Endless investigation of power makes real struggles against oppression impossible.
Hicks, 03- Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY (Steven V., “Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond,” Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109, Questia)
Hence, the only “ethico-political choice” we have, one that Foucault thinks we must make every day, is simply to determine which of the many insidious forms of power is “the main danger” and then to engage in an activity of resistance in the “nexus” of opposing forces. 72 “Unending action is required to combat ubiquitous peril.” 73 But this ceaseless Foucauldian “recoil” from the ubiquitous power perils of “normalization” precludes, or so it would seem, formulating any defensible alternative position or successor ideals. And if Nietzsche is correct in claiming that the only prevailing human ideal to date has been the ascetic ideal, then even Foucauldian resistance will continue to work in service of this ideal, at least under one of its guises, viz., the nihilism of negativity. Certainly Foucault's distancing of himself from all ideological commitments, his recoiling from all traditional values by which we know and judge, his holding at bay all conventional answers that press themselves upon us, and his keeping in play the “twists” and “recoils” that question our usual concepts and habitual patterns of behavior, all seem a close approximation, in the ethicopolitical sphere, to the idealization of asceticism.
Critiques of power are so localized that they prevent coalition from forming that could genuinely fight oppression.
Cook, 92- Associate Professor at Georgetown Law School (Anthony E., “A Diversity of Influence: Reflections on Postmodernism, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751, Lexis)
Several things trouble me about Foucault's approach. First, he nurturesin many ways an unhealthy insularity that fails to connect localized struggle to other localized struggles and to modes of oppression like classism, racism, sexism, and homophobia that transcend their localized articulation within this particular law school, that particular law firm, within this particular church or that particular factory. I note among some followers of Foucault an unhealthy propensity to rely on rich, thick, ethnographic type descriptions of power relations playing themselves out in these localized laboratories of social conflict. This reliance on detailed description and its concomitant deemphasis of explanation begins, ironically, to look like a regressive positivism which purports to sever the descriptive from the normative, the is from the ought and law from morality and politics. Unless we are to be trapped in this Foucaultian moment of postmodern insularity, we must resist the temptation to sever description from explanation. Instead, our objective should be to explain what we describe in light of a vision embracing values that we make explicit in struggle. These values should act as magnets that link our particularized struggles to other struggles and more global critiques of power. In other words, we must not, as Foucault seems all too willing to do, forsake the possibility of more universal narratives that, while tempered by postmodern insights, attempt to say and do something about the oppressive world in which we live. Second, Foucault's emphasis on the techniques and discourses of knowledge that constitute the human subject often diminishes, if not abrogates, the role of human agency. Agency is of tremendous importance in any theory of oppression, because individuals are not simply constituted by systems of knowledge but also constitute hegemonic and counter-hegemonic systems of knowledge as well. Critical theory must pay attention to the ways in which oppressed people not only are victimized by ideologies of oppression but the ways they craft from these ideologies and discourses counter-hegemonic weapons of liberation.
Memory Alternative creates victims of imperialism – their discussion of the Other denies agency
(Katharina, A perfessor at Martin Luther, Landscapes of Violence: Memory and Sacres Space, http://muse.jhu.edu, 6/24/11, S.M)
A second, albeit closely related, field in which violence and memory are brought together, is the narration of victimhood that is often dominated by a discourse of trauma.22 If we consider trauma as the endless repetition of a violent experience, it is necessarily opposed to any idea of closure. Yet the focus on victimhood also entails the problematic dimension of victimization—often by means of a universalized (and mediatized) discourse of suffering that denies agency to survivors who find healing an unavailable (and unacceptable) option.
Rememberance creates collective identities => linking back into the Kritik Reyes 2010 (G. Mitchell is Assistant Professor of Communication at Lewis and Clark College in Portland, Oregon, Memory and Alterity:The Case for an Analytic of Difference, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Volume 43, Number 3, 2010, pp. 222)
Research on the relationship between public memory and collective identity is varied and extensive, but one fairly prominent scholarly perspective coalesces around Hannah Arendt’s idea that the practices of remembrance are the lifeblood of the polis. The stakes here are high, for it seems that without remembrance, the very possibility of collective identity and historical responsibility literally “disappear.” 2 Scholars as diverse as Maurice Halbwachs (1992), Benedict Anderson (1991), and Peter Novick (1999) (to name a few) have emphasized this connection between public memory and collective identity (see also Kattago 2001; Kammen 1991; Gillis 1994a; and Bodnar 1992). Although these scholars’ projects diverge in other ways, they hold in common an interest in public memory’s capacity to constitute transnational, national, and local identities. For these scholars, remembrance is not simply a vehicle for tradition; it is also an activity that brings collective identity into being. Collective identity emerges through the other, whose call to remember constitutes collectivity. The ontological space remembrance creates might thus be considered intersubjective, or between subjects.