new process for interagency reconstruction and stabilization operations, described in Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD-56), did not outlast his presidency, nor was itgenerally followed while he was in office.95 Nor does an executive order presuppose any support from Congress, which funds the executive branch agencies. Because political power in Congress isoften strongly tied to the large sums of money associated with the defense budget, Congress will certainly want to be involved in any reforms that change the national security structure. The CSIS “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” study team noted: “The role of Congress in the process is the most crucial determinant of the prospects for a reform effort. The recommendations that flow from congressionally mandated groups, commissions, or blue ribbon panels are more likely to lead to lasting changes than efforts launched exclusively at the executive branch level.”96 Enduring change comes from legislation. Examples include the 1947 National Security Act which created, among other things, the National Security Council and the Department of Defense; the 1986 GoldwaterNichols Act which created the joint military team; the 2002 act which created the Department of Homeland Security; and the 2004 act which created the office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Object fiat bad – moots the 1ac since we can’t generate offense against the aff’s action. Produces a chilling effect that means we don’t discuss the core of the topic.