There is a much-recycled and certainly apocryphal tale told of



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AT: Perm



Instrumentalism Disad to the perm – Method determines the outcomes of the ethical practices we choose to adopt

Jacques, Dept. Poli. Sci, U. Florida, ‘06 [Peter, Global Environmental Politics, Feb., project muse]

Not only is humanity the center of concern and analysis, other considerations are irrelevant unless they directly involve human welfare. Nature can matter in deep anthropocentrism, but only in very strict instrumental terms. For example, Lomborg argues that poor air quality, since it is directly linked to lives lost, may warrant more attention and even policy. However, even many instrumental values of non-human nature are dismissed because they are too far off, indirect, or inconsequential compared to other matters. Indirect relationships between human welfare and non-human nature as well as notions of interdependence are dismissed as “soft” and therefore invalid.59 Often this is described as something like “waiting for Godot” where the beneªts of many—sometimes all60—environmental policies are viewed as invalid and utopian. Deep anthropocentricism does not see non-human nature as important in absolute terms, and only in thin instrumental terms is non-human nature considered relatively important. For the deep anthropocentric, nature, unlike in anthropocentric environmentalism, is excised utterly from society.
Their epistemology is incompatible with the alternative—turns the case

Best, 10 – Associate Professor of Humanities and Philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso (Steven, 12/31/10, “Total Liberation: Revolution for the 21st Century”, http://drstevebest.wordpress.com/2010/12/31/total-liberation-revolution-for-the-21st-century-4/, KONTOPOULOS)

It has escaped the attention of the entire Left that the arguments they use to justify human domination over animals – that animals allegedly lack reason and language – were the same arguments used by imperialists when they slaughtered native peoples and male oppressors when they exploited women. Humanists upholding speciesist views, therefore, ironically reinforce their own domination and cannot access the animal standpoint to understand the origins of domination, and so are in no position to advance a viable politics of liberation.


Link Wall

We have multiple links to the discourse of the 1AC that prove they reify speciesism:

Prison system analogy- Their discussion of dehuamization and prison ignores those individuals deemed as unhuman and nonhuman aninmals.


Guenther 12 (Lisa, associate professor of philosophy at Vanderbilt, “Beyond Dehumanization: A Post-Humanist Critique of Solitary Confinement”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2012)

What does it mean to be treated like a nonhuman animal? In this paper, I analyze the discourse of “dehumanization” in Madrid v Gomez, a 1995 Eighth Amendment case concerning the treatment of prisoners at California’s Pelican Bay Supermax Penitentiary. I argue that the language of dehumanization fails to describe the harm of solitary confinement because it remains complicit with a hierarchical opposition between human and nonhuman animal that rebounds against prisoners, especially those who have been racialized and/or sexualized as less than human. Humanist discourse neglects the sense in which both human and nonhuman animals are affective, corporeal beings who rely upon the support of others for their own capacity to orient themselves within a mutually-perceived world. Drawing on the testimony of inmates in solitary confinement, and situating this testimony in relation to the political and scientific history of US incarceration practices, I develop a post-humanist critique of solitary confinement. Keywords: Solitary confinement, sensory deprivation, intercorporeal Malebranche would not have beaten a stone as he beat his dog, saying that the dog didn’t suffer. - Merleau-Ponty, Nature, 166 Certain carceral practices are often condemned – both by prisoners and by their legal or political advocates – on the grounds that they violate human dignity by treating people like nonhuman animals. For example, in the 1995 Eighth Amendment case, Madrid v Gomez, the treatment of prisoners at California’s Pelican Bay Supermax Penitentiary is consistently compared to the treatment of nonhuman animals.i Some inmates were “hog-tied” with their hands and feet bound together, then left chained to a toilet or bunk for up to 24 hours (47). Other inmates were confined to outdoor cages the size of a telephone booth, and left naked or partially dressed, exposed to inclement weather and to the view of other inmates (58). One inmate who was caged recalled feeling like "just an animal or something" (59). The presiding judge in this case, Chief Judge Thelton Henderson, concluded that “[l]eaving inmates in outdoor cages for any significant period – as if animals in a zoo – offends even the most elementary notions of common decency and dignity” (62). And yet, Henderson stopped short of condemning prolonged solitary confinement in a tiny indoor cell as cruel and unusual Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2012 (ISSN1948-352X) 47 punishment, in all but the most extreme cases. What is this “common decency and dignity” so often invoked to protect prisoners from abuse, and why does it tend to produce such negligible effects? In what follows, I analyze the tension between the concept of “human dignity” and the ongoing abuse of both human and nonhuman animals. In the first part of the paper, I present a critical reading of Judge Henderson’s decision in Madrid v Gomez. In the second part, I situate this decision within the history of the US penitentiary and Cold War research on the sensory deprivation of human and nonhuman animals in order to demonstrate the complicity of animal abuse and prisoner abuse, especially in the case of racialized prisoners. In conclusion, I suggest a different way of describing the harm of solitary confinement without opposing the needs of human prisoners to the needs of the billions of nonhuman animals confined to zoos, laboratories and factory farms across the world today. De-humanization In Madrid v Gomez, Judge Henderson states very clearly that prisoners have a right to “human dignity” (328), even though they have forfeited many other rights by violating the law. All citizens, incarcerated or otherwise, deserve “not to be treated as less than human beings” (329).ii What is the content of this doubly-negative right? Presumably, it means that prisoners deserve not to be treated like nonhuman animals. But what does it mean to be treated like an animal – and why would being caged or forcibly restrained seem appropriate for nonhuman animals, but inappropriate for human beings? The content of the right to “human dignity” in the context of Madrid v Gomez is based on the satisfaction of “basic human needs,” which are listed as “food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety (330).iii Note the degree to which these basic human needs overlap with the needs of any nonhuman animal; there is nothing on this list, except for clothing and perhaps medical care, that a horse or a bear would not also need in order to thrive. But precisely because “humans are composed of more than flesh and blood” – presumably, because they are not merely animals, but human animals, that is, social and rational animals – Judge Henderson argues that “mental health is a need as essential to a meaningful human existence as other basic physical demands our bodies may make for shelter, warmth or sanitation” (388). Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2012 (ISSN1948-352X) 48 How does Judge Henderson seek to protect this fundamental, apparently human need for mental health? And what is “mental health” anyhow? Henderson condemns the use of excessive force and the deliberate humiliation of prisoners, acknowledging that some of the techniques used at Pelican Bay violated “evolving standards of decency that mark the process of a maturing society” (329, citing Patchette v. Nix, 952 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1991)). He acknowledges the evidence of expert witnesses such as Stuart Grassian, who found that in forty of the fifty inmates he interviewed over the course of two years, prolonged solitary confinement in the SHU, or “Security Housing Unit,” at Pelican Bay had either “massively exacerbated a previous psychiatric illness or precipitated psychiatric symptoms associated with RES [Reduced Environmental Stimulation] conditions” (281). He notes the typical effects of RES, or what Grassian later calls SHU Syndrome, as “perceptual distortions, hallucinations, hyperresponsivity to external stimuli, aggressive fantasies, overt paranoia, inability to concentrate, and problems with impulse control” (276). In passing, Henderson even acknowledges the Court’s observation during its tour of the SHU that “some inmates spend the time simply pacing around the edges of the pen; the image created is hauntingly similar to that of caged felines pacing at a zoo” (270). But Henderson stops short of condemning SHU conditions as a violation of prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights, concluding that: Conditions in the SHU may well hover on the edge of what is humanly tolerable for those with normal resilience, particularly when endured for extended periods of time. They do not, however, violate exacting Eighth Amendment standards, except for the specific population subgroups identified in this opinion.iv (460) The “specific population subgroups” for whom prolonged solitary confinement would count as “cruel and unusual punishment,” are: 1) prisoners who are already mentally ill, and 2) prisoners who are at “unreasonably high risk” of becoming mentally ill if held in SHU conditions (411). Note the frankly biopolitical resonance of the term, “population,” which refers to prisoners as a statistical entity with no specifically human qualities, even in a ruling that celebrates and seeks to protect this population’s (apparently) human need for mental “health.”v How are concepts such as “humanity” and “mental illness” (understood as an Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2012 (ISSN1948-352X) 49 affliction faced by human beings who are “more than flesh and blood”) working together here to expose prisoners to intolerable violence, even while claiming to protect them from it? Colin Dayan has argued persuasively that the “exacting standards” of Eighth Amendment cases have done less to protect prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment, and more to expand the scope and intensity of the violence to which prisoners are exposed within legal limits (Dayan 2005). Henderson’s decision in Madrid v Gomez is no exception to this rule. On one hand, he acknowledges that “contemporary notions of humanity and decency… will not tolerate conditions that are likely to make inmates seriously mentally ill” (388). But on the other hand, by limiting Eighth Amendment protection to just those “population subgroups” who are already suffering from mental illness or are recognizably on the verge of it, he creates a loophole into which virtually every prisoner could fall. If you are already mentally ill or “unreasonably” close to mental illness (whatever that means, and however it is measured), you are protected from conditions that would exacerbate your condition. You are recognized as a human being, with an intrinsic dignity that no civilized nation would dare to violate. But if you are not (yet) mentally ill – if you display “normal resilience” to barely tolerable conditions – you may be confined in a situation that, according to Grassian’s research, produces mental illness in about 90% of the population. To put this more succinctly: Unless you can obtain a diagnosis of mental illness, you may be subject to conditions that typically produce mental illness. In the legal discourse of Madrid v Gomez, and of Eighth Amendment cases more generally, mental illness becomes both the benchmark for distinguishing torture from legitimate punishment, and also the condition that one would need to satisfy in order to be exempt from torture; it becomes both a sign of human dignity and an alibi for dehumanizing treatment. Given the complicity of discourses on humanity and dehumanization with both the abuse of prisoners and the abuse of animals such as hogs and caged felines, to whose condition prisoners are typically “reduced,” we need a different language to describe the harm of prolonged solitary confinement. Is there another way of describing the violence of conditions in the SHU without appealing to human dignity or to the defense of human rights at the expense of nonhuman animals, and ultimately at the expense of human prisoners as well?

This link turns the aff- we must recognize that the abuse brought onto the slaves on the middle passage and current otherization of people of the Islamic faith is a byproduct of our inability to accept the other as equal to ourselves- the human-non-human divide is the root cause of this otherization, but can only be solved by thinking about this relationship as an issue of anthropocentrism, not dehumanization


Guenther 12 (Lisa, associate professor of philosophy at Vanderbilt, “Beyond Dehumanization: A Post-Humanist Critique of Solitary Confinement”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2012)

They put [inmates] in the hole and they chained them, completely nude. So then the following day they give them a pair of shorts, and then the next day they give them a pencil, but no paper, and each day you progress, and if your behavior is not keeping with what they want it to be, then you start back from nothing. The reward punishment trip is what START was about. (cited in Gomez 2006, 63) Again, we could describe this treatment as a form of dehumanization; prisoners were indeed treated like dogs to be chained, confined and re-trained through a system of punishments and rewards. But we cannot fully understand the brutality of these programs until we refuse to accept that dogs deserve to be treated this way, any more than humans do. To the extent that we focus on the abuse of prisoners as an affront to human dignity, we risk overlooking the ethical, political and ontological complexity of a situation in which not only human beings, but living beings as such are at stake. The problem with programs like START and Asklepieion is not that they treated human prisoners as “mere flesh and blood,” but that they failed to respect them as flesh and blood creatures, with corporeal and intercorporeal needs that go beyond the basic conditions of survival. Given the countless situations in which Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2012 (ISSN1948-352X) 60 nonhuman animals are similarly disrespected, the abuse of prisoners may well be described as a dehumanization in which prisoners are treated like animals. But this is only because animals themselves are being de-animalized: reduced to input-output machines, mechanisms of stimulus and response, separable units of behavior that can be disorganized and reorganized, unfrozen and refrozen, according the requirements of the animal industrial complex and/or the prison industrial complex. In order to find more fruitful ways of critiquing the abuse of both systems, in which human and nonhuman animals are confined to cages, pens and cells across the world, we need to think beyond dehumanization, and beyond the anthropocentric worldview that supports it.

2AC 3



Specieism has to be at the center of analysis-otherwise diminishing returns takes out solvency.

Rowe, Professor of Plant Ecology at the University of Saskatchewa, 1990

(Stan, “Environmental Ethics - Ethical Ecosphere”, Trumpeter Vol 7, No 3, http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/article/view/498/841)



Ethics-by-extension soon runs into the problem of diminishing returns. With each expansion, with each enlargement of the circle of concern, the ethical impulse—strong at the centre—is more and more attenuated at its perimeter. For example, Callicott argued strongly for acceptance of Leopold's Land Ethic as a logical extension from the individual to the ecological community, but having made the case he then undermined it by stating that Land, the ecological community, is secondary in importance to ethical objects closer to the centre: friends and relations. Faced with the charge that a Land Ethic might overrule the rights of people (as in most circumstances it should), he surrendered without a shot, abandoning the Land in favour of the rights of Homo sapiens . 9 Clearly ethics-by-extension is not the route to development of normative goals and guidelines strong enough to combat the human species self-love, the anthropocentrism, which is destroying the world. Suppose that the planetary Ecosphere within which we live, move, and have our being, is taken as the primary reality. Suppose It is accepted as inherently valuable, an ethical thing- in-itself, producing life and continuously sustaining its many organic forms which are, however, secondary in significance. Such a novel viewpoint brings a radical shift in the orientation of ethical thought. No longer does it proceed by extension from the inside outward, from the self to like organisms, but instead from the outside in, from the Ecosphere to its contents. Then the foremost ethical question is reframed: How shall the health, beauty, diversity and permanency of the Ecosphere and its sectoral ecosystems be secured? After that, secondly , how shall people and societies fit their activities creatively to the Ecosphere's maintenance? A greater-than-human goal guides human goals.
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