The Polish Review, Vol. LVI, Nos. 1-2, 2011: 111-152 2011 The Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America

Download 209.4 Kb.
Date conversion15.05.2016
Size209.4 Kb.
1   2   3   4   5   6 /hist557/index.htm, Lecture Notes 11. On the Polish Corridor as mainly German, thus violating self-determination, see William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World: An International History (3rd ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 83; Anita Prażmowska, Ignacy Paderewski: Poland (London: Haus, 2009), 103; and Peter Neville, Tomáš Masaryk and Eduard Beneš: Czechoslovakia (London: Haus, 2010), 79.

19 For an excellent summary and analysis of Polish issues at the Paris Peace Conference, see Piotr S. Wandycz, “The Polish Question,” in The Treaty of Versailles. A Reassessment After 75 Years, ed. Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 313-336. For details on working out the Danzig, Polish Corridor and Upper Silesian settlements in 1919, see Cienciala and Komarnicki, From Versailles to Locarno, chs. 2-4, and Kay Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Policies of the Great Powers and the Poles 1918-1919 (Odense, Denmark: Odense University Press, 1979). See also James Headlam-Morley, A Memoir of the Peace Conference 1919, ed. Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant and Anna M. Cienciala (London: Methuen, 1972). For census and plebiscite figures in Upper Silesia, see Blanke and Cienciala in n.17 above. James Headlam-Morley was an expert on Germany in the British Delegation, 1919, and worked out the Free City of Danzig articles of the Versailles Treaty (100-108) with American expert Dr. Sidney, E. Mezes. He was later Historical Advisor to the Foreign Office.

20 On British sympathy for German claims to Danzig and the Corridor, see Cienciala, “German Propaganda for the Revision of the Polish-German Frontier in Danzig and the Corridor: Its Effects on British Opinion and the British Policy-Making Elite in the Years 1919-1933, Antemurale 20 (1976): 77- 129. Halifax to Phipps, November 1 1938, cit. Cienciala, “The Munich Crisis of 1938: Plans and Strategy in Warsaw in the Context of the Western Appeasement of Germany,” in Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein, The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999), 69; Halifax on Danzig and the Polish Corridor, May 1938, cit. Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939: A Study in the Interdependence of Eastern and Western Europe (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul; Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1968), 87-88; R.M.A. Hankey, “Memorandum regarding Danzig and the Polish Corridor,” 1 February 1933, The National Archives, London, F.O. 417, 33, pt. XXVII. Robert Maurice, Alers Hankey (1905-96) was First Secretary at the British Embassy, Warsaw, 1936-39; acted as the F.O. expert on Polish affairs in WW II; and had a distinguished diplomatic career. The solution he proposed had been discussed in the Foreign Office since 1919, especially in 1925 in connection with Stresemann’s proposal of a Western security pact, which led to the Locarno Treaties; see Cienciala and Komarnicki, From Versailles to Locarno, ch. 9.

21 On German revisionist goals and tactics at this time, see Harald von Riekhoff, German-Polish Relations, 1918-1933 (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), ch. 9; favorable review by the then dean of Polish diplomatic historians of the interwar period, Henryk Batowski, Przegląd Zachodni, 1973, no. 4: 353-358.

22 Cit. Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers, 16 and n. 37.

23 For Piłsudski in March 1934, see Kazimierz Świtalski, Diariusz 1919-1935 [Diary 1919-1935] (Warsaw, 1992), 660-661, cit. by Kornat, Polityka równowagi, 313. For April 1934, see General Kazimierz Fabrycy in Tytus Komarnicki, ed., Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka (1935-1945) [Diary and portfolios of Jan Szembek (1935-1945)] (London: Polish Research Centre, Orbis, 1964), 1: 155 [henceforth Szembek]. This volume contains documents for the years 1934-1935 and the 1935 diary of Jan Szembek, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1935-39.

24 On two horses at once, see H.L. Roberts, “The Diplomacy of Col. Beck,” in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats: 1919-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960 [2nd printing]), 599. For a series of excellent studies of the policy of equilibrium, see Kornat, Polityka równowagi 1934-1939. For the claim that Piłsudski’s “ingrained hostility to Russia blinded him and his followers to the growing threat of Nazi Germany,” see Jan Palmowski, Oxford Dictionary of Contemporary World History: From 1900 to the Present Day (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003 [2nd ed.]), 513.

25 For German attempts to discuss Polish-German cooperation against the USSR, see Cienciala articles listed in note 9 above as well as references to Göring, Hitler and Ribbentrop in her book, Poland and the Western Powers. For Ambassador Biddle’s report of 19 June 1938 on his conversation with Beck, see Phillip V. Cannistraro et al., eds., Poland and the Coming of the Second World War: The Diplomatic Papers of A.J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., United States Ambassador to Poland 1937-1939 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1976), doc. 4, cit. Cienciala, in Lukes and Goldstein, Munich Crisis, 59.

26 A recent textbook states: “The arrogant and vulpine [sic] Beck had served as military attaché in France, whence he had been expelled on charges of spying for Germany.” (Martin Kitchen, Europe Between The Wars, 106.) Its author evidently failed to read Piotr S. Wandycz’s article, “Colonel Beck and the Roots of Animosity,” The International History Review 3 (1981): 115-127. Until 2010, this periodical was published at Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, Canada, where Kitchen, the author of several books on twentieth-century international relations and now Professor of History Emeritus, taught for many years. On the same charges in the Russian media, August 2009, see Mariusz Wołoś, “Józef Beck niemieckim agentem? O historii pewnej plotki w retrospektywnym ujęciu… Inne oblicze historii” [Józef Beck a German Agent? On the history of a certain rumor… Another view of history], supplement to Wiedza i Życie nr. 6, (2009): 12-16; French version, “Józef Beck: espion allemand? Histoire d’une rumeur,” Revue Historique des Armées, Paris, nr. 260 (3/2010) : 45-53 ( For Russian TV film, see n. 11 above.

27 This brief biography of Beck is based on Marek Kornat, “Józef Beck — Zarys biografii politycznej (1894-1932)” [Józef Beck — Outline of a Political Biography, 1894-1932], Niepodległość 55 (2005): 36-106. See also short biographical-political sketch of Beck covering his life and policies up to September 1939, in Cienciala, ed. Beck, Polska polityka zagraniczna, 17-44.

28 For Piłsudski and Beck on Austrian and Czechoslovakian survival, as well as T. G. Masaryk’s and Edvard Beneš’s statements on Poland, see Cienciala in Lukes and Goldstein, Munich Crisis, 53-55. Piłsudski’s praise of Beck was cited in a letter to him by former Premier Janusz Jędrzejewicz dated February 27, 1940, when Beck was interned in Romania, cit. Cienciala, Beck Polska polityka zagraniczna,108; English translation, Cienciala; text also in Wacław Jędrzejewicz, ed., Kronika życia Józefa Piłsudskiego 1967-1935. Tom Drugi. 1921-1935 [Chronicle of the Life of Józef Piłsudski. Vol. 2. 1921-1935] (London: Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, 1977), 476.

29 See Cienciala, Beck, Polska polityka zagraniczna, 54-55.

30 For Piłsudski on Danzig as the touchstone of Polish-German relations, see, for example, Beck’s instruction of March 25, 1939, to Ambassador Józef Lipski on the latter’s forthcoming conversation with German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, in Stanisław Żerko, ed., Polskie dokumenty dyplomatyczne 1939. Styczeń –sierpień [Polish Diplomatic Documents 1939. January — August] (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2005), doc. 137; English translation in Wacław Jędrzejewicz, ed., Diplomat in Berlin, 1933-1939: Papers and Memoirs of Józef Lipski, Ambassador of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 506-507; same in Włodzimierz Borodziej, Sławomir Dębski, eds., Polish Documents on Foreign Policy, 24 October 1938 — 30 September 1939 (Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2009), doc. 67.

31 On the Minorities Treaties of 1919, see Carole Fink, “The Minorities Question at the Paris Peace Conference: The Polish Minority Treaty, June 28, 1919,” in Boemeke et al., The Treaty of Versailles, 249-274; also Fink, Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

32 For the Polish text of the Polish-German declaration on minorities of November 5, 1937, see Jędruszczak and Nowak-Kiełbikowa, Dokumenty z dziejów, 2, doc. 60; English translation of the equivalent German text, Documents on German Foreign Policy, D, vol. 5 (London, Washington, D.C., 1953), doc. 18.

33 The Polish minority in the USSR suffered the greatest losses of all national minorities during the Stalin Terror; see Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), ch. 3; National Terror, 89 ff; figures, 103.

34 For the Polish text of the ultimatum of 17 March 1938, see Marek Kornat, ed., Polskie dokumenty dyplomatyczne 1938 [Polish Diplomatic Documents 1938] henceforth PDD 1938 (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2007), doc. 56.

35 Winston Churchill expressed general British opinion — and general Western historical opinion today — when he wrote of the Poles: “We see them hurrying, while the might of Germany glowered up against them, to grasp their share of the pillage and ruin of Czechoslovakia.” (Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm [Boston and London: Houghton Mifflin, 1948, reprint 1983], 323.) Harrison Keylor writes that the Polish government added its demand for Teschen “at Hitler’s urging” and acted “as a silent partner of Germany, to acquire economically valuable territory at Czechoslovakia’s expense.” (Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World, 82.)

36 For the best account of the Teschen/Zaolzie issue in the first postwar period, see Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, ch. 3. For the next ten years, see idem, Twilight. For the first five years of Czech rule in Zaolzie, see Ellen I. Paul, Conflict and Cooperation: Poles and Czechs in Czech Teschen Silesia, 1920-1926 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas, 1999). Map: Wikipedia, Śląsk Cieszyński.

37 On Polish political leaders, including General Sikorski, supporting the cession of Zaolzie to Poland, see the report of the Czech journalist Vaclav Fiala to President Beneš on his talks in Poland in April 1938, per Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers, 66-69; brief mention by idem in Lukes and Goldstein, ed., Munich Crisis, 58.

38 On Halifax’s statements to Hitler, see report by Stefan Lubomirski, counselor at the Polish Embassy, Berlin, on his conversation with Ernst von Weizsäcker, German secretary of state for foreign affairs, December 2, 1937, in Z. Landau and J. Tomaszewski, eds., Monachium 1938. Polskie dokumenty dyplomatyczne [Munich 1938. Polish Diplomatic Documents] (Warsaw: PWN, 1985) doc. 1 [henceforth Monachium]. For Halifax’s report on his conversation with Hitler, 19 November 1937, see Documents on British Foreign Policy, 2nd ser., v. 19 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1982), doc. 336, p. 345; see also Halifax’s account and later thoughts taken from his diary in The Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax. The Life of Lord Halifax (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1965), 368-374; the photo of Halifax meeting Hitler at Berchtesgaden, facing p. 370, is misdated as 1938.

39 Beck speech to the Sejm [modern spelling of Seym] Commission on Foreign Policy, January 10, 1938 in Józef Beck, Przemówienia, deklaracje, wywiady [Speeches, Declarations, Interviews] (Warsaw, 1939), 331-340.

40 For the Polish record of the Hitler-Beck conversation, Berlin, January 14, 1938, see Monachium, doc. 6; Kornat, PDD 1938, doc. 10; English translation in Jędrzejewicz ed., Diplomat in Berlin, doc. 77; for the Beck-Göring conversation of January 13, 1938, see Monachium, doc. 6; PDD 1938, doc. 9; Eng. trans., Diplomat in Berlin, doc. 76.

41 For the Beck-Eden Conversation, Geneva, January 26, 1938, see PDD 1938, doc. 14, cit. in Cienciala review article of same, TPR, 54, no. 2 (2009): 250. Beck had confirmed Poland’s obligations to France as an ally during the visit of French Premier Yvon Delbos in Warsaw in late 1937. For the Beck-Göring conversation of February 28, 1938, see Monachium, doc.10; PDD 1938, doc. 37.

42 H.L. Roberts, The Diplomats 1919-1939, 611.

43 PDD 1938, doc. 86, cit. in Cienciala review of same, TPR, 54, no. 2 (2009): 249. Later, Beck envisaged an autonomous Slovakia within Hungary.

44 Beck’s instructions of May 24 to Polish Ambassador Juliusz Łukasiewicz, in Paris, PDD 1938, doc. 118; Łukasiewicz report on his conversation with Bonnet, May 27 [should be 26], Monachium, doc. 87, PDD 1938, doc. 126; English translation of the Bonnet-Łukasiewicz conversation in Wacław Jędrzejewicz, ed., Diplomat in Paris: Papers and Memoirs of Juliusz Łukasiewicz, Ambassador of Poland (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970), 91-99; see also Cienciala in Lukes and Goldstein eds., Munich Crisis, 59.

45 Summary of Beck’s account, Cienciala in Lukes and Goldstein, Munich Crisis, 56; Polish text in Cienciala, Beck, Polska polityka zagraniczna, 217-218.

46 See Ambassador Biddle’s report of June 18, 1938, in Cannistraro et al., Poland and the Coming of the Second World War, doc. 4, pp. 208 ff., cit. Cienciala in Lukes and Goldstein, Munich Crisis, 59.

47 These developments are described in many studies of the Czechoslovak crisis, for example, Lukes and Goldstein, Munich Crisis. For Polish policy adjustments, see Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers, chs. 2-4; documents in Monachium and PDD 1938.

48 For this information, see Beck’s instructions to Ambassador Lipski to present Polish demands to the German government according to the attached map [not preserved but marking territory claimed by Poland]; Lipski did so the same day, see Monachium ,docs. 388, 390; PDD 1938, docs. 314, 316; Eng. trans., Diplomat in Berlin, docs. 108, 109; see also Cienciala in Lukes and Goldberg, Munich Crisis, 60, 63.

49 For the Polish demands to Prague of September 27 and the Czechoslovak reply three days later, see Monachium, docs. 374, 439; PDD 1938, doc. 307 (Polish note of Sept. 27).

50 For the Polish text of Kwiatkowski’s notes of the castle conference of Sept. 30, 1938, see Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, “Józef Beck,” Zeszyty Historyczne, Paris, Institut Littéraire, 1986, nr.76, p.27; this was a reprint of the original published in a Polish underground periodical, Arka, no. 12, Kraków, 1985; English translation, Cienciala; see also same in Lukes and Goldberg, Munich Crisis, 66. For Beck’s version, see Cienciala, Beck, Polska polityka zagraniczna, p. 223, trans. Cienciala. That day, Secretary of State Jan Szembek noted the “special conference” held at the President’s office and the decision reached by its members: the President [Ignacy Mościcki], Minister Beck, Marshal [Edward] Śmigły [-Rydz], Premier [Felicjan] Sławoj-Składkowski and Kwiatkowski. He also noted that the Czechoslovak reply was received just when the Polish ultimatum was being drafted in his office, and was judged inadequate; see Szembek 4: 284.

51 For the Polish ultimatum to Prague, see Monachium, docs. 446-450; PDD 1938, docs. 352, 353. On Western appeals to Poland and Czech acceptance of the ultimatum, see Cienciala in Lukes and Goldstein, Munich 1938, p. 67; Polish documents: Monachium, docs. 455-458; PDD 1938, docs.359 ff; Szembek 4: 440- 444.

52 For the economic and population figures, see Piotr S. Wandycz, The Price of Freedom. A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 208. For a detailed description of the industry of Zaolzie as well as Austrian and Czech census figures and ethnic maps, see Dr. B[ogusław] Kożusznik, The Problem of Cieszyn Silesia: Facts & Documents (London, October 1943). (The back cover has the address: Central Depot, 91Queen’s Court, Queensway, London, W.2.) The author, a physician from Zaolzie, was at the time — as stated on the cover — a member of the Polish National Council, an advisory body consisting of the leaders of political parties. For maps of Zaolzie as annexed by Poland in early October 1938, as well as the Spis, Beskid, Pieniny mountains, and Orava areas annexed on the basis of agreements signed on November 30, 1938, see Monachium, 519-522, Wikipeda, Śląsk Cieszyński.

53 Lipski report on conversation with Hitler, September 20, 1938, Monachium, doc. 246; Kornat, PDD 1938, doc. 248. For the English translation, see Jędrzejewicz, ed., Diplomat in Berlin, 408-412. The author of this article erred in her book, stating that Hitler proposed a thirty mile–wide German Corridor through the Polish Corridor, see Poland and the Western Powers, 119.

54 On German demands, Beck’s play for time and the British guarantee, joined by France, of March 31, 1939, see Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers, ch. 6, 7; also idem, with the benefit of French and British archival and published documents unavailable earlier, “Poland in British and French Policy in 1939: Determination to Fight — or Avoid War?” TPR 34, no. 3: 199-226; slightly abbreviated reprint in Patrick Finney, ed., The Origins of the Second World War (London: Arnold, 1997), 413-433.

55 For “The Third Europe” project, see Kornat, Polityka równowagi, ch. 7; also Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers, ch. 5.

56 See Lipski’s note on his conversation with Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on October 24, 1938, full Polish text in PDD 1938, doc. 400, 729-730. English translation in Jędrzejewicz, ed., Diplomat in Berlin, doc. 124, 452-453; partial reprint in Włodzimierz Borodziej, Sławomir Dębski, eds., Polish Documents on Foreign Policy, 24 October 1938-30 September 1939 (Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2009), doc. 1, p. 3, henceforth PDFP. On Danzig Nazis and calls for the return to Germany in late October 1938, see Jan Szembek’s note on his conversation with the Polish Commissioner General in the city, Marian Chodacki, October 28, 1938, Szembek 4: 333. Ambassador Lipski viewed the tense situation in Danzig as part of a German offensive to regain the city, ibid., 334.

57 For these charges, see Stanisław Żerko, Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1938-1939 [Polish-German Relations 1938-1939] (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1998), 464, and idem, “Dylematy Józefa Becka” [The Dilemmas of Józef Beck] in 1939. Jak rozpętała się II wojna światowa,” in Polityka, wydanie specjalne [How the Second World War Broke Out. Special edition of Polityka] 3/2009, 67-68.

58 PDD 1938, docs. 435, 448; English translation of Beck’s instruction, PDFP doc. 19; see also Cienciala, “Minister Józef Beck i Ambassador Edward Raczyński a zbliżenie polsko-brytyjskie w okresie październik 1938 — styczeń 1939” [Minister Beck, Ambassador Raczyński and the Polish-British Rapprochement in the Period October 1938 — January 1939] in Henryk Bułhak et al., eds., Z dziejów polityki i dyplomacji polskiej. Studia poświęcone pamięci Edwarda Raczyńskiego, Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na wychodźstwie [From the History of Polish Policy and Diplomacy. Studies in Memory of Edward Raczyński, President of the Polish Republic in Exile] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe,1994), 348-363.

59 See PDD 1938, docs. 268, 273.

60 PDD 1938, docs. 297, 317.

61 Czechoslovak letter to President Mościcki, Sept. 22, 1938, Szembek 4: 438-439; Monachium, doc. 360; on Beneš appeal to Moscow, see Cienciala in Lukes and Goldstein, Munich Crisis, 61-62.

62 Hugh Ragsdale shows, on the basis of declassified Soviet documents, that the Red Army vastly increased its forces on the Soviet frontier with Poland in late September 1938 (when Britain placed her navy on alert and France called up her reservists), suggesting they could have marched into Bessarabia (now Moldova and Transdnistria). See Ragsdale, The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); for the author’s earlier statements on this topic and comments by Mark Kramer, see “Soviet Actions during the Munich Crisis,” Kennan Institute Report 15, no. 18 (1998). On Red Army concentrations on the Polish frontier, see also M.I. Myeltukhin, “Krasnaya Armya w uslovyakh narastaniya mezhdunarodnogo krizisa 1938-1939” [The Red Army in Conditions of the Growing International Crisis, 1938-1939] in N.S. Lebedeva, Russian Academy of Sciences, and M. Wołoś, Permanent Representative of The Polish Academy of Sciences, Y.K. Korshunv compiler, Myukhenskoye Soglashenye 1938 goda: The Munich Agreement of 1938: History and Modernity [Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of World History, 2009], 231-232. For a rejection of the claim of Soviet readiness to help Czechoslovakia in 1938, see Igor Lukes, “Stalin and Czechoslovakia in 1938-39: An Autopsy of a Myth,” in Lukes and Goldstein, Munich Crisis, 13-47; critical review by Milan Hauner, International History Review 23 (March 2001): 195-196.

63 On diplomatic correspondence from and to London, Paris, and Prague, available to Stalin and Molotov in the 1930s, see Vasili S. Khristoforov, Chief of Registration and Archival Fonds (Collections), Department of the Federal Security Service of Russia, in the Russian-language volume edited by Myukhenskoye Soglashenie, 342-343. On the five former Cambridge students, then members of the Foreign Office, who supplied Soviet agents with intelligence on British policy, see Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books,1999), ch. 4; on a Soviet agent in the F.O. cipher department, see D. C. Watt, “Francis Herbert King: A Soviet Source in the Foreign Office,” Intelligence and National Security, 3, no. 4 (1988): 62-82.
1   2   3   4   5   6

The database is protected by copyright © 2016
send message

    Main page