17 See Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe(Oxford University Press, 2000), at 139; Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitution, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 63, 65 (1998).
18 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 7 (Cornell University Press, 1998).
Recent examples of this scenario of constitutionalization include the affirmation of New Zealand’s commitment to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by the preamble to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights provisions into Danish law in 1993, into Swedish law in 1995, and into British law through the enactment in Britain of the Human Rights Act of 1998 (came into force in October 2000) – the first rights legislation introduced in the United Kingdom in 300 years.
stSee Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England, 49 J. of Econ. Hist. 803 (1989); Barry Weingast, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets, 149 J. Of Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 286 (1993); Barry Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 A. Pol. Sci. Rev. 245 (1997).
20Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 161-162 (University of California Press re-issue 1978) (1922).
See North and Weingast, supra note 20.
SeePaul Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. Legal Stud. 503 (2001); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. of Pol. Econ. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 222 (1999).
23William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875, 879 (1975); Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?13 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 349, 358 (1993); Eli Salzberger & Paul Fenn, Judicial Independence: Some Evidence from the English Court of Appeal, 42 J.L. & Econ. 831 (1999); Robert D. Tollison & W. Mark Crain, Constitutional Change in an Interest-Group Perspective, 8 J. Legal Stud. 165 (1979).
See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. Legal Stud. 721 (1994). J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan (University of Chicago Press,2003).
See Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. 213, 227 (1990).
26 Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases 200-201 (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
27 This logic has been forcefully put forth and cleverly drawn upon to explain variance in judicial power among new Asian democracies (Taiwan, Mongolia, and South Korea), and among Southern European democracies (Greece, Portugal, and Spain). See, Ginsburg, supra note 27; Pedro Magalhaes, The Limits to Judicialization: Legislative Politics and Constitutional Review in the Iberian Democracies (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 2002).
28See, e.g. John Goodman, The Politics of Central Bank Independence, 23 Comp. Pol. 329, 333 (1991).
SeeHirschl, supra note 4, for a detailed discussion of these illustrations of the hegemonic preservation thesis in action.
SeeHirschl, supra note 4; Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism, and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
31 Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three Middle Eastern Tales, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1819 (2004).
32See, e.g.,Sylvia Maxfield, Financial Incentives and Central Bank Authority in Industrializing Nations, 46 World Pol. 556, 564 (1993).
See Michael Maloney & Robert McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. & Econ. 99 (1982).
See Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union, 49 Int’l Org. 171 (1995). See also, Geoffrey Garrett et al., The European Court of Justice, National Governments and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52 Int’l Org. 149 (1998).
35 See Lisa Conant, Justice Constrained: Law and Politics in the European Union (Cornell University Press, 2002).
The progressive-liberal Argentine government adopted a constitutional amendment in 1994 that incorporated ten international treaties and covenants protecting fundamental human rights and civil liberties into Argentina’s domestic law.
See Pinai Nanakorn, Re-making of the Constitution in Thailand, 6 Singapore J. of Int’l & Comp. L. 90, 103 (2002).
See Miles Kahler, The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 Int’l Org. 661, 663 (2000).
SeeMoravcsik, supra note 37, at 220.
41 Poland’s population alone (40 million) accounts for half of that increase. The combined population of the biggest four accession countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia) accounts for nearly 70 million of the 80 million new EU citizens.
42 Cited in “Those pesky Poles,” The Economist (Nov. 27, 2003).
See Jan Zielonka & Peter Mair, Introduction: Diversity and Adaptation in the Enlarged European Union, in The Enlarged European Union: Diversity and Adaptation (J. Zielonka & P. Mair, eds., Frank Cass, 2002), at 1.
44 Giuliano Amato & Judy Batt, Final Report of the Reflection Group on The Long-term implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border, 11 (1999), cited in Zielonka & Mair, supra note 44, at 3.
45 The presidium was eventually shamed into adding an invitee from mighty Slovenia to its numbers.
Cited in “Claims that new constitution is designed to cope with European Union expansion are false,” The Economist (Oct. 9, 2003).
48 Cited in “Might it all tumble down?” The Economist, Dec. 11, 2003.
On the international and domestic political economy vectors behind the global convergence to constitutionalism, seeHirschl, supra note 4.
50 See, e.g. Gretchen Helmke, The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 291 (2002); Karen J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2001). See also Nancy Maveety, The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior (Michigan University Press, 2003).
51 See the oft-cited ECJ’s landmark rulings of Van Gend and Loos, 26/62 (1963) ECR 1 (ECJ); and Costa v. Enel, 6/64 (1964) ECR 585 (ECJ).
52Attributed to Lyndon B. Johnson, 36th President of the United States.