The linear model’ did not exist: Reflections on the history and historiography of science and research in industry in the twentieth century



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lxiv Science and Education for a Prosperous China: Lessons From Abroad: A report from U.S. Embassy Beijing November 1996 .

lxv Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy since World War Two (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990), p. 51.

lxvi Harvey M. Sapolsky, Science for the Navy: A history of the office of Naval Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), Table A-5, p. 137.

lxvii That the military didn’t believe it is argued by Paul Forman, in for example, his “Into Quantum Electronics” in National Military Establishments and the Advancement of Science and Technology, eds. Paul Forman and José Manuel Sánchez-Ron (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), pp. 270–271. Sapolsky, Science and the Navy, p. 63 notes the use by the ONR of a ‘two-title’ policy, whereby scientists used one title for the project, while ONR staff used another in their relations with naval staff, the latter stressing naval programmes and needs.

lxviii Sapolsky, Science for the Navy, pp. 94–6.

lxix Paul Forman, “Behind Quantum Electronics: National security as a basis for physical research in the United States, 1940–1960,” HSPS, vol. 18 (1987), pp 198–9.

lxx Ibid.,p. 216.

lxxi Ibid., p. 224.

lxxii Ibid., p. 229.

lxxiii For the recognition of the small scale of what ‘the diffusion model’ or indeed ‘the linear model’ takes to be science, see Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 162–73.

lxxiv Tom Wilkie, British Science and Politics since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) while recognising Haldane’s distinction, is overwhelmingly about the types of research associated with the research councils. See also Jon Agar, Science and Spectacle (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1998), pp. 2–5; though note that the evidence provided negates the central point.

lxxv This is the burden of Forman, “Behind Quantum Electronics” and Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The military-industrial-academic complex at MIT and Stanford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), which recognises in the first few pages that most R&D was not academic. See also See also E. Mendelsohn, M. R. Smith, & P. Weingart, eds., Science, technology and the military, 2 volumes (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988); the journal Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, for the 1990s in particular, and the special issue on Science in the Cold War, of Social Studies of Science, vol. 31 (2001): 163–197; Michael Aaron Dennis, “‘Our First Line of Defence:’ Two University Laboratories in the Postwar American State,” Isis, vol. 85 (1994), pp. 427–55; Everett Mendelsohn, “Science, scientists and the military,” in Science in the Twentieth Century, eds. J. Krige and D. Pestre (London: Harwood Academic, 1997); A. Pickering, “Cyborg History and the World War II Regime,” Perspectives on Science, 3 (1995): 1–48.

lxxvi D. S. L. Cardwell, The Organisation of Science in England: A retrospect (London: Heinemann, 1957), pp. 10–11.

lxxvii Rachel Laudan, “Natural Alliance or forced marriage—changing relations between the histories of science and technology,” Technology and Culture, vol. 36 (1995): S17–S28.

lxxviii Wolfgang Koenig, “Science-Based Industry or Industry Based Science? Electrical Engineering in Germany before World War 1,” Technology and Culture, vol. 37 (1996): 70–101, clearly prefers the latter.

lxxix Jean-Paul Gaudillière and Ilana Lowy, The invisible industrialist: Manufactures and the production of scientific knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1998); Soraya Boudia and Xavier Roqué, “Science, Medicine and Industry: The Curie and Joliot-Curie Laboratories,” History and Technology (1997).

lxxx Pickstone’s model of different kinds of ways of knowing which appear in a particular historical sequence, but adding to and interacting with earlier ones, without replacing them suggests both that it may have some warrant and some John V. Pickstone, Ways of knowing: A new history of science, technology and medicine (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000/Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001). He labels them analytical, experimental and techno-scientific ways of knowing, though the last is also a way of making. These ways of knowing are found roughly contemporaneously in science, technology and medicine, and also, though this point is not explored in any detail in Pickstone’s work in different kinds of institutions: academic, industrial and governmental. Pickstone’s model does not fully describe the process for the twentieth century, and does not use the categories above.

lxxxi See my England and the Aeroplane (London: Macmillan, 1991) and Science, Technology and the British Industrial Decline (Cambridge: CUP/Economic History Society, 1996) for examples of this.

lxxxii Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis (New York: Viking, 1989), chapter eight.

lxxxiii D. E. H. Edgerton, “Science and Technology in British Business History,” Business History, vol. 29 (1987): 91, 92, 98; Sally Horrocks, “Enthusiasm constrained? British industrial R&D and the transition from wars to peace, 1942–51,” Business History, vol. 41 (1999): 42–63; D. A. Hounshell and J. K. Smith, Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

lxxxiv Edgerton, “From Innovation to Use.”

lxxxv Hyman Levy, Modern Science (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1939), p. 710.

lxxxvi See my introduction to Industrial Innovation and Research in Business (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996).

lxxxvii See D. Cahan, “The institutional revolution in German physics, 1865–1914”, Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 15 (1985): 1–65; my “From Innovation to Use;” John Pickstone, Ways of Knowing (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); Robert Fox and Anna Guagnini, Laboratories, Workshops and Sites: Concepts and practices of research in industrial Europe, 1800–1914 (University of California, Berkeley, 1999); Elsbeth Heaman, St Mary’s: The history of a London Teaching Hospital (Montreal: McGill UP, 2003); Mark Pendleton, “‘A Place of Teaching and Research:’ University College London and the Origins of the Research University in Britain, 1890–1914,” University of London PhD, 2001. For the business case see the papers I edited in Industrial Innovation and Research in Business (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996).

lxxxviii Or indeed in many other fields, technical and otherwise. Indeed the distinction between research and non-research can help clarify the debates within interwar British medicine discussed by Chris Lawrence in his “A tale of two sciences: Bedside and bench in twentieth century Britain,” Medical History, vol. 43 (1999): 421–49 and “Still incommunicable: Clinical holists and medical knowledge in interwar Britain,” in Greater than the Parts: Holism in Biomedicine 1920–1950, eds. C. Lawrence and George Weisz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 94–111.

lxxxix Edgerton, “De l’innovation aux usages.”

xc Ernst Homburg, “The emergence of research laboratories in the dyestuffs industry, 1870–1900,” British Journal for the History of Science, 25 (1992): 91–111. A point also forcefully made in Michael Dennis, “Accounting for Research: New histories of corporate laboratories and the social history of American science,” Social Studies of Science, vol. 17 (1987): 479–518 and especially Ulrich Marsh, “Strategies for Success: Research organisation in the German chemical companies until 1936,” History and Technology, vol. 12 (1994), 23–77. See also Pickstone, Ways of Knowing, p. 171; W. Koenig, “Science-based industry or industry-based science? Electrical engineering in Germany before World War I,” Technology and Culture, 37 (1996): 70–101.

xci Ulrich Marsh, “Strategies for Success: Research organisation in the German chemical companies until 1936,” History and Technology, vol. 12 (1994): 23–77, but see also the standard accounts such as Leonard S. Reich, The Making of American Industrial research: Science and business at GE and Bell, 1876–1926 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); D. A. Hounshell and J. K. Smith, Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) [note how in these titles ‘science’ is equated with research and R&D].

xcii See Homburg, 109–110 for the German dye firms in the 1880s, which were generally recruiting their research leaders from the outside.

xciii Ulrich Marsh, “Strategies for Success: Research organisation in the German chemical companies until 1936,” History and Technology, vol. 12 (1994): 23–77, on p. 23.

xciv David Edgerton, “Industrial Research in the British Photographic Industry 1879-1939,” in ed. Jonathan Liebenau, The Challenge of New Technology: Innovation in British Business since 1850 (Aldershot: Gower, 1988), pp. 106–134. Sally Horrocks, “Consuming Science: Science, technology and food in Britain, 1870–1939,” (University of Manchester, PhD Thesis, 1993).

xcv D. Cahan, “The institutional revolution in German physics, 1865–1914,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 15 (1985): 1–65; G. Gooday, “Precision Movement and the Genesis of Physics Teaching Laboratories in Victorian Britain,” British Journal for the History of Science, 23 (1990), 25–51; S. Schaffer, “Late Victorian Metrology and its Instrumentation: A Manufactory of Ohms,” in Invisible connections: Instruments, institutions, and science, eds. Robert Bud & Susan E. Cozzens (Bellingham, Wash.: SPIE Optical Engineering Press, 1992), p. 23–56.

xcvi Similarly in studies of industrial research there is a sense that the work done even in the most science oriented of corporate laboratories is to be contrasted with what is taken to be the pure work of the academic scientist, a criticism forcibly and clearly made by Dennis. Michael Dennis, “Accounting for Research: New histories of corporate laboratories and the social history of American science,” Social Studies of Science, vol. 17 (1987): 492ff. Dennis makes the crucial point that academic research schools were often as narrow in focus as corporate research laboratories (p. 504).

xcvii Elsbeth Heaman, St Mary’s: The history of a London Teaching Hospital (Montreal: McGill UP, 2003).

xcviii For the low place of research in the British university in the interwar years see: Bruce Truscot (Pseud.) Red Brick University (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1951), chapter 4. See also Bernal, Social Function; Mark Pendleton, “‘A Place of Teaching and Research:’ University College London and the Origins of the Research University in Britain, 1890–1914,” (University of London, PhD 2001).

xcix In a collection of well-known articles on industrial research I deliberately included papers on the same topic from different periods, not only to show how historical interpretation had changed, but also in some cases retrogressed. David Edgerton (Ed.), Industrial Research and Innovation in Business (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996).

c “The ‘White Heat’ revisited: British government and technology in the 1960s,” Twentieth Century British History, vol. 7 (1996): 53–82. Reprinted in Luca Guzzetti ed., Science and Power: The Historical Foundations of Research Policies in Europe (Brussels: European Commission, 2000), pp. 207–236.

ci “British Scientists and the relations of Science and War in Twentieth Century Britain,” in National Military Establishments and the Advancement of Science: Studies in Twentieth Century History, eds. Paul Forman and J. M. Sanchez Ron (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), pp. 1–35.

cii Edgerton “Introduction,” Industrial Research and Innovation in Business (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), pp. x–xvi part of International Library of Critical Readings in Business History. See the paper by Michael Sanderson (1972), which refuted David Mowery (1986).

ciii Thus the SCOT program was an ‘application’ of sociology of scientific knowledge to technology, oblivious or dismissive of the point that sociology, economics, technology, had been long been used in the study of technology. The historical novelty and significance of SSK was that sociology was, long after it had been applied even to other kinds of knowledge, applied to scientific knowledge. See my “Tilting at Paper Tigers” an essay review of Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy, in British Journal for the History of Science, vol. 26 (1993): 67–75.

civ See my Science, Technology and the British Industrial ‘Decline’ ca. 1870–1970 (Cambridge: CUP/Economic History Society, 1996), “The ‘White Heat’ revisited: British government and technology in the 1960s,” Twentieth Century British History (1996) and Terence Kealey, The Economic Laws of Scientific Research (London: Macmillan, 1996). As an example see John Jewkes, David Sawers and Richard Stillerman, The Sources of Invention, Second edition (London: Macmillan, 1969), chapter X: “The last ten years in retrospect.” As evidence that the science policy community is unaware of/indifferent to this fundamental point, see, for example As evidence that the science policy community is unaware of/indifferent to this fundamental point, see, for example: Ben Steil, David G. Victor And Richard R. Nelson (eds), Technological Innovation and economic performance. A Council for Foreign Relations Book (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

cv See my forthcoming Warfare State.

cvi See Steven Shapin’s article in this volume.

cvii Paul Forman, “Independence, Not Transcendence, for the Historian of Science,” vol. 82 Isis (1991), 71–86; “British Scientists and the relations of Science and War in Twentieth Century Britain,” in National Military Establishments and the Advancement of Science: Studies in Twentieth Century History, Paul Forman and J.M. Sanchez Ron eds. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996).



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