Cooperation is only a guise for controlling an invisible enemy. Liberal democratic rhetoric is just a cover up for western, imperial truth.
Spanos in 2K
(William, V. Professor at Bingham, “America’s Shadow: an anatomy of empire, page 154-155, MDA)
In thus overdetermining the spectrality of the invisible "enemy," this baffled writing, which would come to terms with the event of Vietnam, betrays what a purely political or economic analysis of this war, in its reliance on the disciplinary imperatives of positive "science," is precluded from attending to. It does not simply disclose the blindness to alterity — to the Other, the lack, the difference, the trace, that is, the Nothing — of the imperial "truth" discourse informing this writing. As the grotesquely rigorous reasoning of the last passage makes chillingly clear, it also discloses the unthought violence that informs the logical economy of its narrative.50 The response of the American Mission to the "de-structive" strategy of the elusive Vietnamese Other was not to readjust its "European" military tactics of decidability to a kind of warfare in which the spectral enemy was always hauntingly invisible and unknowable, in which, in other words, the differential Other refused to obey the Western rules of warfare. The American Mission, that is to say — and it is important to emphasize this — did not reorient its Western logocentric concept of war in the face of an enemy that refused to answer to the fundamental epistemic imperatives of the European Enlightenment: those emanating from the grounding principle of differentiation (within a larger identical structure). I mean by this last, the knowledge-producing disciplinary table (uniforms, insignia, rank, and so on) that would distinguish soldiers from civilians (and women and children) and its linear/circular impeVietnam and the Pax Americana 155 rial tactical geometries that would render the enemy's moves locatable, predictable, and masterable. On the contrary, the American response to these unexpected and psychologically and practically baffling conditions precipitated by the enemy's refusal to adhere to the structural imperatives of the hitherto self-evident liberal democratic narrative was — predictably — reactive. As is well known (despite the official effort to repress this knowledge), the Pentagon managers and the American Mission in Saigon simply substituted one European form of warfare for another, the frontal assault that would end in the decisive battle for a war of attrition. The "body count," it was hoped, would eventually deplete the spectral numbers of the Vietnamese Other's army to — in a telling locution — the point of no return. True to this unrelenting American will to convert the spectral to verifiable numbers (tabulation), this technologization (and routinizing) of death — Caputo refers to his soul-destroying duties as "Regimental Casualty Reporting Officer" as keeping "Wheeler's [his commanding officer's] Scoreboard" (RV^ 159)51 —the American Mission retaliated by unleashing a technological firepower against the recalcitrantly invisible and undifferentiated Other unprecedented in (nonatomic) military history: We took space back quickly, expensively, with total panic and close to maximum brutality. Our machine was devastating. And versatile. It could do everything but stop. As one American major said, in a successful attempt at attaining history, "We had to destroy Ben Tre in order to save it."52
Link – International Agreements
The Law is an extension of colonialism – the law justifies bare life, violence and oppression
(Nicholas. Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University. Law, Property, The Frontier, Violence: the Survey, and the Grid Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 93, No. 1, March, pp. 121-141, Published by Taylor & Francis, Ltd. JSTOR, Accessed: 6/23/11. EL)
The construction of that which is deemed law thus rests on the definition of a violent world of non law. The inscription of a frontier? which may be figurative,temporal and spatial?is integral to this process.4 The effect is to create a distinction such that law's violence ?rational, regulated, advancing common goals? is separated from and imagined as a counter to the "anomic or sectarian savagery beyond law's boundaries" (Sarat and Kearns 1992a, 5). Without such a division, of course, the commonplace distinctions between terrorist and reason- able force, or murder and execution, break down (Williams 1983, 329-31). Similarly, the very existence of that deemed property has long relied upon a distinction to a domain of non property. Inside the frontier lie secure tenure, fee simple ownership, and state-guaranteed rights to property.Outside lie uncertain and undeveloped entitlements, communal claims, and the absence of state guarantees to property. Inside lies stability and order, outside disorder, violence, and "bare life" (Agamben 1998). This is evident in the Western foundational narratives that tell property's story, which often begin from an a priori and usually violent world before property, such as Locke's ( 1980, ?124) world of "fears and continual dangers" (see also Blackstone  1838). For Hobbes, this space behind the frontier was one where "there can be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it" (in Fitzpatrick 1992, 77). The absence of government and property, Hobbes ( 1988, 186) argued, underpins a life of "continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." But these worlds without property are also located in space that is before History. "In the beginning," claims Locke ( 1980, ?149), "all was America" (emphasis in original). And it is here that the violent frontiers of property are more sharply spatialized. Western notions of property are deeply invested in a colonial geography, a white mythology, in which the racialized figure of the savage plays a central role:5 "Disorder on law's part can- not... be located in law itself. The sources of disorder must exist outside of law?in the eruptions and disruptions of untamed nature or barely contained human passion against which an ordering law is intrinsically set. The savage was the concentration of these dangers and the constant and predominant want of the savage was order" (Fitzpatrick 1992, 81). Peter Fitzpatrick (1992, 65) documents the ways in which the law of the European Enlightenment reduced the world to European universality: "That which stood outside of the absolutely universal could only be absolutely different to it. It could only be an aberration or something other than that which it should be." Rather than a multiplicity of legal possibilities, difference was positioned relative to the West. European legal identity, he argues, entails the mapping of the colonial subject as purely negative ("ni foi, ni loi, ni roi"), from which the positivity of Western law is derived. This is a strikingly geographic exercise, in which, as Burke put it, "[t]he great Map of Mankind [is] unrolPd at once" (in Fitzpatrick 1992, 65). For many classical European writers on property, the space of the savage was one of the absence of law and property and the concomitant presence of violence. For nineteenth- century legal theorist John Austin, the figure ofthe savage is also foundational. Imagined as incapable of an appreciation of legal rights and duties, including property, the savage is deemed prepolitical and thus set irrevocably apart from the West (Fitzpatrick 1992, 78-81).6Jeremy Bentham offers a more explicit example of the frontier that separates the spaces of property and violence. Property, for Bentham ( 1978, 52), was "an established expectation" that requires the security pro? vided by law for it to exist: "Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases." In the absence of security, property fails, and so doeseconomic activity.
(Nancy. Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE SECURITY. Space Policy Institute Security Policy Studies Program Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University. http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/PERSPECTIVES_ON_SPACE_SECURITY.pdf Accessed 6/25/11 P.7 EL) Since the space age began, two competing images have influenced policy debates about space security. One conception sees space as the “final frontier,” a largely lawless environment where conflict is inevitable and superior firepower provides the only reliable protection for satellites
and the terrestrial activities that depend on them. The alternative view uses imagery of “the heavens” to suggest that if, and only if, humans can transcend the fear and greed that generate earthly conflict, then there will be a natural harmony of interest that promotes the peaceful use of space for the benefit of all. Neither the “Realist” imagery of unbounded conflict nor the “Idealist” imagery of natural cooperation adequately reflects the amount of effort spent over the past half century on developing rules to manage space operations. When analysts and practitioners do write about the rules for space, they typically focus only on space law, especially those rights and obligations that have been codified by international treaties — another idealized conception of the rules governing space activity. This paper broadly defines the rules for space as anything that induces regularity or restraint in behavior beyond what would be predicted on the basis of interests and power alone. This includes not only formal laws, but also principles, norms, informal understandings, common practices, agreed decision making procedures, and institutional arrangements. In other words, this paper analyses space as an extension of an international system where governance occurs on a piecemeal basis in the absence of a world government with supranational law-making and enforcement powers. The rules that regulated early space activities, while far from ideal in any sense of the word, were reasonably functional and stable because the formal laws, informal operating practices, and strategic context complemented and reinforced each other. Over time, fundamental processes associated with globalization have altered the strategic context and the operational practices for space activities, but international efforts to update the formal legal framework have not kept pace. Instead, the United States has embarked on a unilateral attempt to rewrite key rules related to space in ways that other countries find extremely threatening, while hoping to preserve international support for aspects of space law that the United States finds beneficial. This strategy underestimates negative international reaction both to the substance of US space security policy and to the process whereby the United States is making momentous policy changes while rebuffing international attempts to discuss, let alone negotiate, new rules for space security. More importantly, this strategy overestimates the United States’ ability to accomplish its objectives in space without widespread acceptance of equitable rules to protect legitimate space activities.