88 See in that context Halberstam, ‘Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering’, in K. Nicolaidis and R. Howse (eds), The Federal Vision (2001), at 213.
89 The wording was modified later for the OJ version, see supra.
90 R. Bocklet, Bericht über die Ergebnisse des EU-Konvents, Bavarian government memorandum dated 11.9.2003 (on file with the author); see also Schröder, supra n. 57.
91 Previously Art. III-65.
92 Previously Art. I-24.
93 Previously Art. III-10.
94 P. M. Huber, ‘Das institutionelle Gleichgewicht zwischen Rat und Europäischem Parlament in der künftigen Verfassung für Europa’, Europarecht (2003) 574, at 584. For the related issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenzsupra, n. 10. The critics tend to ignore that autonomous treaty amendment is not that exotic: The UN Charter can be amended by a 2/3 majority, see Art. 108 UN Charter.
95 Previously Art. III-1 et seq.
96 See Cremona, ‘The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External relations and external action’, 40 CMLRev. (2003) 1347.
99 See in that context Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (1999), at 353.
100 See the Judge rapporteur for European law related cases (!) in the German Constitutional Court Bross, ‘Grundrechte und Grundwerte in Europa’, Juristenzeitung (2003) 429, at 431. Critical former ECJ judge Everling, ‘Quis custodiet custodes ipsos?, EuZW (2002) 357. For a similar debate in the US on a Court of the Union composed out of the Chief Justices of the State Supreme Courts see ‘Amending the Constitution to Strengthen the States in the Federal System’, 36 State Government (1963) 10 (pro) and Kurland, ‘The Court of the Union or Julius Caesar Revised’, 39 Notre Dame Lawyer (1963-1964) 636 (contra).
101 See the Chief Justice of the German Constitutional Court Papier in a recent interview, Der Spiegel, October 2003. See also the cases referred to supra, n. 47.
102 Previously Art. I-28.
103 Previously Art. III-270.
104 Previously Art. III-285.
105 Previously Art. III-274.
106 See Dänzer-Vanotti, ‘Unzulässige Rechtsfortbildung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes’, RIW (1992) 733; Scholz, ‘Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und innerstaatlicher Verfassungsrechtsschutz’, in K. H. Friauf and R. Scholz (eds), Europarecht und Grundgesetz (1990), at 97 et seq.; P. M. Huber, ‘Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europäischer Gerichtshof als Hüter der Gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Kompetenzordnung’, 116 AöR (1991) 211, at 213, with further references. See also Sir Patrick Neil before the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Sub-Committee on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, HL Paper 88, 218 et seq.; 253 et seq.
107 Colneric, ‘Der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften als Kompetenzgericht', EuZW (2002) 709. See also ECJ, Case C-376/98, Germany/Commission (Tobacco directive),  ECR I-8419, which may be seen as a functional equivalent to the US Supreme Court’s case law in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Printz v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997) and Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (1999).
108 For the details of these improvements see F. C. Mayer, ‘Individualrechtsschutz im Europäischen Verfassungsrecht’, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (2004) 606.
109 See in that context the proposal of a Constitutional Council by Weiler, ‘The European Union Belongs to its Citizens: Three Immodest Proposals’, 22 ELRev. (1997) 150, at 155.
110 v. Bogdandy/Bast/Westphal, supra n. 57, at 417.
111 For details of the coordination issue, see F. C. Mayer, ‘Nationale Regierungsstrukturen und europäische Integration’, Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (2002) 111.
112 See for the reading of the competence issue as a problem of horizontal division of powers see Bogdandy/Bast, supra n. 1.
113 Dashwood, ‘States in the European Union’, 23 ELRev (1998) 201, at 213.
115 See Nettesheim, supra n. 1, at 442, though, who points to competences in the field of CFSP and JHA.
116 A counterexample can be seen in the US model where competencies of federal or state level authorities are not just rule-making competencies, but ‘comprehensive’ competencies extending to administrative implementation and enforcement of legislation through a separate federal administration and to the judiciary with a separate federal judiciary.
117 v. Bogdandy/Bast/Westphal, supra n. 57, at 415.
118 This may be related to Herbert Wechsler’s theory of political safeguards of federalism, Wechsler, ‘The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government’, 54 Colum. L. Rev. (1943) 543, reprinted in H. Wechsler, Principles, Politics and Fundamental Law (1961), 49-82. See also Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
119 See Biedenkopf, infra n. 121, at point 3.
120 For the demands by the Länder for the IGC 1996 see Schwarze, ‘Kompetenzverteilung in der Europäischen Union und föderales Gleichgewicht’, DVBl. (1995) 1265.
121 Note that this goes notably for larger Länder such as Bavaria or Nordrhein-Westfalen. See for example the Minister President of Bavaria E. Stoiber, Reformen für Europas Zukunft (27.9.2000) (”tendency towards an omnicompetence of the EU”); the Minister President of Nordrhein-Westfalen W. Clement, Europa gestalten – nicht verwalten, FCE 10/2001, . See also the Minister President of Sachsen K. Biedenkopf, Europa vor dem Gipfel in Nizza - Europäische Perspektiven, Aufgaben und Herausforderungen, FCE 10/2000, .
122 See Schwarze, supra n. 120, at 1265.
123 See v. Borries, supra, n. 46, at 298.
124 Of course, the fact that Germany has become a “unitary federal state” is also part of an explanation for the specific condition of the Länder (see Konrad Hesse K. Hesse, Der unitarische Bundesstaat (1962), in: P. Häberle and A. Hollerbach (eds), Konrad Hesse. Ausgewählte Schriften (1984) at 116 et seq. See in that context Fritz Scharpf’s brilliant analysis ‘Mehr Freiheit für die Bundesländer. Der deutsche Föderalismus im europäischen Standortwettbewerb’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 83, 7.4.2001, at 15. A constitutional reform of the German federal system is currently being prepared.
125 The Art. 23 provision dealing specifically with European integration was introduced in December 1992, replacing the old Art. 23 which had served as the legal basis for German reunification. Both Arts. 23 and 24 foresee an act of assent for the transfer of public powers. Art. 23 establishes two sets of limits; on the one hand, it institutes limits concerning the European construct, which for example has to guarantee a standard of fundamental rights protection essentially equal to that guaranteed by the German constitution. On the other hand, Art. 23(1) points to the limits of how European integration can affect Germany, as the principles mentioned in Art. 79(3) are inalienable.
126 According to § 8 of the Statute on the cooperation between the Federal power and the Länder in European affairs (EuZBLG, BGBl. 1993 I p. 313) the Länder offices have no diplomatic status. To emphasize this seems to increase the importance of these offices, though.
127 BR-Drs. 61/00 v. 4.2.2000, No. 2. Equally opaque the conservative position in the Bundestag (“europäische Kernaufgaben”, European core tasks), BT-Drs. 14/8489 12.3.2002, p. 2.
128 Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96, Sachsen v Commission  ECR II-3663; Case C-156/98, Germany v Commission  ECR I-6857.
129 Case C-209/00, Commission v Germany,  ECR I-11695.
130 See Nr. 3 of the protocol of the Conference of Minister Presidents (Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz (MPK)) of 14.12.2000. See also Clement, supra n. 121.
131 This is very clear in Stoiber, ‘Auswirkungen der Entwicklung Europas zur Rechtsgemeinschaft auf die Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, Europa-Archiv (1987) 543, at 547.
132 Now Art. III-56 et seq. State aid is considered to be one of the pillars of the internal market, Lehman, Art. 87 CE Para. 6, in P. Léger (ed), Commentaire article par article des traités UE et CE (2000). Removing the control of state aids from the Treaties would be tantamount to removing one of the main goals of the whole integration project; it would open a race to the bottom, which may arguably endanger the whole concept of an internal market.
133 See in that context the case-study by A. Becker, ‘Regionale Wirtschaftsförderung unter europäischer Kontrolle: Beihilfenaufsicht und Strukturfonds’, WHI-Paper 10/01,
134 Santamato and Westerhof, ‘Is funding of infrastructure State aid?’, EuZW (2003) 645.
136 White Paper ‘Strategy for a future Chemicals Policy’, COM(2001) 88 final.
137 Case C-27/04, Commission/Council, Pending Case.
138 Previously Art. I-21.
139 See for more details on this method the Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council 23./24.3.2000, SN 100/00, , Point 37. This method can be traced back to previous summits, though. But in Lisbon, it was the first time that OMC was officially mentionned and that it was used outside employment policy.
140 Definition suggested by members of Working Group V on Complementary Competencies, see the final report of that group, CONV 375/1/02 REV1), p. 7.
141 See in that context the discussions in the Convention Working groups VI (CONV 357/02 WG VI 17), IX (CONV 424/02 WG IX 13) and XI (CONV 516/1/03 REV 1 WG XI 9 and CONV 516/1/03 REV 1 COR 1).
142 “Constitutional status should be assigned to the open method of coordination, which involves concerted action by the Member States outside the competences attributed to the Union by the treaties”, Final report of Working Group IX on Simplification (29.11.2002), CONV 424/03, p. 7.
143 This is the position taken by v. Bogdandy/Bast/Westphal, supra n. 57, at 417.
150 D. Simon, Le système juridique communautaire (2nd ed. 1998) at 83 et seq., referring to V. Constantinesco, Compétences et pouvoirs dans les Communautés européennes (1974), at 231 et seq. and 248.
151 See in that context for example Reich, ‘Zum Einfluss des Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die Kompetenzen der deutschen Bundesländer’, EuGRZ (2001) 1, at 13, confusing European competencies and points of contact between European integration and Länder activities.
152 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos,  ECR 1 (English special edition); Case 6/64, Costa/ENEL,  ECR 585 (English special edition).
154 Case C-60/00, Mary Carpenter/Secretary of State for the Home Department,  ECR I-6279.
155 Case C-260/89, ERT,  ECR I-2925; Case 60/84 and 61/84, Cinéthèque,  ECR 2605 point 26; Case 12/86, Demirel,  ECR 3719 point 28; Case 2/92, Bostock,  ECR I-955 point 16; Case C-368/95, Familiapress,  ECR I-3689. See also Case C-299/95, Kremzow,  ECR I-2629 points 14 et seq; AG Van Gerven, Case C-159/90, SPUC/Grogan,  ECR I-4685 point 31.
156 Previously Art. II-51.
157 Case C-260/89, ERT,  ECR I-2925 point 43.
158 In the French version: “ le champ d’application du droit communautaire”. The Court also says that it can not review Member State measures “which do not fall within the scope of Community law“. In the French version: “ une réglementation nationale qui ne se situe pas dans le cadre du droit communautaire”. Part of the confusion around the ERT-jurisprudence is due to the fact that the English version of ERT uses the same wording where the French (as the German) version use different wordings.
159 See for a comparison with the American concept of incorporation, Metropoulos, ‘Human Rights, Incorporated: The European Community’s New Line of Business’, 29 Stanford Journal of International Law (1992) 131. See also Kühling, ‘Grundrechte’ in A. v. Bogdandy (ed), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht (2003), at 583 (606 et seq.). It is true that these cases are not that frequent and that the ECJ always points to the ECHR in the ERT-formula. Thus, these cases could also be read as the Court simply pointing to the obligations that the Member States have under the European Convention of Human Rights, see Thym, ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights : Competititon of Consistency of Human Rights Protection in Europe?’, Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2000) 19, at note 82.
160 This point was also debated along the IGC.
The German Federal Constitutional Court quoted Art. 51 of the Charter (!) and the ERT-case together, implying that there is no contradiction. See Decision of 22.11.2001 - 2 BvB 1-3/01 (Banning of the NPD-Party), .
161 Case C-60/00, Mary Carpenter/Secretary of State for the Home Department,  ECR I-6279. The crossborder element that the ECJ detects in that case is so weak that it raises the question whether it is sufficient to enter into the scope of application of Union law (services) to simply consult a website originating in another Member State.
162 For the link between fundamental freedoms and Art. 95 EC see Weiler, ‘The Constitution of the Common Market Place’, in P. Craig and G. de Burca (eds), The evolution of EU law (1999), at 349; see also Th. v. Danwitz, ‘Zur Reichweite der Gemeinschaftskompetenz nach Art. 100a I und III a.F. (Art. 95 I und III EGV n.F.)’, EuZW (1999) 622, at 624.
163 Case C-379/98, Preussen-Elektra,  ECR I-2099.
164 In Preussen Elektra the court upheld national legislation that aimed to protect the environment, but the decision is almost incompatible with the previous caselaw of the Court.
165 An example of such a confederal approach may be seen in the German Constitutional Court’s Maastricht decision, where the Court reserved the right to declare European acts ultra vires, BVerfGE 89, 155 – Maastricht.
166 Art. 1 CONV 528/03 (6.2.2003).
167 Art. I-1 CONV 850/03. See already CONV 724/03 (26.5.2003). Replacing ‘federal’ by ‘community’ appears odd, as the European Communities ceases to exist.
168 See in that context the different conceptions of the relationship between federal power and states of James Madison and Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers of 1787/88: On the one hand, there is the conception of a Union founded by the States, being a closer Union than the one of the Articles of Confederation, but still with a substantive role of the states (Madison in Federalist No. 51). On the other hand, there is the emphasis on a distinct and sovereign federal power (Hamilton in Federalist No. 78). See also R. Burt, The Constitution in Conflict (1992), at 51 et seq. See also the Virginia/Kentucky-Resolutions 1798/99 and the Nullification doctrine established by John Calhoun in the first half of the 19th century, J. C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government and a Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States (1851), at 146.
169 See CONV 724/03 for the modification of this formula.
170 v. Bogdandy/Bast/Westphal, supra n. 57, at 415.
171 “Hoheitsrechte übertragen” (Art. 23 of the German Constitution); “transferts de compétences” (Art. 88-2 of the French Constitution).
172 This concern is elaborated in v. Bogdandy/Bast/Westphal, supra n. 57, at 416.
173 Case 6/64, Costa/ENEL,  ECR 585 (English special edition), at point 3.
174 Ibid. Ophüls, ‘Juristische Grundgedanken des Schumanplans’, NJW (1951) 289, at 290, relates this to the concept of federalism suggested by Calhoun. On whether Calhoun really meant federalism F. C. Mayer, Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztentscheidung (2000), at 285 et seq.
175 See also the Federal government’s official introduction to the German EEC Treaty Ratification Statute, referring to a “European construct of constitutional nature”, emphasising that the Community is transnational community with public authority of ist own, 2. Wahlperiode, Bundestags-Drucksache 3440, Anlage C, at 108.
176 See Nettesheim, supra n. 1, at 425.
178 This is the position taken by v. Bogdandy/Bast/Westphal, supra n. 57.