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____________________, __________________

Latin American History—Period 8

March 5, 2013

As #10: DBQ Writing—

Communication during the Cuban Missile Crisisthis is a featured page

There are five documents for this assignment and five questions to answer following the appropriate documents. The percentage for each question tells you how much should be written to answer the question and the number of points you need to make to get the full credit.

Subject: The Cuban Missile Crisis

These questions refer to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The accompanying documents are above.

1.


(a) What, according to Source A, was the significance of the Soviet military buildup on Cuba?

12%

(b) What message is conveyed by Source B?

8%

2.

Compare and contrast the views about the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis expressed in Sources C and D.

24

3.

With reference to their origin and purpose, discuss the value and limitations of Source C and Source E for historians studying the Cuban Missile Crisis.

24

4.

Using these sources and your own knowledge, analyze the importance of Soviet-U.S. communication during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

32

Sources have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets [ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses (...); minor changes are not indicated.

Source A: President John F. Kennedy’s television and radio address, October 22, 1962.

Good Evening, My Fellow Citizens:

This government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.

First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated…

Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace… He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction.


1(a) What, according to Source A, was the significance of the Soviet military buildup on Cuba? Highlight text and form sentences to answer the question AS IT IS ASKED (12%)

Answer: ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________



Source B: Editorial Cartoon, Karl Hubenthal, 1962

u.s. relations with cuba - ecumene
1. (b) What message is conveyed by Source B? (Note title, symbols, characters and cartoonist’s POV)—8%

Answer: ______________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________






Source C: Translation of Telegram From Khrushchev to Kennedy sent from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, Moscow, October 26, 1962, 7 p.m.

Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, are not carrying any armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions, which you have declared the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognize your right to such actions.

If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied.

And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.



Source D: Dobrynin's Cable to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 27 October, 1962

Late tonight R. Kennedy invited me to come see him. We talked alone.


The Cuban crisis, R. Kennedy began, continues to quickly worsen. We have just received a report that an unarmed American plane was shot down while carrying out a reconnaissance flight over Cuba. The military is demanding that the President arm such planes and respond to fire with fire. The USA government will have to do this.
I interrupted R. Kennedy and asked him, what right American planes had to fly over Cuba at all, crudely violating its sovereignty and accepted international norms? How would the USA have reacted if foreign planes appeared over its territory?
.....
"In this regard," R. Kennedy said, "the president considers that a suitable basis for regulating the entire Cuban conflict might be the letter N.S. Khrushchev sent on October 26 and the letter in response from the President, which was sent off today to N.S. Khrushchev through the US Embassy in Moscow. The most important thing for us," R. Kennedy stressed, "is to get as soon as possible the agreement of the Soviet government to halt further work on the construction of the missile bases in Cuba and take measures under international control that would make it impossible to use these weapons. In exchange the government of the USA is ready, in addition to repealing all measures on the "quarantine," to give the assurances that there will not be any invasion of Cuba and that other countries of the Western Hemisphere are ready to give the same assurances-the US government is certain of this."
"And what about Turkey?" I asked R. Kennedy.
"If that is the only obstacle to achieving the regulation I mentioned earlier, then the president doesn't see any unsurmountable difficulties in resolving this issue," replied R. Kennedy. "The greatest difficulty for the president is the public discussion of the issue of Turkey. Formally the deployment of missile bases in Turkey was done by a special decision of the NATO Council. To announce now a unilateral decision by the president of the USA to withdraw missile bases from Turkey-this would damage the entire structure of NATO and the US position as the leader of NATO, where, as the Soviet government knows very well, there are many arguments. In short, if such a decision were announced now it would seriously tear apart NATO."
"However, President Kennedy is ready to come to agree on that question with N.S. Khrushchev, too. I think that in order to withdraw these bases from Turkey," R. Kennedy said, "we need 4-5 months. This is the minimal amount of time necessary for the US government to do this, taking into account the procedures that exist within the NATO framework. On the whole Turkey issue," R. Kennedy added, "if Premier N.S. Khrushchev agrees with what I've said, we can continue to exchange opinions between him and the president, using him, R. Kennedy and the Soviet ambassador. "However, the president can't say anything public in this regard about Turkey," R. Kennedy said again. R. Kennedy then warned that his comments about Turkey are extremely confidential; besides him and his brother, only 2-3 people know about it in Washington.

"That's all that he asked me to pass on to N.S. Khrushchev," R. Kennedy said in conclusion. "The president also asked N.S. Khrushchev to give him an answer (through the Soviet ambassador and R. Kennedy) if possible within the next day (Sunday) on these thoughts in order to have a business-like, clear answer in principle. [He asked him] not to get into a wordy discussion, which might drag things out. The current serious situation, unfortunately, is such that there is very little time to resolve this whole issue. Unfortunately, events are developing too quickly. The request for a reply tomorrow," stressed R. Kennedy, "is just that-a request, and not an ultimatum. The president hopes that the head of the Soviet government will understand him correctly."


I noted that it went without saying that the Soviet government would not accept any ultimatums and it was good that the American government realized that. I also reminded him of N.S. Khrushchev's appeal in his last letter to the president to demonstrate state wisdom in resolving this question. Then I told R. Kennedy that the president's thoughts would be brought to the attention of the head of the Soviet government. I also said that I would contact him as soon as there was a reply. In this regard, R. Kennedy gave me a number of a direct telephone line to the White House.
.....
I should say that during our meeting R. Kennedy was very upset; in any case, I've never seen him like this before. True, about twice he tried to return to the topic of "deception," (that he talked about so persistently during our previous meeting), but he did so in passing and without any edge to it. He didn't even try to get into fights on various subjects, as he usually does, and only persistently returned to one topic: time is of the essence and we shouldn't miss the chance.
After meeting with me he immediately went to see the president, with whom, as R. Kennedy said, he spends almost all his time now.

2. Compare and contrast the views about the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis expressed in Sources C and D. Complete the Venn Diagram before writing. 24%


C + D

Comparison: _______________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Contrasting: __________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________


Source C: Translation of Telegram From Khrushchev to Kennedy sent from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, Moscow, October 26, 1962, 7 p.m. REPEATED FOR QUESTION #3

Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, are not carrying any armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions, which you have declared the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognize your right to such actions.

If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied.

And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.



Source E: US, Department of Justice, Memorandum, TOP SECRET, “Memorandum for the Secretary of State from the Attorney General,” on Robert Kennedy’s October 27 Meeting with Dobrynin, October 30, 1962.

u.s. relations with cuba - ecumene


3. With reference to their origin and purpose, discuss the value and limitations of Source C and Source E for historians studying the Cuban Missile Crisis. In other words, how does who, where, and why the document was written effect how valuable it is as a source on the topic, and why it may not be so good to use for the topic. 24%

Source C: ____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Source E: _____________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Using these sources and your own knowledge, analyze the importance of Soviet-U.S. communication during the Cuban Missile Crisis. USE NOTEBOOK PAPER FOR THIS ESSAY. 32%

Paragraph 1: Answer the question: How important was communication during the crisis? Give three reasons why you gave this analysis.

Paragraph 2: Use one of the three reasons and give details to back up this reason. Include facts, quotations from 2-3 documents, and other ideas on only this reason.

Paragraph 3: Use another of the three reasons and give details to back up this reason. Include facts, quotations from 2-3 documents, and other ideas on only this reason.

Paragraph 4: Use the third of the three reasons and give details to back up this reason. Include facts, quotations from 2-3 documents, and other ideas on only this reason.

Paragraph 5: Summarize your claim and the reasons—do not rewrite the first paragraph or restate it in another way.



Historical Background Information Timeline follows:

January 1, 1959http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


Fidel Castro assumes power after the Cuban Revolution.

December 19, 1960http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


Cuba openly aligns itself with the Soviet Union and their policies.

January 3, 1961http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


The U.S. terminates diplomatic and consular relation with Cuba.

April 12, 1961http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


President Kennedy pledges the U.S. will not intervene militarily to overthrow Castro.

April 17, 1961http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


Backed by the U.S., a group of Cuban exiles invades Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in an attempt to trigger an anti-Castro rebellion. The invasion fails and more than a thousand Cuban rebels are captured by Castro's forces.

June 3-4, 1961http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


Khrushchev and Kennedy hold summit in Vienna.

July 27, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


Castro announces that Cuba is taking measures that would make any direct U.S. attack on Cuba the equivalent of a world war. He claims that the U.S.S.R. has invested greatly in helping defend his country.

August 10, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


CIA Director John McCone sends a memo to Kennedy expressing his belief that Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) will be deployed in Cuba

August 31, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


Senator Kenneth Keating tells the Senate that there is evidence of Soviet missile installations in Cuba. Keating urges Kennedy to take action.

September 11, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


In a speech to the UN, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko warns that an American attack on Cuba could mean war with the Soviet Union.

October 9, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


Kennedy orders a U-2 reconnaissance flight over western Cuba, delayed by bad weather until the 14th.

October 10, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


Senator Keating charges that six intermediate-range ballistic missile bases are being constructed in Cuba.

October 14, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


A U-2 flying over western Cuba discovers missile sites. Photographs obtained by this flight provide hard evidence that Soviets have missiles in Cuba.

October 15, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


  • A readout team at the National Photographic Intelligence Center reviews photos taken during the U-2 flight and identifies objects similar to MRBM components observed in the U.S.S.R. at San Cristobal.

  • McGeorge Bundy decides after hearing about the discovery of missiles in Cuba not to inform the president until the next day.

  • McNamara is shown the photographic evidence of the MRBMs at San Cristobal.

October 16, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


  • Bundy breaks the new to Kennedy who calls for a meeting of a group later to become known as EX-COMM.

  • At that meeting Kennedy and his advisors discuss possible diplomatic and military courses of action.


October 17, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


  • Kennedy flies to Connecticut to campaign for the Democratic Party and congressional candidate Abe Ribicoff.

  • Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen meet the President at the airport and fill him in on what he had missed during that day's deliberations. Throughout EX-COMM's discussions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and especially the Air Force strongly argue for an air strike.

  • After another U-2 flight on the night of the 17th, the military discovers intermediate range (IRBMs) SS-5 nuclear missiles.

October 18, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


  • Gromyko and Kennedy meet for two hours. Reading from notes, Gromyko assures Kennedy that Soviet aid to Cuba has been only for the "defensive capabilities of Cuba."

October 19, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


  • Kennedy departs Washington for scheduled campaign speeches in Cleveland and the West Coast.

October 20, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


  • Kennedy's Press Secretary announces that the President is canceling the remainder of his campaign trip because of an "upper respiratory infection."

  • Kennedy meets with his advisors and orders a defensive quarantine instituted as soon as possible. The full operation is reviewed and approved, and the President's television address is scheduled for the next evening.

October 21, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


  • Kennedy is told by General Maxwell Taylor that an air strike could not guarantee to destroy all Soviet missiles in Cuba.

  • Kennedy decides on a quarantine of Cuba for the time being.

  • Kennedy requests that the press not deny him the "element of surprise" or he warns, "I don't know what the Soviets will do."

  • Another U-2 flight that day reveals bombers and Migs being rapidly assembled and cruise missile sites being built on Cuba's northern shore.

October 22, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


  • Congressional leaders assemble at the White House for a meeting with Kennedy. They are shown the photographic evidence of the Soviet missile installations. The congressional leaders express support, but many advocate stronger action.

  • The President addresses the nation in a televised speech, announcing the presence of offensive missile sites in Cuba.

  • U.S. military forces go to DEFCON 3.

  • U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay is reinforced by Marines.

October 23, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


  • Kennedy orders six Crusader jets to fly a low level reconnaissance mission.

  • Organization of American States (OAS) unanimously approves of the quarantine against Cuba.

  • By the end of the day U.S. ships had taken up position along the quarantine line, 800 miles from Cuba.

  • Late in the evening, the President sends Robert Kennedy to the Soviet embassy to talk with Ambassador Dobrynin.

  • Kennedy receives a letter from Khrushchev in which Khrushchev comments that there is a, "serious threat to peace and security of peoples."

  • President decides to give Khrushchev more time and pulls the quarantine line back to 500 miles.

October 24, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


  • Soviet ships en route to Cuba with questionable cargo either slow down or reverse their course except for one.

  • Military forces go to DEFCON 2 the highest ever in U.S. history.

October 25, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


  • Kennedy sends a letter to Khrushchev laying the responsibility for the crisis on the Soviet Union.

  • EX-COMM discusses a proposal to withdraw U.S. missiles from Turkey in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

October 26, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


  • The Soviet ship Marucla is cleared through the quarantine.

  • During an EX-COMM meeting, Kennedy says that he believes the quarantine alone can not force the Soviet government to remove its offensive weapons from Cuba.

  • A CIA report from that morning states that there was no halt in progress in the development of the missile sites and another reconnaissance flight reveals the Soviets were also attempting to camouflage the missiles.

  • Aleksandr Fomin, who was known to be the KGB station chief in Washington, requests a meeting with ABC News correspondent John Scali. Fomin proposes the dismantling of Soviet bases under U.N. supervision in exchange for a public pledge from the U.S. not to invade Cuba.

  • Khrushchev sends another letter to Kennedy proposing removing his missiles if Kennedy would publicly announce never to invade Cuba.

October 27, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


  • A new letter from Khrushchev arrives, proposing a public trade of Soviet missiles in Cuba for U.S. missile in Turkey.

  • An American U-2 is shot down over Cuba killing the pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson.

  • U-2 accidentally strays into Soviet airspace near Alaska nearly being intercepted by Soviet fighters.

  • Dobrynin and Robert Kennedy meet and discuss the price of removing the missiles from Cuba.

  • Kennedy writes Khrushchev a letter stating that he will make a statement that the U.S. will not invade Cuba if Khrushchev removes the missiles from Cuba.

October 28, 1962http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/hortri.gif


  • Khrushchev announces over Radio Moscow that he has agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba.



Question

Percent earned

Percent Possible

Percent Computation for Valid Points

1 (a)




12

Four points for each valid statement directly from Source A

1(b)




8

Four points for each valid statement directly from Source B

2




24

Four points for each compare or contrast statement; however, at least two must be from each (compare or contrast), and to gain credit the statements must be on the views expressed by the authors and both sources must be used equally for full credit points

3




24

Four points for each assessment statement about the usefulness of the sources, but each must refer to the origin and purpose for its value and state specific bias from the origin and purpose. No more than 12 points will be rewarded for any one of the two sources.

4




32

All five documents must be used (Sources A-E) in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 for a possible 16 points. Four points are given when the sources are used in combination or with outside information and are quoted/ cited. Without at least five outside information, no more than 16 total points will be rewarded. A clear thesis (introductory paragraph) with valid reasons can get up to five points.

Question

Percent earned

Percent Possible

Percent Computation for Valid Points


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