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1The literatures on each of these concepts is, by now, quite large, except for “network-centric warfare,” whose main source is Cebrowski and Garstka (1998). Some writers (e.g., Florini, 2000) prefer the term “transnational civil society” over “global civil society.”
2See Kelly (1994) and Lipnack and Stamps (1994) on “the network age,” Castells (1996) and Kumon (1992) on “the network society,” and Dertouzos (1998) on “networks as nations.”
3See Held and McGrew (2000), esp. Ch. 2 (excerpted from a 1999 book by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton), and Ch. 11 (from a 1997 paper by Michael Mann). Also see Rosenau (1990), and Nye and Donahue (2000).
4The Harvard Business Review is a fine source of business-oriented references, e.g., Evans and Wurster (1997) and Coyne and Dye (1998), which address banking networks, and Jacques (1990), which provides a classic defense of the importance of hierarchy in corporate structures.
5Adapted from Ronfeldt (1996).
6The success of Otpor (“Resistance”) in overthrowing the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia is an example of a combined insider-outsider strategy (Cohen, 2000).
7Some of this subsection is verbatim from Ronfeldt (2000).
8The references are, respectively to books by Nohria and Eccles (1992); Wellman and Berkowitz (1997); and Wasserman and Faust (1994). The INSNA’s website is at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/project/INSNA/.
9More complicated designs may be laid out, depending on how many nodes and variations in ties are taken into account. While we appreciate the simplicity of the three designs mentioned here, a more complex depiction of networks composed of from three to five persons appears in Shaw (1976), which uses the term “comcon” instead of “all-channel.”
10Term from Burt (1992). See also his chapter in Nohria and Eccles (1992), and his writings posted at http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/ronald.burt/research/. The “structural hole” concept is quite promminent in the literature about social network analysis. Meanwhile, a somewhat similar, equally interesting concept is the “small world network” being developed separately by mathematicians. See footnote 19.
11Granovetter (1973) is the classic reference about strong vs. weak ties, Perrow (1979) about tightly vs. loosely coupled systems.
12For a fascinating discussion of the history of visualization techniques, see Freeman (2000).
13The discussion here, like the one in the prior subsection, is selective and pointed. For broader, thorough discussion of the various literatures on organizational forms and organizational network analysis, see Monge and Contractor (2001) and Monge and Fulk (1999).
14For example, Miles and Snow (1992) discuss why network organizations in the business world may fail rather than succeed; and Kumar and Dissell (1996) discuss interorganizational business systems whose topologies correspond to chain, hub, or all-channel networks. Also see references in footnote 4.
15In that volume, Perrow (1992) sounds a new note when he concludes that the large, fully integrated firms so characteristic of American life may have eroding effects on civil society—and the growth of small firm networks may have revitalizing effects.
16George Johnson, “First Cells, Then Species, Now the Web,” New York Times, December 26, 2000, pp. M1, M2, provides an overview, and relates how this pattern may reflect a mathematical “power law” that interests complexity theorists.
17Some of the text in this subsection is from earlier iterations (see Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1996, 2000). What is analytically new here is the addition of the narrative level to the scope of analysis.
18This assumes that there are enough actors and resources to organize a network in the first place. Otherwise we would have to specify a recruitment and resource level as part of what makes a network strong and effective.
19See Burt (1992, and his website) on “strucutural holes” and “bridges,” and Watts (1999) and Strogatz (2001) on “small world networks.” Watts and Strogatz approach the study of complex networks as mathematicians.
20From Jody Williams, “1997 Nobel Lecture,” December 10, 1997, posted at http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/nobel_lecture_97_williams.html.
21From Dan Barry and Al Baker, “Getting the Message from ‘Eco-Terrorists’: Mystery Group Takes Its Campaign East,” New York Times, January 8, 2001, A15. The ELF sometimes operates in alliance with the Animal Liberation Front (ALF).
22We have previously discussed the need for attention to hybrids of hierarchies and networks, most recently with regard to military swarming (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2000). Yet, the idea that such hybrids are a normal feature of social life has figured in a substream of academic writings for decades. In an exemplary volume from the 1970s (La Porte, 1975), the authors maintain that few social activities have structures that look like a “tree” (hierarchy) or a “full matrix” (an all-channel network). Most have “semilattice” structures—they resemble a set of oddly interconnected hierarchies and networks.
23Because we want to encourage a new turn of mind, we discuss this as the narrative level, in keeping with our sense that “whose story wins” is a vital aspect of netwars of all types. But we could also have presented this level of analysis in a more traditional light, as a cultural, ideological, and/or political level.
24We could have discussed this level in terms of goals and ideals, or ideology and culture, but the concepts of “narratives” and “stories” seem equally useful and more dynamic for capturing how people actually communicate with each other.
25This has been a strong theme of American radical activist organizers, from early pre-netwar ones like Saul Alinsky, to contemporary strategists like Gene Sharp.
26This, of course, is true for earlier modes of conflict too. Modern guerrilla wars placed very strong emphasis on winning by convincing an opponent that an implacable insurgent movement can never be decisively defeated. In counterinsurgency, similar efforts are made to win the “hearts and minds” of indigenous peoples.
27According to a classic of organization theory (Schein, 1985, p . 2), “there is a possibility . . . that the only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture.” According to Bran Ferren, former Walt Disney Imagineering executive, “The core component of leadership is storytelling, how to articulate a vision and communicate it to people around you to help accomplish the mission.” (From Tony Perry, “Navy Takes a Scene Out of Hollywood, Los Angeles Times, November 27, 2000, pp. C1, C5, on Ferren’s design of a new command center for a Navy command ship).
28Lee Hockstader, “Pings and E-Arrows Fly in Mideast Cyber-War,” Washington Post Foreign Service, October 27, 2000. Carmen Gentile, “Israeli Hackers Vow to Defend,” Wired News, November 15, 2000.
29Gowing (1998) provides a distressing account of how well-meaning but naïve and presumptuous humanitarian NGOs were outmaneuvered by Rwandan officials and their allies in the battle for the control and manipulation of information in the Great Lakes region of Africa in the mid 1990s. Rothkopf (1999), among others, warns about the advent of “the disinformation age,” though his examples are not from netwars.
30Standard sources on neorealism include a range of writings by Kenneth Waltz and John Mearshimer in particular. The literature on constructivism is much more recent and less settled, but revolves mainly around writings by Emanuel Adler, Peter Katzenstein, Terrence Hopf, and Alexander Wendt, among others. An interesting effort to split the difference, by focusing on how people argue their stories, is Risse (2000). Our own interest in the narrative level stems in part from our work on the concept of “noopolitik” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999, and Ronfeldt and Arquilla, 2000).
31Commonly recognized downsides are the possibilities that no decision is made, or unaccountable ones are made, or that a network will lack a “center of gravity.”
32According to Paul de Armond, many far rightists may now regard leaderless resistance as a backward step, since it means that they should not, indeed cannot, organize a mass party and be very public about their leaders and aims. See Barkun (1997) for further discussion of leaderless resistance.
33From Martin A. Lee, “Neo-Nazism: It’s Not Just in Germany’s Beer Halls Anymore, Los Angeles Times, December 31, 2000, p. M2.
34See DAN’s website at http://www.directactionnetwork.org/. It is the source of the observations and quotations in the paragraph.
35One role in an affinity group might be police liaison, but it carried the risk that this person would be perceived as a group leader, when in fact the group did not have a leader per se and made all decisions through consensus.
36Starhawk, “How We Really Shut Down the WTO,” December 1999, posted at http://www.reclaiming.org/starhawk/wto.html.
37Sources are: Dylan Bennett and Gretchen Giles, “Spokes Persons: Bicyclists see transportation as critical,” Sonoma County Independent, April 3-9, 1997, posted at http://www.metroactive.com/papers/sonoma/04.03.97/bikes-9714.html; “Critical Mass,” undated, a brochure posted at http://danenet.wicip.org/bcp/cm.html; Joel Pomerantz, “A San Francisco Critical Mass Glossary: 7 years of building a culture & learning lessons, as reflected in our terminology,” September 1999, posted at http://bok.net/~jig/CM/glossary.html; and Joel Pomerantz, “A Few Comments on Critical Mass: A brief introduction to the Critical Mass Glossary,” October 1999, posted at http://bok.net/~jig/CM/glossaryintro.html.
38Interested readers should visit http://www.nyu.edu/projects/wray/ and related Web sites.
39From Stefan Krempl, “Computerized resistance after the big flood: Email Interview with Ricardo Dominguez,” Telepolis (European online magazine), February 16, 2000, posted at http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/te/5801/1.html; and Carrie Kirby, “Hacking With a Conscience Is a New Trend,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 20, 2000, posted at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/11/20/BU121645.DTL. Also see the websites of the EDT, the Electrohippies, and the Cult of the Dead Cow.
40We thank Bob Anderson for pointing out the importance of peer-to-peer computing. He observes that peer-to-peer computing can enable its users to: prevent censorship of documents; provide anonymity for users; remove any single point of failure or control; efficiently store and distribute documents; provide plausible deniability for node operators. See Adam Langley, “Freenet,” Oram (2001).
41Rutherford (1999), with original text corrected via email correspondence. Also see Williams and Goose (1998, esp. pp. 22-25).
42Alexander MacLeod, “Call to picket finds new ring in Britain’s fuel crisis,” The Christian Science Monitor, September 19, 2000. MacLeod notes that recent commercial practices increased Britain’s vulnerability to this social netwar: many tanker drivers were freelancers, with no contractual obligations to the oil companies; and many gas stations operated under a “just in time” delivery system, keeping few reserves in place.
43Schweizer (1994) details the CIA’s sending of advanced communications devices to Solidarity, and notes (p. 146) that “the administration also wanted the underground fully equipped with fax machines, computers, advanced printing equipment, and more.” Woodward (1987, p. 66) observes that these secure lines of communication were also used to maintain contact with the CIA, which often gave Solidarity early warning of the military regime’s planned “sweeps” for activists and leaders.
44See the three-part series of articles in the New York Times on “Holy Warriors, beginning with Stephen Engelberg, “One Man and a Global Web of Influence,” New York Times, January 14, 2001, pp. A1, A12-A13.
45From discussion after the speech by Jody Williams, “International Organization in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines,” speech at a gathering of recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize, University of Virginia, November 6, 1998, posted at http://www.virginia.edu/nobel/transcript/jwilliams.html.
46In Copeland (2000), see especially the statements by James Rosenau and Steven Metz.
47From the “Introduction” to Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, Department of State Publication 10687, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, released April 2000, as posted at http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/1999index.html.
48From U.S. Government Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, December 2000, Chapter 1, as posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/pub45270/pub45270chap1.html#4.
49National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts, NIC 2000-02, Central Intelligence Agency, December 2000, as posted at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html.
50See Lenin (1916, p. 76), whose breakdown showed 90% of Africa under colonial control in 1900, 60% of Asia, all of Polynesia and Australia, and nearly a third of the Americas.
51Hoffman (1998) notes that religion is also a rising force behind terrorism.
52See footnote 3.
53In the 19th century, the notion of a harmony of interests seemed to predominate over realpolitik—at least from the fall of Napoleon in 1815 to the onset of the social revolutions of 1848, and even, though falteringly, until the onset of World War I. The 20th century, on the other hand, seems to have been mainly the child of realpolitik.
54Koestler (1978) does not adequately consider the kind of disequilibrium in which a refusal to connect with the world as a whole may lead to mischief.
55This unexpectedly paraphrases President Reagan, whose national security strategy articulated in June of 1981 called for the spread of American values, creating a new dimension of American power. He wanted to encourage the world to see, in the American example, “a shining city on a hill.” As Reagan observed in his farewell address to the nation (given January 11, 1989): “I’ve spoken of the shining city all my political life, but I don’t know if I ever quite communicated what I saw when I said it. In my mind it was a tall, proud city built on rocks stronger than oceans, windswept, God-blessed, and teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and peace; a city with free ports that hummed with commerce and creativity.” (Hannaford 1998, p. 278)
56Kennan (1996, p. 282) puts it concisely, noting that what we call the “beacon” strategy “would be a policy that would seek the possibilities for service to morality primarily in our own behavior, not in our judgment of others.”
57We have related in other writings (e.g., Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999) our own view that states will remain the paramount actors in the international system. As a result of the information revolution, nonstate actors will continue to gain strength and influence; and this will lead to changes in the nature of the state—but not its “withering away.” What will occur is a transformation, where some states will emerge stronger than ever because of a capacity to work conjointly with NGOs and other civil nonstate actors. As this process unfolds, there will be a rebalancing of relations among state, market, and civil-society actors around the world—in ways that favor “noopolitik” over realpolitik.
58For example, Afghanistan’s Taliban government, while it refuses to extradite Osama bin Laden, shows little sign of protecting him out of self-interest. Rather, its position seems to stem from a sense of obligation to an heroic fighter in the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. In Colombia, far from embracing criminal networks, the government is imperiled by them. The only unambiguously clear example of a state reaching out to a nonstate organization thought to engage in terrorist attacks is that of Iran and Hizbollah, which operates out of southern Lebanon and recently drove the Israeli Defense Forces out of Lebanon, after two decades of occupation. Finally, there are some signs that China is cooperating on some levels with certain criminal networks—modern-day pirates in particular—but the evidence is scant at best.
59See the discussion above about the recently released Global Trends 2015 report (NIC, 2000) which focuses to a large extent on the rise of networked criminal and terrorist organizations, while spending very little time on the opportunities that may arise from working with and supporting nonstate civil society actors.
60A growing literature has begun to identify lessons and options for states and NGOs to work together. Recent sources we consulted include Florini (2000), Reinicke (1999-2000), Gerlach, Palmer, and Stringer (2000), and Simmons (1998); Fukuyama and Wagner (2000) for a RAND research perspective; Chayes, Chayes, and Raach (1997) on conflict management situations; Metzl (1996) and Tuijl (1999) on human rights issues; and Carothers (1999-2000) and Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler (1998) for cautionary observations about expecting a lot from global civil society.