This book explores the impact of the 1917 Revolution on factory life

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This book explores the impact of the 1917 Revolution on factory life
in the Russian capital. It traces the attempts of workers to take
control of their working lives from the February Revolution through
to June 1918, when the Bolsheviks nationalised industry. Although
not primarily concerned with the political developments of the
Revolution, the book demonstrates that the sphere of industrial
production was a crucial arena of political as well as economic

Having discussed the structure and composition of the factory

workforce in Petrograd prior to 1917 and the wages and conditions
of workers under the old regime, Dr Smith shows how workers saw
the overthrow of the autocracy as a signal to democratise factory life
and to improve their lot. After examining the creation and activities
of the factory committees, he analyses the relationship of different
groups of workers to the new labour movement, and assesses the
extent to which it functioned democratically.

The central theme of the book is the factory committees’

implementation of workers’ control of production. Dr Smith rejects
the standard Western interpretation of this movement as
‘syndicalist’, showing that its ideological perspectives were close to,
but not identical with, those of the official Bolshevik party.
Essentially, workers’ control was a practical attempt to maintain
production and to preserve jobs in a situation of deepening economic
chaos. On coming to power in October, the Bolsheviks envisaged an
expansion of workers’ control, and the committees pressed for
nationalisation and workers’ management. The collapse of industry
and the reluctance of employers to continue their operations,
however, convinced the Bolshevik leadership that workers’ control
was inadequate as a means of restoring order in the economy, and
they subordinated the committees to the trade unions in 1918.

Dr Smith assesses the extent to which the Bolsheviks’ capacity to

carry out a genuinely revolutionary programme was limited by their
own ideology or by the economic and social conditions in which the
revolution was born. Throughout, he places the struggle in the
factories in the context of an international and comparative
perspective. The book will thus appeal not only to historians of
Russia and the Russian Revolution, but also to students of labour
history and of revolutionary theory.

S. A. SMITH is Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex. He

studied at the Universities of Oxford, Birmingham, Moscow and




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Senior Lecturer in History, University of Essex

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Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge
CB2 irp
32 East 57th Street, New York, ny 10022, USA
10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia

Cambridge University Press 1983

First published 1983
First paperback edition 1985

Library of Congress catalogue card number: 82-12885

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Smith, S. A.

Red Petrograd: revolution in the factories,

1917-18.—(Soviet and East European studies)

1. Leningrad—Politics and government

  1. Russia—Politics and government—1894-1917

  2. Soviet Union—Politics and government—1917-1936

  1. Tide II. Series

947-45 DK265.8.L/

isbn o 521 24759 4 hard covers
isbn o 521 31618 9 paperback

Transferred to digital printing 2003


To my mother and father


Acknowledgements x

Introduction i

  1. A profile of the Petrograd working class on the

Petrograd: the city and its industry 5

The size and distribution of the factory workforce

in 1917 9

The social composition of the Petrograd working class 14

Peasant workers and ‘cadre’ workers 14

Sexual and age divisions 23

Skill divisions 27

Conclusion 35

  1. The tsarist factory

The administration of the tsarist factory 3 7

Conditions of work 41

The standard of living during the war 44

The strike movement during the war 48

  1. The February Revolution: A new dispensation in

the factories 54

Democratising the factory order 54

The eight-hour day 65

Wage struggles 68

Management strategy after the February Revolution 74

  1. The structure and functions of the factory

The structure of the factory committees 80

F actory committees and the organisation of food supply 86

Factory committees and labour discipline 88

Factory committees and the campaign against

drunkenness 92

Factory committees and cultural policy 94

Factory militias and Red Guards 98

  1. Trade unions and the betterment of wages 103

Craft unionism and industrial unionism 103

The political composition of the trade unions 109

Strikes and inflation 116

The campaign for collective wage contracts 119

The metalworkers’ contract 121

The wage contracts: key features 129

Relations between workers and Sluzhashchie 134

  1. The theory and practice of workers’ control of

The theory of workers’ control 139

Anarchism, syndicalism and the Petrograd labour

movement 142

Workers’ control as a response to economic chaos 145

The politics of workers’ control: February to October
J9J7 *49

Menshevik, SR and anarchist perspectives on control
of the economy 151

The Bolsheviks and workers’ control 153

The factory committee conference debates on

workers’control 156

The politics of workers’ control at factory level 160

7 Deepening economic chaos and the intensification

of workers’ control 168

Economic crisis and industrial relations 168

Workers resist attempts to evacuate industry 171

The factory committees against redundancies 174

Workers’ control becomes more radical 176

The relationship of the factory committees to the trade

unions 185

  1. The social structure of the labour movement 190

The social composition of labour protest and labour

organisation 190

Women workers 192

Peasant and unskilled workers 196

Y oung workers 197

Democracy and bureaucracy in the trade unions and

factory committees 200

Democracy in the trade unions 200

Democracy in the factory committees 203

  1. The October Revolution and the organisation of

The decree on workers’ control 209

The role of the trade unions 216

The subordination of the factory committees to the

trade unions 219

Towards a socialist economy 223

Lenin, the Bolsheviks and Workers’ control after

October 225

10 The economic crisis and the fate of workers’

control: October 1917 tojune 1918 230

From workers’ control to workers’ self-management 230

Economic catastrophe and the dissolution of the

working class 242

The labour organisations and the crisis of labour

discipline 246






This book began life as a Ph.D. thesis undertaken at the Centre for
Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham.
I wish to thank everyone there for providing a stimulating atmos-
phere in which to work, especially Professor Moshe Lewin, now of the
University of Pennsylvania, who provided much of the inspiration for
this work when it was in its early stages. I would like to express my
warm thanks to Maureen Perrie, also of CREES, who supervised the
final stages of this work. I am most grateful to the British Council for
granting me an exchange studentship to Moscow University in the
academic year 1976-7, and to Professor V. Z. Drobizhev of the
Faculty of History, who gave me advice and hospitality. I would like
to record my indebtedness to the librarians of INION and the Lenin
Library in Moscow, the newspaper room of the BAN Library in
Leningrad and, above all, to Jenny Brine, librarian of the Baykov
Library, CREES.

I would like to thank the University of Essex for granting me study

leave during the Autumn term of 1979, and all my colleagues in the
History Department for providing a congenial atmosphere in which
to teach. Mary McAuley, Geoffrey Crossick, Geoffrey Hosking and
Rose Glickman all made helpful comments on parts of this book in an
earlier form. Professor Yoshimasa Tsuji of Waseda University read
the whole manuscript, and made many useful criticisms. I am
grateful to all of them, though none bears any responsibility for any
errors that remain. Finally, I would like to say thank-you to all my
friends in Birmingham, Moscow, Leningrad, Colchester and else-
where, who offered me the personal support without which I could
not have written this book. Special thanks to Bob Lumley, Kevin
Halliwell, Karl Goswell, Elia Michael, Peter Baxter and, above all,
Philip Jakes.


Revolutions are centrally about the breakdown of state power, the
elimination of old political elites and institutions, and the ultimate
reconstitution of a new state power and a new elite.1 The history of
revolutions is thus, intrinsically, a political history, and the history of
the Russian Revolution of 1917 is no exception. It begins in February
with the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy, continues with the ‘dual
power’ of the Provisional Government and Petrograd Soviet, culmin-
ates in the Bolshevik seizure of power and eventuates in a one-party
dictatorship. Yet revolutions entail more than the collapse of state
power: they engender a whole-scale restructuring of social relations.
Only recently, have historians begun to pay attention to the profound
changes which took place in the society, culture and economy of
Russia during the revolutionary years. The manifold transformations
of social relations were dependent on the collapse of state power, but
they in turn shaped the processes whereby centralised, bureaucratic
state power was reconstituted. Power was thus directly at issue in all
the multiple changes which rent the fabric of tsarist society, and it is
for this reason that any ‘social history’ of the Russian Revolution
cannot but also be a political one.

The present study is concerned with the relationships between

class power as it was manifest in the world of work and the broader
processes of the Russian Revolution. It seeks to explore the impact of
the revolution on factory life in Petrograd during 1917 and the early
part of 1918. Its central theme is the struggle of workers to abolish the
autocratic order of the tsarist factory, their efforts to establish
workers’ control of production, and their groping attempts to
reorganise life in the factory. This study is not primarily concerned
with tracing the emergence of a revolutionary political consciousness

among Petrograd workers, and thus the events, political parties and
personalities which dominate other accounts of the revolution recede
into the background of the present study.2 Nevertheless, in deliber-
ately foregrounding the activities of workers around work and
production, it is hoped to shed new light on the wider political
developments of 1917, in particular, by demonstrating that the sphere
of production was itself an important arena of political as well as
economic conflict.

Although the separation of the economy and polity is a particular

feature of modern capitalist society, the unequal distribution of power
within production is crucial to the maintenance of class power in
society at large. If one defines power as the capacity of a group to
control the physical and social environment and to thus make its
interests prevail over those of other groups, then it is clear that
management and workers do not enjoy equal power within the
production process.3 The two sides of industry do not have equal
access to and control over resources and sanctions, be they material or
ideological. In 1917 the unequal distribution of power within
production was a central concern of Petrograd workers, and their
struggle for greater power in industry had major implications for the
balance of class forces in society at large and for the eventual
consolidation of a new state power.

This perspective has implications for the way in which we analyse

working-class activity in 1917, for it means that we must jettison any
simple dichotomy between the ‘economic’ and ‘political’ struggles of
workers, i.e. between struggles which take place within the sphere of
production and those which take place on the terrain of the state. In
Marxist discourse this dichotomy appears in the guise of the Leninist
distinction between ‘trade-union’ and ‘Social-Democratic’ struggles.
Although he was not absolutely consistent in this view, Lenin tended
to argue that the spontaneous struggles of workers for the improve-
ment of wages and working conditions could only generate a
‘trade-union’ consciousness, the chief characteristics of which are
sectionalism and economism, and that only through the intervention
of a revolutionary party could workers develop a revolutionary
awareness of capitalist society.4 The experience of 1917 suggests that
this rigid dichotomy is in need of modification. In that year, in a
context of economic crisis and acute class conflict, the attempts of
workers to defend their living standards and to preserve jobs led
them, to a large extent ‘spontaneously’, to see in the revolutionary

options offered by the Bolsheviks the ‘natural’ solution to their
immediate problems. Moreover, the Leninist thesis overlooks issues
of power and control within production. In most work-situations
there is resistance by workers to the authority of the employer, so that,
in the words of Carter Goodrich, the ‘frontier of control’ is constantly
shifting.5 An orthodox Leninist might argue that such conflicts over
job-control are but a variant of economistic struggles, since they
encroach on, but do not transcend, managerial authority. Yet even at
their most defensive, such conflicts testify to the desire of workers to
impose their definitions upon the work-situation. The experience of
1917 again suggests that when the power of the state is relatively
ineffective, defensive struggles by workers to control production can
quickly become offensive struggles to take power from management,
and that these struggles have profound implications for the balance of
power within society as a whole. The present study suggests that it
was the struggles of workers in the world of work, and the activities of
work-based organisations, such as the factory committees and trade
unions, which were of central importance in promoting revolutionary
consciousness in 1917. This is not to suggest that consciousness
developed solely on the basis of the experience of work. In 1917
revolutionary feeling grew in response to the wide range of problems
that faced the Russian people - problems of war, governmental
ineptitude and the crisis in the countryside. Nor is it to suggest that
revolutionary consciousness grew in a purely ‘spontaneous’ fashion.
Bolshevik agitation played a crucial part in articulating this con-
sciousness. Nevertheless the Bolsheviks did not themselves create
revolutionary feeling; it developed primarily out of attempts by
workers to grapple with problems of survival.

This study concentrates almost exclusively on factory workers in

Petrograd. It ignores important groups such as railway workers,
transport workers, workers in public utilities, postal and telegraphic
workers, shop workers, construction workers, domestic servants,
small artisans and others. This is not because these workers were
defined a priori as somehow less ‘proletarian’ than factory workers. It
was decided to concentrate on factory workers, partly to keep down
the length of the book, and partly because factory workers did
constitute the major element within the industrial labour force and
within the labour movement in Petrograd in 1917. Perhaps something
should be said to justify the inclusion of printers in the category
‘factory workers’. It is true that of the sixty-four print works (tipografii)

in Petrograd for which we have information, twenty-seven employed
less than fifty workers; but even if one excludes the huge State Papers
print works, which employed 5,784 workers, the average print works
still employed 136 workers, so it was more of a ‘factory’ than a small
workshop.6 It should not be supposed that factory workers, in any
sense, constituted a homogeneous social group. They were divided
among themselves by industry and trade, degree of proletarian-
isation, skill, sex, age etc. These divisions are important in under-
standing the dynamics of the labour movement in 1917, and are
explored in Chapters 1 and 8.

A word should be said about periodisation. The first two chapters

discuss the structure of the working class, and life in the tsarist factory
before February 1917. The main body of the text (Chapters 3 to 8) is
concerned with developments between February and October, but
since the main theme of the work - the attempt of workers to take
control of their working lives - continues beyond October, it was
decided to pursue the analysis into the middle of 1918, though in a less
detailed way than for 1917. The account thus stops at the point when
the Bolsheviks decided to nationalise industry at the end of June 1918,
but this is more a convenient finishing point, than a real historical
break, for it was some time before workers’ control of production
disappeared, and some time before nationalisation was a reality.

The capital of Russia is called by St Petersburg when referring to

the period before 18 August 1914. On that date the tsarist govern-
ment, in a fit of anti-German fervour, changed the name of the city to
the less German-sounding Petrograd. This study follows suit. When
referring to the period beyond Lenin’s death in 1924, the city is called
by its modern name of Leningrad. This study uses old-style dates of
the Julian calendar until 14 February 1918 (i.e. 1 February 1918),
which was the date when the Bolshevik government changed to the
Gregorian calendar. All dates thereafter are given in the new style.
Except in quotations, measures of weight have been translated into
metric units. The currency of rubles and kopecks is abbreviated to ‘r.’
and ‘k.’.


A profile of the Petrograd working class
on the eve of 1917

petrograd: the city and its industry

Petrograd was a city of sharp contrasts. It was the capital of the

Russian Empire, yet closer culturally to Western Europe than to the
rest of Russia. It was at once a city of elegant grandeur, lauded by
Pushkin, and a city of eerie squalor, abhorred by Dostoevsky.
Petrograd was both symbol of tsarist power and of popular revolt.
Here the Imperial Court headed an army of 70,000 civil servants; here
in 1905 the first Soviet had headed a general strike. Along the avenues
and canals of the city centre stood palaces, splendid emporia, banks
and company offices. Across the river stood bleak tenements and
teeming factories. Not a stone’s throw from the University and the
Academy of Sciences thousands of people lived in appalling ignorance
and misery. Petrograd was home to rich and poor, to a thriving
revolutionary underground and to the Holy Synod, to the liberal
opposition and to the Black Hundreds. Here in February 1917 a
revolution erupted which was to have world-shattering reverbera-

In 1917 Petrograd had a population of 2.4 million, making it the

fifth largest city in Europe.1 The Russian Empire had about 182
million inhabitants, less than a fifth of whom lived in towns.2
Petrograd was by far the largest city in the Empire; between 1897 and
1914 its population had grown from 1.26 million to 2.21 million — a
very high rate of growth, compared to the average for the country as a
whole.3 This growth was largely due to the immigration of peasants
from the countryside. Every year thousands of peasants flocked to the
city in search of work — some to stay for a short while, others to settle
permanently. In 1910, no fewer than 68% of the population had been
born outside the city.4

The huge scale of peasant migration to St Petersburg gave the city’s
population a distinctive demographic structure. The birth-rate in the
capital was low by Russian standards, though high by Western
European standards.5 The death-rate was lower than the national
average, but this was deceptive, since in almost every age-group it
was actually higher than average. Only the preponderance of young
adults in the population depressed the overall death-rate. Even so,
mortality in St Petersburg was extremely high by European stan-
dards. The large proportion of young adults in the city was paralleled
by very small proportions of children under 10 and of people over 50.
This reflected the tendency for children to be brought up in the
countryside, and for older people to retire there. Since greater
numbers of men than women left the countryside in search of work,
there was an imbalance in the population in favour of males, though
the proportion of women grew rapidly after 1900. Finally, a majority
of both men and women were single. The marriage-rate in St
Petersburg was low both by Russian and European standards, and
late marriage was the norm. These distinctive demographic patterns
suggest that the ‘typical’ inhabitant of St Petersburg on the eve of the
First World War was, therefore, a single, male peasant in his twenties.

The census of 1910 provides the fullest information on the social

structure of St Petersburg. This classified the city’s population of

  1. by social estate (soslovie), revealing that 7.2% were nobility,

  1. 5% clergy, 4.1% honorary citizens, 0.7% merchants, 15.5% ‘lower
    middle class’ (meshchane) and 68.7% peasants.6 This latter category
    included most wage-earners. Workers comprised about 27% of the
    capital’s population, and consisted of 234,000 factory workers; 77,000
    white-collar workers in commercial and industrial enterprises
    (sluzhashchie); 52,000 transport workers; 25,000 in the catering trade
    and 41,000 who worked in public utilities and city organisations. In
    addition, there were about 260,000 servants in private or public
    employment and 58,000 artisans. Financial and industrial business-
    men comprised less than 1 % of the population, and there were about

  1. owners of small businesses, including shops and restaurants.7

In 1914 Petrograd was the foremost financial and industrial centre

in a country where two-thirds of the population still engaged in

agriculture. The city’s banks controlled the metallurgical and coal
industries of the South, the oil industry of Baku, Urals copper,
Siberian gold, Ukrainian sugar, Turkestan cotton and Volga
steamships.8 By 1917 the assets of Petrograd’s private commercial

banks amounted to three-quarters of the entire assets of Russia’s
commercial banks.9 These banks financed the major industrial
companies of the capital, most of which were concentrated in the
metalworking and engineering sector. The Discount and Loan bank,
for example, financed the Nobel-Lessner engineering group, the
American-Russian rubber company and the Skorokhod shoe
company.10 Since two-thirds of the assets of Russian commercial
banks were foreign-owned, foreign capital played a crucial part in
Petrograd industry.11 In 1917, however, only fifteen firms in the
capital were owned outright by foreign companies.12 The industry of
Petrograd was distinguished not so much by its dependence on
foreign capital as by its dependence on the state.

Underpinning the economy of the city was a tight nexus of large

monopolies, finance capital and government orders. From the
industrial crisis of 1900-3 onwards, companies began to form
syndicates in order to exercise monopoly control over the market.13
This process of monopolisation was given a sharp boost by the First
World War, which made Petrograd the main centre of armaments
production. By 1917 sixty of the largest firms in the capital were
organised into syndicates or trusts. During the war, the government
farmed out orders for ammunition and some types of ordnance to
these syndicates. The Russian-Asiatic bank organised a War Indus-
tries syndicate which distributed orders to the Baranovskii engineer-
ing company, the Russian Optical Company and the Russian
Company for the Manufacture of Shells and Military Supplies.
Snaryadosoyuz, a private syndicate comprising six firms, produced
shells directly for the Artillery Administration. The transport-
engineering syndicates Prodparovoz and Prodvagon were treated by
the Ministry of Communications more or less as official government
contractors. S.N. Vankov headed a state-capitalist organisation
which produced three-inch shells directly for the Artillery Adminis-
tration by sub-contracting orders to four large companies in

As well as providing orders for the major private companies, the

state directly owned several large enterprises in Petrograd. From its
foundation in 1703, St Petersburg had been a major centre of
government-sponsored industry. By 1917 there were 31 state-owned
or state-controlled enterprises in the city and the surrounding region,
which provided a large part of the cartridges, revolvers, machine-
guns and other types of ordnance required by the army and navy. Ten

enterprises were run by the Artillery Administration, the largest of
which were: the Pipe works (Trubochnyi zavod) with a workforce of
18,942 in January 1917; the Cartridge works (Patronnyi zavod) with
some 10,000 workers; the Okhta explosives works with 10,200
workers; the Sestroretsk works, situated 34 km from the capital,
which had 6,228 workers. In all, 53,000 workers were employed by
the Artillery Administration. In addition, a further 36,000 workers
worked in five large factories run by the Naval Ministry. These
included the Obukhov works, which employed 12,954 workers in
January 1917; the Izhora works at Kolpino, which had 8,902 workers;
the Baltic shipbuilding works, which had 7,645 workers. The rest of
the state enterprises were made up of miscellaneous ports, arsenals
and railway workshops.15 In 1917 there were also two large com-
panies which were state-controlled, though not state-owned. These
were the massive Putilov works, with its workforce of around 30,000,
and the Nevskii shipbuilding company, which employed more than

  1. workers. In 1916 the government sequestered both firms, by
    appointing new boards of management, although each continued to
    be privately owned.16

In both state and private sectors, Petrograd industry was remark-
able for its advanced technology. From the start of industrial
‘take-off’ in the 1890s, most branches of industry in the capital were
highly mechanised. This was a response to the high labour-unit costs
in Russia, which reflected low labour-productivity, the cost of raw
materials and marketing, and the relatively restricted market for
sales.17 After 1907 Petrograd was caught up in the ‘Second Industrial
Revolution’, which saw the emergence of new industries, such as
chemicals, the rise of mass production, the restructuring of the labour
process and the invasion of workshops by electric power. By 1914
Petrograd industry had attained a high level of technological
sophistication.18 Its largest firms lagged little behind those of
America and Western Europe. The Putilov works exchanged tech-
nical information and patents with the Schneider, Armstrong-
Whitworth, Paul Girault and A.G. Duisberg companies.19 There
was, however, considerable variation in technological level between
different factories and different industries: machine-tool construction
and machine construction, for example, were somewhat archaic,
compared to the electro-technical and engine-building industries.20

The technical efficiency of Petrograd industry was put to stringent

test by the war and, on the whole, was not found wanting.21

Enterprises were reorganised and re-equipped, and massive amounts
of capital were injected into them. Mass-production techniques were
introduced in the armaments factories and in some machine-
con truction plants. The conversion of private factories to production
of shells, hand grenades, detonators and mortars was very successful.
Production of guns was less successful, but adequate. Most engineer-
ing industries coped well, but could not always meet demand.
Production of engines increased and simple machine-tool production
expanded both quantitatively and qualitatively. Production of auto-
mobiles and aircraft was established, but production of precision
instruments remained weakly developed.22

Industrial output in the capital doubled between 1914 and 1917. In

1916 Petrograd factories fulfilled military orders worth 1.5 million
rubles. In the metalworking industry, 81% of enterprises and 98% of
the workforce worked on war orders.23 Until the later part of 1916,
therefore, in spite of some weaknesses, Petrograd industry managed
to satisfy the voracious appetite of the Russian war machine.
Thereafter, it found it increasingly hard to maintain output in the
teeth of declining supplies of fuel and raw materials and growing
chaos in the transport system.24

On the eve of the Russian Revolution, the structure of industry

in Petrograd was altogether remarkable, unparalleled except in
Germany. Petrograd represented an island of technologically soph-
isticated state-monopoly capitalism in a country whose mode of
production still consisted in the main of rudimentary capitalist and
pre-capitalist forms, albeit under the overall dominance of large
capital. The economy of the city was being convulsed by a colossal
boom which was entirely a consequence of the slaughter daily taking
place at the Front. War, however, could not go on for ever. This was
an economy living on borrowed time: as soon as the mighty powers
had glutted themselves with carnage and destruction, the economy of
Petrograd would deflate like a pricked balloon. No end to the war was
as yet in sight, but already the signs of imminent collapse were on the


in 1917

Between 1890 and 1914, the number of factory workers in St

Petersburg grew from 73,200 to 242,600.25 Between 1914 and 1917, it

grew by 150,000 to reach 392,800 — or 417,000, if one includes the
factories situated on the outskirts of the city.26 About one-third of the
workforce of the city and its suburbs, i.e. 134,464 workers, worked in
state enterprises.27 At the beginning of 1917, the factory workers of
Petrograd represented about 12% of Russia’s 3.4 million industrial
workers.28 During the first half of that year, the number of workers in
the capital continued to grow—possibly by as much as 10%. From the
summer onwards, however, the workforce began to contract, as
economic crisis set in.29

The huge expansion of the Petrograd workforce between 1914 and

1917 took place almost entirely in industries producing for the war
effort. In the metal industry the workforce grew by 135%; in
chemicals by 99% and in clothing by 44%. In textiles the workforce
remained constant in size, and in the food, printing and paper
industries the workforce shrank.30 By 1917 the distribution of the
Petrograd workforce by industry was as follows:

Table 1.
Branch of

Number of

Number of

% of total







44i 15






Printing and Paper












Leather and footwear















  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   32

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