There is not hospitality toward the Other, globality is an assimilative process translating into inevitable violence, genocide and colonialism.
Nayar in ’99
(Jayan, RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall, 1999, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599, MDA)
Despite the vision of world-order founded on a notion of a universal society of humankind aspiring toward a universal common good, (first given meaning within a conceptual political-legal framework through the birth of the so-called "Westphalian" state system n14 ), the materialities of "ordering" were of a different complexion altogether. Contrary to the disembodied rhetoric of world-order as bloodless evolution, the new images of the world and languages of "globality" did not evolve out of a sense of "hospitality" n15 to the "other," the "stranger." Rather, the history of the creation of the post-Westphalian "world" as one world, can be seen to be most intimately connected with the rise of an expansionist and colonizing world-view and practice. Voyages of "discovery" provided the necessary reconnaissance to image this "new world." Bit by bit, piece by piece, the jigsaw of the globe was completed. With the advance of the "discoverer," the "colonizer," the "invader," the "new" territories were given meaning within the hermeneutic construct that was the new "world."[*607] The significance of this evolution of the world does not, however, lie merely in its acquiring meaning. It is not simply the "idea" of the world that was brought to prominence through acts of colonization. The construction of the "stage" of the world has also occurred, albeit amid the performance of a violent drama upon it. The idea of a single world in need of order was followed by a succession of chained and brutalized bodies of the "other." The embodied world that has been in creation from the "colonial" times to the present could not, and does not, accommodate plurality. The very idea of "one world" contains the necessary impetus for the absorption, assimilation, if not destruction, of existing worlds and the genocide of existing socialities. This violence of "order-ing" within the historical epoch of colonialism is now plainly visible. Colonialism leads to genocide
(Patrick, La Trobe Research Fellow in History at La Trobe University, Australia and author of Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event , "Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native", hawaii.edu, December 2006, pg 3, http://www.hawaii.edu/amst/pwolfe/PWolfeArticles/PWolfe_EliminationNative.pdf, CH)
The logic of elimination not only refers to the summary liquidation of Indigenous people,though it includes that.In common withgenocide as Raphae¨l Lemkin characterized it,6 settler colonialism has both negative and positive dimensions. Negatively, it strives for the dissolution of native societies. Positively, it erects a new colonial society on the expropriated land base—as I put it, settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event.7 In its positive aspect, elimination is an organizing principal of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superseded) occurrence. The positive outcomes of the logic of elimination can include officially encouraged miscegenation, the breaking-down of native title into alienable individual freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion, resocialization in total institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and a whole range of cognate biocultural assimilations. All these strategies, including frontier homicide, are characteristic of settler colonialism. Some of them are more controversial in genocide studies than others.
Impact – Inevitable Violence
Collectivizing humanity allows the U.S unrestricted mental access and control over other countries
(Margolin, Uri, BA cum laude (Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel) Philosophy and English Literature. PhD (Cornell University) Comparative Literature, Telling in the Plural: From Grammar to Ideology Margolin, Uri. Poetics Today, Volume 21, Number 3, Fall 2000, pp. 599-600 (Article) Published by Duke University Press, DA: 6/24/11, CP) When an individual narrator speaks/writes about a ‘‘you’’ or ‘‘they’’ group, his position relative to it is obvious: he is no part of it; nor does he act as its spokesman. When a singular narrator originates a ‘‘we’’ discourse, on the other hand, the situation is, or at least can be, quite ambiguous. A narrator who says ‘‘I did X’’ may be truthful or not, but there is no doubt he himself is the subject of this assertion.When a narrator says ‘‘We did X,’’ on the other hand, it is clear he is referring to a (con)textually defined group of which he is a member, but it is not clear whether he himself participated in this action, since ‘‘We [as a group] did X’’ is compatible with ‘‘But I did not,’’ as we have seen earlier. Once more, when an individual speaker makes any ‘‘we’’ claims, he is obviously speaking about a group of which he is a member but not necessarily for it or on its behalf. If he is empowered to speak on behalf of the reference class as a whole, his claims convey a joint communicative intent, the ‘‘we’’ designates both topic entity and originator of the discourse, and his utterance possesses the status of group or collective speech act. But if the speaker is not so empowered, the ‘‘we’’ tokens in his discourse designate topic entity only, and the authority, communicative intent, and illocutionary force of his ‘‘we’’ speech act rest with him individually. Note, however, that empowerment to speak on behalf of a group or lack thereof cannot be inferred from linguistic features and require contextual information. An uneasy and unstable hybrid is created in ‘‘we’’ narratives originating with a single speaker whenever they contain statements about inner action: mental states, events, or attitudes of any kind, from perceptual to cognitive. A basic convention of literary narrative is that every personalized speaker has direct, immediate access to his own mental states but not to those of his coagents, which he must infer (fallibly!) from their intersubjectively accessible behavior and statements. Any ‘‘we felt,’’ ‘‘we thought,’’ or ‘‘we observed’’ statements, unlike ‘‘we ran’’ or ‘‘we found ourselves at’’ ones, are hence inherently heterogeneous or hybrid, combining the speaker’s immediate, inside knowledge of his own psyche with hypothetical, indirect, and inferred knowledge formulated by the speaker concerning his coagents’ mental states and activities. One part of the statement rests on one’s own direct experience, while the other consists of experiences attributed to others from the outside.The problem disappears in an impersonally narrated ‘‘they’’ narrative, which, in analogy to third-person singular narratives, allows the narrating voice unrestricted mental access. A key (some would say the key) component of any narrative consists of the portrayal of the physical, verbal, and mental states or actions of narrative agents in a domain. When a CNA rather than individual agents is being portrayed, the question naturally arises whether or not the same possibilities of action portrayal are still available in this new situation, or whether new constraints and/or possibilities are inevitably added. The basic tension underlying the portrayal of group states or actions stems from the logical impossibility of describing things on a holistic and individual level at the same time, even though both levels exist concurrently and are irreducible to each other. The problem is ultimately philosophical and has to do with the supervenience or emergent relation between group phenomena and individual ones. There is no doubt that group phenomena cannot exist without lower-level individual ones (for example, there can be no coordinated group action without individual subactions), and that differences on the lower levelmust lead to differences on the higher one.On the other hand, one can describe group phenomena without reference to individual ones, and the same upper-level phenomena can often be realized through different lowerlevel ones. Furthermore, collective predicates are irreducible to individual ones, being logically distinct and independent of them, and they cannot be logically derived or inferred from them either. At least some social patterns of action are not reducible to actions of individuals taken as isolated entities, and external group structures (norms, rules, conventions, expectations) can serve from the outset as constraining forces on individual actions (gang rules in Greene, the Nazi death camps structure in Tadeusz Borowski’s story collection ( ).