Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University



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45 .

46 See v. Borries, ‘Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip im Recht der Europäischen Union’, EuR (1994) 263, at 298; Bermann, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States’, 94 Colum. L. Rev. (1994) 332.

47 BVerfGE 89, 155 - Maastricht. See also the Danish Maastricht case, Højesteret decision 6.4.1998, Carlsen et al./Rasmussen, I 361/1997, UfR (1998) 800. For a more recent example of how national courts see the issue see the British Metric martyrs case, Thoburn v Sunderland City Council; Hunt v Hackney London Borough Council; Harman and others v Cornwall County Council; Collins v Sutton London Borough Council, CMLR (2002) 1461.

48 J. Fischer, Vom Staatenverbund zur Föderation – Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen Integration, FCE-Spezial 2/2000, .

49 The Laeken declaration contains several dozens of questions.

50 The result of the Convention’s work, the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (hereinafter, articles cited without further references refer to the Draft Treaty) is the convention document CONV 850/03 (18.7.2003). A certain number of ‘technical’ modifications has been suggested by the legal experts of the IGC secretariat (mainly the Council legal service), see IGC document CIG 4/03. The modifications accepted by the legal experts of the Member States are laid down in CIG 50/03 (25.11.2003). After the failure of the Brussels European Council of 15/16 December 2003 (see CIG 60/03), a political agreement was reached on most of the remaining issues at the level of foreign ministers (see CIG 81/04) and then, at the Brussels European Council on Friday, 18 June 2004, at the level of Heads of state and government (see CIG 85/04).

51 See CIG 86/04 (25 June 2004) for a consolidated version of the IGC outcome.

52 This means for example that the categories of competences that have been introduced or the absence of a new competence court were not disputed. Of course, the debate on qualified majority voting which was a core issue of the IGC cannot totally be detached from the competence issue. I will address this infra.

53 See in that context ‘The exercise of European competencies is the real problem, not the allocation of competencies in the treaties. Nine points for the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference’, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung – International Policy Analysis Unit – Working Group on European Integration – Working Paper No. 10, September 2001/March 2002, .

54 See in that context Pernice, supra n. 1, at 876; see also Schwarze, ‘Kompetenzverteilung in der Europäischen Union und föderales Gleich­gewicht', DVBl. (1995) 1265, at 1268.

55 Conclusions of Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity (23.09.2002), CONV 286/02.

56 Final report of Working Group V on Complementary Competencies (4.11.2002) CONV 375/1/02 REV1.

57 CONV 850/0357. See already the draft of Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty CONV 528/03. For an assessment of the provisions in the Convention draft, see v. Bogdandy/Bast/Westphal, ‘Die vertikale Kompetenzordnung im Entwurf des Verfassungsvertrags’, 26 Integration (2003) 414; R. Bocklet, Bericht über die Ergebnisse des EU-Konvents, Bavarian government memorandum dated 11.9.2003 (on file with the author); Schröder, ‘Vertikale Kompetenzverteilung und Subsidiarität im Konventsentwurf für eine europäische Verfassung’, Juristenzeitung (2004) 8.

58 Previously Art. I-11.

59 Previously Art. I-9 to I-17.

60 See for the draft CONV 579/03. ‘Protocol’ is a term that does not correspond to the constitutional terminology used elsewhere by the Convention.

61 See already Art. I-3 para. 5, though: “These objectives shall be pursued by appropriate means, depending on the extent to which the relevant competences are attributed to the Union in the Constitution“.

62 Previously Art. I-9.

63 Previously Art. I-10.

64 The fact that European law prevails over national law in case of conflict may be conceptualised as ‘supremacy’ or as ‘primacy’. Unlike European law textbooks and doctrinal writings, the ECJ has used the term ‘supremacy’ only once in a judgement so far (ECJ, Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm [1969] 1, para 5). The term appears as a keyword in a 1972 decision (ECJ, Case 93/71, Leonesio, [1972] 287) and occasionally in Advocate General Conclusions (in Case C-112/00, Schmidberger [2003] ECR 5659, para 5, AG Jacobs played it safe: “...by virtue of the primacy or supremacy of Community law, they prevail over any conflicting national law”). ‘Primacy’ can be found much more frequently in ECJ decisions, albeit often enough the Court just refers to what was said by parties or the national court. For an example of the ECJ clearly using ‘precedence’ see ECJ, Case C-256/01, Allonby [2004] ECR ____ (13 January 2004), para 77. The Constitutional Treaty uses ‘primacy’ (Art. I-10 DCT). It is hard to say for a non-native speaker to what extent there is a difference between primacy and supremacy, whether this difference is related to British versus American English or whether the term supremacy implies more of a hierarchy or of the German concept of Geltungsvorrang as opposed to Anwendungsvorrang (European prevailing over national law would also affect the validity (Geltung) of national law, not only its applicability (Anwendung)).

65 Previously Art. I-11 et seq.

66 Previously Art. I-12.

67 Previously Art. I-13.

68 The Commission argued for the internal market to be an exclusive competence. The compromise is that the competence to establish competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market is an exclusive competence.

69 Thus the Union shall have competence to carry out actions in the areas of research, technological development and space in particular to define and implement programmes; in the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Union shall have competence to take action and conduct a common policy; however, the exercise of these competences may not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs.

70 Previously Art. I-16.

71 Previously Art. I-14.

72 Previously Art. I-15.

73 Previously Art. I-17.

74 Previously Art. 235 TEC.

75 Most critics interpret Art. I-18 to be wider that Art. 308 EC, though, see Schröder, supra, n. 57, at 10.

76 Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, para. 7.

77 For a more detailed assessment of the structure see F. C. Mayer, ‘Verfassungsstruktur und Verfassungskohärenz – Merkmale europäischen Verfassungsrechts?’, Integration (2003) 398.

78 Previously Art. I-50.

79 Previously Art. II-8.

80 Previously Art. I-46.

81 Previously Art. III-6.

82 Previously Art. III-7.

83 Previously Art. III-9.

84 Previously Art. I-8.

85 Previously Art. III-21.

86 For an overview see CIG 8/03.

87 Kommission zur Modernisierung der bundesstaatlichen Ordnung,
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