The Psychology of Free Will

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The Psychology of Free Will

Eddy Nahmias

Georgia State University

Unpublished paper 2008

* Please do not quote without author approval. *
1. The Traditional Free Will Problem

According to the traditional free will debate, research in psychology is irrelevant to the question of whether we have free will, or in any case, less relevant than research in physics about whether the universe is deterministic or not. This is a mistake. In this article I will briefly diagnose this mistake and then suggest avenues for correcting it by discussing four ways that psychological research is highly relevant to philosophical debates about free will.

First, psychological research can help us systematize ordinary beliefs and intuitions about freedom, responsibility, intentional action, morality, and other concepts that bear on philosophical debates about free will. Since debates about free will and responsibility often make references to what we ordinarily think or say about these issues, it would be helpful to empirically examine whether these references are accurate. Second, to the extent that ordinary intuitions about free will conflict, research may uncover the psychological mechanisms that underlie these conflicts—and that perhaps drive the philosophical debates as well. Third, psychological research can study how changing people’s beliefs about free will and responsibility may alter their behavior—for instance, how suppressing the ordinary belief that we have free will might lead to less responsible behavior or different legal practices. Fourth and most significant, psychological research about human agency and action presents potential threats to our free will (or to the degree to which we possess free will), threats that are distinct from—and more salient than—the potential threat suggested by determinism. I will concentrate here on psychological research that poses challenges to our ability to act on our consciously considered reasons.

The traditional free will debate centers on the “compatibility question”: whether or not free will is compatible with determinism, which is the thesis that a description of the state of the universe at one time, conjoined with the laws of nature, entails a description of the state of the universe at any other time. The primary axis of the debate divides philosophers according to their answer to the compatibility question: incompatibilists argue that determinism precludes free will, because it purportedly entails that we cannot do otherwise; while compatibilists argue that free will is possible even if determinism were true, because determinism does not preclude the requisite ability to do otherwise or because the ability to do otherwise is not required for free will. Incompatibilists have then traditionally divided into libertarians who believe we have free will (so determinism is false) and hard determinists who believe determinism is true so we do not have free will.1 This way of posing the question is well-suited to philosophical (conceptual) analysis, conspicuously distanced from messy empirical data—except to the extent that the truth of determinism is an empirical question, in which case, for some incompatibilists, whether we have free will would depend on an empirical question that could be answered by a team of physicists, presumably while entirely ignoring human beings.2

Though this debate can be brought down to earth, as I will explain, notice that, as posed, it is quite abstract and general (it’s supposed to be a metaphysical question, after all). Incompatibilists argue that, necessarily, if determinism holds in a universe (or the relevant part), no being has free will. Humans can be ignored since the question is whether determinism would preclude any creature—angels, immaterial souls, animals, aliens, and unimagined beings—from having free will. In practice, the discussion usually focuses on humans, but our specific cognitive and volitional capacities are often ignored. Meanwhile, a common compatibilist tactic is to describe an ideal agent (e.g., fully rational and self-controlled) and suggest that such an agent has capacities that are both compatible with determinism and sufficient to secure free will. But the question of whether actual human agents have such capacities—or the degree to which they have them—becomes lost in the more abstract debate.

In addition to being abstract, the debate is often presented as being entirely conclusive: either free will exists or it doesn’t (of course, posing the debate in these terms has had the effect of making it entirely inconclusive, leading to what John Fischer (1994) aptly labels a “dialectical stalemate”). If incompatibilism is true and determinism holds, no agent has any free will. Some libertarians suggest that the seemingly incontrovertible fact that most of us do have free will shows that determinism is not true. Meanwhile, the idea behind most compatibilist approaches seems to be that by establishing the compatibility of free will and determinism we thereby establish that we normally have free will. This, of course, does not follow since the compatibility question is abstract and concerns what is compossible with what, so answering that agents could have free will in a deterministic universe says nothing about whether we human beings actually have free will.

As we’ve seen, there are incompatibilists who believe we have free will and incompatibilists who believe we do not have free will, and then there are compatibilists who believe we have free will. There is a logical space just waiting to be filled: compatibilists who worry that we do not have free will. And it is a logical space to be filled. Call this position “neurotic compatibilism.”3 Regardless of whether free will is compatible with determinism, it may be incompatible with lots of other things. For compatibilists (like me) who think the truth or falsity of universal determinism is irrelevant to whether humans have free will, and who do not worry about what physicists might discover (if anything) about the deterministic (or probabilistic) nature of the causal relations among physical events, the problem of free will does not just fade away. Rather, it shifts to more fertile ground and more salient threats.

Some of these challenges still derive from metaphysical issues. For instance, suppose philosophical arguments convinced us that folk psychological concepts—including those that we employ when we deliberate about what to do and that we think of as representing essential causes of our actions—should be eliminated in light of scientific advances, or that these mental states play no causal role in our actions (e.g., that consciousness is epiphenomenal). Such eliminativism or epiphenomenalism seems to challenge the existence of free will as we know it, and these threats apply to most compatibilist and libertarian theories alike. Such challenges from theories in the philosophy of mind are entirely orthogonal to the issue of determinism. Indeterministic epiphenomenalism or eliminativism is a viable possibility. Conversely, the reality and causal efficacy of mental states or events would not be ruled out by the truth of determinism alone. For that matter, deterministic substance dualism is a logical possibility.

Other challenges to free will derive from empirical claims about human cognitive capacities. Of course, such claims only challenge free will to the extent free will is conceptualized in certain ways. But most theories of free will, whether compatibilist or libertarian, suggest shared necessary conditions that include specific cognitive capacities, such as the ability to consciously consider one’s reasons for action and to control one’s actions in light of these considerations (see 3.1 below). These capacities to be “reasons responsive” are amenable to empirical investigation—and hence, susceptible to empirical challenges, for instance, from results in social psychology that suggest we often act on situational factors we do not recognize and would not accept as reasons for acting. As Robert Kane notes, referring to another body of research I will discuss, “If conscious willing is illusory or epiphenomenalism is true, all accounts of free will go down, compatibilist and incompatibilist” (2005).4

When considering the cognitive capacities involved in most accounts of free will, the question of whether we have free will looks less “conclusive”, less all-or-nothing, than the traditional debate makes it out to be. In general, cognitive capacities are possessed and exercised to varying degrees. Hence, different types of creatures and different individuals may possess more or less free will, and individuals may exercise more or less freedom in particular actions. Information from psychology and other sciences of the mind may suggest that we have less free will than we typically think we have without establishing that none of us has any free will (as incompatibilists argue determinism would show). This, I take it, is an advantageous implication. It accords with our intuition that humans develop greater autonomy and control as they grow up, and it accords with our practices of holding people morally responsible to varying degrees, depending on the degree to which they have matured to possess the relevant cognitive and volitional capacities, as well as the degree to which they are able to exercise those capacities in a particular situation (e.g., we tend to mitigate responsibility when people are under undue cognitive or emotional stress).

Personally, I find it highly intuitive that we possess and exercise free will to varying degrees and that our moral responsibility should roughly track these degrees of freedom. I also find it intuitive that free will is not threatened by the “bony” thesis of determinism, but that free will may be threatened by certain “meaty” empirical discoveries about the way our specific cognitive capacities work. And I’m tempted to add that my intuitions are surely shared by most ordinary people untainted by philosophical theorizing—that my views just are intuitive, commonsensical … obviously true. But, despite common practice, determining whether a position in a philosophical debate is commonsensical or intuitive should not be determined solely by philosophers consulting their own intuitions. It should be determined by whether most ordinary people in fact find it intuitive. This is a question to be answered not from the armchair but by systematic psychological research.
2. The Folk Psychology of Free Will

Philosophers often offer as support for their views that they are intuitive. If they mean that the views are intuitive just to them, then that seems to have little evidential weight and will certainly be unconvincing to philosophers who hold competing views (and intuitions). If they mean that their view is intuitive to most philosophers, then (a) it is unlikely to be true, at least for some of the crucial intuitions in debates as contentious as the free will debate, and (b) we might wonder why philosophers’ intuitions should have special status, at least for any debate that extends outside the ivory tower to deal with concepts and practices of great practical import to non-philosophers—such as the concept of free will and the practice of attributing moral responsibility. In fact, however, when a philosopher says that her view is intuitive, she usually implies that it is intuitive to most ordinary people. And, if she is right, that seems to offer some evidential weight for the view—again, at least in debates that involve ordinary concepts and practices rather than technical concepts, such as supervenience or determinism. I am not suggesting that whether a philosophical claim is true should be determined by whether most non-philosophers think it is true, nor that conceptual analysis should involve simply the systematization of ordinary conceptual usage. But at a minimum and other things being equal, an intuitive view should not be discarded for a counterintuitive view without good reason and perhaps without some error theory to explain why people have mistaken intuitions. The burden of proof rests on the counterintuitive view.5

2.1 Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?

Traditionally, incompatibilists have situated the burden on compatibilists in just this way. They have suggested that most ordinary people see an obvious conflict between free will and determinism such that compatibilism is counterintuitive. Robert Kane (following William James and Immanuel Kant) writes:

In my experience, most ordinary persons start out as natural incompatibilists. They believe there is some kind of conflict between freedom and determinism; and the idea that freedom and responsibility might be compatible with determinism looks to them at first like a ‘quagmire of evasion’ (James) or ‘a wretched subterfuge’ (Kant). Ordinary persons have to be talked out of this natural incompatibilism by the clever arguments of philosophers. (1999: 217)
Similarly, Laura Ekstrom claims that “we come to the table, nearly all of us, as pretheoretic incompatibilists” (2002: 310). And Galen Strawson contends that the incompatibilist conception of free will (though impossible to satisfy) “is just the kind of freedom that most people ordinarily and unreflectively suppose themselves to possess” (1986: 30), adding that it is “in our nature to take determinism to pose a serious problem for our notions of responsibility and freedom” (89).

I have no doubt these philosophers are reporting not just their own intuitions but also the reactions of some of their students.6 But students’ reactions depend heavily on the way the issues are presented to them, likely influenced by the theoretical predilections of the teacher (an interesting hypothesis that could be tested empirically). When I present determinism to mean that there is a sufficient explanation for our choices such that without it our choices would ultimately be random, well, then my students tend to express compatibilist intuitions. Of course, this is a misleading characterization of determinism (and indeterminism). But it is similarly misleading to characterize determinism to suggest that our actions and choices are caused by forces that bypass our mental life or make our conscious deliberations, desires, and reasons irrelevant to what we do. For instance, incompatibilist intuitions are pumped when determinism is presented to mean that our choices are caused entirely by our genes or by our brain states (e.g., “An agent would not be morally responsible at all if he was caused necessarily, predetermined, to try to do what he did, by his brain state”), that the forces of nature coerce us (e.g., “What am I but a helpless product of nature, destined by her to do whatever I do and to become whatever I become?”), or that our conscious deliberations are epiphenomenal (e.g., “our self-monitoring and self-critical capacities, so essential to human nature, might as well dry up and wither; they would no longer have any function”).7 I suspect that incompatibilist intuitions are pumped in large part by conflating determinism with, for instance, reductive mechanism of a sort that suggests eliminativism or epiphenomenalism about conscious mental states, or with fatalism, or with coercion by the past and laws of nature.

In any case, these claims about ordinary intuitions—and what pumps them—cannot be settled by philosophers consulting their own intuitions and announcing that most people share them. Rather, they can and should be empirically tested using methods from psychology. Indeed, under the general moniker of “experimental philosophy,” several philosophers have done just this, surveying non-philosophers’ judgments using thought experiments designed to elucidate ordinary conceptual usage and intuitions about, for instance, intentional action, epistemology, morality, and free will and moral responsibility.8

To examine laypersons’ intuitions about the relationship between determinism and free will and moral responsibility, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jason Turner, and I developed various scenarios in which we describe determinism, without conflating it with other issues, and ask people whether agents in such scenarios can be free and responsible.9 For instance, in one study, we presented participants (college students who had not studied the free will debate) with this scenario:

Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from the exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this universe the same conditions and the same laws of nature produce the exact same outcomes, so that every single time the universe is re-created, everything must happen the exact same way. For instance, in this universe a person named Jill decides to steal a necklace at a particular time, and every time the universe is re-created, Jill decides to steal the necklace at that time.

We then asked participants whether it is accurate to say that Jill stole the necklace of her own free will, and 66% responded that it is. We also asked whether it would be fair to hold Jill morally responsible (i.e., blame her) for her action, and 77% responded that it would. We developed two other scenarios that describe determinism in different ways (in one a supercomputer, based on the state of the universe and laws of nature, perfectly predicts the actions of agents before they are born; in the other, identical twins raised by different families either keep or return a wallet with the stipulation that their values and actions are completely caused by their genes and upbringing such that they would perform the other action if they had been raised by the other family), and we varied scenarios to include morally positive, negative, and neutral actions. Across all of these variations, the results showed a consistent pattern: between two-thirds and three-quarters of the hundreds of participants we surveyed responded that agents in deterministic scenarios act of their own free will and should be held morally responsible for their actions.10

While these results do not establish that compatibilism is more intuitive to non-philosophers than incompatibilism, they certainly put pressure on the received view that incompatibilism is intuitive and that the burden of proof is on the “counterintuitive” compatibilist position. My current view is that this data indicate that most people do not see determinism per se as a threat to free will or moral responsibility; rather, they will come to see determinism as a threat to free will only if they are convinced (through argument or rhetoric) that determinism has certain implications: that we are manipulated or coerced, that we cannot do otherwise in the relevant sense, that our choices are fated, that our conscious deliberations are bypassed, or that we are mechanistic systems. Indeed, I have conducted experiments that show most people do not take psychological determinism to threaten free will or responsibility but that most people do take a reductive mechanistic description of determinism (in terms of neuro-chemical processes) to be threatening.11

Empirical work tends to be messy, so it is no surprise that other results have complicated this picture. After we ran our studies, Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe developed studies that suggest people’s intuitions about the compatibility of determinism and responsibility differ significantly depending on whether their “reactive attitudes” (e.g., moral anger or indignation) are stirred up or not. When people read their description of a fully deterministic universe (A) and a universe in which decisions are not fully determined (B), most responded that our universe is like universe B and also that individuals in universe A could not be held fully morally responsible for their behavior. But when participants read a description of the two universes and were asked if a man in the deterministic universe A who brutally killed his wife could be “fully morally responsible,” most responded ‘yes.’ As Nichols and Knobe (forthcoming) put it, “most people give the compatibilist response to the concrete case, but the vast majority give the incompatibilist response to the abstract case,” and they suggest that one interpretation of these results is that people have an incompatibilist theory of responsibility that they then apply incorrectly in concrete, emotionally laden cases.

Now, I have some criticisms of the experimental design of these studies and whether they show that people have an incompatibilist theory of responsibility, but I do not want to rehearse those here.12 Rather, I want to discuss an important implication that these studies of folk intuitions have highlighted and that Nichols and Knobe draw from their work. In addition to allowing us to examine what people’s intuitions are regarding free will and moral responsibility, these studies also allow us to investigate the psychological sources of people’s conflicting intuitions.

2.2 Psychological sources of intuitional conflict

Regardless of whether the majority of non-philosophers express intuitions consistent with compatibilism or incompatibilism, the studies carried out so far indicate that (a) different people make different judgments about the same scenarios (e.g., our results tended to be split 2-to-1 or 3-to-1); (b) specific minor changes to the scenarios can produce significant differences in the response patterns (a finding consistent with loads of psychological research, e.g., on framing, priming, and order effects); and (c) in some cases, the same individual will respond in ways that suggest he or she has conflicting intuitions about the issues. That is, there appear to be interesting inter-subject and intra-subject intuitional conflicts about the relationships between free will, moral responsibility, and determinism.13 Careful psychological investigation, informed by philosophers’ conceptual resources, is needed to elucidate the contours of these conflicts and perhaps uncover the psychological mechanisms driving them. Such work could have important implications for the philosophical debates; for instance, it may challenge the assumption shared by most philosophers that there are invariant conditions of moral responsibility (see Knobe and Doris, forthcoming), and it could establish in what ways a philosophical theory of freedom and responsibility revises our folk theory and practices and in what ways it preserves them (see Vargas, 2005).

Suppose, for instance, that Nichols and Knobe’s data are confirmed and extended to demonstrate that people have radically different intuitions about free will and moral responsibility depending on whether they are considering abstract cases vs. concrete cases of individuals doing dastardly deeds (which may also differ from cases of individuals doing benevolent deeds). We then face an important question: which intuitions, if any, should we care about in our theorizing, those primed by specific emotionally salient cases or those primed by abstract cases? When it comes to judgments of moral responsibility, should some emotions be considered biases that distort our judgments or rather crucial components required for making proper judgments?

The answer to these questions clearly goes beyond the purely “descriptive project” of empirically exploring the contours of people’s intuitions and concepts. Rather, it involves the “substantive project” of developing a philosophical theory about which of these intuitions are most likely to be accurate, which of them should be preserved and which discarded or revised as we engage in reflective equilibrium. I take it that this philosophical project nevertheless depends on the descriptive project, though the crucial question of how it so depends is itself part of the substantive project. As I’ve suggested, I think ordinary intuitions about certain concepts and practices have prima facie but defeasible evidential value, they can help establish burden of proof, and they can set the guideposts for revisionist projects. It may also turn out that the evidence gives us reason to diminish the evidential value of intuitions, either the folk’s or philosophers’ or both. Empirical work has suggested that people’s intuitions, at least in some domains, can be influenced by seemingly irrelevant factors, such as their socio-economic status, cultural background, or even order effects.

Finally, there is a third project, the “prescriptive project” that involves prescribing what we should do once we develop a philosophical theory.14 For instance, suppose that we discovered that most people have compatibilist intuitions, but the philosophical community became convinced that incompatibilism is the best theory. In that case, should we work to change (educate) people’s views? Or suppose we discovered that most people have a libertarian conception of free will and responsible agency but philosophers become convinced that such a conception is incoherent and hence impossible to satisfy. Should we then work to explain this to people or should we worry that they “can’t handle the truth” and will be harmed if exposed to this knowledge (as suggested by Smilansky, 2000)?

Like the substantive project, the prescriptive project requires both going beyond the descriptive facts while also carefully attending to them.

2.3 The effects of people’s beliefs about free will

How people think about free will—notably, whether they think they have it—seems likely to affect how they behave. But this, of course, is an empirical question ripe for psychological investigation. As it happens, little research has examined this question, which is not surprising given the difficulties involved in first determining what people believe about free will and then trying to examine differences in behavior based on such differences in beliefs.

The existing research in experimental philosophy does agree that most people strongly believe that humans have free will and are morally responsible (though, as suggested above, it is not clear how to interpret these beliefs in terms of the philosophical theories). A few people, however, claim to be hard determinists or skeptics about the existence of free will and “robust responsibility.” It would be interesting to examine whether these skeptics think, feel, and act differently than “optimists” about free will. Do skeptics conform to moral norms any more or less, do they forgive others more easily, are they less likely to praise or feel gratitude towards others, are they happier or more depressed, are they less likely to be retributivists about punishment?15

A more informative but more difficult experimental paradigm would involve diminishing people’s generally entrenched beliefs that humans are free and morally responsible and then examining the effects. Would losing their belief in freedom make people more apt to behave immorally or to feel more hopeless (as Smilansky contends), would it make them less apt to hold others morally responsible, would it diminish their reactive attitudes towards others (e.g., indignation) or towards themselves (e.g., guilt)?16

As I mentioned above, it seems likely that people think of free will and moral responsibility as capacities people possess to varying degrees. If so, then we could also examine whether different people, or even different cultures, believe people generally have more or less freedom and responsibility and then compare these differences across individuals or cultures to see if it correlates with differences in their beliefs and practices regarding morality, praise, blame, reward, punishment, and various reactive attitudes.

Such information could help inform a prescriptive project about what to do with any relevant empirical discoveries and philosophical conclusions regarding free will. Personally, however, I find it highly unlikely that philosophers could convince people they do not have any free will and are not morally responsible at all, even if most people have libertarian views and the physicists informed us that the universe is deterministic. I think it is much more likely, at least in our culture, that neuroscientists and psychologists might present evidence that convinces people that we have much less free will than we thought, and that this would influence people’s beliefs about how responsible we are.

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