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Jan Dutkiewicz

New School for Social Research

Department of Politics

dutkj415@newschool.edu



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Working paper: Do not cite or circulate without the authors permission.
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Constructing (ecosystemic) sovereignty on the high seas:

CCAMLR, the Ross Sea, and international politics beyond territory and species
Introduction

If the efforts of an international groups of scientists and NGOs have their way, The Ross Sea, an Antarctic body of water touted as “the only large intact marine ecosystem remaining on the planet,”1 will be declared a no-catch marine protected area (MPA). Such a decision - if it were to be taken by the CCAMLR, an inter-state body governing humans and nonhumans alike in this remote jurisdiction on the high seas - would make this pristine marine ecosystem off-limits to human intervention outside scientific research. In other words, a consensual decision by a group of states would place a space in the no man’s land of international waters (and the creatures that inhabit it) outside the reach of both commercial interests and the sovereign clutches of any single state. The potential effect of such a decision would not only set a precedent for environmental protection, but would provide a conceptual challenge to IR theorists and scholars of environmental politics.

This paper, rather than dwelling on the internal politics of the CCAMLR, poses a number of broader questions. First, if we consider the high seas to exist in a state of political anarchy, how can we account for the development of preservation areas and their acceptance by states? Second, how can we conceptualize the potential protected area itself? In other words, what would it mean to establish a consensual preservation area outside the sovereign domain of any single state? And what would this mean for the primary agents affected, namely the marine species over and into whose very lives human sovereign governance is being extended? Finally, can we consider sovereignty in this form to be a furthering of human intervention in nonhuman nature or, perhaps, is some form of sovereignty necessary to prevent a market-driven maritime tragedy of the commons?

This paper seeks to answer these questions by engaging with the constructivist IR literature to explain sources and forms of norms which determine state action in the global commons (including the very idea of recognizing the global commons as such) and with the literature on sovereignty (and its critics) to theorize the nature of the relationship between human governance systems and marine species and ecosystems. Specifically, it suggests that while most debates about state behavior and sovereignty are highly anthropocentric, critics of sovereignty as it relates to animals and ecosystems reify these very ideas. As such, their radical critiques overlook the capacity of states to change their interests and behavior. By contrast, this paper suggests that recognizing the Ross Sea as a no-catch “Last Ocean” would not free the region from human intervention or sovereignty, but would rather suggest a contextually-situated change in the nature of sovereignty, as least as it relates to the Antarctic commons and its aquatic denizens.



The oceanic commons as extraterritorial anarchy

In the overwhelming majority of academic work regarding sovereignty, terra firma is taken for granted. Societies exist, states are formed, and sovereignty is claimed on and over territory and the (human and nonhuman) populations residing there. Sovereignty, Stephen Krasner reminds us, has classically “been understood as the Westphalian model: an institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on territoriality and autonomy States exist in specific territories. Within these territories, domestic political authorities are the only arbiters of legitimate behavior.”2 And, although Krasner argues that the Westphalian model “has never been an accurate description of many of the entities that have been regarded as states,”3 IR has consistently set disciplinary borders based around ontological and epistemological notions of the nature and purpose of the fixed territorial state.4 The above holds even though scholars - of different ideological and epistemological leanings - have argued that in a globalizing age the capacity of the state for decision-making and enforcement is increasingly diminished.5 Quite simply, it seems that territorial sovereignty requires territory.

The world’s seas and oceans present a theoretical and practical challenge, however, in that they are inherently extra-territorial. Under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS)6 states have exclusive rights to the seas (and seabed and “resources” contained in both of these) within 200 nautical miles of their borders. The rest, the mare liberum of Hugo Grotius’ political imaginary, is in theory open to all states and it therefore is also open to – and indeed necessitates – contestation. And yet this massive international commons, making up far more than half of the world’s surface (and the subject of voluminous legal and policy debate), receives short shrift in the voluminous IR and political theory literature. In a rare maritime reference, John Ruggie states that “politics is about rule” in the sense of “genuine dominion over a ‘spatial extension’.”7 Given his focus on extraterritoriality and non-exclusive sovereignties, however, Ruggie glosses over the high seas, stating that the “strategic consequences of the essential unity of the world’s oceans” are less important than other territorial concerns.8 The problem faced by Ruggie is that human interaction with marine environments and interstate interaction on the seas happens in what might be termed a state of anarchy. Given the absence of pre-exiting states on the high seas, terrestrial states have had to create their modes of interaction in extraterritorial waters.

Some of these play out in terms of individual states seeking to expand their own fields of security and resource extraction. This, at least to some extent, has been the case with the Arctic. As Richard Powell has argued, the Arctic has long been treated as a “resource hinterland,” an imaginary now growing with climate change opening up potential shipping routes and technological advances increasing the possibility of undersea resource extraction.9 Within this context, states are engaging in a politics of expansion of territorial sovereignty in the sense of “sovereign rights over … natural resources.”10 What is at play here is both traditional power politics and what Standsbjerg refers to as “cartopolitics” (namely the politics and practices of claims over the creation and extension of sovereign territory).11 It is beyond the scope of this paper to trace a genealogy of international legal and military contestation over the seas or even the Arctic, but the point is to show that some engagement with the high seas in indeed about effort to plant a flag on terra firma, even if that’s thousands of feet under the ocean surface (as comically evidenced by Russia’s planting of a flag on the North Pole’s seabed in 200712).

And yet, as evidenced by the creation of UNCLOS and various fisheries bodies, cooperation can take the place of zero-sum contestation. The proliferation of governance bodies addressing trade and fisheries is a case in point, as states, coming together in an anarchic realm, have created a patchwork management system that is based on consultation and (ideally) gives a important role to scientific inquiry in shaping human-nonhuman interaction.13 Indeed, zero-sum politics have long been accompanied by various systems and forums for consultative governance over various aspects of inter-state engagement on the high seas. The goals of such governance regimes, moreover, need not solely serve state’s material strategic interests, as is evident in the move toward conservationism and preservationism in the missions of some governance regimes.14 A prime example of such cooperation is the Antarctic Treaty.

After close to 200 years of over-exploitation of the Antarctic’s animal species (termed marine living resources – MLR - in the official and academic literature, a euphemism which speaks volumes about the role played by animals in human politics) and rival sovereign claims to Antarctic lands and waters, the Antarctic Treaty came into effect in 1961. Interpretations of the full range of motives behind the agreement vary15, but from a practical perspective, the governance of the Antarctic appears to be a success of neoliberal institutionalism. The Treaty, which has 46 signatories, is described as “minimalist, visionary and flexible, which allows it to endure in a dynamic world.”16 Central to the Treaty is Article IV of its Convention, which posits that no state has claim to territory or autonomous legal jurisdiction below the 60th parallel.17 The Antarctic landmass is subject to interstate conventions and laws arrived at through a discursive process by states with interest in international cooperation. For some, this is a triumph, whereby the signature of the treaty “formally recogniz[es] Antarctica’s great international value as a region that should be protected from self interest and devoted to peace and science.”18

Given that Article IV means states can interpret laws and conventions as they see fit within “the spirit and intent of the treaty,” commentators have argued that this “ambiguity actually builds stability, as no activities are inherently threatening while such a broad interpretation is available to the parties.”19 Indeed, cooperation and a preservationist ethic based on the notion of peaceful interaction and scientific inquiry “transforms the Antarctic into a de facto global commons.”20 Under the auspices of this extraterritorial governance network, no single state has sovereignty over either the decision-making process, the transient human population inhabiting Antarctica, or any undersea territory from which resources might be extracted. The revolutionary nature of this decision bears restating: sovereign states came to a common agreement about their mutual abstention from claiming sovereign control over the space or resources of a territory, to be mutually upheld in good faith.

In his seminal work on the nature of state interaction, Alexander Wendt (1992) argues that the process of interaction itself, rather than any inherent and fixed state identities, can lead to inter-state cooperation.21 Moreover, he posits that “identities and interests are endogenous to interaction” and that these identities and interests are not rooted in the anarchic nature of the world system.22 Given this fluid conception of state identity and interest, Wendt opens the door to the possibility of non-state actors including civil society, NGOs, and institutions to influence identity formation and knowledge sharing at the state and international level.23 In Wendt’s conceptualization of state interaction, state self-interest, be it related to security or economic gain, can be outweighed or at least tempered by the creation of new meanings, understandings, and commitments that arise from state interaction. Many scholars have taken up this analytical model as pertains to myriad aspects of international relations and governance

IR scholars studying environmental issues have been particularly amenable to a constructivist approach.

Robyn Eckersley, for instance, suggests that because “the prerogatives of sovereign states [have] changed over time” and the actions of numerous actors on the global stage – and especially NGOs – have placed environmental issues on the policy agenda, states can and should embrace “shifting norms” that would lead then in a more environmentally-friendly direction.24 States, she argues, can undertake gradual change at the level of “policy instruments,” “policy goals,” “policy paradigm[s],” and even “the role of the state” to align these with environmental concern at the domestic and international level.25 Litfin’s work presents a causal chain whereby the “popular pressure” exerted by nonstate actors influences how constituencies view states, which, in seeking public legitimacy, conform to and propagate new environmental discourses, which affect how they act in regards to their domestic environment and to the commons via international treaties.26 In the case of whaling, Charlotte Epstein has shown how norms and new discourses affect how states interact not only with each other and with human actors, but also with nonhumans, including in domestic and international institutional settings.27



Marine species as sovereign subjects

But while notions and norms of sovereignty and cooperation regarding the commons are contested and consulted between states, the marine species who inhabit the commons have traditionally held the same pre-determined role as their land-lubbing counterparts: they have been considered resources. Sea creatures, as they have been historically, today continue to be hunted virtually indiscriminately to feed unsustainable global appetites. However, stock depletion and increasing scientific understanding of the broader ecosystemic effects of overfishing, have begun to force a norm change toward inter-state governance over the global fish industry.28 While the situation for most stocks has not been greatly ameliorated29 and fisheries regimes have been criticized for “failing” both to comply with internationally set performance standards or to curtail fishing deemed “unsustainable”30 the norm of inter-state engagement with regards to marine species has none the less changed to a more cooperative and consultative one.31 This is not to say, however, that the role of animals as resources (albeit to some extent protected ones), has changed; nor has the idea that humans have a “right to fish.”32

Contemporary academic literature on the subject casts fish as “renewable ocean resources” over which states can claim “ownership rights.”33 Indeed, mutually agreed-upon ownership rights within governance regimes are seen as being necessary to avoid a “tragedy of the commons,” with the tragedy being not animal death or damage to marine biotic systems, but the depletion of a commodity.34 As Ainley and Brooks argue, “often throughout history, particularly when dealing with large international spaces, [Garret] Hardin’s analysis has shown humans to be incurable of their self-interested mentality.”35

Fishing governance, embodied in myriad international agreements including UNCLOS, suggests that fishing rights may need to be applied not in terms of territory but in terms of fish stocks, making them systems of surveillance and control over animal life and death rather than over delimited space. As Scott argues, institutionally negotiated catch quotas can help fishing nations “not only harvest but manage the fishstock or biomass.”36 This line of reasoning is brought to its logical conclusion by Tsamenyi (1986), who argues that because migratory fish species escape human territorial systems by virtue of moving past imaginary lines on a map, they should come under human sovereignty at the level of species.37 Writing from a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, Tsamenyi argues that a fish stock “management”-based governance over animal species arrived at through inter-state consultation could lead to conflict avoidance and, by extension, improved long-term profitability for states. This logic, as the next section will demonstrate, applies to the governance regime within which the battle for the Ross Sea MPA is taking place.

Fisheries regimes and those addressing issues like maritime pollution fit with Wendt’s assertion that interstate interaction can create norms based on not “exploiting your friends” and that the trade-off involved in identity formation needs to include tangible (presumably material) benefits for participating states.38 Within commons, then, “goods [can be] non-excludable and free for the taking [or] commons resources may be collectively owned and managed by a community or unit in a common property regime.”39

An example of the latter arrangement is the Antarctic Treaty System, consisting of the Treaty and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. This multilateral regime is unique in that it specifically addresses the animal species that dwell in waters which lie outside any state’s exclusive economic zone.40 In effect, it represents the creation of a governance scheme in a space where no deep-rooted claims to sovereignty existed and where there were no antecedent governance structures.

The history of human exploitation of various Antarctic fish, bird, and sea mammal species already reads like a macabre catalogue of successive ecocide.41 Given that the Antarctic Treaty did not include “any language or specific measures that dealt with the exploitation of living resources” and faced with rapid proliferation of fishing interests in the Southern Ocean the signatories of the Antarctic Treaty established the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCMLAR), whose convention came into effect in 1982, in order to manage fishing and its effects on both targeted fish stock populations and on the ecosystem as a whole.42 Claimants in the Antarctic treaty therefore become de jure coastal states with some attendant fishing claims. As Brooks notes, CCAMLR is unique in at least two crucial senses. First, it is an international “science-based management body” where scientific understanding of aquatic species and ecosystems is, at least in theory, given pride of place. Second, it is a high seas fisheries management organization that includes a significant proportion of nations that do not fish, making it an exception to organizations made up of proverbial foxes consulting over access to the chicken coop.43 The CCMLAR, then, unlike other older fisheries regimes, is based on norms of ecological conservation over and above - or at the very least alongside - the goal of achieving “sustainable” fishing quotas. Using what it terms an “ecosystemic approach” which “considers the whole Southern Ocean to be a suite of interlinked systems,” the CCAMLR aims to protect not only individual fish stocks, but to maintain the integrity of the Antarctic marine ecosystem.44
CCAMLR and No-Catch MPAs: the idea(l) of non-exploitative governance

CCAMLR has been deemed a defense mechanism against a literal tragedy of the commons occurring in the world’s oceans “evidenced by … excessive illegal, unregulated, unreported (IUU) fishing.”45 Indeed, given a global reality where deep sea fisheries have been likened more to mining operations than any kind of “traditional” fishing46, entities like CCAMLR seem necessary to avoid ongoing market-driven extinction events. CCAMLR is not, however, a preservationist entity. Article II of its Convention is clear that while the overarching goal is “the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources” this comes with the proviso that “the term ‘conservation’ includes rational use.”47

As such, I argue that the CCAMLR, with its explicit purview of studying and controlling access to ecosystems and animals, exercises sovereignty and biopolitical governance over non-human life. The CCAMLR has the ability to control, based at least in part on scientific research, state lobbying, and civil society input, which animals will live and which will die (and in what quantities) and, by extension, what shape the ecosystem under its jurisdiction will take. Its task is literally what Youatt dubs, after Foucault, “the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life.”48

Part of CCAMLR’s stated objective, then, is to facilitate, albeit based on a conservationist ethic, the killing of animals, which are explicitly termed “resources.” In order to, in Foucauldian terms, determine who will live and who will die, CCAMLR must claim possession of the Antarctic ecosystem and its non-human inhabitants in order to, in a controlled manner, parcel out access to these creatures to fishing fleets. This, in turn, is accomplished through the deployment of networks of biopower rooted in scientific inquiry into the nature and lives of marine species. Biopower here is used not in the strict Foucauldian sense of ensuring the “good life” for a body of disciplined and auto-disciplining productive human subjects but rather, after Youatt (2008), as a “logic of eco-governance.”49 Within such a system, science becomes the arbiter of ecological meaning and the human “right” to engage with the ecosystem under its sovereignty.50 The ecosystem’s biological processes become translated into scientific models designed to predict future biological outcomes, as evidenced by Figures 1 and 2. This is telling as a heavy onus is placed on these models to meet the CCAMLR’s stated objective of “the prevention of changes in the marine ecosystems that are not potentially reversible in two or three decades.”51



Figure 1: CCAMLRs conceptual framework of marine ecosystem processes



SOURCE: CCAMLR
Figure 2: CCAMLR model for the development of a management strategy



SOURCE: CCAMLR
The CCAMLR could therefore be said, unlike traditional fishing regimes, to regulate rather than facilitate the “rational” extraction of marine living resources (recognizing that this jargon does not change the fact that the CCAMLR governs animal life and death). To achieve this end, it deploys a web of disciplinary and regulatory measures onto state and state-sanctioned actors to attempt to ensure compliance. These include:

“…port state controls (catch documentation—import, export, and transshipment); flag state controls (vessel licence [sic.] conditions—construction, design, equipment, and management, including vessel monitoring technologies); coastal state controls (harvest licence conditions—monitoring, observing and inspecting, hot pursuit, boarding, and arrest); and interstate cooperation that is supportive of these measures (information sharing—vessel identities, licences, movements, catches and non- compliance records, blacklists, and collective sanctions).”52

This mechanism – which, some argue, minimizes illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing53 – creates a disciplinary regime based on observation, inspection, and documentation. The aim is not only overt enforcement and monitoring, but the development of self-monitoring on the part of states and fishermen. The ultimate aim is to change human behavior vis-à-vis the regime and nonhumans as both the CCAMLR’s rules and the ecosystemic approach itself are internalized. In the absence of an overarching power to ensure compliance – in other words, in the absence of sovereignty in the classical sense – new norms are established through scientific expertise (co-constituted by, but also weighed again, economic interests) that is at the heart of the multilateral regime. It is within this system that the MPA for the Ross Sea is being proposed.54

While other no-catch MPAs have been established, very few have been attempted on the high seas, and none on the scale of the Ross Sea. As such, this proposal would be

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